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1Abstract
The Raj in Arabia
and
Frank Holmes —  “Father of Oil”
At the close of World War One, the great oil reserves of the Arabian 
Peninsula were hidden beneath the desert sands while the Arab shaikhdoms 
were ruled, and policed, by the Government of India. Today’s Gulf States 
were little valued backblocks in the rich real estate of the Indian Raj. As 
first Persia, then Iraq, gave up their petroleum lakes to serve the British 
Empire, across the water on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf, the entire 
peninsula was deemed worthless by world experts who decreed “there is no 
oil in Arabia”.
The study gives particular concentration to the 25 years from 1913 to 1938. 
What is revealed is that the Arab shaikhdoms were denied either authentic 
protectorate status or independence and were then intentionally excluded by 
the British Government from the League of Nations’ supervised Mandates. 
Discussion of the status of the Arab shaikhdoms was deliberately kept off 
the agenda of post World War One settlement provisions in order to hand 
them over to the authority of the Government of India, in compensation for 
failure to achieve its World Ware One goal -  the annexation of Iraq as a 
colony for India.
In demonstrating the effect of rule by the Government of India and the 
position of the Arab shaikhdoms as outposts of the Raj, the study shows that 
New Zealander Frank Holmes identified and mapped the oil fields of Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait in 1922-1923. Through following Holmes’ 
activities, and by examining the documented hostile reactions to his efforts 
to open up the Arabian oil fields, it is shown that rule by the Government of 
India delayed development of Arabia’s sole resource thereby continuing the 
area’s poverty. Considered an icon of the Indian Empire, the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company contributed to blocking the area’s aspirations, even though 
that company was convinced nothing would be found because Arabia was 
oil barren. Neighbouring Persia’s commercial oil industry began in 1908 
and Iraq’s in 1925. On the Arab side of the Persian Gulf, the first oil flowed 
in 1932 in Bahrain, and not until 1938 for Saudi Arabia; Kuwait did not 
export its oil until 1946.
This is the first study to examine the role of the Government of India in the 
Arabian Peninsula in the post-World War One years. It utilises unpublished 
official documentation, and untapped corporate and personal archives, to 
focus on the period and bring into context the development of the 
economics, politics and international relations of the modem states of the 
Arabian Peninsula. An insight is provided into why the Gulf States remain 
suspicious of Western criticism of their oil production and pricing policies. 
And the historical basis of the West’s belief that it has a “right” to Arabia’s 
oil is examined.
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Frank Holmes’ map of the A1 Hasa concession prepared in 1922 and amended to 
include the Neutral Zone created by Sir Percy Cox at the December 1922 Ujair 
Conference. Reprinted, page 85, in Ameen Rihani’s Ibn Sa 'oud of Arabia; His people 
and Land (1928) with caption “map prepared by Major Holmes”.
Arabian oil fields, pipelines and refineries in 1949 as they appeared in Life Magazine of March 
28th 1949. The caption read “America’s concession is the largest...”
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Showing development of the Arabian oilfields in 1958, and the surrounding areas of 
Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Aden. Page xii, Wayne Mineau’s The Go Devils, 1958
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INTRODUCTION
“When there are no horses, saddle the dogs,” is a local proverb that surely illustrates 
the resilient character with which the Arabs of the Gulf endured the domination of 
the Government of India. When Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, included the 
Arab shaikhdoms on his almost royal tour of 1903, he carried with him a purpose- 
built platform. From a silver and gold throne atop this dais, Curzon addressed the 
Arabs assembled on the bare ground below. It was Curzon’s majestic example that 
set in place the imperial style in which the British officials of the Government of 
India would treat the Arabs of the Persian Gulf for the coming half century.
With the gunboats of the Indian Marines ever on the horizon, and platoons of Indian 
Sikhs kept in easy striking distance, there was little the Gulf Arabs could do to resist 
Britain’s assumption of power through its proxy, the Government of India. Abdul 
Aziz Bin Saud, the future Ruler of Saudi Arabia once expressed it very well. In 1922 
he explained: “I will put my seal, if they say I must, but I will strike when I can. 
What I cede of my rights under force, I will get back ... when I have sufficient 
force.”1
In the event, the means by which the Gulf Arabs escaped the harsh embrace of the 
Government of India was not force. It was development of their oil resources. New 
Zealander Frank Holmes discovered that oil in 1922-1923, then had to fight the 
Government of India, and the British Empire, to develop it. He succeeded, finally, in 
bringing in the Americans and then had to fight all over again on their behalf. The 
obfuscation, objections and obstacles thrown up by the Government of India and her 
officials in the Gulf to deter Frank Holmes’ development of the Arabian oil fields are 
related in this thesis.
• r r *
1 Rihani, Ameen, Ibn Sa'oud o f Arabia: His people and Ixmd, London: Constable, 1928. page 68 
citing a personal conversation with Bin Saud
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Structure of the thesis
This thesis seeks to answer the question -  what was it that delayed development of 
Arabia’s oil, after Holmes’ 1922-1923 discovery, until 1932 for Bahrain and 1938 
for both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, particularly since neighbouring Persia had been 
pumping oil since 1908 and Iraq since 1927. It is the contention of this thesis that it 
was rule by the Government of India in the Arabian Peninsula, reconfirmed by 
Winston Churchill in 1921, that held back the development of Arabia’s oil for 
decades. In pursuit of this contention it is necessary to demonstrate two main issues 
which are first, that Frank Holmes did identify the Arabian oil fields and second, that 
the Government of India did hold power in the Arabian Peninsula.
The thesis is in three parts. Section One sets out the background and begins with a 
revision of the existing literature Myths and Mistakes: the Record Corrected. It notes 
the efforts to belittle and even slander Frank Holmes’ personal and professional 
reputation. After Holmes’ 1932 oil success in Bahrain proved the world experts 
wrong in their unanimous opinion that there was no oil in Arabia, rather than admit 
Holmes’ achievement, a number of myths were propagated. Paramount among these 
was that the 51% British Government owned Anglo Persian Oil Company did know 
there was oil, but pursued a deliberate policy of declaring the area oil barren in order 
to keep away possible competitors. This myth is shown to have no basis.
Chapter Two, No Oil in Arabia, details the many geological surveys. Beginning in 
1904 with Pilgrim’s survey for the esteemed Geological Survey of India, through 
various surveys mainly by British, but also Hungarian and Swiss geologists -  and 
including seven surveys of Kuwait by the geologists of the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company -  the world experts decreed the Arabian Peninsula of no geological value.
How the Government of India came to be in the position of exercising authority over 
the Arabian Peninsula is explored in Chapter Three, The Gulf Raj. Britain’s entry 
into Mesopotamia in WW1, accomplished by the Indian military and managed by the 
Government of India, is examined and India’s goal of annexing Iraq for a colony of 
India is demonstrated. The deliberate way in which the status of the Gulf States was 
kept from the attention of the international peace process, and Churchill’s 1921 Cairo 
Conference endorsing the authority of India, is discussed. The dimension of the India 
associations of the Anglo Persian Oil Company is revealed. Consolidation of the 
Government of India’s power in the area and the process of “Indianisation” of the 
Gulf States are highlighted.
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Section Two is devoted to Frank Holmes’ struggle to obtain concessions over the oil 
fields he had identified. Chapter Four, A Very Promising Area, documents Holmes’ 
discovery of the fields of A1 Hasa in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait and describes 
the hostile reactions of the Government of India’s Political Officers in the area. 
Chapter Five, Resolute Rulers, illustrates the resistance of the Arab rulers to the 
blandishments, threats and intimidation employed by the Political Officers in their 
attempts to persuade the Rulers not to sign Holmes’ financially generous concessions 
but instead to enter into “no fee, no guarantee” arrangements with Anglo Persian Oil 
Company.
In Chapter Six, The Model, the theme is expanded of collusion between the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company and the Government of India’s Political Officers. The 
restrictive terms of the British sponsored agreement reached with the Iraq 
Government by the 50% British owned Turkish Petroleum Company is analysed. 
This agreement, particularly the British Nationality Clause, is shown to be the model 
that the British sought to emulate in the Arab concessions as a means of obtaining 
“maximum British control” that would ease the fears of the Government of India.
Section Three opens with Chapter Seven, Meltdown, in which it is shown that 
development of the Arabian oil fields could only begin when events occurring 
outside the area resulted in the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office bringing 
pressure to bear on the Government of India. The argument is developed that it was 
events such as the Persian claim to sovereignty of Bahrain, the need to build the oil 
pipeline from Iraq to the Red Sea and Persia’s cancellation of Anglo Persian’s 
concession that led directly to removing opposition to Holmes’ concessions. The 
American claim that it was diplomatic pressure from the US State Department that 
gained them entry into Bahrain and Kuwait is shown to be unsupportable. Attention 
is given to the terms of the “British Nationality Clause” imposed on Bahrain and the 
secret “Political Agreement” signed between the British Government and the Kuwait 
Oil Company, a joint venture between Gulf Oil Corporation USA and the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company.
Chapter Eight, Legacy, looks at the post WW2 retreat to Bahrain of the remnants of 
the Gulf Raj, where it was still in evidence a decade after the independence of India. 
The stages by which the Arab countries gained profit sharing in their respective oil 
companies are outlined as is the attainment by the Gulf States of independence.
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Finally, the question is explored of what was gained by wiping from the record the 
achievement of Frank Holmes’ discovery and persistent efforts to develop the 
Arabian oil fields. The hypothesis proposed is that diminishing Holmes’ role 
removed an impediment to British and American claims to possess a “right ’ to 
Arabia’s oil, a claim that seems to have extended into a belief that the West in 
general has a right to the oil of Arabia.
In the years covered by this thesis, a number of characters played their roles. Many 
are worthy of stand-alone portraits. However, in the interests of keeping the text flow 
tight and remaining with the arguments, biographical details of individuals 
mentioned in the text are included as Appendix-3 Who's Who. A Glossary is 
provided as Appendix-1 and Frank Holmes 1934-1947 is Appendix-2.
The research
The discrepancy between the Western view of the history of Arabia’s oil, and the 
view held by the Arabs of the Gulf, first caught my attention in 1973. As a journalist, 
I was on assignment covering political developments, and the drafting of a 
Constitution, in post independence Bahrain. The island was alive with discussion of 
the possible use of what was termed the “Arab oil weapon”, an embargo on Arab oil 
shipments to countries that had aided Israel in the October War of that year. The 
American media were full of reports expressing outrage that the Arabs could adopt 
such a measure “after all we’ve done for them” alongside supporting stories about 
American “oil pioneers” who had toiled in the heat and dust of the Arabian deserts to 
discover the oil.
In government offices, and in the homes and coffee shops of Bahrain, I was told 
emphatically that the Americans did not discover the oil of Arabia. Every Bahraini 
seemed to know that the true discoverer was a New Zealander -  Abu Al Naft -  
though few knew that his name was Frank Holmes. After working outside the Middle 
East for some years, I returned to Kuwait in 1979, where I was again assured that 
Abu Al Naft was indeed the “Father of Oil” in Arabia.
Settling into Bahrain for a long posting in 1980,1 began to pursue this mystery. Most 
of the current publications I read barely mentioned the New Zealander Frank 
Holmes. Those that did depicted him not as a discoverer of oil but as a concession 
hunter of somewhat dubious reputation. This was also the picture I was given of
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Holmes by the American and British managers of the Bahrain Petroleum Company, 
the Kuwait Oil Company and the Arab American Oil Company (Aramco) in Saudi 
Arabia, at least by those who had even heard of Frank Holmes.
By now I had spoken to Husain Bin Ali Yateem, the nephew of Muhammad Yateem, 
who was Holmes’ colleague and personal assistant from 1922-1938. Frank Holmes 
and his wife Dorothy had cared for Husain while he attended school in Brighton, 
England. Back in Bahrain, as a very young man, Husain had been sent by Holmes on 
a mission to the Shaikh of Qatar. Husain Bin Ali Yateem knew, without a shred of 
doubt, that Frank Holmes had discovered the oil of the Arabian Peninsula. The 
Yateem family’s records, however, had been destroyed by fire in their Bahrain 
offices some years earlier.
1 searched for books published closer to the time of discovery. Tantalising glimpses 
of Frank Holmes began to emerge in publications such as Ameen Rihani’s 1928 Ibn 
Sa’oud o f Arabia; His People and Land. I pursued a first trawl through the India 
Office Library and the Abu Dhabi Documentation Centre. I spoke with Dame Violet 
Dickson in Kuwait. Her husband, Harold Dickson (1881-1959), was a Political 
Officer with the Government of India and features throughout this thesis. Although 
she was at pains to impress on me what a truly engaging personality Frank Holmes 
was, her memory at that stage did not extend to dates or hard facts.
In London, I met with Archibald Chisholm (1902-1988). Chisholm was joint 
negotiator with Holmes in 1934 for the Kuwait Oil Company concession and in 1978 
published The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement: a Record o f the Negotiations 
1911-1934. While Chisholm also extolled his personality, he could not agree that it 
was Holmes who actually pinpointed the oil fields although he did acknowledge he
had first identified Kuwait as rich in oil. Chisholm wanted credit for discovering
2Kuwait’s oil to be given to the Anglo Persian geologists.
The primary source breakthrough came by tracing Holmes’ family members, now 
scattered throughout the world in New Zealand, Australia, England, USA, and South 
America. From Frank Holmes’ surviving personal papers, and letters of his wife 
Dorothy, I was able to construct a timeline of what Holmes was doing, where and 
when. Documents of Frank Holmes’ younger brother, Percy, assisted to fill in the 
gaps and provided a picture of Holmes’ personal and professional background before
he entered the Arab world. The personal correspondence between Swiss geologist
••• ^ ' *■ ■»* *
2 Chisholm, Archibald, H T, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement: a Record o f the 
Negotiations 1911-1934, London: Frank Cass, 1975
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Arnold Heim and Frank Holmes held at Zurich University was enlightening. The 
material of Guy Scholefield, editor of the New Zealand Dictionary of Biography, 
held at the Alexander Turnbull Library was useful and contained some additionally 
informative personal letters.
The publication in 1990 of Bahrain Oil and Development 1929-1989, to celebrate the 
Bahrain Petroleum Company’s 60th anniversary, was a setback with its comment 
that “opportunist businessman” Frank Holmes was “instrumental in securing oil 
concessions” and its claim that “Arabia’s first oil well was struck by American 
pioneers.” Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power 
quickly followed in 1991 and, although this was a little kinder to Holmes, he was still 
described as a concession broker. Despite these two publications, the Bahrainis, 
Kuwaitis, Qataris and Saudis remained adamant. In conversations with me they 
insisted that it was Frank Holmes who was Abu AI Naß.2,
When I began work on this thesis in 1998, it was my intention to demonstrate 
whether or not Frank Holmes was, as the Arabs of the Gulf insist, the true discoverer 
of the oil of Arabia. I searched the Chevron Oil archives in San Francisco and the 
American Heritage Center’s International Archive of Economic Geology at the 
University of Wyoming. A satisfying exercise was the search through the personal 
correspondence related to publication of T E Ward’s Negotiations for Oil 
Concessions in Bahrain, El Hasa (Saudi Arabia), the Neutral Zone, Qatar and 
Kuwait (1965), and Edgar Wesley Owen’s Trek of the Oil Finders: A History o f 
Exploration for Petroleum (1975). The post publication comment on both books was 
particularly productive.3 4
My “hunch” that there should be, somewhere, the papers of Karl Twitchell (1885- 
1968), related to the Saudi Arabian concession, was a frustration for many months as 
I pursued this possibility. Discovery of these was exhilarating. I found them, 
uncatalogued in 11 cartons, at the Seeley G Mudd Manuscript Library (Public Policy 
Papers and University Archives) at Princeton University.
3 Clarke, Angela, Bahrain Oil and Development 1929-1989, London: Immel Publishing, 1991, 
(written for the 60th anniversary o f Bahrain Petroleum Company) page 53 “opportunist 
businessman”; Yergin, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, USA: Simon 
& Shuster, 1991
4 Ward, T E, Negotiations for oil Concessions in Bahrain, FA Hasa (Saudi Arabia), the Neutral 
Zone, Qatar and Kuwait, New York: privately published, 1965, and Owen, Wesley Edgar, Trek of 
the Oil Finders: A History of Exploration for Petroleum. Semi Centennial Commemorative 
Volume, Tulsa USA: published by the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975
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My conviction that there should be a body of correspondence between Frank Holmes 
and Ameen Rihani also proved correct and discovery of this in Lebanon provided me 
with a treasure trove of primary source material.
For some time the only connection I had between 31st President of the United States, 
Herbert Hoover (1874-1964), and Frank Holmes was from secondary sources. The 
discovery of Hoover’s letter of 1908 among the personal correspondence held by the 
Hoover Library, and mention of the relationship between Hoover and Holmes in the 
Chevron Oil Archive documents, allowed me to prove this connection.5
Analysis of the American documentation on the history of oil leads to the thought 
that the denial of the achievements of Frank Holmes in the written record, in favour 
of American “oil pioneers”, might be attributed to the public perception of the oil 
industry itself. From its very inception the industry was forced to defend its 
reputation. The American oil industry, for example, appeared before some twenty 
Congressional Hearings beginning with the “trust busting” actions of 1890-1911 that 
ended with the breaking up of the original Standard Oil. From that experience, the 
American oil companies recognised the value of positive publicity and did not stint 
on investing in powerful public relations departments. As early as 1919 Standard Oil 
of California had a public relations practitioner whose experience included stints as a 
foreign correspondent in Asia, South America and England -  before becoming Chief 
of Foreign Intelligence and Chief of Information at the State Department, from where 
he was hired by Standard Oil of California. 6
Import of Government of India
A second careful search of the India Office Library, and the personal papers of 
various Holmes’ contemporaries at St Antony’s College Oxford, produced a bigger, 
and even more startling insight that resulted in my widening the scope of this project 
beyond demonstrating that it was Frank Holmes who discovered Arabia’s oil. I have 
dubbed the picture that emerged from this research “The Gulf Raj” — it is a picture 
of an Arabian Peninsula ruled, not by “the British” as is usually described, but an 
Arabian Peninsula ruled by the Government of India.
5 See Footnote 16 ~ ■** -
6 Yergin page 97-113 for break up of Standard Oil: White, Gerald T, Formative Years in the Far 
West: A History of Standard Oil Company o f California and Predecessors through 1919, USA: 
Appleton Century Crofts, 1962, page 557, he was the 35 year old Philip H Patchin
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That this factor is not evident in works dealing with the period remains a puzzle to 
me. Briton Cooper Busch in both Britain and the Persian Gulf (1967) and Britain, 
India, and the Arabs (1971) comments on the Government of India in Mesopotamia, 
but does not extend his attention to the Arabian Peninsula. Most writers imply the 
presence of the Government of India faded after WW1, giving way to ‘The British”. 
While this is true for Mesopotamia/Iraq, it is not what happened in the Arabian 
Peninsula.7 8
It seems that even some Arab scholars are confused by this loose categorisation of 
“the British”. In Beyond Oil, Unity and Development in the Gulf Muhammad 
Rumaihi remarks on the discussion among Arab “legal analysts” of whether or not 
the shaikhdoms were ever true protectorates and “about the nature of the ties between
the Amirates and the British authorities, and about whether relations existed with the
8Bombay government (the British regime in India) or with London directly.”
In entering this discussion, I have drawn on the primary source documentation to 
show that the relations of the Arab Gulf countries were indeed with what Rumaihi 
terms “the Bombay government”. This relationship, in the form of the authority of 
the Government of India for all matters except policy, was re-confirmed by Winston 
Churchill at the Cairo Conference of 1921 and remained in force until the Foreign 
Office took over responsibility in 1948 on the independence of India. “Policy” was 
not defined although this was usually accepted to mean such matters as auditing of 
accounts, supply of materials and grant of local allowances. As will be shown, in 
practice the Government of India retained full control of general policy as well as 
administration. Until 1948, while the administrators and the political officers were 
certainly “British”, they were members of the Indian military or the Indian Civil 
Service. They received instructions from India and reported, not to the British 
Government, but to the Government of India.9
7 Busch, Briton Cooper, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914, USA: University o f California 
Press 1967, and Britain, India, and the Arabs 1914-1921, USA: University o f California Press 
1971
8 Rumaihi, Muhammad, Beyond Oil, Unity and Development in the Gulf, London. A1 Saqi Books, 
1986, page 51 “nature of the ties”, Rumaihi remarks on the argument they were not protectorates 
and so did not relinquish legal sovereignty. Rumaihi refers particularly to A1 Bahama, Hussein 
Muhammad, The Modem Gulf States: International Relations and the Development of their 
Political, Legal and Constitutional Positions, Beirut; (np) 1973
9 IOL/R/L/PS/11/193 January 31st 1921 “Report o f the Interdepartmental Committee appointed by 
the Prime Minister to make recommendations as to the formation o f a new department under the 
Colonial Office to deal with mandated and other territories in the Middle East” Clauses 9-12 deal 
with the “Persian Gulf littoral”; And IOL/R/L/PS/10/1273/PG/Sub/l8 December 12th 1929 
Committee of Imperial Defence, Persian Gulf, Report by a Sub-Committee on Political Control; 
Appendix “De Facto” position as regards political arrangements in the Persian Gulf
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The new Orders in Council enacted following the August 1947 Indian Independence 
Act referred to the previous arrangements linking the Arab shaikhdoms to the 
Government of India. Clause 4 of the Note attached to the Bahrain Order states that 
previously “the Governor General of India exercised a number of powers”. It was 
now necessary, the Note explained, to “transfer elsewhere all powers hitherto 
exercised by the Governor General of India.” Herbert Liebesny, on the staff of the 
Foundation for Foreign Affairs in Washington, pointed out in Middle East Journal in 
1947 “the Political Residency, and the Political Agencies are subordinate to the 
Government of India.” In 1956 he observed, “only very recently have the Arab 
principalities of the Persian Gulf been officially put into the category, at least for 
some purposes, of British-protected states.”10
Once having grasped this all important dimension, I moved on to track the equally 
important India associations of the Anglo Persian Oil Company. Now the trials and 
tribulations experienced by Frank Holmes in his effort to develop the oil fields he 
had discovered fell into place. Previously it had seemed to me that, at times, the 
objections to Holmes were instances of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. But 
once it became clear that the Government of India was defending its very presence in 
the Arabian Peninsula -  a presence deliberately not put before any international body 
for authorisation or endorsement -  the reaction to the perceived threat presented in 
the person and activities of Frank Holmes came into context.
Who was Frank Holmes (1874-1947)?
This thesis explores the episode of the Raj in Arabia through the device of following 
Frank Holmes from discovery of the area’s oil to resolution of the granting and 
development of the concessions. Therefore, at this point a biography of Holmes up to 
the moment he began his search for Arabia’s oil is necessary.11
10 Liebesny, Herbert J, “Documents. British Jurisdiction in the States o f the Persian Gulf,” in 
Middle East Journal, vol.2, 1949, pages 330-332, “Governor General of India” and Liebesny, 
“International Relations of Arabia: The Dependent Areas”, Middle East Journal, vol l 1947, pages 
148-168 “subordinate to the Government of India” and Liebesny “Administration and Legal 
Development in Arabia, the Persian Gulf Principalities” in Middle East Journal, vol.10, 1956, 
pages 33-42, “British protected states”
1 The biography is assembled from —  Peter Mort for Frank Holmes personal papers; Stella 
Pendlebury for Dorothy Holmes personal papers; Michael Stephenson for Percy Holmes personal 
papers; Philip Davidson and Gerald Davidson for Holmes’ family records; correspondence was also 
received from family members Shirley Engberg, Edward Holmes and Dorrie Wilby; The Alexander 
Turnbull Library Wellington NZ, MS papers 212, Folder 22, Guy Scholefield, Editor o f the 
Dictionary o f NZ Biography, for correspondence; Herbert Hoover Library USA for correspondence; 
Otaga Boys High School Dunedin 1889 Register; personal interview Archibald Chisholm London
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Holmes may have inherited sheer grit from his mother. On the day he was bom, 
November 25th 1874, she rode, alone on horseback for hours, to visit Frank’s father 
where he was constructing bridges for the New Zealand Government. Frank’s father, 
James, had emigrated from the Lakes District in England, arriving as a young man 
first in Tasmania, where he met his future wife, then on to New Zealand. He worked 
on the roads and bridges that were opening up that country and later took advantage 
of government grants of virgin land to develop a sheep farm in Otago, where he 
raised his seven children. Frank completed his education at Otago Boys High School 
and in 1891, at 17, followed his two older brothers already apprenticed to the father’s 
brother in South Africa. The Holmes’ boys learned the mining business in the gold 
fields of the Rand where their uncle was general manager of the Johannesburg based 
Jumpers Co, a pioneer in the cyanide process of recovering gold, a knowledge 
Holmes would later use to advantage.12
In South Africa he learned more than mining. On December 29th 1895 he was 
among the 500 men whom Scotsman, Leander Starr Jameson, unsuccessfully led 
on a 36 hour raid into the Transvaal in rebellion against Kruger’s high taxing of 
the mostly British owned mining industry. Soon after this Holmes left South 
Africa for Australia. While he was employed as a metallurgist with the Melbourne 
Mint, he married Nina Isobel (Nancy) the daughter of Dr James Howard Eccles, 
children’s specialist at the Melbourne Hospital. They moved on to the arid area of 
Broken Hill, Australia’s “Silver City”, 1180 kilometres west of Sydney. This was 
where Australia’s biggest company, Broken Hill Pty Ltd (BHP) was incorporated 
in 1885 to exploit the rich silver, lead and zinc deposits discovered two years 
earlier. Frank and Nina’s son, Frank Junior known as “Eccles”, was bom here 
while Frank was manager of “Seabrook” a metallurgical and ore treatment plant. 
Across in Western Australia, the first claims were being staked out in what would 
become the fabulously rich Kalgoorlie gold fields. 13
September 4th 1987; personal interviews Husain AJi Yateem Bahrain 1987-1988, interview Violet 
Dickson Kuwait June 24th 1987.
12 Frank’s father, James Holmes, was bom in Westmoreland UK 1837, his wife, Mary Ann Smith, 
was bom in Hobart 1836; they married in Otago NZ 1866. Frank’s two older brothers, Robert and 
Alan, died during the Boer War. Frank’s youngest brother, Percy (1880-1968), followed a similar 
apprenticeship to the uncle in South Africa. Percy Holmes went on to be manager of the “Patino 
Mines”, in his time the world’s largest tin mine; he founded a branch of the family in Bolivia.
13 Jameson surrendered on January 2nd 1896, the raid was one o f the important causes of the Boer 
War o f 1899-1902. Papers held by Philip Davidson and Michael Stephenson show Frank and Nina 
married in the Holy Trinity Church, Maldon Victoria, October 14th 1897; See Blainey, Geoffrey, 
The Rise o f Broken Hill, Australia: Macmillan, 1968
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With Herbert Hoover
American President-to-be Herbert Hoover was hired to inspect these remote 
Western Australian fields. His London principals bought the Sons of Gwalia 
mine, initiated by a group of Welsh miners, on Hoover’s advice. At the age of 22, 
Hoover was appointed Mine Manager and Frank Holmes, also 22, joined him, 
initially as metallurgist. From Western Australia Hoover was promoted to a post 
in China for the same company, and Holmes who was now one of few persons 
experienced in the Cyanide Process of gold extraction, went with him. Though 
Hoover was constantly urged by the Chinese to find gold, as it turned out, much 
of the time was spent seeking and developing the enormous coal deposits that 
constituted China’s true wealth.
When they travelled together on the boat from Basra to Bahrain in 1922, Holmes 
spoke to the Lebanese American writer, Ameen Rihani, of this experience and of 
his admiration for Hoover who was at that time US Secretary of Commerce. 
Rihani recorded that Holmes told him: “Hoover was not long in bossing a job he 
undertook. A man of decision, of quick mind, impetuous but not nervous, full of 
ambition and grit. He seldom hesitated in making up his mind. He would go down 
a mine, for instance, look it over and say whether it was worth working or not”. 
Holmes told Rihani: “I once inspected a mine and thought it was good. 1 asked 
Hoover to go down and look it over. He did; and when he came up he told me that 
it was no good. T wouldn’t spit on it’, he said. Hoover is like that. He wasted no 
time or energy on what he thought was of no value.”14
That period in the desert of Western Australia was an experience important to 
Holmes’ later recognition of the resources hidden in the deserts of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Certainly, it taught him how to survive in a harsh climate. Herbert 
Hoover’s description of Kalgoorlie could apply equally to Arabia. It was, he said, 
“among the hottest and driest and dustiest places on this earth. The temperature 
was over 100 degrees at midnight for days at a time. The rain was little more than 
an inch a year and most of it all at once. The country is unbelievably flat and 
uninteresting ... some of our mines lay long distances away in the interior ... the 
principal means of transport was long strings of Afghan camels. We rode them on 
inspection trips ... we travelled in 20 to 30 mile daily stages, mostly slept on the 
ground under the cold stars and were awakened by swarms of flies at daybreak.”
14 Rihani page 80 “I once inspected a mine”
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Hoover also wrote of water problems that Holmes, from his experience in 
Western Australia, recognised immediately when he saw them again in Arabia; a 
recognition that prompted his successful search for artesian water in Bahrain and 
Kuwait. “The Kalgoorlie mines were unbelievably rich, but presented difficult 
metallurgical problems, made more difficult by the lack of water ... such water as 
we had came from shallow wells in salty depressions ... we must of necessity 
recover all the water we could from our metallurgical processes in order to use it 
over again,” Hoover recorded.1^
When the work in China, interrupted by the Boxer Rebellion, ended in October 
1901, Hoover went back to California, returning to Australia in 1902. Holmes 
travelled to London where he joined the mining enterprises of the groups chaired 
by Edmund Davis, who would later form the Eastern & General Syndicate for 
work in Arabia. Holmes stayed in touch with Hoover sometimes referring mining 
persons he considered to be particularly good; Hoover often employed them on 
Holmes’ recommendation. In 1926 Herbert Hoover would provide a personal 
reference to the American oil companies attesting to Holmes’ professional 
abilities and character. Holmes’ association with Hoover may also have 
influenced his choice of the Gulf Oil Corporation USA as a partner in developing 
the Bahrain oil concession. The founder and majority stockholder in this company 
was the Mellon Bank family. In 1926 Andrew Mellon was US Secretary for the 
Treasury, working with Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce.16
Hie Memoirs o f Herbert Hoover: Years o f Adventure 1874-1920, London. Hollis & Carter, 1952, 
pages 30-32. From 1897 to closure in 1963 the Gwalia mine produced 2.6 million ounces o f gold. 
For the work in Australia and China see also Burnet, David, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life, New 
York: Alfred A Knopf, 1979
16Herbert Hoover Library, July 11th 1908, Hoover to Holmes: “I am in receipt of your letter 
regarding a position for a friend of yours. I am afraid that I have no opening at the present moment 
although I think I shall want a general clerk when we expand our works a little and will be very 
glad to oblige you. I owe you many thanks for Travis for he is doing splendid work.” Chevron 
Archives Box 120791, memorandum for historical research project, notes of telephone 
conversation with Mrs Mary Steams 20/10/1955 “...Holmes had worked with Herbert Hoover in 
Australia at some time pre WW1 and gave Hoover's name as reference ...Loomis checked on 
Holmes with Hoover”. Andrew Mellon (1855-1937) was Secretary of the Treasury under three 
successive Presidents, Harding, Coolidge and Hoover; Herbert Hoover was behind the post WW1 
push to-obtain a share of Iraq’s oil for American companies, he insisted the British afford an 
“Open Door” policy to Americans. See, for example, Shwadran page 209 then Secretary o f  
Commerce Herbert Hoover “took it upon him self’ to ensure American oil companies would have a 
share in Mesopotamia’s oil
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Russia, Malaya, Australia and Mexico
The Edmund Davis’ groups sent Frank Holmes to Russia, where he had his first 
taste of the oil industry in the Caspian, and then to Malaya as Assistant General 
Manager of the Penang Corporation whose many branches included running the 
Tanjong Pagar Dock Company at Singapore, an experience echoed in Holmes’ 
later advice to Abdul Aziz Bin Saud that Ras Tanura was the best prospect for 
developing a commercial port. By 1905, Holmes was back in Australia, intending 
to set up his own business as a mining consultant, but his London associates made
17him an offer he couldn’t refuse and, now 30 years old, he moved to Mexico.
He managed several mining projects simultaneously, mostly around Chihuahua
northern Mexico, while also acting as Consulting Engineer to the General Luis
Terrazas Estate, headquartered in Chihuahua. Spurred by the 1901 discoveries just
across the border in Texas, Weetman Pearson (later Lord Cowdray) spent five
million sterling until, in 1908, he found the huge oil reserves in Mexico that
would later make him one of the richest men in Britain. Very quickly the Hearst
family was drilling for oil in Chihuahua and Holmes’ associate General Terrazas -
dubbed “the largest individual land and cattle owner in the world” -  obtained a
1810-year regional prospecting licence for oil.
Holmes’ sympathy for the native labour, frequently employed in deplorable 
conditions at that time, was not always well regarded by expatriate mining 
colleagues. In Mexico, the foreign miners spoke disparagingly of the indigenous 
people as “Apaches”. Holmes, sniffed one of his contemporaries, “does not offend 
them”. Rebellion broke out in Mexico in 1909 in the lead up to the 1910 elections. 
Nina, Holmes’ Australian wife, died in May 1910 following the loss of an infant 
daughter. Within weeks, rebel activity had caused the suspension of all mining 
operations in Chihuahua. Holmes packed up his son and took him to England.19
17 See Henry, J D, Baku, An Eventful History, London: Archibald Constable & Co, 1905; Dickson 
papers, Box 2a/file 4a Report September 30th to November 12th 1922 Dickson to Cox: “Holmes 
said he had already concluded from charts Ujair (as Bin Saud wanted) was useless as a port, Ras 
Tanura was the place”
18 Sampson, Anthony, The Seven Sisters, UK. Hodder & Stoughton, 1975, pages 81, 88, 100-101 for 
detail Lord Cowdray and Mexican Eagle (Aguila) Company; Among Holmes’ private papers is a card 
recording the inscription on a gold watch, dated October 31st 1908, “presented to Mr. Frank Holmes, 
General Manager of the Palmarejo & Mexican Gold fields Ltd, o f the Oxnam Prospecting Co No. 1, 
Chinipas, Chihuahua as a token of their esteem by the staff o f both.”
19 Percy Holmes papers held by Michael & Gloria Stephenson, Bolivia, the 1909-1912 Journal of  
Robert Emmerson, page 175, “(the mine) has a bunch o f Apaches.. Holmes does not offend
them.. the only Indian on the warpath is m yself’; The Mexican troubles continued; in 1911 despotic 
dictator General Porfirio Diaz resigned, he had been President since 1877. Holmes and his son arrived 
in London July 1910. “Eccles” was with the Indian Army for 15 years after joining during WW1, he
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While the boy settled in with the Shropshire family of his father’s friend William 
Pendlebury -  Holmes would marry Dorothy, a daughter of this family -  over the 
next four years, Holmes worked again in Russia, then on various tin and gold 
mining projects in West Africa. For his London group, he negotiated the purchase 
of a lightering company in Uruguay and also spent time in Montevideo. Although 
Nigeria did not develop its oil resources until years later, Holmes was there before 
the First World War exploring for gold, tin, and oil. In April 1914 he married 
Dorothy in England and was preparing to move his family back to South America 
when, in August, Britain entered the war against Germany.20
“Major” Frank Holmes
Among Holmes’ friends was fellow New Zealander Major George Richardson who 
was in England in 1914 attending the military Staff College at Camberley. 
Richardson was appointed Chief of Staff of the Royal Naval Division. Created by 
Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, this was a hybrid force 
composed of two Marine Brigades and one new formation for the purpose of feeling 
the way for troop landings. Holmes went to see Churchill. Although visualising his 
new force as attracting the very cream of Britain's bright young men, Churchill made 
a personal exception.
When Holmes appeared in his office, Churchill took one look at the burly New 
Zealander and barked “how old are you?” To the reply of "just forty, Sir" Churchill 
snapped "that's a bit old isn't it?" Holmes smoothly retorted "it's exactly your age, 
Sir." Churchill didn’t miss a beat and shot back “in that case you're in the prime of 
life. We'll see what can be done."21
married Cecily Ronide (no children), was financed by his father in mining projects in Canada, and 
died in 1939
20William Pendlebury would progress from schoolmaster to Director o f Education for Shropshire. 
Dorothy was proud of her Austrian mother, whom she told Scholefield was the daughter of “Baron 
del Monte von Montaucau an aide de camp to the Emperor Franz Joseph” Dorothy was with Frank 
in Abyssinia 1919 and on 4-6 month visits taking in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai in 1924, 
1934 and 1937
2'See Jerrold, Douglas, The Royal Naval Division, London: Hutchinson, 1923 and Sparrow, 
Geoffrey and Macbean-Roos, J N, On Four Fronts with the Royal Naval Division, London: 
Hodder & Stoughton 1918; Scholefield Collection, July 25th 1960, Dorothy Holmes to 
Scholefield, “Frank knew General and Mrs Richardson when he was at the Staff College 
Camberley. I think it was probably on his recommendation that Frank joined the RND. I know he 
went to see Churchill who said Frank was too old when Frank commented that Churchill was the 
same age Churchill said in that case you are in the prime o f  life and he got the commission.” See 
also Mineau, Wayne, The Go Devils, London: Cassell, 1958, Mineau interviewed Dorothy and 
recounts this episode pages 179-180; Also October 26th 1959 and December 1st 1960, Lord 
Freyberg, Lt Gov Windsor Castle to Scholefield “Richardson and Holmes were known to me about
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Commissioned as Senior Supply Officer, Major Frank Holmes delivered mules and 
horses to the forces at Gallipoli, landing them at the height of the debacle of March 
1915. He was there to assist with the evacuation of his beleaguered fellow colonials, 
the Australians and New Zealanders, during which he was twice mentioned in 
dispatches. Following the April 1916 surrender at Kut of the Anglo Indian Army, 
when control of operations in Mesopotamia was taken from the Government of India 
and transferred to the War Office, Holmes was posted to Addis Abbaba, with his 
headquarters in the British Embassy. From there he scouted through Abyssinia, the
Italian colony of Eritrea and across the Arabian Peninsula locating and buying meat
22and supplies for Britain’s Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force (in modem Iraq).
Soon after the March 1917 capture of Baghdad, he was home on sick leave, laid low 
by what the Medical Board diagnosed as "the effects of food and water conditions in 
his area of active service." On recovery, he was posted to Flanders with the Royal 
Marines, 63rd (RN) Division. In January 1918, Winston Churchill personally 
recalled Frank Holmes from the trenches of France. Churchill instructed that Frank 
Holmes "be ordered to return to England and report to the Admiralty as soon as 
possible, as he is required for other duties".23
Abyssinia and the Red Sea
The “other duties” were to assist in capturing the imagined mineral riches of 
Abyssinia for Britain. Over the previous twelve months, Holmes' prewar mining 
associates had been talking with the Board of Trade, the Department of Agriculture 
and the Ministry of Munitions. Influential Chairman Edmund Davis (later knighted 
for service to British industry) was requesting exclusive rights to take over several 
concessions covering potash, potassium, and Wolfram. The British Government 
endorsed the group’s aim, as these were all minerals used in production of fertiliser 
and, more importantly, the manufacture of explosives.
1914.. .they certainly were associated with Winston...I saw a great deal o f Holmes when he was 
with the Naval Division and several times after the war...” As General Sir George Richardson he 
became Administrator o f Western Samoa.
22Jerrold page 48 “Senior Supply Officer”; see also Hickey, Michael, Gallipoli, Melbourne: John 
Murray, 1995; Holmes’ diary 1914-1915 for detail Gallipoli; Dorothy Holmes’ papers, November 
7th 1915, Dorothy to her sister “a piece in The Times refers to Frank’s being mentioned in 
Despatches in the Dardanelles”; also Scholefield collection Scholefield, Guy H, “A Tough Patient 
New Zealander”, Otago Daily Times (nd/np) “served throughout to the evacuation and was twice 
mentioned” and “NZ Man Walked into Confidence o f Sheik Oilmen”, Post (nd/np) “headquarters 
at the British Embassy”
23PRO/WO 339/69521 is Frank Holmes’ WW1 military file, contains Medical Board report 
“effects o f food and water” and January 25th 1918 Admiralty to Secretary War Office request 
Holmes be returned to England and February 23rd 1918 advises that "Major Frank Holmes, Royal 
Marines, reported at the Admiralty, on return from France, on the 20th instant"
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The Germans had long been the main suppliers of potash and the French and Italians 
were already in Abyssinia. Britain had been buying these minerals through the 
Italians, paying, as Churchill pointed out, almost double the price charged to Italian 
industry. 24
Abyssinia was tipped in 1917 mining circles as an area of unlimited mining potential. 
Holmes’ associates put forward grand plans for developing the concessions, 
including construction of several railways, and nominated their own consulting 
engineer, New Zealander Frank Holmes, as the ideal man, perhaps the only man, 
capable of both negotiating and securing the concessions and then moving on to 
physically and technically develop them. The group formed in March 1918 for this 
venture was named “The Frank Syndicate”.25
Holmes returned to London when the war ended in November 1918. There, in 
December, he received another letter from the Admiralty informing him he was to 
receive the "Diploma of the Order of the Crown of Italy (Cavalier) awarded you by 
His Majesty the King of Italy". Modestly, he told friends it was "only a dog fight 
medal”. With Dorothy, he went back to Abyssinia. The British had predicted that 
“parts of Abyssinia will prove an El Dorado, a new California, for commercial 
enterprises after the war”. The hoped-for riches did not eventuate. By the close of 
1919 Holmes’ attention was centred on the other side of the Red Sea, particularly on 
the lapsed oil concession on the Farasan Islands and also the Salt Mines concession 
of the Sal if Peninsula.26
It was the policy of Holmes’ business associates to set up different groupings of 
investors to support individual, and financially separate, ventures. The syndicate 
backing the Abyssinia operations remained intact and a new grouping was formed 
for activities on the Arabian side of the Red Sea. This was The Eastern & General 
Syndicate Ltd (E&GSynd). Originally visualised in April 1920 as "developing trade
24 PRO “Abyssinia” and Board o f Trade files, BT 66/11, October 1917-December 1918 and CO- 
727/3 Colonial Office memo, correspondence from Department o f Overseas Trade
25 Papers held by Philip Davidson and Michael Stephenson, Registration of “The Frank Syndicate” 
dated London March 25th 1918 and Power o f Attorney to Frank Holmes, same date, witnessed by 
Davis’ associates listed as Directors, Edmund Janson and William Pocock
26 PRO/WO 339/69521 Admiralty to Holmes “Citation from King of Italy, published London 
Gazette 17/1/1919”; Holmes papers, December 13th 1918, Dorothy to her family “dog fight 
medal” and Scholefield Collection October 27th 1959 Dorothy to Scholefield “...we never could 
quite fathom what this was in aid of...”; PRO/BT66/11 November 30th 1917 re Abyssinian Potash 
Deposits “The British Consul General Cairo, and General Clayton say. . .Eldorado...” Prior to WW1 
the Turkish Government had ceded the salt revenues of the Empire to the Ottoman Public Debt 
Administration but during the war the Salif Mines, with salt deposits estimated at 3,000,000 
tonnes, were barely operated except for some export to India
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on the Arab Coast, but more especially on the Assir and Yemen portion of the Red 
Sea", by the time of its August 6th official registration in London, its aims had
97extended to also include "dealing with concessions in Arabia".
It is the contention of this thesis that Frank Holmes -  Abu AI Naß, as the Gulf Arabs 
call him -  went on to discover Arabia’s oil after moving from the Red Sea to the 
Persian Gulf, and that it was rule by the Government of India that prevented 
development of these oil riches.
27 Eastern & General Syndicate Ltd was incorporated in London on August 6th 1920
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SECTION ONE 
The Background
Chapter One
MYTHS AND MISTAKES
The record corrected
Introduction
In examining the written record of the discovery and development of Arabia’s oil, 
inconsistencies, discrepancies and seemingly wilful falsehoods become apparent. It is 
possible to trace errors as they repeat, and in some cases compound, from publication to 
publication through the years. Several themes consistently emerge. The first is a 
diminishing of Frank Holmes and his role in the discovery and development of Arabia’s 
oil to a point where Daniel Yergin, in his 1991 The Prize, could describe him as having 
been “a figure of condescension and ridicule”.
A cause of the continuing dismissal of the abilities and achievements of Frank Holmes 
can be discerned in the second prominent theme that occurs in the literature. This is a 
series of claims, both individual and corporate, to have been the person, or company, 
most deserving of honour in the discovery and development of the oil resources of the 
Arabian Peninsula.
The denial of Frank Holmes’ professional background, and his depiction as a mere 
concession hunter rather than an experienced and practised geologist, owes much to the 
failure of the contemporary geologists, and the oil companies for which they worked, to 
discern the existence of Arabia’s great oil resources. These men were dogmatic in their 
insistence that there was no oil in Arabia. The 1932 success of Frank Holmes’ Bahrain 
oil field left them immensely embarrassed, and considerably annoyed, at having been 
shown up by someone they considered a rank outsider and well below their own calibre.
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In Section Two of this study, the denigration of Frank Holmes by the Political Officers 
of the Government of India is revealed in their reports and letters. As will be seen, these 
Officers were intent on removing Holmes because they perceived him to be an obstacle 
to their political aspirations in the area. They therefore sought to discredit him 
personally to their superiors, to the Shaikhs and to British officials in Whitehall. The 
Political Officers mostly centred their attacks on Holmes’ character and integrity, only 
occasionally spilling onto his professional skills and abilities. In demonstrating that 
Frank Holmes did discover the oil of Arabia, it is necessary to first clear away the errors 
that have built up in the existing body of literature dealing with the discovery and 
development of the Arabian oil fields.
Prior to Frank Holmes’ death in 1947, there were only two commercially published 
works. These were an article in the January 1939 American magazine and Lebanese 
American writer Ameen Rihani’s 1928 book Ibn Sa’oud o f Arabia. A clue as to how a 
false picture of the foundation of Arabia’s oil industry could become entrenched in the 
literature may be found in American magazine’s “Is John Bull’s Face Red!” The writer 
of this article complains bitterly of the information blockade imposed by the Political 
Officers of the Government of India on Bahrain and the Arab shaikhdoms and states that 
“employees of the oil company are forbidden to write or talk for publication”. He adds 
“Major Holmes, who now lives in Kuwait, like others concerned in the deal, won’t talk 
for publication.”1
As discussed below, a surviving letter in Rihani’s personal papers, preserved in Beirut, 
is evidence that Frank Holmes did attempt to set the story straight by strongly objecting 
to Ameen Rihani’s portrayal of him and of his role in the identifying, mapping, and 
obtaining of the concession for the oil of A1 Hasa in modem Saudi Arabia.
But, Frank Holmes never had a chance to correct the record or to defend himself against 
the way in which he, and his achievements, were depicted in the publications touching 
on the history of Arabia’s oil. With the above two exceptions, all were published after 
his death. A spate of publications, beginning with Stephen Longrigg’s 1954 Oil in the 
Middle East, followed the revelation in 1952 that the five major American oil 
companies, and British Petroleum with the Royal Dutch Shell group, combined to set 
prices. A further spur was Iran’s demand for a fairer deal from the Anglo Persian Oil
1 Yergin page 283 “figure o f ’; Beatty, Jerome, “Is John Bull’s Face Red!”, American Magazine (January 
1939) page 32 “forbidden to write or talk”
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Company and the subsequent nationalising of its oil industry. Recent works are Angela 
Clarke in 1990 and Daniel Yergin in 1991. Anthony Cave Brown’s 1999 Oil, God, and 
Gold, The Story o f Aramco and the Saudi Kings relies on Philby for the material on 
Holmes.
The liberties taken by some writers with the evidence are salutary. Most have simply 
relied on previous published works and many have depicted Frank Holmes as a cartoon 
character best summed up by Wallace Stegner in his 1971 Discovery/ Holmes was, says 
Stegner, “one of those who awake alertly in the night, hear history’s clock strike at a 
critical time — but count the strokes wrong”. In reviewing the literature it is necessary 
to reappraise the various streams of misinformation that have attached to Holmes 
personally, to his group the Eastern & General Syndicate Ltd, and to the discovery and 
development of the oilfields of Arabia.2
The Clown
As noted, the earliest mention of Frank Holmes is by Ameen Rihani in 1928. He is an 
engaging writer who did not see himself as producing a scholarly work but rather one 
that would attract and amuse the general reader. After first meeting in 1922 on the 
steamer from Basra to Bahrain, and again soon after at the Ujair Conference, Holmes 
and Rihani became friends. Rihani’s younger brother, Albert, was employed as 
translator for the Swiss geological expedition that Holmes arranged to give a second 
opinion on his own exploration and mapping of A1 Hasa, Bahrain and Kuwait.
Rihani and Holmes corresponded regularly until, in 1927, Holmes took strong exception 
to an article written by Rihani. Among Rihani’s papers in Beirut is a handwritten draft 
of a letter to Holmes, dated February 14th 1927. Rihani tells Holmes “what grieves me 
most in your letter is the wrong you imagine I have done you in writing about you in the
2 Longrigg, Stephen Helmsley, Oil in the Middle East, its Discovery <£ Development, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1954; Brown, Anthony Cave, Oil, God, And Gold, The Story o f  Aramco and the Saudi 
Kings, USA: Houghton Mifflin, 1999, note that this seems to be a biased and error-filled book; Stegner, 
Wallace, Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil, Beirut. Middle East Export Press, 1971, as abridged for 
Aramco World Magazine, page 6 “awake alertly in the night”; Curiously, Trench, Richard, “The King’s 
Good Servant”, in Near Exist Business magazine, (September-October 198 L) part four in a series on Middle 
East business history, takes this quote from Stegner, and applies it not to Holmes, but to H St John Philby.
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Hasa Concession in Asia Magazine.” Rihani defends himself saying: “I have re-read the 
paragraph to see where it is ‘blackguarding’ and wherein your character is attacked but I 
fail to see any justification for your resentment, much less for the bitterness in your 
feeling."
Rihani continued: "outside a passage of description, in which the humour is without 
malice at all, without even a sting, everything else in the few paragraphs is the truth and 
it reflects nothing but good upon you. Yes, there is that one reference to a certain 'M’jor 
Holmes' which 1 regret ... But one sometimes writes with a good intention what the 
reader interprets as malice." Rihani made a plea for clemency by saying, "my intentions 
are of the purest. I have always thought well of you and will always think well of you. 
Now to give you a proof of this, the book of my travels will appear in English and the 
story of the Hasa Concession, and Major Holmes, is set down faithfully ... but in my own 
particular style ...”3
Rihani could hardly have known that his "own particular style", and his somewhat ham 
handed efforts to keep the reader amused, would be used for years to denigrate Frank 
Holmes. It is possible that the more worldly Holmes knew exactly how Rihani's text 
would be used against him. The close and friendly correspondence that the two men had 
maintained ceased abruptly at this point.
The picture of Holmes as a clown-like character, a buffoon even, can be traced in a 
direct line to Rihani's attempts at a "humorous" style. He is cruelly satirical in the 
personal sketches of many of the characters in this book. His description of Holmes’ 
arrival to Ujair still persists today. Rihani wrote, "he wore over his European clothes a 
thin aba which concealed nothing; and over his cork helmet, a red kerchief and ighal 
which made his head seem colossal. But in this attempt to combine good Arab form with 
comfort and hygiene he certainly looked funny." Like many of the men before, and after 
him, Rihani was delighted by the opportunity to dress up in full Arab robes. Elizabeth 
Monroe comments on this proclivity in Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1971 
where she remarks that “Englishmen who had long ceased to live and work in Indian
3 Rihani Museum, Frieke, Lebanon, Rihani papers, February 14th 1927 Rihani in Beirut to Frank Holmes 
“my own particular style”
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clothes put on Arab robes and headdress without embarrassment.” Rihani was no 
different, "I was an Arab of Nejd from tip to toe," he crowed.4
For men who did not feel comfortable in an ankle length gown, adapting the local dress 
in much the same manner as Holmes was not unusual. A photograph taken at the 1930 
British handover of lkhwan rebels to Bin Saud appears in Arabian Days, written by the 
first Saudi Minister to Britain, Shaikh Hafiz Wahba. Breasting a line of British military 
uniforms, the Kuwait Political Agent, Colonel Harold Dickson, is shown similarly 
wearing a cork helmet and a thin aba over his three piece suit and tie. Nevertheless, later 
writers seized on Rihani's description. By 1981 Robert Lacey in The Kingdom had 
transformed the passage to "a curious figure waded ashore, a burly and perspiring 
Westerner clad in suit, shirt and tie, an Arabian gold trimmed outer robe, and a pith 
helmet draped with a chequered headdress and black head ropes. This original 
apparition introduced himself as Major Frank Holmes, a New Zealand businessman and 
prospector."5
Colonel Dickson's own description of Holmes' sartorial taste on first meeting him in 
Bahrain, just days before he reached Ujair, is at variance with Rihani, and infinitely 
more imaginative. Perhaps it was because Dickson himself was given to wearing the 
outfit that Rihani found so comical that he ascribed a completely outlandish appearance 
to Holmes. Dickson writes of Holmes in his 1956 Kuwait and Her Neighbours, "he 
carried a large white umbrella, lined green, wore a white helmet as issued to French 
troops in Africa, and over his face and helmet a green gauze veil, like those worn by 
tourists visiting the Egyptian pyramids." Dickson's description appears in later works as 
frequently as does Rihani's. Richard Trench managed skilfully to combine both in an 
article that appeared in a series on the history of Middle East business in August 1981.
4 Rihani Ibn Sa’oud page 82 “colossal head”; Monroe, Elizabeth, Britain 's Moment in the Middle East, 
London: Chatto & Windus, 1981 (first published 1963) page 116 “without embarrassment”; Rihani Ibn 
Sa’oud page 17 “head to toe”; Colonel T E Lawrence, “Lawrence of Arabia”, is perhaps the most famous 
for revelling in Arab dress but he is by no means alone, for example, Karl Twitchell startled the Americans 
working in Bahrain in 1932 by swishing around the drilling site dressed in full Arab robes; in a May 1943 
Life Magazine the American reporter and photographer are both pictured at Aramco in Arab dress; Lacey, 
Robert, The Kingdom, London: Hutchinson 1981, page 274 describes Winston Churchill trying on full Arab 
robes, complete with sword, in 1945
5 Wahba, Shaikh Hafiz, Arabian Days, Londeon. Arthur Barker, 1964, photograph between pages 112-113 
and also appears in Dickson, Violet, Forty fears in Kuwait>, London: George Allen & Unwin 1971, 
between pages 96-97; Lacey page 170 “original apparition”
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Trench wrote of the "comic and ungainly character" who "waddled over the shimmering 
horizon" at Ujair "wearing a solar topee with an Arabian headdress thrown over it, and 
carrying a white umbrella".
But the prize must surely go to Ralph Hewins for this passage in A Golden Dream 
(1963): "Holmes waddled on to the sun baked island of Bahrain from London enveloped 
in a thick loose fitting tweed jacket, corduroys and a white French military sun helmet 
with a green gauze veil and carrying a large white parasol. Come any wild south wester 
or blinding sandstorm, he remained faithful to this garb, and looked a fantastic sight on a 
donkey, more like one of the Crazy Gang than a serious technician."6
There is a photograph taken at the December 1922 Ujair Conference and reprinted in the 
March 1984 The Arabian Sun, the house magazine of Aramco. The Sultan Abdul Aziz 
Bin Saud, in Nejdi robes, is sitting on the left. The Resident, and High Commissioner of 
Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, in black suit, bow tie and trilby hat sits on the right. Standing 
between them is Major Frank Holmes. He looks very business like in a well tailored suit 
with neat collar and tie. His topee is standard British issue as regularly worn in the 
tropics. Such exotic adornments as green gauze veils, colossal heads, or white parasols 
are nowhere in sight.7
Nevertheless, Rihani, and then Dickson, had opened the way for Holmes to be held up as 
a figure of ridicule. Rihani's attempts at amusing his readers had given permission for 
Dickson similarly to exercise an active imagination. Subsequently, few writers proved 
capable of withstanding the temptation of casting Frank Holmes as the comedy relief 
when playing out the story of discovery and development of Arabia's oil. It is an image 
that still obscures the real achievements of this remarkably skilled and determined man.
6 Dickson, H R P, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, London. George Allen & Unwin, 1956, page 269 “white 
umbrella”; Trench, Richard “Windmills in the Sand”, NearEast Business magazine (May 1981) part three in 
a series on Middle East Business history, pages 14-17 “shimmering horizon”; Hewins, Ralph, A Golden 
Dream, The Miracle o f  Kuwait, London: W H Allen, 1963, page 210 “one o f the Crazy Gang”
7 On the evidence o f the photographs, showing Colonel Dickson wearing the aba over his European 
clothing and Holmes not affecting this combination, and both men of roughly the same shape and size, it is 
entirely possible that in his initial excitement about the Ujair Conference, Rihani confused Dickson for 
Holmes
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The Intruder
Other errors, and possibly deliberate misinterpretations, have been equally damaging. 
Rihani, for example, was quite misleading in his account of the events that took place at 
the December 1922 Ujair Conference. He correctly notes that, on this second visit with 
Bin Saud, Holmes was bringing back from Basra the legal translation of the draft 
concession agreed with Bin Saud after the prospecting trip in which he had identified, 
and mapped, the oilfield of A1 Hasa. Rihani seems unaware that, before leaving Bahrain, 
Holmes had arranged to meet Sir Percy Cox, with Bin Saud, at Ujair, where Cox had 
gathered the group to settle the boundaries between Bin Saud, Iraq and Kuwait. Sir 
Percy Cox wrote his own detailed report for the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of 
Devonshire. In this report Cox states the arrangement was that Holmes should precede 
him "to join Bin Saud and await my coming. On arrival at Ujair, on November 27th 
1922, I found that Bin Saud had had to leave Major Holmes at Hofuf as he was unwell 
on the day His Highness started for Ujair, but he was to follow in a day or so”.
Sir Percy’s report continued: “Major Holmes turned up in due course and had an 
interview with me ... Major Holmes appeared to be behaving straight forwardly and Bin 
Saud’s attitude had been satisfactory so that, encamped together as we were on the sea 
shore at Ujair, with other important business to get through, I did not feel justified in 
humiliating His Highness or otherwise disturbing the atmosphere by objecting to further 
intercourse between them and had to content myself with making it clear to both of 
them that it was out of the question for His Highness to commit himself on any terms 
without the advice of His Majesty’s Government ... When not doing political business 
with me, Bin Saud discussed the draft concession at odd times with Major Holmes.”8
Perhaps Rihani was unaware of the arrangements between Holmes, Cox and Bin Saud 
when he recorded colourfully: “Holmes loomed up on the horizon, unexpectedly as 
usual, and incorporated himself into the Ujair Conference". Rihani's error still echoed 
some 40 years later in Pulitzer Prize winning American novelist Wallace Stegner's 1971 
Discovery! Creatively, Stegner metamorphosises Rihani's passage into, "in November, 
Holmes intercepted Bin Saud at Hofuf, in the A1 Hasa oasis. He followed him to Ujair 
where the King was holding a conference with Sir Percy Cox." Robert Lacey does even
8 PRO/CO/730/26, December 20th 1922, Secret, Sir Percy Cox High Commissioner in Iraq to Duke o f  
Devonshire Secretary o f State for the Colonies, “not justified in humiliating”
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better. He says Cox "was not amused" by Holmes’ arrival and continues "Holmes had to 
pitch his tent at a distance from the British encampment, and he sat there, pointedly 
ignored for most of the week ..." Lacey says Holmes had framed “a clumsy letter of 
application” for Bin Saud asking for an oil concession and says that Cox "grudgingly 
agreed" to meet Holmes on the final day of the conference where "he made clear his 
personal distaste for the Major".9
Lacey’s last point is drawn from Dickson’s Kuwait and Her Neighbours. Recently 
removed from his post in Iraq, and unemployed at the time, Dickson’s attention at the 
conference was focused on obtaining the appointment of British Adviser to Bin Saud, as 
he believed Cox had promised him. It will be seen that, from Dickson’s personal papers 
held by the Middle East Centre at St Antony’s College Oxford, and other contemporary 
documentation, Dickson’s book is riddled with errors and falsehoods, particularly in 
relation to Holmes. Bin Saud refused to appoint Dickson and, from that time on, his 
view of Holmes seems to have been one of envy and irritation at the close personal 
relationship between Holmes and Bin Saud and Holmes and the other Arab Rulers.
Of Holmes at the Ujair Conference, Dickson writes: “It was not until the last day of the 
conference that Major Holmes took any part ... Sir Percy warned Bin Saud that the 
Eastern & General Syndicate is not an oil company and will probably sell the concession 
to others ... Major Holmes was then called in ... and introduced to Sir Percy.” Dickson is 
wrong on each point. Sir Percy’s report to the Duke of Devonshire shows he first met 
Holmes early in the conference and that Holmes was very much involved with Bin Saud 
in the days that followed.
Moreover, as H St John Philby also points out in the 1964 Arabian Oil Ventures, 
according to Rihani, Holmes had been taking all his meals with the British and 
“frequenting the tents of both the Sultan and Sir Percy” since first pitching his own tent 
between both camps. Cox’s account of his discussions with both Bin Saud and Holmes 
also shows Dickson’s attribution to him of the statement “E&GSynd is not an oil 
company and will probably sell the concession to others” to be pure fiction. Dickson 
was expressing his own opinion when he next stated, “Sir Percy did not like Major 
Holmes and obviously thought his presence inimical to His Majesty’s Government’s
9 Rihani Ibn Sa’oud page 83 “loomed up”; Stegner page 6 “intercepted Bin Saud”; Lacey page 170 
“pointedly ignored” and “personal distaste”
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interests. Holmes had got in, so to speak, by the back door, and there is little doubt that 
Sir Percy would have condemned him and his activities to Bin Saud, if he could have 
done so safely.”10
Nevertheless, Sir Percy did not allow Bin Saud to sign the concession with Holmes at 
the conference. He personally dictated a delaying letter that he insisted Bin Saud sign 
and deliver to Holmes. (The intrigue leading up to the subsequent grant of Bin Saud’s 
concession to Holmes some six months later, in May 1923, is fully explored in chapter 
four A Very Promising Area.) Despite the factual evidence to the contrary, Rihani set off 
another enduring myth by inferring that Holmes left the Ujair conference without 
satisfaction and that it was Rihani himself who was the force behind the assignment of 
the A1 Hasa concession.
The files of the Ujair Conference, available at the India Office Library, show that on 
receipt of the Cox dictated letter, and a personal visit from Bin Saud, Holmes advised 
Cox that he had no intention of backing down. Holmes’ letter to Cox began: “In regard 
to the interviews I have had with you dealing with the question of obtaining, on behalf 
of the Eastern & General Syndicate Limited, an oil concession from His Highness Sultan 
Bin Saud, covering the Province of Hasa in His Highness' Territory.” In this letter of 
December 2nd, Holmes informed Cox: “I respectfully submit that I have continued my 
negotiations with His Highness the Sultan and have now arranged with him that he is to 
grant my Syndicate a concession subject to the approval of Your Excellency and the 
Home Government ...”* 11
Yet, Rihani gives an account of meeting Holmes again in Baghdad on April 10th. He 
writes: “Here is Major Holmes again. He has been waiting all this time for a decision 
from somebody ... about the concession ... nothing has come, nothing favourable, and he 
has cold feet. He is packing up and going home.” Rihani claims he urged Holmes to 
change his mind and go back again to see Bin Saud at A1 Hasa.
Rihani writes: “I will give you a letter to Bin Saud and I’m certain you’ll get the 
concession.” The fact is, as detailed in chapter four A Very Promising Area, that, in
10 Dickson, page 277 “Holmes called in” and “not an oil company”; Philby, H St J B, Arabian Oil Ventures, 
Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1964, page 61 “all his meals”; Dickson Kuwait page 278 “by the 
back door”
11 IOL/ R/l 5/1/618/F. 52, December 2nd 1922, Holmes in Ujair to Sir Percy Cox “arranged with him to 
grant my Syndicate a concession”
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May, Bin Saud sent to Bahrain for Holmes to come immediately and sign the agreement. 
Undeterred, Rihani implies that he was the essential factor when he concludes by saying 
that in August he, Rihani, received a letter from Bin Saud “in which he says he has
i ^
granted the concession of A1 Hasa to the syndicate of Major Holmes”.
Stegner's version of Rihani and Dickson's accounts, while glaringly inaccurate, is 
dramatic. This reads: "Sir Percy, with the interests of the Anglo Persian Oil Company in 
mind, turned an understandably cool eye upon Holmes' efforts and advised the Sultan 
that concessions for the exploration of A1 Hasa were premature at that time. Premature 
or not, Holmes pursued the Sultan back to Hofuf and in the teeth of Sir Percy's plainly 
indicated objections obtained a concession to explore for oil over 60,000 square miles of 
A1 Hasa, Arabia's eastern province."
Rihani's influence is again obvious in Wayne Mineau's 1958 The Go Devils. Mineau 
begins his version of the Ujair episode with "into the desert came the Major". He 
describes Holmes as looking "bizarre" and says "within a day or two" Holmes learned 
that Bin Saud could not resist the pressure from Cox and "sent the Major a message". 
Mineau writes that "the Ujair conference ended and on its last day Bin Saud himself 
walked into Holmes' tent to voice his regret. Then Holmes packed up and left, puzzled 
though still hopeful". Robert Lacey also echoes Rihani as he contends, "Holmes got the 
message. He packed his bags and left Ujair". Lacey then elaborates, without any basis, 
though perhaps inspired by Stegner: "The following spring, the Major disembarked from 
his steamer, without any warning, halfway down the Gulf and headed rapidly inland ... 
where he obtained the concession from Bin Saud." Richard Trench in NearEast Business 
is extraordinarily imaginative when he reports the outcome of the Ujair conference as 
Holmes and his Bahrain colleague, Muhammad Yateem, "... pulling a white donkey 
behind them, returned to Bahrain, disappointed." 13
All the works considered as “standard” on early discovery and development of Arabia's
011 have accepted Rihani. Stephen Helmsley Longrigg in his 1954 Oil in the Middle 
East, says that Holmes “followed” Cox and Bin Saud to Ujair and “presented to Bin 
Saud his suggestions for an oil licence to cover the A1 Hasa province ... the Sultan, 
advised by Cox, was wisely cautious ...” Benjamin Shwadran in The Middle East, Oil
12 Rihani Ibn Sa’oud page 86 “give you a letter”
13 Stegner page 7 “pursuedUhe Sultan”; Mineau page 182 “packed up and left”; Lacey page 171 “headed 
rapidly inland”; Trent “Windmills”page 15 “pulling a white donkey”
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and the Great Powers (1956) cites Rihani but includes the erroneous addition that 
"Holmes tried for a long time to contact Bin Saud with a view to obtaining an oil 
concession in A1 Hasa province, but Baghdad authorities denied him travelling 
facilities”. Shwadran follows Rihani unquestioningly as he adds: “When Sir Percy Cox 
... arrived for the Ujair Conference ... Holmes also appeared ... Holmes returned to 
Baghdad to await the decision. In August 1923 he was informed that Bin Saud had 
granted him the oil concession.”14
Henry Longhurst in the 1959 Adventure in Oil, the Story o f British Petroleum (originally 
the Anglo Persian Oil Company) fails to even mention the 1923 A1 Hasa Concession. 
This book was written for the company’s 50th anniversary. At the time, Longhurst was a 
sports reporter, specifically the Golf Correspondent at the London Sunday Times. The 
omission is corrected by R W Ferner in his scholarly 1982 work The History o f the 
British Petroleum Company, the Developing Years 1901-1932. Unfortunately, Ferrier 
cites Dickson and so also gets it wrong when he writes that Holmes “attended” the Ujair 
Conference and “made his first moves to seek an oil concession for the A1 Hasa 
province from Bin Saud”.15
In his 1965 record of the oil negotiations Thomas E Ward relies entirely on Rihani for 
this episode. Archibald Chisholm does give a true and correct report of Holmes' early 
visits to Bin Saud and of the Ujair Conference in his 1975 record of the Kuwait 
negotiations. Unfortunately, Chisholm's account is frequently ignored. Angela Clarke, 
for instance, skips Chisholm's version in favour of Rihani's colourful, 63 year old and 
now discredited text, from which she quotes at length.16
The Carpetbagger
The assault on Holmes’ character, repeatedly reinforced in the literature, does not end 
there. His written profile suffers the indignity of being caricatured as a man of bizarre 
appearance and unorthodox taste in clothing and an interloper completely lacking all
14 Longrigg page 100 “wisely cautious”; Shwadran, page 286 "denied him travelling facilities"
15 Longhurst, Henry, Adventure in Oil, the Story o f  British Petroleum, London. Sidgwick & Jackson, 
1959; Ferrier, R W, The History o f the British Petroleum Company, the Developing Years 1901-1932, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982, page 561-162 “made his first moves”
16 Ward pages 12-14; Chisholm pages 5 and 93-96; Clarke pages 53-57
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comprehension of “correct” behaviour. To this is now added an attack on his integrity in 
which he is made to appear as a carpetbagger, a soldier of fortune, nothing more than an 
adventurer and “a rover in oil”. The styling of Holmes as a negotiator of concessions, 
some sort of super salesman, rather than as a discoverer of oil fields was set early and 
firmly cemented in following publications. In 1958, Mineau speaks of Holmes as “this 
humorous man who knew little about oil or geology” and Hewins in 1963 states “he had 
no academic qualifications in geology, mining or engineering”. 17
While some writers, such as Daniel Yergin, concede that Holmes “was convinced the 
Arabian coast would be a fabulous source of petroleum”, they do not ask on what basis 
Holmes reached this conviction. Yergin, for example, states that the prevailing expert 
opinion was shared by the Anglo Persian Oil Company which was “convinced there was 
no oil in Arabia”. But he does not question how it came about that Frank Holmes 
reached the opposite conclusion, and was so spectacularly correct. Holmes is denied the 
respect due to his long international mining experience, and eventually proven 
geological skill. Even the few writers who deal with Holmes sympathetically refer to his 
negotiating abilities and excellent manner when dealing with the Arabs, but never to his 
achievement in actually discovering, identifying and mapping the Arabian oil fields for 
which he then negotiated the concessions.
“Major Frank Holmes”, wrote Jerome Beatty in the much quoted 1939 article in 
American magazine, “is a hearty New Zealander, who for years has been a man about 
the world, ready to promote any project, mostly gold and copper mines, that might make 
him a reasonable profit”. This article says that Holmes “had not thought of promoting 
oil anywhere” but after “poking around in books and reports, guessed that Bahrain 
looked promising, and went there”. A decade later, Fortune magazine described him as 
“a remarkable Englishman called Major Frank Holmes who had for years been prowling
around the Middle East. In the process he had picked up some oil options in Saudi
1 8Arabia ... then chance led him to Bahrain ... where he was given an oil option.”
17 Yergin page 281 “rover”; Mineau page 177 “knew little”; Hewins page 211 “no academic 
qualifications”
18 Yergin page 280 “fabulous source” and “no oil in Arabia”; American magazine January 1939 page 110 
“ready to promote any project”;, Anonymous, “The Great Oil Deals, US Business, Doing Business, Does 
What Government Cannot Do,” Fortune Magazine, vol. XXXV, N o.5, (May 1947), pp 81-84, 143, 175- 
176, 179, 180,182, “prowling around the Middle East”
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Frederick Lee Moore Jnr prepared a thesis for his BA in History at Princeton University 
in 1948 by relying almost entirely on information from American businessman T E 
Ward. Ward acted as broker in the 1927-1929 sale of the Bahrain Concession, and 
further options, from E&GSynd to Gulf Oil Corporation and on to Standard Oil of 
California. He would privately publish in 1965 his own version of events in Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In his thesis, Moore is severely critical, for “conflicting with 
evidence and fact”, of both the American and Fortune magazine articles and “other 
journals”. He is scathing about Benjamin Brooks’ 1944 book Peace, Plenty & 
Petroleum for containing “inaccuracies due to the author basing some of his statements 
on journalistic writings”. In his bibliography, Moore refers to his own use of a 
memorandum by T E Ward originally submitted “at the request of Fortune Magazine” 
but ignored in favour of “current material and a little historical colouring”. In his 
preface Moore states “the hidden wealth of Araby once lay in the hands of a lone 
adventurer and his London constituents”. His own description of Holmes is taken direct 
from Rihani and reads: “He cut a fantastic figure as he travelled on foot, ass, camel and 
steamer along the coast of the comparatively unknown Arabian subcontinent and its 
environs accompanied only by an interpreter and a Somali servant.”19
One standard source for American writers was the 1950 Aramco and World Oil, written 
by Roy Lebkicher as the Handbook for American Employees. In this publication Holmes 
is introduced as “an energetic and amiable New Zealander who was following the trail 
of oil prospects in the Persian Gulf area. He went to Bahrain in the early 1920’s to assist 
in developing water resources, but his principal interest seemed to be in possible oil 
resources”. A later source was the 1971 History o f Standard Oil New Jersey, which 
seems to have taken its information from Moore’s thesis. This publication refers to 
Holmes as “a New Zealand veteran of the World War One British campaign in the 
Middle East who had been commissioned by a London syndicate in 1920 to search for 
potential mining or oil lands in the region of the Persian Gulf’.
19 Moore, Frederick Lee Jnr, Origin o f American Oil Concessions in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
[Unpublished BA thesis, Department o f History Princeton University 1948] page 26 “conflicting with 
evidence” and “inaccuracies” and page 19 “lone adventurer” and “fantastic figure”
20 Lebkicher, Roy, Aramco and World Oil in Arabian American Oil Company Handbook for American 
Employees, vol. 1, New York, Russell F. Moore, 1950, page 23 “amiable New Zealander”; Larson, 
Henrietta, Knowlton, Evelyn, and Popple, Charles, History of the Standard Oil Company New Jersey, vol.
3, New Horizons 1927-1950, USA: Harper & Row 1971, page 39 “New Zealand veteran”
Myths and Mistakes 31
NearEast Business offered this snapshot in 1981: “Holmes, a gigantic rolling stone from 
New Zealand, was overweight, over loud and easy going ... a mining engineer ... he was 
on the look out for oil concessions.” Aramco’s house magazine, Arabian Sun in 1984, 
said “Holmes was a self taught mining engineer ... a swaggering character ... who 
mounted a negotiating campaign that must have been wonderful to behold.” Aramco 
World Magazine, in the February 1999 issue, celebrating 100 years of Saudi Arabia, 
introduced its readers to “an enterprising New Zealander, Frank Holmes, who was 
something of an adventurer ... and had set himself up in Bahrain as agent of a brokerage 
house called the Eastern & General Syndicate.”21
Rihani had praised Holmes’ mining experience and pointed out that he had “worked 
with Herbert Hoover” in mining in Australia and China. Rihani paid tribute to the 
technical detail and geological data found in Holmes’ map and concession documents, 
passed to him for a translation check by Bin Saud. In praise of Holmes’ skill and 
knowledge, Rihani wrote. “He knows what is in the bosom of the land, this man; he can 
see the invisible streams of water that flow from the Persian mountains under the Gulf, 
through the veins of the Hasa soil; can track the bubbling oil and the sparkling minerals 
to their depths and beyond; has the modem Argus eye of science and finance.” This 
passage of Rihani’s is ignored by later writers who selectively use his text to paint 
Holmes as a colourful character far removed from the serious, hard working, geologist 
that his achievements illustrate.22
In his 1964 Arabian Oil Ventures, H St John Philby remarks that Longrigg “seems to 
have gone out of his way to belittle” Holmes’ achievements. Longrigg, more correctly 
“Brigadier Stephen Hemsley Longrigg”, was ex-Mesopotamia, one of the military men 
who served with the Anglo Indian Army occupation force and were then imported into 
the Anglo Persian Oil Company, barely transforming in the process from occupying 
soldiers to “oilmen”. Later in this book Philby also indulges in undermining the 
reputation of Frank Holmes as he attempts to build up his own role, and that of 
American Karl Twitchell, in the 1933 resale to Standard Oil of California of Holmes 
original, but lapsed, A1 Hasa concession.
21 Trent “Windmills”, page 14 “overweight, overloud”; Arabian Sun March 1984, “swaggering character”, 
Grutz, Jane Waldron, “Prelude to Discovery” Aramco World, (January-February, 1999) vol. 50, N o .l ,  
pages 31-34, “something o f  an adventurer”
2 Rihani, lbn Sa’oud, pages 80-83 “with Herbert Hoover” and “modem eye o f  science”
23 Philby, Oil Ventures, page 54 “belittle”
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At no point does Philby honour Holmes’ skill in identifying the Arabian oil fields. 
Instead he implies that Holmes’ skill was in dealing with bureaucracy, saying: “It must 
be admitted that Major Frank Holmes had an extraordinary flair for the possibilities of 
the situation, enabling him to play a major part in obtaining the necessary permits [my 
italics] for the opening up of the largest reservoir of oil in the world. With the 
concessions for the Hasa (1923), the Kuwait Neutral Zone (1924), Bahrain (1925) and 
Kuwait some years later ... he achieved a proud record in his lifetime. And his name will 
always be associated with the development of the Arabian oilfields ...”
Longrigg diminishes Holmes’ achievements through the technique of declaring, in 
absolute contradiction to the facts (see chapter two No Oil in Arabia), that Arabia’s oil 
prospects were already known and therefore Frank Holmes was not an oil discoverer, 
but merely an opportunist. After Holmes’ wells came in, this was the myth perpetuated 
by the geologists and executives of Anglo Persian who claimed they had always known 
there was oil on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf, but maintained there was not for the 
purpose of deterring competitors. Longrigg’s entry on Holmes reads “... after a sojourn 
in Bahrain, to which he was attracted by known oil seepages, Holmes formed the 
ambition of entering the mainland of Arabia as oil concessionaire.”24
Dickson grabs this technique and runs with it. He claims that, well before Holmes, he 
was the one who knew there was oil in Arabia and had even made several, unsuccessful, 
expeditions in search of it. He offers an extraordinary tale in which he says Holmes 
claimed to be a butterfly hunter, but he, Dickson, “knew” immediately that Holmes’ 
interest must be in “the rumoured oil seepage behind Qatif oasis”. Philby takes strong 
exception to both Dickson’s unsourced claim and to his entire narrative in relation to 
Holmes and the Ujair Conference. Dickson first introduces Holmes as “a mining 
engineer”. He says when he became aware that Bin Saud had sent for Holmes, he knew 
it must be “to investigate” the “known” oil seepages and that if Holmes’ geological 
investigations were promising, “he might try to get a mining or oil concession from Bin 
Saud”. As evidenced by Dickson’s own papers and other contemporary documentation, 
Dickson at this point had no inkling either of the possibility of oil in A1 Hasa or that 
Frank Holmes had any connection with oil. In reality, Dickson was convinced Holmes 
was a Civil Engineer interested in the possibility of developing roads, irrigation, ports 
and harbours for Bin Saud. (See “A Promising Area”)
24 Longrigg pages 98-100 “known oil seepages”
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Philby, who follows Rihani for his version of Holmes at Ujair, severely criticises 
Dickson saying, “it is difficult to take seriously Colonel Dickson’s much later references 
to oil in connection with the Ujair Conference, which may well have been occasioned by 
actual subsequent developments”. Dickson creates a conversation in which Sir Percy 
questions a supposed Saudi insistence on maintaining control of a certain area. Dickson 
has the Saudi declare they want it because “quite candidly, we think oil exists there”. 
Philby scoffs at Dickson’s profession of “all this foreknowledge of the possibilities of 
the area”.25
Archibald Chisholm, who was a major participant in the events and had competently 
researched for his own book, was also very critical of Dickson. After receiving a copy of 
T E Ward’s privately published work, Chisholm wrote to tell him the stories Ward had 
included, as told to him by Dickson, were not true. “These stories are all inventions,” 
Chisholm wrote, “Dickson is not a reliable writer on the subject.”
Curiously, Ward had already been warned of this by none other than Dickson himself. In 
a letter dated ten years before Ward’s book was published, Dickson wrote to tell him “I 
am afraid some of the stories I told you ... will not appear in such detail in my new book 
Kuwait & Her Neighbours, as in all such things one has to be extra careful what one 
puts in print, especially as several of (the participants) are still alive.” Dickson’s book 
appeared in 1956. Frank Holmes died in 1947. Perhaps this explains why Dickson felt 
free to malign him.
Dickson, like Rihani before him, obviously thought the art of the story was in its telling, 
not necessarily in its facts, and that artistic licence was always permissible. Seemingly 
oblivious to the damage inflicted on Holmes’ reputation, Dickson told Ward in this 
letter: “Major Frank Holmes was a very remarkable man and was very greatly thought of 
by the late Ruler of Kuwait. This was entirely due to the fact that he had a gift of making 
Shaikh Ahmad believe in him and that he had Shaikh Ahmad’s entire interests at heart. 
Frank Holmes was also a friend of mine and his memory will always remain “green” 
with me.” Without checking, Ward ran Dickson’s stories anyway.
25 Dickson, Kuwait, pages 268-269 “try to get a mining oil concession” and “quite candidly”; Philby, Oil 
Ventures, page 60, “difficult to take seriously”
26 American Heritage Centre, University o f  Wyoming, T E Ward papers, March 15th 1965, Chisholm to 
Ward “all inventions” and May 5th 1955, Dickson to Ward “are still alive”
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Wallace Pratt, former Executive and Chief geologist of the Standard Oil Company New 
Jersey, spoke to a conference in 1960 at the Harvard School of Business Administration. 
He told the conference that Holmes “was an impressive figure — burly, loquacious, 
picturesque — with a gift for showmanship. His manner of approach to the local rulers 
was spectacular and persuasive and within a short time all his negotiations succeeded.” 
Stegner in 1971 told his readers of “a ruddy, genial, hearty, energetic, undiscourageable 
New Zealander adventurer named Major Frank Holmes ... at the beginning of the 1920s 
he showed up in Bahrain to work on the water system ... When a group of London 
financiers formed the Eastern & General Syndicate to promote profitable enterprises in 
the Arabian Gulf area, Holmes was their natural choice.”
Anthony Sampson in the 1975 The Seven Sisters says Holmes was “a rough hewn New 
Zealander, acting for a London syndicate speculating in concessions.” Ferrier in 1982 
says that “Frank Holmes burst upon the stage with a splendid performance of 
concessional wizardry.” As mentioned, Clarke refers to Holmes as “an opportunist 
businessman” with “an eccentric personality.” Although she does acknowledge that he 
was “trained as a mining and metallurgical engineer” she dismisses his achievements 
with the breezy “he was instrumental in securing several oil concessions for Eastern & 
General Syndicate ...”27
The Claims
When the Third Volume of The History of Standard Oil New Jersey appeared in 1971, T 
E Ward’s son was moved to write to the editor, Dr Henrietta Larson. “In several places 
you have referred to my father as ‘an associate in New York’ of Major Holmes. My 
father, Thomas E Ward, initiated and completed the negotiations in New York which 
finally led to the first American Oil Companies’ participation in the Middle East,” he 
wrote. Ward’s son then admonished the editor with, “you refer to Frederick Lee Moore 
Jnr’s Princeton thesis. Mr Moore relied a great deal upon the information which was 
supplied by my father.” Moore does, in fact, credit in his Preface “the indispensable aid”
27 Pratt, Wallace E, (o f  Standard Oil Company New Jersey) The Value o f  Business History in the Search 
fo r  Oil originally presented to the Harvard School o f  Business Administration and (np) published in Oil’s 
First Century 1960, page 66 “gift for showmanship”; Stegner page 6 “to promote profitable enterprises”; 
Sampson page 103 “acting for a London syndicate”; Ferrier page 561 “concessional wizardry”; Clarke page 
53 “trained as a mining”
Myths and Mistakes 35
afforded him by T E Ward who, he says, “paved the way for USA participation in, and 
early development, of a major part of the world’s richest known petroleum area”. Moore 
gives his primary sources, with two minor exceptions, as interviews, memoranda and 
letters of T E Ward 28
For reasons possibly associated with his friendship with Madgwick, and possibly to 
legitimise himself as a principal in the negotiations between E&GSynd and the 
American oil companies, T E Ward did not credit Frank Holmes with discovering 
Arabian oil. Ward claimed it was his own associate, George T Madgwick, who 
identified the oil riches of Bahrain. Madgwick was in Bahrain assisting Holmes with a 
program, successful, of drilling for artesian water while the initial 1923 grant of the 
Bahrain concession to Holmes was being held up by British officials responding to 
Anglo Persian complaints. Ward states that Madgwick was inspired by the findings of 
Dr Guy E Pilgrim and the first geological expedition mounted in the area by the 
Geological Survey of India in 1904. Unfortunately for Ward, and Madgwick, while 
Pilgrim had noted the possibly favourable anticline feature of Bahrain, he had concluded 
that, because of atmospheric forces “any petroleum that ever existed must long ago have 
drained away”.29
Moore admits that “Holmes had had many opportunities for examining the geological 
structure of the Bahrain Islands, as well as the vague oil seepages that occurred there”. 
He then relies on American Magazine, of which he had been so critical, to state quite 
erroneously that Holmes had “obtained opinions on the oil prospects of Bahrain from as 
many as five competent geologists, but only one, Madgwick,” working from Pilgrim, 
gave a favourable report. Oddly, Moore does state that “the opinion of Professor 
Madgwick on Bahrain was guarded” and goes on to explain that Madgwick had not done 
any survey work, had not made a map, and had recommended only the truly obvious 
“that a deep test should be conducted”.
Yet Moore determines, probably prompted by Ward, that Madgwick’s vague report “was 
virtually the sole geological basis on which an historic decision was made” by the 
Americans to invest in Bahrain. When T E Ward wrote his own book seventeen years
28 Ward papers, December 12th 1971, T E Ward Junior to Dr Henrietta Larson “my father” and “relied a 
great deal”; Moore, Preface and Bibliography
29 Pilgrim, Guy E, Geological Survey o f  India, Memoir, 1908, vol. 6 4  /  Part 4^ “Th6 Geology o f  the Persian 
Gulf and the Adjoining Portions o f  Persia and Arabia”, page 154 “drained away”
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later, he played up the claim that it was Madgwick, not Holmes, who identified 
Bahrain’s oil. To legitimate this claim, Ward employs the extraordinary technique of 
citing Moore’s Princeton thesis. As Ward was the source for Moore, he was, in effect, 
citing himself.30
The correspondence held in the American Heritage Centre of the University of 
Wyoming relating to Ward’s book is illuminating. “What a great thing you have done in 
assembling all this material for publication and then getting the Gulf Oil Corporation’s 
permission for its release. You must have had some very convincing arguments ... before 
clearance was forthcoming,” reads one. “I can’t help wondering how you got permission 
from the various oil companies to publish as many of the letters a la negotiations as you 
have,” says another. Christopher Tugendhat, author of Oil the Biggest Business, wrote 
“some information for my book was in fact drawn from your own great work, lent to me 
by Archie Chisholm of BP and I found it an invaluable source of information.” Ward not 
only initiated the claim that it was Madgwick who discovered Bahrain’s oil, but also 
accepted Karl Twitchell’s claim, that he, not Holmes spotted the oil fields of A1 Hasa. 
Ward repeated Twitched’s claim almost word for word as written in Twitched’s own 
book. Nevertheless, Twitched’s reaction to Ward’s book was less than enthusiastic. 
Obviously without recognising its significance, Ward had reprinted Holmes’ original 
1923 map, showing Holmes’ identification of the oilfield of A1 Hasa some five years 
before Twitched ever set foot in the area. Twitched’s comment on receipt of Ward’s 
book was brief. “The photographs are interesting ... and the maps ...” he responded.31
In 1975, the American Association of Petroleum Geologists published the 
Semicentennial Commemorative Volume, Trek o f the Oil Finders: A History o f 
Exploration for Petroleum, edited by Edgar Wesley Owen. Correspondence and related 
documents are held by the American Heritage Centre. To one correspondent, Owen 
comments: “Several of the published histories of major oil companies are useful, having 
been written by professional historians with access to company records and freedom 
from censorship. Some are excellent; others are abominable. But, with only two
30 Moore page 26 “had many opportunities” and “five geologists but only one”; Moore page 46 “guarded” 
and page 40 “sole geological basis”
31 Ward papers, January 17th 1966 Edward S Bleecker to Ward “in assembling”, September 2nd 1965, 
Charles W Hamilton to Ward “how you got permission”, May 28th 1966, Christopher-Tugendhat to Ward 
“drawn from”, September 3rd 1965, Twitchell to Ward “and the maps”
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exceptions which I have seen, they give the impression that all of the oil was discovered 
in the executive offices of New York, London and The Hague.”32
Unfortunately, for the section on Holmes and the Arabian oil fields, Owen relied on 
“contemporary publications and documents” and a script submitted by two Anglo 
Persian geologists one of whom, P T Cox, had twice inspected Kuwait, including 
drilling, and failed to recognise its oil potential. The other was F E Wellings who wrote 
to Owen in 1964, “... I can’t keep my own name out because any man who has been 
No.2 in the Middle East for 20 years and Chief Geologist in London for a further 10 
years is bound to have served directly for important operational decisions”. All three 
men were critical of previous publications.
Owen remarked on “the ignorance of the geological role of the Longrigg book.” P T Cox 
advised Owen “... in reading Longhurst’s Adventure in Oil it might be well to remember 
that it was written for public relations purposes rather than as serious historical literature 
and its accuracy is no greater than that of good journalistic work.” Cox saw no anomaly 
in his own position as he continued “in acknowledging such information as I have given 
you, I hope you will be able to say that it is published with the permission of the 
Chairman and Directors of the British Petroleum Company Limited”. And Wellings 
warned Owen “our text has been passed by the company (BP). If you rewrite I shall have 
to resubmit your text to the company”.33
Owen was intent on redressing the wrong he believed history had done to geologists by 
not acknowledging their individual achievements in the oil industry. Sadly, Owen cites 
T E Ward and repeats the claim that Madgwick discovered Bahrain oil and Twitchell the 
oil of A1 Hasa. Relying on the script supplied by Cox and Wellings, Owen denies 
Holmes’ his abilities as a geologist mentioning only his negotiating skill and interest in 
acquiring concessions: "Negotiations which led eventually to successful drilling on 
Bahrain Island and indirectly to the development of the Arabian mainland were initiated 
by Major Frank Holmes as agent for Eastern & General Syndicate Ltd of London ... his 
interest in the Middle East originated during the war, when he was a purchasing officer
32 American Heritage Centre, University o f  Wyoming, Owen papers, Box la, September 28th 1964, Owen 
to Wellings “in the executive offices”
33 Owen papers Box la December 28th 1964, F E Wellings to Owen “important operational decisions”, 
August 15th 1966, P T Cox to Owen “with the permission o f’ (interestingly, Cox was also a New 
Zealander); December 28th 1964, F E Wellings to Owen, “resubmit your text”
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for British troops in Mesopotamia and Eritrea. At his instigation, Eastern & General 
Syndicate was organised in 1920 to acquire concessions in the region.”
In 1991, Daniel Yergin locked in this picture of Holmes as not a geologist, but a 
concession hunter. Yergin explains that Holmes was “a promoter par excellence, with a 
gift for making people believe in him, he travelled up and down the Arabian side of the 
Gulf, from one impoverished ruler to the next, spinning his vision, promising them 
wealth where they saw only poverty, seeking always to put another concession into his 
kit.” 34
The Speculators
Holmes personally suffered from what can only be called a bad press and his group, 
Eastern & General Syndicate Limited, was also the target of concerted, and organised, 
castigation. Holmes was not the only one to be treated in this way. In her 1976 work Oil 
& Empire, British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, Marian Kent discusses the depiction of 
William Knox D’Arcy, founder of what became the Anglo Persian Oil Company, as a 
mere concession hunter. She points out that an associate of both Royal Dutch Shell 
and Rothschild Paris oil interests and of Gulbenkian, indicated to the Foreign Office his 
reluctance to combine with D'Arcy saying that D'Arcy wished to obtain the 
Mesopotamian concession merely to resell it but that his own associates intended to 
work it themselves.” She adds that D’Arcy vehemently denied this charge.
Kent accurately points out “in succeeding years the various rivals (for Mesopotamian 
oil) were continually making this accusation against each other”. Charging ones’ 
business rivals with being purely profit-motivated, for example, concession hunters and 
not genuine oil developers, was a technique well practised among those jockeying for 
position in the fledging industries of developing countries. It was particularly successful 
in the British Empire where the grant of monopolies depended on, at least giving the
35appearance of, an intention to better the conditions of the local subject peoples.
34 Owens Trek, page 1319 “negotiations which led”; Yergin page 281 “into his kit”
35 Kent, Marian, Oil and Empire. British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1960-1920, UK: Macmillan, The 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976 pages 24-25
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D’Arcy was a target of the charge of being merely a concession hunter, although in his 
case there may be some truth as he had no background in the sweat, toil, or practical 
aspects of mining and never set foot in Persia. Similar criticisms were proclaimed 
against Calouste Gulbenkian of the original Turkish Petroleum Company. Ralph 
Hewins, for example, assaulted Gulbenkian’s reputation in a book entitled Mr Five Per 
Cent. Yet, Gulbenkian was second generation in an oil business family. He studied 
mining engineering at King’s College London where he presented a thesis on petroleum 
technology. He had hands-on practical experience in the oil fields of Baku and was 
author of a highly respected series on Russian oil. It was Gulbenkian’s report on the 
“great potential” that first aroused interest in Iraq’s oil. Nevertheless, because of the 
tenacity with which he held on to his interest in Turkish Petroleum against the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company, and later American interests, he was branded a concession hunter. 
The same charge was laid against American Rear Admiral Colby M Chester and his 
Ottoman American Development Company which obtained Mesopotamian mineral 
rights, including oil, from the Turkish Government in 1910 and was ousted after World
36War One by the Anglo Persian Oil Company, backed by the British Government.
The Anglo Persian Oil Company was masterful at applying the technique of denigrating 
possible competitors in the Persian Gulf which it viewed as its own “area of influence”. 
Using this technique it had successfully seen off several potential rivals, in Persia and 
Iraq, both before and after the war. When Frank Holmes entered the region, and looked 
like gaining a foothold, the Anglo Persian Oil Company and its supporters in the Indian 
Political Service posted to the Gulf, in the India Office London and in the Admiralty and 
the Petroleum Department, swung into action with a powerful propaganda campaign 
against both Holmes and his syndicate. The campaign was so successful that, even 
today, it is the propaganda that survives in the literature of the discovery and 
development of Arabia’s oil.
Holmes’ group, Eastern & General Syndicate Ltd, was described by the British 
Department of Overseas Trade as headed by individuals “well known to the two West 
African Departments of the Colonial Office as extremely acute men of business 
connected with serious West African mining ventures”. E&GSynd’s Chairman was Sir 
Edmund Davis, who was also Chairman of the respected Chartered & General 
Exploration and Finance Company Ltd and a director of a multitude of mining and
36 For background on Gulbenkian see Yergin page 186; for background on Admiral Chester and the 
Ottoman American Development Company see Shwadran page 197
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railway companies. E&GSynd directors included Edward Janson and Percy Tarbutt, 
both of P C Tarbutt & Co Consulting Engineers and both holding directorships in 
various mining companies. Two other directors were E H Lomas, a mining engineer and 
director of a number of mining and rubber companies and F W Gamble representing the 
giant pharmaceutical and manufacturing chemists Allen & Hanbury’s.
There is no question that this group’s business was the development of its mining 
concessions — a fact fully recognised by the British Government. In 1921, for example, 
the British Board of Trade had unreservedly recommended the group for development of 
a mining venture in Abyssinia, writing to Winston Churchill “this department would 
welcome the granting of a concession to this syndicate”. Yet, the concerted propaganda 
campaign was so effective that barely a trace remains in the oil literature today of the 
true nature of this very serious, and respected, British mining and development group 
with which Frank Holmes had long been associated.37
In his 1948 thesis, Moore explains, “the Eastern & General Syndicate, in seeking oil 
concessions in the Near East, had hoped for a lucky strike, but it relied more fully upon 
its initiative in obtaining large and attractive options for resale to the organised 
petroleum industry or to other aggregates of venture capital which could afford to 
explore and develop the country.” The reporter for the 1939 American Magazine was 
apparently unaware that, from 1917 until 1935, Frank Holmes was working in the Red 
Sea and Persian Gulf, only occasionally returning to London and twice making short 
visits to the USA. American magazine confidently, but completely erroneously, states 
that from 1922 “for six years Holmes went from office to office in London” trying to sell 
his concession; Holmes was “the worst nuisance in London. People ran when they saw 
him coming”.38
And Fortune of 1947 follows this by commenting that Holmes with options on Bahrain 
and A1 Hasa “returned to London ... in vain he tried to peddle his wares ... in the 
fashionable London clubs, Holmes became known as an interminable bore.” While 
Moore had been intensely critical of “journalistic writings”, he also echoed these two 
articles with “in London Major Holmes was busying himself in an attempt to market the
37 PRO/BT66/11 October 1917-December 1918, includes background and composition of the syndicate/s, 
and PRO/CO/727/3 (1917) Colonial Office Memo/Correspondence Department of Overseas Trade
38 Moore page 19 “lucky strike”; American magazine January -t939 page 110 “for six years” and “worst 
nuisance”
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syndicate's oil options to either private investors, or speculators, and to the organised oil 
industry.” Moore does seem a little confused. He states “the syndicate’s directors were 
lukewarm to undertaking the risk of oil developments on their own; they preferred to 
sell the concession.” Three pages later, he writes, “in August 1926, the syndicate stated 
that it had decided to drill in Bahrain by itself’.39
Longrigg says that E&GSynd’s task was “to dispose profitably of the rights acquired” by 
Holmes and their “efforts to ‘place’ their licences and options were long unsuccessful.” 
Shwadran describes E&GSynd as being intent on obtaining “oil concession in the 
Persian Gulf area with the purpose of selling rather than operating them” and Dickson 
describes them as “not an oil company”. Philby says that E&GSynd was “a finance 
company of the City of London with no recognised standing among the great oil 
companies of the world”. Hewins tells his readers that E&GSynd “was formed with the 
object of acquiring oil concessions in the Middle East and selling them to producing 
companies for development.” Mineau says that “Holmes and other engineers who had 
worked together years earlier ... formed Eastern & General Syndicate; among its hopes 
was to buy oil concessions in the Middle East deserts for selling at a profit, in the city, to 
oil companies able to operate such areas, a job the syndicate could not itself tackle; and 
its chief traveller, negotiator and agent was Holmes ...” In his 1982 PhD thesis for the 
University of London, Yossef Bilovich writes that “the syndicate’s policy in the Persian 
Gulf was to secure oil concessions in order to sell them to the highest bidder and not to 
produce oil”.40
Karl Twitchell’s version of events was published in 1947 as Saudi Arabia, With an 
Account of the Development of its Natural Resources. Twitchell extols the virtues of 
“American enterprise” and, although he does not mention either by name, he disposes of 
Frank Holmes and E&GSynd by offering an unsourced opinion, supposedly from Bin 
Saud. Twitched claims Bin Saud told him “he had a former arrangement with a foreign 
oil company concerning A1 Hasa, but as they had not lived up to their terms of 
agreement, he wanted nothing more to do with them.” Twitched overlooks the
39 Fortune May 1947 page 83 “peddle his wares”; Moore page 41 “lukewarm” and page 44 “drill in 
Bahrain”
40 Longrigg pages 100-101 “dispose profitably”; Shwadran page 286 “purpose of selling”; Dickson page 
277 “not an oil company”, Philby Oil Ventures page 54 “no recognised standing”; Hewins page 212 “object 
of acquiring”; Mineau page 179 “for selling at a profit”; Bilovich, Yossef, Great Power and Corporate 
Rivalry in Kuwait 1912-1934: A Study irrdntemational Politics /Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
London 1982] page 84 “to the highest bidder”
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impossibility of operating this concession during the years of Bin Saud’s military 
campaign to capture Mecca and Jedda and the ensuing Ikhwan rebellion that raged 
through the A1 Hasa area. He also ignores the thoroughly documented fact that the 
relationship between Holmes and Bin Saud remained so strong that Bin Saud urgently 
sent for Holmes to join him in Jedda when Twitchell was negotiating on behalf of 
Standard Oil of California.41
When the American oil companies came on the scene they were so keen to gain credit 
for themselves for the discovery of oil in Arabia that they took the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company’s original besmirching technique and doubled it. Standard Oil of California, 
which retained Twitchell (and Philby) during the 1933 purchase of Holmes’ lapsed 
concession, played along, to a point, with Twitchell’s claim to have discovered the oil of 
A1 Hasa. Soon, however, they initiated their own folklore in which it was the men from 
the American oil companies who were mythologised into the “oil pioneers” of Arabia.
The 1950 Aramco Handbook tells its American employees that “the English group, 
E&GSynd, were not oil operators but hoped to interest English companies who were. In 
this they were unsuccessful ... at length the Syndicate turned to America ... and 
American Gulf Oil Corporation sent a geologist to examine and map Bahrain”. Stegner, 
in his 1971 work abridged and published by Aramco, states that E&GSynd “proposed 
either to act as negotiator for oil companies which wanted concessions but lacked 
contacts for making them, or to obtain the concessions first and then sell them to 
companies which could explore and develop them”. In 1976 Anthony Sampson 
describes E&GSynd as “a London syndicate speculating in concessions” and Robert 
Lacey in 1981 called it “a group of speculators who specialised in buying oil 
concessions and selling them on to larger companies”.
Standard Oil New Jersey’s Wallace Pratt characterised Frank Holmes to the Harvard 
conference as “the British Soldier of Fortune” and said “early in the 1920’s he had 
already opened a vigorous campaign to dispose of the concessions he hoped to obtain. 
He went first to London ... then to New York”. Wallace Pratt also depicts Holmes not as 
a geologist but as a broker of concessions. He said that “despite his failure to interest 
either of the three (big oil) companies who were his most likely customers, Major
41 Twitchell, K S, Saudi Arabia, With an Account o f the Development o f its Natural Resources USA: 
Princeton University Press, 1947 (with the collaboration of Edward J Jurji) page 146 “had a former 
arrangement”
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Holmes and an American associate, Thomas E Ward, persisted in their sales effort on 
both sides of the Atlantic. All through the early and middle 1920’s these two haunted the 
offices of the big oil companies both in London and New York ... for years a diligent 
broker goes about the world striving vainly to sell to the leading units in the industry the 
greatest of all our oilfields. For years he found no buyer ...”42
Conclusion
By tracing the literature, some of the inconsistencies, discrepancies and 
misinterpretation of the record of the discovery and development of Arabia’s oil have 
been addressed. To be fair, some writers appear to have been aware of the discrepancies 
in the accepted accounts on which they were relying. Frederick Lee Moore, for example, 
noted in 1948 that “the impact of the discovery of the Arabian oil resources is recent, 
and so great, as to overshadow its origin ... further investigation of the events ... will 
have to wait upon the opening of (government and oil company) files.” Moore also notes 
that Twitchell’s account does not ring true and comments, “this is not to infer that 
Twitchell deliberately has not made a true report ... but only that the record in his book 
is incomplete.” Benjamin Shwadran in 1956 remarks on the oddity that, in his book, 
Twitched “does not mention Philby’s role” in the resale of Holmes’ A1 Hasa concession 
to Standard Oil of California. He notes also that Roy Lebkicher, in Aramco and World 
Oil “confirms Philby’s role, but minimises Twitched’s” Archibald Chisholm, who was 
Head of Public Relations at British Petroleum 1945-1962, in a letter to Ward, candidly 
admits the bias in his book as he says it “was written primarily for the archives of the 
British Petroleum Company Ltd”. 43
In January 1950, Roy Lebkicher had felt it necessary to include in Aramco’s Handbook 
for American Employees the following passage: “In mentioning the lack of interest of 
the English oil companies in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia ... no disparagement of their 
judgement is intended. They had good reasons for their views (that there was no oil in 
Arabia) ... The point is made primarily to correct an impression commonly held that
42 Lebkicher, page 23 “turned to America”; Stegner page 6 “either to act as”; Sampson page 103 
“speculating in concessions”; Lacey page 170 “specialised in buying”; Pratt page 66 “haunted the offices”
43 Moore Introduction to Bibliography “overshadow its origins”; Shwadran page 290 “Philby’s role” and 
“minimises Twitchell’s”
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Standard Oil of California ‘knew’ there was oil in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia before 
beginning its ventures in these countries.”
Lebkicher would have been dealing with the problem that, despite the public relations 
efforts of the oil companies, the Arabs of the Persian Gulf recognised the skills of Frank 
Holmes, so much so that they dubbed him Abu Al Naft, the Father of Oil. Standard Oil of 
California bought Holmes’ original concessions. Certainly, the Arabs “knew” there was 
oil there, because Holmes said there was, and after he was proved correct, they 
continued to praise Holmes as the discoverer of the Arabian oil fields.
Nevertheless, the American “correction”, of what was indeed common knowledge at the 
time, has been so effective that in 1999 Aramco World could unflinchingly close its 
article “Prelude to Discovery” by stating that four months after the May 1933 resale to 
Standard Oil of California of Holmes’ lapsed 1923 Al Hasa concession, two American 
geologists arrived and “the search for oil in Saudi Arabia had begun”.44
In the introduction to his 1982 PhD thesis on the negotiations for the Kuwait oil 
concession, Yossef Bilovich points out “the history of the Persian Gulf oil concessions 
has never been fully outlined nor analysed in any depth”. He adds. “The accounts 
provided by former employees of the various oil companies ... have been inclined to 
treat their publications merely as an exercise in public relations.” In a 1988 article, 
Bilovich comments that “the Bahrain case is relatively unknown and the existing record 
quite erroneous”.
In 1971 Wallace Stegner, whose book on Standard Oil of California and Saudi Arabia, 
observed that the story of the Al Hasa concession “has been told several times”, 
including Philby, Longrigg and Shwadran. But, noted Stegner, “it has never been quite 
fully or quite accurately told, even by those who participated in it.” Stegner did not 
claim to redress this injustice as he comments “some day, some historian ... will relate 
the episode in detail” 45
44 Lebkicher, page 25 “to correct an impression”; Grutz “Prelude” page 34 “search had begun”
45 Ward papers, March 15th 1965, Chisholm to Ward “primarily for ...BP”;; Stegner pages 17-18 “some 
day some historian”; Bilovich unpublished thesis page V “never fully outlined”; Bilovich, Yossef, “The 
Quest for Oil in Bahrain, 1923-1930: A Study in British and American Policy”, in The Great Powers in the 
Middle East 1919-1939, ed. Uriel Dann, for Tel Aviv University, Holmes & Meier 1988, pages 252-268 
“record quite erroneous”; Moore page 82 “is incomplete”
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SECTION ONE 
The Background
Chapter Two
NO OIL IN ARABIA
Introduction
The discovery and development of oil in Arabia is a story set in the context of the 
imperialism of the day and punctuated by the faults and drawbacks of imperial and 
colonial systems. The big successes, in Persia and in Iraq, were a matter of hijacking 
cottage industries that already existed in oil extraction — as had been done in Burma. In 
Arabia, where the great oil fields waited to be discovered, rather than merely 
appropriated, the oil companies failed completely.
For 30 years, from the first expedition mounted by the Geological Survey of India in 
1904 until the seventh “investigation” of Kuwait’s oil seepages in 1932, the belief that 
Arabia held no prospects for oil was an article of faith. Geological survey followed 
geological survey and one after the other each reached the same conclusion — there was 
no oil in Arabia.
The conclusion owed as much to the organisational structures in which the oil seekers 
were employed, an environment of patronage, paternalism and proteges, as it did to the 
scientific standards of the day. Once Arabia had been decreed devoid of oil by the 
acknowledged experts, few men of ambition would disagree with the opinion of their 
superiors — certainly not when promotion depended on loyalty, being a “team player”, 
and keeping the job long enough to achieve seniority. This obedient respect for superiors 
was actively approved by a hierarchical management structure that drew its members 
from a closed network of like-minded and well-connected, Servants of Empire. Early 
20th century British corporations, such as the Anglo Persian Oil Company, seemed no 
more inclined towards meritocracy than was the Empire’s civil Service.
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British Petroleum historian R W Ferner attempts to rationalise the failure to recognise 
Arabia’s oil riches. He theorises that “what has been assumed to be the political 
sensitivity or indifference of Anglo Persian has, in fact, been due to genuine geological 
differences of opinion.” It is doubtful, however, whether any difference of opinion did 
occur, genuine or otherwise. There may have been one or two hesitant suggestions about 
possible further examination of Kuwait or Bahrain, for example, but no evidence exists 
to show any firmly held opposing view. Before moving on to the geological surveys, all 
of which recorded opinions of an “oil dry” Arabia, it is necessary to examine the myth 
propagated after this opinion was shown to be in error.1
The Myth
The 1932 oil strike in Bahrain, and then in, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Neutral Zone, 
in concession areas originally delineated by Frank Holmes a decade earlier, left many 
highly rewarded people very embarrassed indeed. A number of myths were subsequently 
fostered in an effort to gloss over the fact that, in the conviction there was no oil in 
Arabia, the established experts were so wrong, so often, and for so long. The prime myth 
holds that the Anglo Persian Oil Company (in 1935 renamed Anglo Iranian Oil 
Company and, in 1955, British Petroleum) and its geologists did know there was oil on 
the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf — but either contrived a strategy of publicly stating 
there was not in order to deter competition from what they considered to be their turf, or 
employed tactics aimed at delaying competitors until they themselves were ready to 
develop these fields.2
1 Ferner page 541 “genuine geological differences”
2 Knox D ’Arcy (see Who's Who) formed First Exploration Company in 1901, investment from Burma Oil 
(see Who's Who) created Anglo Persian Oil Company in 1909 in which the British Government purchase a 
51% interest in 1914. Anglo Persian acquired in 1917 the British Petroleum Company, the Petroleum 
Steamship Company and the Homelight Oil Company from the British Public Trustee (registered in Britain 
and Breman, the three companies had been confiscated as enemy property). Anglo Persian was renamed 
Anglo Iranian in 1935 along with Persia’s change of name. In May 1951, the Iranian Government 
nationalised the properties of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company and declared a new company called the 
National Iranian Oil Company. Anglo Iranian Oil Company continued as the vehicle to receive 
compensation payments and as the 40% shareholder in the eight-company consortium formed in 1954 as 
operators of the National Iranian Oil Company. The agreement officially designated the consortium as “an 
Exploration and Producing Company and a Refining Company known as The Operating Companies”. In 
1955, Anglo Iranian Oil Company was relegated to a subsidiary and the name British Petroleum Company 
Ltd became the dominant title.
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In his 1982 PhD thesis on the negotiations for Kuwait's oil, and 1988 article on 
Bahrain’s oil in “The Great Powers in the Middle East 1919-1939”, Yossef Bilovich 
accepts without question the myth that Anglo Persian knew there was oil in Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. “Indications of oil were evident”, he alleges, and surmises 
that the company concentrated on trying to get backing from the British Government “in 
order to deter any other group from entering the field”. Bilovich says the company 
wanted to postpone any “costly activity” until such time as their financial situation 
improved. He claims that, although they were “unwilling” to take on oil exploration in 
the Persian Gulf for “several years to come” the company was “eager to secure 
government acknowledgment at least of its priority right”. Somewhat lamely, he 
explains Anglo Persian’s refusal to match Frank Holmes’ financial terms for the Arab 
concessions by stating that “they considered it a dangerous precedent to pay higher dues 
in the Persian Gulf than those paid in Persia”. If, as Bilovich contends, Anglo Persian 
was certain there were substantial oil reserves in these states, it is hardly feasible they 
would not lift their offers by the relatively small amount required in order to gain the 
concessions and thus ensure to themselves both the monopoly of the area and all 
expected future profits.
Shwadran also followed the myth in 1956 when he wrote: “In 1910 geologists of the 
British Indian Survey [sic] discovered seepages of oil in Bahrain. Coming as it did after 
the successful discovery of oil in Persia and the organisation of the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company there was apparently considerable discussion of oil possibilities in Bahrain. 
The British pressed the Shaikh for a definite commitment not to permit the exploitation 
of oil by non British concerns.” Shwadran misses the point that the first examination by 
the Geological Survey of India in 1904, and again in 1913 (not 1910) and the 
Admiralty’s “Oil Experts’ Commission” sent by Winston Churchill in the same year, 
reported enthusiastically on Persia but expressed little interest in either Kuwait or 
Bahrain (see below). Not until three year later, in mid war 1916, did Admiral Slade, 
head of Churchill’s 1913 commission, advocate gaining control of the oil rights of the 
entire Arabian Gulf (Mesopotamia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Arabia) so “no other power” could 
enter the area.
In this, Slade, who was appointed a director of the Anglo Persian Oil Company after the 
British Government bought its 51% interest, and was Vice Chairman in 1916, was
3 Bilovich thesis page 58 “deter any other group” page 67 “unwilling to take on”; Bilovich “Quest for Oil in 
Bahrain” page 253 “dangerous precedent”
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supporting the company’s bid to be granted a regional monopoly, similar to that held 
throughout the Indian Empire by its influential second shareholder and operating 
company, Burma Oil. Coincidental with Slade’s advice, the company chairman 
addressed the Foreign Office stating that he expected Anglo Persian would “in the event 
of any change in the Middle East favourable to British interests occurring, be given the 
complete oil rights over any portion of the Turkish Empire which may come under 
British influence”. British influence was already well established in Bahrain, Kuwait and 
with Bin Saud, and the Shaikhs had signed agreements not to “cede, sell or lease” any 
concession without British permission. Yet, Anglo Persian made no real effort to move 
in there, either in 1916 or after the war. Indeed, the chairman’s letter opens with a 
specific reference to an area “100 miles inland from the Shatt al Arab River lying 
between Kuwait and Ur of the Chaldees ... which shows there are possibilities of 
finding oil in the area surveyed”. Clearly, Anglo Persian’s interest was not in the Arab 
shaikhdoms, but in Mesopotamia, where a thriving local industry already existed in oil 
extraction. 4
The myth has sometimes been endorsed by claims the Anglo Persian Oil Company was 
attempting to obtain concessions, particularly in Kuwait, from as early as 1911. This 
does not stand up to scrutiny. The incident on which the claim is based is examined later 
in this chapter; it involves Scottish engineer George Reynolds, credited with “setting the 
very foundations of the Iranian oil industry”. Reynolds was fired soon after bringing in 
Anglo Persian’s first successful well. Shortly after dismissing him, Sir Charles 
Greenway, Chairman of Anglo Persian, learned that Reynolds was interesting the still 
Dutch controlled Shell in exploring Kuwait. Greenway turned to the Government of 
India’s powerful Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Percy Cox, requesting he 
secure a concession in Kuwait explaining that “it would be very prejudicial to have a 
powerful foreign rival on our heels in the Persian Gulf’. But Greenway also clearly 
stated, “I do not know what reasons Reynolds has for assuming that there are any oil 
deposits of value in Kuwait ... the question of whether or not there are oil deposits of 
any value in Kuwait is, of course, entirely problematic”.5
Anglo Persian’s conviction that the Arab shaikhdoms were oil barren was obvious in a 
July 1924 report for the Management Committee that said: “Although the geological
4 Shwadran page 371 “considerable discussion”; Ferner page 580 quoting Slade Memorandum “Political 
Position in the Persian Gulf at the End of the War”; PRO/FO/371/2721 February 25th 1916, Confidential, 
Charles Greenway, APOC Chairman, to Foreign Office “between Kuwait and Ur”
5 Ferrier page 73 “very foundations”; Chisholm page 87 “entirely problematic”
No Oil in Arabia 49
information we possess at present does not indicate that there is much hope of finding 
oil in Bahrain or Kuwait, we are, I take it, all agreed that even if the chance be 100 to 1, 
we should pursue (blocking Holmes), rather than let others come into the Persian Gulf 
and cause difficulties of one kind or another for us.” In the event, Anglo Persian’s 
“pursuit” of the matter did not extend to financial commitment or development 
undertakings that would have secured them Bahrain, Kuwait and Bin Saud’s territories 
with British Government backing. As noted dryly by geologist P T Cox, it was not until 
Holmes’ Bahrain field struck oil in 1932, just weeks after Cox’s own negative survey of 
Kuwait, that “Anglo Persian set about getting a concession from the Shaikh of Kuwait as 
a matter of urgency”.6
Holmes’ pinpointing of the oil resources of Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was a 
blow to Britain’s national prestige, one that reverberated for years. Despite the fact that 
throughout the 1930s outraged MPs continued to raise questions in the British 
Parliament about the failure to recognise the oil riches of Arabia, Winston Churchill 
personally propagated the myth of British discovery. In his forward to Henry 
Longhursf s 1959 Adventure in Oil, The Story o f British Petroleum, Winston Churchill 
referred to his own “close association” with the Anglo Persian Oil Company and praised 
“the pioneering of the vast oil industry of the Middle East; a story of vigour and 
adventure in the best traditions of the merchant venturers of Britain”.
Poor Discovery Record
Yet actual discovery of oil was not one of the skills of the Anglo Persian Oil Company. 
Prior to the arrival of the British, a cottage industry in oil extraction already existed in 
Persia. W K Loftus, of the Persian Turkish Frontier Commission of 1848, estimated that 
12,000 pounds of liquid naphtha and prepared bitumen were collected annually in the 
area of the Bakhtiyari Mountains. A takeover of “certain existing seepages, worked 
privately at Shustar, Qasr-i-Shirin and Dalaki” was agreed in the concessionary 
arrangements between D’Arcy and the Persian Government. Anglo Persian’s most 
productive field at Maidan-i-Naftun had been producing oil since Biblical times. The 
name translates to “area of oil”; this was perhaps too obvious. Company publications
6 Ferner page 566 “100 to 1”; Owen pages 1336-1337 “a matter of urgency”
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took to describing the area as Masjid-i-Suleiman instead, although this was almost as big 
a giveaway. It means “Temple of Suleiman” and was the site of a sacred fire temple, 
erected around the permanent gas escape from the nearby oilfield.
Simply muscling in on an existing operation was nothing new in the imperial 
experience. Anglo Persian’s partner and operating company, Burma Oil, had already 
done exactly this, with great success, in Burma after her 1885 annexation to India. 
Founded by a group of Scottish traders and investors, Burma Oil had begun by 
appropriating the oil gathering activities of Burmese village people, an appropriation on 
which it built a commercial industry and a refinery in Rangoon; the growth of Burma 
Oil was aided by the monopoly it obtained from the Government of India over the sale 
and extraction of oil products throughout the Indian Empire. 7
The Germans had already completed a considerable amount of work in Mesopotamia 
(Iraq) where, after World War One, the Anglo Persian Oil Company moved in through 
its 50% holding in the Turkish Petroleum Company. Since the late 1800s German 
geologists had reported favourably on Iraq and held several options, interrupted by the 
occasional military coup and the 1908 revolution. During World War One, the Germans 
ambitiously developed Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk, Tuz, Qaiyara and Hit. They shallow 
drilled, built walkways and galleries, conducted basic refining and transported this fuel 
by road tanks for military use; they were planning a pipeline to the Mediterranean. Yet, 
when Anglo Persian/Turkish Petroleum brought in a well at Baba Gurgur in 1927, they 
had no hesitation in claiming it as their own “sensational” find and were equally self 
congratulatory at Qaiyara in 1928.8
Ferrier does admit Anglo Persian’s poor discovery record. He states that the company 
was in a situation where “ no alternative sources of supply to Persia had been discovered 
by 1923” -  some 14 years after Ma idem-i-Naftun -  and “concessionary success had 
certainly not been commensurate with the efforts taken or the money spent”. When he 
joined the company, John Cadman criticised its concessionary activities as “primarily 
based on examination of territory which has been brought to our notice through third 
parties ...” Anglo Persian did have a step by step procedure to follow in the search for 
new oil fields. Ferrier explains “the procedure ... was to acquire concessions, examine 
them, test them if geologically favourable, and then float a working company if the tests
7 Owen page 1263 “liquid naptha and prepared bitumen” and page 125.3 “certain existing seepages”
8 For early German involvement see Longrigg pages 13-15,45, page 69 “sensational”, page 71 “Qaiyara”
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were sufficiently promising”. He continues: “This was a simple procedure which kept 
expenditure to a minimum. It did not involve any cash liability, other than the cost of 
geological examination, until the company was satisfied with the geological evidence. 
At that point there would be the expense of testing operations ...”
Because of Britain’s power in the Persian Gulf, the company had been able to move 
directly to “examining” Bahrain, Kuwait, Bin Saud’s territories and the Trucial States 
without incurring any preliminary cost for prospecting licences. The fact that they did 
not then acquire concessions in these areas, or attempt to implement any of the other 
steps, further indicates the strength of their conviction that there was no oil in Arabia. 
Anglo Persian had adhered to the procedure in other areas. By 1924 they had abandoned 
interest in Cyprus, Russia, Sicily, Brunei, Timor, Angola, Egypt, the Gold Coast, 
Guinea, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Madagascar and New Brunswick. During this period 
of hectic concessionary exploration, no effort had been taken, or money spent, right next 
door on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf — which certainly makes suspect the later 
claims by Anglo Persian, mythologised after the successes of Holmes’ fields, to have 
known all along that oil existed there.9
American Delight
The Americans took some delight in the British discomfort at being shown up 
geologically and technically by their failure to recognise the oil riches of the Arab side 
of the Persian Gulf. In his 1948 thesis, Moore emphasised that “because of the British 
protected status of the shaikhdoms in the area, only the British were allowed to explore 
the territory for purposes of future exploitation”. The 1950 Aramco Handbook assured 
its American employees that the discovery and development of Saudi Arabia’s oil was 
“a story of distinctly American flavour” based on “common effort on the part of typical 
Americans working together in a tradition of free enterprise”. American employees were 
told that the British oil companies were not interested in the Arab concessions because 
they were “not prepared for expansion in uncertain ventures.” Somewhat patronisingly, 
the explanation continues, “there have been examples in the United States of newcomers
9 Ferrier page 542 “through third parties”, page 547 “no alternative sources”, page 524 “procedures”; page 
544 “had abandoned”
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entering an area and finding oil in places which the companies with experience there 
had condemned on similar geological grounds”.10
The article in American magazine of 1939 is not nearly so kind as it trumpets: “Bahrain 
is one of the world’s great oilfields. It was discovered and built up by the Standard Oil 
Company of California.” The article gloats: “For years the British Government and 
British oil companies, which are tied in one bundle, told each other, told the Shaikh and 
all parties who wanted them to gamble on a test well, that there was no oil there ... it is 
difficult for the British to explain why Americans could find oil where the English said 
there wasn’t any.”* 11
Despite all the subsequent American bravado, the fact is that before moving in on Frank 
Flolmes’ identification and mapping of the oil reserves of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 
Standard Oil of California’s own record of discovery was as dismal as that of the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company. In 1920, Standard Oil of California (Socal) had set out to expand 
its sources beyond its traditional area of the Western United States. A division was set 
up called “Foreign Crude Oil Production” and geologists were sent to Central and South 
America, Mexico, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. From 1920 to 1928 some 
$50 million was spent on foreign exploration, drilling and concessions; Socal explored 
and relinquished one concession after the other. By 1929, when it took over Frank 
Holmes’ Bahrain concession, Standard Oil of California had not been able to develop a 
single barrel of foreign commercial production. Vice President Maurice Lombardi 
would later recall that during this period “a foreign legion of Socal men probed various 
places”. And in 1953, Lombardi would admit to being no better than Burma Oil, Anglo 
Persian and Iraq Petroleum in the habit of taking over other peoples’ discoveries. He
revealed that: “Sumatra oil fields, from which oil is now shipped to California, were
12found for us by the Japanese during their occupation of that country ...”
10 Moore page 11-12 “only British could explore”; Lebkicher, Preface “distinctly American flavour” page 
25 “examples in the USA”
11 American magazine page 111 “why Americans could find oil”
12 For detail o f Socal 1920-1931 see Moore pages 60-62, 78, citing Annual Reports; also see Moore page 
68 “total expenditure on Bahrain to the date o f discovery was a mere $650,000” mostly spent on drilling 
and equipment; Chevron Oil Archives, Box 0120814, December 18th 1953, Re Socal Antitrust Case, In 
House interview with Maurice E Lombardi “foreign legion” and “found by the Japanese”
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The Surveys
It may have been their very political power that allowed the British experts to get it so 
wrong, so often and for so long. Absolute British hegemony over the Arab shaikhdoms 
of the Persian Gulf ensured that only the narrowest of views were aired. In contrast, 
before becoming a British Mandate following World War One, Mesopotamia had been 
visited by an international array of natural scientists and travellers, as had Persia. 
Consequently, while only the British knew Arabia, the oil resources of Iraq and Persia 
were widely recognised.
An Austrian geologist, Emil Tietze, summarised the oil possibilities of the Middle East 
in his 1879 review of the accounts of travellers. Tietze wrote: “Claudius Rich is of the 
opinion that... petroleum might be found in various areas (other than Persia) within that 
entire mountain range. Indeed, it seems that near Kirkuk, Tuz, and Kifri, one of the most 
important petroleum areas of the old world is waiting for future exploration, once those 
areas, at present still much too remote, will be made more accessible to European skill.”
Tietze’s opinion of the adjacent area appears so startlingly ahead of its time that it is 
difficult to imagine how it was almost totally ignored by the petroleum seekers of the 
first decades of the 20th century. Tietze wrote: “it might be of interest to mention the 
occurrence of bitumen on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf ... the possibility of a 
geologic connection between the south Persian and the Arabian petroleum areas 
certainly exists in the same manner as between the bitumen seepages on the Caucasian 
and those on the Turkmenian side of the Caspian sea.” With notable clarity, Tietze adds: 
“Any petroleum industry to be established in Persia should realise the possibility of a 
foreign, but nearby competition, and therefore reckon with the condition on the Arabian 
side of the Gulf.”13
Unlike Persia and Mesopotamia, few “foreigners” made it through the stifling embrace 
of the Government of India’s “protection” of the Arabian side of the Gulf. From the late 
1800s what was known about these mysterious shaikhdoms came from British scientific 
expeditions. And in the hierarchical imperial environment of seniority and mentors, a
13 Owen; page 1282: Tietze’s reference is to Claudius James Rich (1787-1821) His widow published in 
1836 "Narrative of a residence in Koordistan, and on the site of ancient Ninevah, with journal of a voyage 
down the T ig r i s Owen page 1319 “possibility of a foreign”
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self-protective herd instinct prevailed even in supposedly independent scientific 
endeavour. In organisations where promotion was awarded by Heads of Department, 
few men would go out on a limb by disagreeing with the opinion of a superior.
Men like D’Arcy’s first oilfinder in Persia, Scottish engineer George Reynolds, and the 
New Zealander Frank Holmes who had spent most of his working life in non British 
countries, were outsiders — and they were visibly made to pay a price for their non­
conformism as the Establishment closed ranks against them. Perhaps it was this very 
factor of being outside the dominant corporate cultures, not socialised into company or 
imperialist patterns of thought and behaviour, that generated their independent mentality 
and risk-taking approach rather than mere acceptance of the prevailing wisdom. 
Certainly, when tracing through the geological surveys, from Pilgrim in 1904 to Cox in 
1932, a culture of conformism clearly emerges and is, perhaps, one explanation for the 
repeated failure to recognise the oil riches of Arabia.
Redwood 1895-1906
At the turn of the 20th century the most respected British expert on petroleum was Sir 
Boverton Redwood. His 1895 Treatise on Petroleum, reissued in 1906 and again in 
1913, covered all the known theory and data on geographical distribution and geological 
occurrence, chemical properties, refining, transport and storage of petroleum and natural 
gas. His London based consultancy provided geologists to every comer of the world. At 
one time Redwood, whose training was in chemistry, was consultant to the Burma Oil 
Company and to D’Arcy Exploration (forerunner of Anglo Persian Oil Company). He 
also directed large-scale exploration in Mexico while simultaneously servicing other 
clients scattered across the globe. He was Adviser on Petroleum to the Admiralty, the 
Home Office and the India Office and also Consulting Adviser to the Colonial Office. 
Redwood was either a member, or one of the important advisers, on every official 
petroleum related committee and was one of the earliest and most consistent advocates 
of liquid fuel in warships that would later culminate in Winston Churchill committing 
the British Government to a commercial partnership with Anglo Persian.
Redwood’s Treatise remained the standard work for two decades. His influence ran 
strongly through the early years of petroleum exploration in the Persian Gulf. The
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recommendations of the first official British geological reconnaissance, mounted by the 
Government of India, were rooted in Redwood’s theories. Under the heading “Arabia” 
Redwood recorded, without comment, Tietze’s mention of the observations taken by 
Captain C G Constable while mapping the waters of the Gulf Redwood recorded: “On 
the eastern side of Arabia, traces of petroleum occur at Benaid el Oar near Koweit on 
the Persian Gulf, on the waters of which also films of oil often appear, after earthquakes 
or storms between the islands of Kubbar and Garu, and again near Farsi Island. Deposits 
of bitumen are also reported as found on Bahrein Island, and oil is said to rise in the sea 
off Halal Island eastward of Bahrein peninsula.”14
Pilgrim 1904-1905
Following his majestic tour of the Persian Gulf in 1903 -  designed to leave the Shaikhs 
in no doubt as to who was in charge -  Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, commissioned the 
Geological Survey of India to explore and document minerals in the area that could be 
of economic importance to the Government of India. The task went to the Survey’s 
Deputy Superintendent, Guy E Pilgrim. Beginning in Oman in November 1904 Pilgrim 
trekked along the coast to Dubai and up to Qatar, went on to Bahrain and to the islands 
of the lower Gulf and, until June 1905, travelled across southern Persia; Pilgrim did not 
visit Kuwait. After the 1906 general publication of his report, The Geology o f the 
Persian Gulf and the Adjoining Portions o f Persia and Arabia, and with the prestige of 
the Geological Survey of India behind him, Pilgrim became the accepted authority on 
the Persian Gulf.
Pilgrim would surely have been familiar with Tietze’s 1879 review but appears to have 
ignored it in favour of the work of Redwood, the eminence grise of oil affairs, and 
British to boot. Pilgrim firmly adhered to the theory expounded in Redwood’s Treatise 
and “now universally accepted” that petroleum originated at the same time as the 
gypsum beds “in which it is stored”. Pilgrim merged Redwood’s theory with the belief, 
popular in Europe since the 1840s, that gypsum originated through the action of 
volcanic gases on limestone. Pilgrim now decreed “the formation of the petroleum is 
directly due to volcanic action”. Putting forward his volcanic theory, Pilgrim took a 
swipe at the French commenting: “I cannot share M. de Morgan’s opinion expressed in
14 Redwood, Sir Boverton, Petroleum: A Treatise, London: second edition Charles Griffin & Co, 1906
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the Annales des Mines, 1892, and in Mission Scientifique en Perse, that there is a great 
subterranean source, which feeds the surface reservoir.” In this Pilgrim was echoing 
Redwood’s acerbic putdown of “minds of a certain calibre” which presented the 
“wildest assertions as to underground ‘rivers’ or ‘lakes’ of oil”.
The volcanic theory fitted neatly the manifestation in the Gulf waters that Pilgrim notes 
as “apparently bituminous springs exist beneath the sea, as Captain Constable records 
his ship having passed through a sea covered with an oily substance emitting a strong 
smell of naphtha.” Pilgrim reached the same conclusion as Redwood, that these were 
“mud volcanoes” and that “the occurrence of these volcanoes, and of hot springs 
generally, were merely the accompaniment of metamorphic change “not possessing any 
significance in regard to the occurrence of petroleum”.
Pilgrim also favoured the mistaken, but prevailing belief, that productive reservoirs were 
to be found in the lowest beds of the Fars series “which in their lithological character 
would afford as favourable a reservoir as could be desired”. As to the low range of hills 
in Persia, where “petroleum springs” were situated, Pilgrim surmised “since the greater 
part of the formation has been laid bare for ages untold, it is also evident that most of 
the petroleum that existed in it once has now been wasted”. And he predicted the same 
barrenness for Bahrain. “The strata which overlie the Jebel Durkhan beds are admirably 
adapted lithogically for storing petroleum ... In the present instance, however, as I have 
already stated, not only the whole of the ‘cover’ but also the whole of these porous beds 
have been removed from the anticline by the operation of atmospheric forces, so that 
any petroleum that ever existed must long ago have drained away.”
Redwood had written of “trivial oozings from shallow and temporary crevices”. Pilgrim 
agreed. He reported that conspicuous “shows” did not signify much because “the laws of 
hydrostatic pressure would naturally force a limited vein or pocket deposit of petroleum 
to find an outlet”. The only deposit of asphalt, or bitumen, that Pilgrim actually 
examined was that of Bahrain. He dismissed this completely as he concluded “the 
deposit need not be seriously considered in the light of its offering any scope for an 
export trade, although it would be a pity not to make some use of it locally”. For 
Bahrain, he recommended further consideration of sulphur and iron oxide mining and 
perhaps quarrying of gypsum and building stone.
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Pilgrim thought the whole area he spent eight months examining was a pretty poor 
prospect. He concluded: “Southern Persia and the Gulf region do not present as 
favourable a field for prospecting operations as Northern Persia seems to. Petroleum 
alone seems to offer any promise of great financial success and the ultimate issue of the 
work which is being carried on in regard to that remains at present quite doubtful.” 
Pilgrim’s reference was to the failure of the Persian sites, recommended by Sir Boverton 
Redwood, and now being closed down by D’Arcy’s exploration company. Drilling had 
begun at Redwood’s recommended Persian sites in 1902. At the time Pilgrim was in the 
area, 1904-1905, original shows had shrunk to a trickle and the early Redwood sites 
were being abandoned.13
Reynolds 1902-1911
Pilgrim’s negative report sponsored by the authoritative Geological Survey of India 
squashed any geological interest in the Arabian side of the Gulf. Only George Reynolds 
seems to have disagreed with Pilgrim’s conclusions. Reynolds, a graduate of the Royal 
Indian Engineering College, was in charge of the D’Arcy operations from their 
beginning. As noted earlier, it was Reynolds, in May 1908 as Chief Engineer, who 
proved the rich Persian oil field at Masjid-i-Sulaiman, the site which Reynolds had spent 
two years unsuccessfully advocating to D’Arcy’s consultant, Sir Boverton Redwood.
In December 1910, eighteen months after producing the first commercial oil in the 
Middle East, Reynolds was summoned to London and unceremoniously dismissed by 
Charles (later Sir) Greenway, Chairman and Managing Director of Anglo Persian — 
both chairman and company now firmly secured on the basis of Reynolds’ work. Eight 
of Reynolds’ wells had struck oil and there was no doubt about the oilfield he had 
proven. After ten years in Persia, Reynolds was given a severance consideration of 1,000 
sterling. In his history of the company Ferrier concluded that Greenway, who spent his
15 See IOL/R/15/5/236 November 26th 1912, Confidential, Percy Cox to Government of India 
“Pilgrim...did not visit Kuwait...only refers to Kuwait incidentally...”; Redwood page 111 “universally 
accepted”; Pilgrim page 146 “due to volcanic action”; Owen page 1261 “theory of origin o f gypsum”; 
Pilgrim page 147 “cannot share Morgan’s opinion”; Redwood page 117 “wildest assertions”; Pilgrim page 
143 “apparently bitumous springs”; Redwood page 122 “not possesing signifiance”; Pilgrim pages 146-7 
“has now been wasted” and 154 “have drained away”; Redwood page 118 “trivial oozings”; Pilgrim page 
147 “find an outlet” and 154 “not seriously considered”, page 32 mentions several times D ’Arcy 
unsuccessful drillings, page 144 “quite doubtful”
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career in India with an establishment firm of British managing agents, had decided the 
rough and ready Reynolds was not a Company Man.
After his dismissal from the company that owed so much to his skill and tenacity, 
Reynolds showed interest in Kuwait where, in 1903, he had had time to look around 
because of a delay arranging passage back to England. In London in 1911, after his 
dismissal, Reynolds was talking to Royal Dutch Shell about Kuwait. News of the 
discussions reached Anglo Persian. Greenway, although doubtful about there being oil in 
Kuwait -  “The question of whether or not there are oil deposits of any value in Koweit 
is, of course, entirely problematic” -  was nevertheless wary of Reynolds’ instinct and 
demonstrated skill.
Greenway appealed to Percy Cox, the Government of India’s Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf, to take action to block Reynolds. Although Cox replied that conditions in 
the area were too disturbed for an application to be put forward, no more is heard of 
Reynolds in the area of the Persian Gulf. Instead, after proving oil in Persia, Reynolds 
went on to make major discoveries in Venezuela. Had Greenway not blocked him, 
George Reynolds may have gone on to prove Kuwait’s oilfields, 27 years before an 
Anglo Persian/Gulf Oil combine finally drilled successfully in the Frank Holmes’ 
advocated site at Burgan ... after two unsuccessful years at other sites, as directed by the 
company geologists.16
Pascoe 1913
It was Reynolds’ interest that 18 months later inspired a secret agreement between the 
Government of India, Percy Cox, the Kuwait Political Agent and Anglo Persian’s 
Greenway to arrange with the Geological Survey of India to take a closer look at the oil 
possibilities of Kuwait. The scheme was for the geological survey to be put to the 
Shaikh of Kuwait under the guise of a report on the possibilities of initiating a water
16 See Ferner page 86 and Yergin page 143 for the May 1908 strike and “eight of Reynold’s wells”; Ferrier 
page 139 particularly citing Greenway’s comments about Reynolds and saying he wanted “a good office 
man”; Yergin page 142 and Ferrier page 66 refer to Reynolds meeting the Indian Viceroy, Lord Curzon, in 
Kuwait on November 28th 1903; Pilgrim page 32 mentions meeting Mr G B Reynolds and examining 
geological specimens he had collected from beds in the Bakhtiyari country; Ferrier page 139 “major 
discoveries in Venezuela”
No Oil in Arabia 59
supply for Kuwait Town. The sensitive mission went to E H Pascoe, Assistant 
Superintendent of the Geological Survey of India, who arrived in March 1913. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, Pascoe, waiting his turn in the promotion line at the Geological Survey 
of India, displayed much deference to the theory and opinion published by his Deputy 
Superintendent, Guy E Pilgrim.
In his report, Prospects o f Obtaining Oil Near Kuwait, Persian Gulf Pascoe appears to 
have been trying to please both those conspirators who hired him and his Superintendent 
at the Indian Survey. He carefully hedged his bet, reporting, “the age of the beds is 
favourable, if it is correct to assume they belong to the Fars, since this is the oil bearing 
series in Persia. There is no reason to believe the nature of the beds beneath Burgan 
should be different from that of the Fars in Persia and they may be looked upon 
therefore as sufficiently porous to retain oil in workable quantities.” And yet, Pascoe 
warned: “This locality is not on the line of strike of the rich oil deposits now being 
worked (in Persia) ... it is in fact over 170 miles to the southwest of this line. This does 
not necessarily mean that oil in commercial quantities does not occur below Burgan, but 
it adds a decidedly speculative element to any operations”. 17
The Admiralty Commission 1913
At this time, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, was converting the ships of 
the Royal Navy from coal burning to oil burning and, in order to secure oil supplies, was 
prepared to commit the British Government to buy into the Anglo Persian Oil Company. 
Several members of Parliament objected to this expensive government venture. 
Churchill critic Admiral Sir Charles Beresford declared, “the Government should not 
contract with any company without having their own geological expert to report”. 
Immediately after Beresford’s criticism, Churchill appointed a “Commission of Oil 
Experts”, headed by Admiral Sir Edmund Slade and advised by the ever-present Sir
17 For the secret agreement see IOL/R715/5/23 6 November 26th 1912 Cox to Government o f India and 
January 14th 1913 Cox to Captain Shakespear Political Agent Kuwait and February 11th 1913 “Secret & 
Confidential” instructions to Pascoe by Shakespear “on no account must such resources or possibilities be 
discussed with anyone in Kuwait, European or native”, British consulting engineer C F Shaw was hired for 
the water survey, Shakespear warned Pascoe “neither Shaw nor my Head Clerk has any inkling o f the 
possibility of mineral or oil deposits”; for Pascoe’s report see Chisholm page 88 “decidedly speculative”
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Boverton Redwood, to visit Anglo Persian’s concession and report to Parliament on the 
production potential of the Persian oilfields and the operation of the company refinery.
Although the Commission’s terms of reference were clearly stipulated as being to 
“investigate the resources of the oilfields comprised in the Concession of the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company”, three days after their October 23rd 1913 arrival in Persia, Percy 
Cox grabbed the initiative on behalf of Greenway and Anglo Persian and approached the 
Shaikh of Kuwait suggesting that the Commission could visit his country “to inspect 
Burgan ... and see if there is a hope of obtaining oil ...” In the same conversation, Cox 
also “suggested” that the Shaikh sign a document agreeing to give a concession only to a 
company, or person, recommended by the “High” Government.
As Pascoe had only six months earlier completed his secret mission to inspect Burgan, 
and communicated his less than glowing report, Cox’s move must be interpreted as 
using the Admiralty Commission as bait in order to block any other interest, such as 
Reynolds and Shell, from dealing with Kuwait. The Shaikh signed, stating that “we are 
agreeable to everything which you regard as advantageous” and “if in their (the 
Commission) view there seems hope of obtaining oil we shall never give a concession in 
this matter to anyone except a person appointed from the British Government”. By itself 
this document met Anglo Persian’s goal of denying access to any other party, as laid out 
in Greenway’s letter two years earlier to Cox after learning of Reynolds’ interest in 
Kuwait. While the prospect of an inspection by Churchill’s “Commission of Oil 
Experts” may have enthused the Shaikh to sign, it is open to interpretation how seriously 
the Commission considered the opportunity.18
E H Pascoe was seconded by the Government of India to assist the group. He joined 
them in Persia and now went back into Kuwait, again to Burgan, only six months after 
completing his secret assignment there. Pascoe and S Lister James, “one of Redwood’s 
roving geologists”, spent a single day “examining the hills and rocks (of Burgan)” before 
returning to Kuwait, “having decided that nothing further was to be learned”. The 
Shaikh, who was certain his oil potential was as good as Persia’s, provided a guide and 
boats to reach another reported seepage the next day but “Mr Pascoe and Mr James ... 
were unable to reach the spot before sunset and ... returned unsuccessful”. Admiral
18 Ferner page 183 citing Hansard, House of Commons, vol 55, col 1622, July 17th 1913 “own geological 
expert”; The Terms of Reference are in Final Report o f the Admiralty Commission on the Persian Oilfields- 
Explanatory Memorandum; House of Commons Tabled Papers; 1914; vol 54 (liv) Cd 7419; Chisholm 
pages 3, 89 “we are agreeable”
No Oil in Arabia 61
Slade and fellow Commission member, John Cadman, at the time Petroleum Adviser to 
the Home Office and Colonial Office, showed not the slightest interest in Kuwait’s oil 
possibilities. According to the report of the Political Agent, they spent the whole visit in 
the relative comfort of the Kuwait Political Agency, attending to “social” matters.19
The Shaikh of Bahrain may have avoided persuasion to sign a document similar to 
Kuwait through the simple expedient of being out of town. The Slade Commission 
arrived in Bahrain on November 21st, and so did Percy Cox, aboard the Indian Navy’s 
“Lawrence” accompanied by a Major General and a Colonel. The Bahrain 1913 
Administrative Report records: “The Shaikh was away on a hawking and shooting 
expedition and could not get back in time to see the Resident.” As Cox and his military 
entourage stayed two full days, and Bahrain Island measured only 10 by 30 miles, this 
seems curious indeed. By December, Cox had left the Gulf, promoted to Secretary of the 
Foreign Department of the Government of India. But the Shaikh of Bahrain had 
achieved only a reprieve. A year later, he gave in to pressure from the Political Agent 
and signed a statement: “I do hereby repeat to you that if there is any prospect of 
obtaining kerosine oil in my territory, I will not embark on the exploitation of it myself 
and will not entertain overtures from any quarter regarding it without consulting the 
Political Agent in Bahrein and without the approval of the High Government.”
In its three-month tour, the Admiralty Commission included four days in Kuwait and 
four days in Bahrain. As the Anglo Persian Oil Company did not have a concession in 
either Kuwait or Bahrain, the Commission (or Cox and Slade) was acting outside its 
Terms of Reference to “investigate the resources of the oilfields comprised in the 
Concession of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company”. Tellingly, while producing “a report of 
such unanimous enthusiasm on the oilfields of Persia that Churchill laid before 
Parliament a Bill by which the British Government was to become the major and 
controlling shareholder in Anglo-Persian”, there is no mention at all of Kuwait or
90Bahrain in the Admiralty Commission’s official Report to Parliament.
19 Ferrier page 282 “one of Redwood’s”; Administrative Report for the Political Agency, Kuwait, for the 
year 1913 Memorandum on visit o f Sir Edmund Slade and Oil Experts' Commission to Kuwait (the Political 
Agent was Captain William Henry Irvine Shakespear) “returned unsuccessful” and “attended to social 
duties”. Both Slade and Cadman were to become members of the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) 
Board; the latter, as Chairman 1927-1941, would become Sir John and then Lord Cadman
20 Administrative Report Bahrain, for the Year 1913 (the Political Agent was Major Arthur Prescott 
Trevor) “the Shaikh was away”; Faroughy, Abbas PhD, I he Bahrein Islands 750-1951, A contribution to 
the study of Power Politics in the Persian Gulf New York: Verry, Fisher & Co, 1951, Shaikh o f Bahrain 
letter dated May 14th 1914 reproduced on page 124; The Admiralty Comission was in Kuwait Nov 11-15
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Lister James 1917
A young Lister James, finding himself in the illustrious company of Admiral Slade, John 
Cadman and E H Pascoe, had agreed with Pascoe’s report on Kuwait and Bahrain in the 
same way as Pascoe had earlier agreed with the findings of his senior colleague, Guy 
Pilgrim. Lister James, who was a Redwood man, had selected two sites in Persia, both of 
which were now proving unsuccessful. Following his excursion with the Admiralty 
Commission he recommended to Anglo Persian a site on Qishm Island, near the Straits 
of Hormuz. This site was also unsuccessful. Following Pilgrim, and Pascoe, James 
reported that Eocene rocks, as found in Kuwait and Bahrain, were “not known to be 
petroliferous”. Nevertheless, he halfheartedly suggested the company might want to try 
shallow structure drilling near Kuwait’s bitumen seepages at Burgan and Bahra. As to 
Bahrain, he wrote, “in view of the definite occurrence of asphalt and the ideal nature of 
the structure it appears inadvisable to ignore the area before testing with a 
fairly deep well”.
On the heels of the 1916 request for a monopoly of “all areas that may fall under British 
influence” made by Anglo Persian’s Chairman and Admiral Slade, Lister James, now 
employed by Anglo Persian, was sent back into Kuwait yet again. In January 1917, 
accompanied by geologist G W Halse, Lister James undertook the fourth inspection of 
Kuwait. They apparently concluded the sites of Burgan and Bahra had more curiosity 
value than oil potential. As a matter of scientific endeavour only, they recommended 
digging pits or trenches “to find out more about the provenance of bitumen” and “for
9 1geological information”.
Pascoe 1918-1919
The division of the Arab world among the victors following World Ware One delivered 
Mesopotamia to the British, along with some of history’s most famous oil seepages. In 
1918-19, immediately after the war but before the award of the League of Nations
and Bahrain Nov 21-26; Longhurst page 51 “unanimous enthusiasm”; See Final Report o f the Admiralty 
Commission on the Persian Oilfields
21 Ferner page 282 “also unsuccessful”; Owen page 1322 “fairly deep well’’^  page 1336 “G W Halse” and 
“geological information”
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Mandates, E H Pascoe, now promoted to Director of the Geological Survey of India, 
arrived to spend five months surveying “as many of the important oil indications as 
possible”. Stimulated by favourable reports of oil potential, Mesopotamia had for ten 
years or more been the object of diplomatic and commercial manoeuvring for oil 
concessions.
Just one extract from E H Pascoe’s survey reveals the extent of the prize that was known 
to exist in Iraq: “Oil was collected here by the Turks, or by the Germans who were in 
control of the place before the w ar... Seven borings were made by the Germans before 
the British occupation. Of these, four are producing or capable of producing oil ... one 
was still in process of construction and was evidently on the point of entering the oil 
horizon, as oil has recently commenced to appear at the casing head ... The best well has 
a considerable pressure and would fill an ordinary kerosene tin in five or six seconds 
with a black oil containing a certain amount of tar but some petrol as well. The wells are 
all in the same locality and about 300 yards apart. There is a small refinery of five stills, 
for which crude oil was used as fuel, and two condensers, all in working order though of 
crude construction. Some of the refined oil was found in drums.”
No great scientific skills were needed to conclude of this particular site, as Pascoe did, 
that “an oil field of importance exists here”. Pascoe’s report concluding that 
Mesopotamia “should rival the Persian fields, and outclass Burma” ensured that 
attention remained focused on the side of the Gulf where “the principal structural and 
stratigraphic features extend across the two countries (Persia and Mesopotamia)”. 
Pascoe grouped the oil prospects from “A” to “F” in declining order of importance. 
Kirkuk, which would, in October 1927 prove to be Iraq’s major oil field, he categorised 
as “C -  scarcely promising enough to warrant deep boring”.22
Frank Holmes 1918-1924
The story of Frank Holmes’ identification and mapping of the oil riches of Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and of his struggle to ensure these fields were developed, is
22 Pascoe, E H, Director Geological Survey o f India, Geological Notes on Mesopotamia with Special 
Reference to Occurrences of Petroleum in Memoirs o f the Geological Survey o f India, vol 43; 1922; 
Yergin page 185 “manoevering for oil”; Pascoe page 74 “should rival”, Owen page 1283 “across the two 
countries”; Pascoe page 74 “scarely promising”
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told in later chapters. But from his first contact with the region, Holmes was convinced 
this was an area of great oil potential. In 1918, Frank Holmes had written to his wife in 
England. “I personally believe that there will be developed an immense oil field running 
from Kuwait right down the mainland coast.”
In 1920, he returned to the area representing Eastern & General Syndicate Ltd, a new 
syndicate formed with his long time mining and investment associates headquartered in 
London. On this trip, he went first to Aden. Though the Turks had mines here, the only 
known geological report was from 1912 when a British geologist, Professor Arthur 
Wade, had examined an area including Farasan Islands on the Red Sea coast of Yemen. 
Wade’s report was enthusiastic: “I think indications foreshadow success from a 
commercial point of view”. In response, Redwood had inserted the cryptic line, 
“Petroleum is said to occur at many points in the interior of Yemen” in the 1913 edition 
of his Treatise on Petroleum.
In 1919, the Idrissi of Yemen lodged an official request to the Resident in Aden for the 
services of an expert to investigate and report on the Farasans. Twelve months later he 
was still waiting for an answer. When Holmes approached him in 1920, the Idrissi 
invited him to visit the Farasan archipelago to satisfy himself “as to the possibility of 
finding oil in commercial quantities”. On this four week visit, Holmes stayed with the 
Idrissi in his guesthouse (fort) in Jaizan. As Holmes then offered very generous terms he 
appears to have been “satisfied” as to the oil prospects. But, as will be seen, Churchill 
baulked at the possibility of exposing to international scrutiny Britain’s assumption of 
power in this area. Holmes left Aden and moved his base to Bahrain from where he 
pursued his plan of examining A1 Hasa, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar.
Holmes’ technical discussion of his findings, with maps, given at presentations to 
Standard Oil New Jersey and the Gulf Oil Corporation in New York in September 1926 
was sufficiently persuasive to inspire Standard Oil New Jersey’s C Stuart Morgan to act 
almost immediately in a clandestine attempt to obtain the A1 Hasa concession using 
Philby’s self declared friendship with Abdul Aziz Bin Saud. Morgan, an Englishman,
23 Mineau page 192 “I personally believe” verified by Dorothy Holmes January 18th 1960 in a letter to Guy 
Schofield Editor NZ Biographies Alexander Turnbull Library Wellington NZ, MS papers 212, Guy 
Schofield, Folder 22, Clarke page 52 rather cheekily, but quite erroneously, cites this as from Bapco 
Archives; Baldry, John, “The Powers and Mineral Concessions in the Idrissi Imamate o f Assir 1910-1929”, 
in Arabian Studies 11, Middle East Centre University of Cambridge 1975 pages 76-107 “indications 
foreshadow”; Redwood, 3rd edition, page 134 “interior of Yemen”; Baldry page 83 “generous terms”; 
Rihani Ibn Sa’oud page 81 “stayed four weeks”
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had been with Wilson’s administration in Mesopotamia where he worked with Philby. 
He moved on to Anglo Persian before becoming Adviser of Near Eastern work for 
Standard Oil New Jersey. Morgan admitted his new found “deep interest in A1 Hasa and 
the Trucial Coast” was aroused because “Frank Holmes has been over here to talk with 
me”. Morgan secretly forwarded to Philby a copy of Holmes’ map obtained at the New 
York meetings together with a copy of Holmes’ 1923 A1 Hasa concession laying out the 
dimensions of that field.24
After the 1932 oil strike in Bahrain proved Frank Holmes to be correct in his 
unwavering conviction that the shaikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula were rich in oil 
resources, so severely embarrassing the experts of the day, Holmes was asked how he 
had known. Archibald Chisholm describes a 1945 London meeting of oil company 
representatives where Holmes was asked how he had been so certain, for ten years 
before oil was struck in Bahrain, that the world’s leading petroleum geologists were 
wrong in their unanimous opinion there was no oil on the Arab side of the Gulf. Tapping 
a finger to the side of his nose, he replied enigmatically, “this was my geologist”. 25
In reality Holmes’ certainty was based on his personal observation, exploration and 
surveys together with study and analysis of the available record, including Admiralty 
maps and gazetteers. Standard Oil of California’s Francis Loomis first met Holmes in 
London in 1929 and came away with respect for Holmes’ knowledge and skills. He 
reported to fellow Vice President Maurice Lombardi: “Holmes seems to be very familiar 
with the country on the mainland and in fact with all this region. He says there is a line 
of seepages about three hundred miles long in the Kuwait territory and thinks there are 
plenty of good areas to be had.” After listening to Holmes, Loomis advised Lombadi, “it 
occurs to me that if we take over the Bahrain concession, ultimately we may want a 
good deal more in that general region”. In their efforts over the next few years to gain
24 St Antony’s College Oxford, Philby papers Box XXX-7, August 26th 1927 Morgan to Philby’s partner, 
and Morgan’s personal friend, T D Cree “Frank Holmes has been over here to talk with me” and November 
10th 1927 Cree forwarding to Philby, provided by Morgan, the map and concession copies commenting on 
“Morgan’s keen desire to get into this territory”; correspondence about Holmes and the A1 Hasa concession 
between Cree, Morgan and Philby is contained in Philby papers XXX-7 and X V 1-2 and X X V I1 -Box 1 & 
2; Note that when they sighted Holmes map and technical detail some time later, Standard Oil o f California 
was also persuaded see, for example, Chevron Archives Box 120791 May 2nd 1930 Lombardi to Loomis 
refers to seeing “Holmes’ map o f the Persian Gulf and littoral ... areas o f petroleum interest beyond 
Bahrain and Kuwait ... the rest o f Arabia and nearby territory” ^
25 Chisholm page 161 “my geologist”
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the A1 Hasa concession (and perhaps knock their colleagues, Gulf Oil, out of Kuwait) 
both Loomis and Lombardi would refer to Holmes’ map and technical information.
The first geologist Standard Oil of California sent to Bahrain in 1930, to work with 
Holmes, was Fred A Davis, accompanied by the superintendent of the Producing 
Department Bill Taylor; Davis eventually became Chairman of the Board of Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco) in Saudi Arabia. In his Forward to Philby’s 1964 
Arabian Oil Ventures Davis unkindly dismisses Holmes as a person “with whom the 
company dealt in its introduction to Bahrain”. Davis claims that his own recognition of 
the oil possibility of Saudi Arabia began “the day we first set foot on Bahrain”. 
However, correspondence from Loomis in the Chevron Oil Archives show that Loomis, 
after his London meeting with Holmes, had alerted Davis to the possibilities of A1 Hasa 
and instructed him to try to get on to the mainland. 27
As to his 1930 time in Bahrain, a letter in the Owen papers at the American Heritage 
Centre reveals Davis admitting that his own work in Bahrain “consisted only in 
checking a very fine map which had been prepared by "Dusty" Rhoades of Gulf Oil a 
year or so earlier". In February 1928 Gulf Oil had expected Rhoades and two assistants 
to take nine months -  their chief geologist wanted 18 months -  to “arrange, complete, 
and report on, a geological survey” of Bahrain. But when the Americans arrived -  far
26 Chevron Archives Box 120797 May 17th 1930 Fred A Davis of Standard Oil of California in Bahrain to 
head office San Francisco “During the latter part of the War Holmes was attached to the Admiralty and 
while there had access to their confidential petroleum maps. From his study of those maps, as well as 
personal observations in the field, he knows many seepages along both the Persian Gulf and Red Sea coasts 
of Arabia, and believes there are many areas there worthy of exploration”; Note that a British Gazetteer 
was secretly produced during World Ware One, among other sources it drew on Lorimer’s 1908 Gazetteer; 
Box 0120796 April 15th 1929, Loomis in London to Lombardi in San Francisco, “I had a long 
conversation with Holmes who seems to be a very straightforward, truthful person, though rather 
optimistic... I spent nearly three hours with him a few days ago discussing the whole Bahrain matter and 
obtaining.. a considerable number of facts which will be of use to us in a practical way...” He also reported 
“ the members of the syndicate (E&GSynd) make quite a good impression. I have made some enquiries 
about them and from what I learn their standing seems to be good, though they are not considered a group 
of great importance in oil circles. The two important members, Janson and Tarbutt are known rather 
extensively in South African affairs and seem to have standing as mining men and mining engineers”
27 Philby Oil Ventures, Forward page xi “from the day we first set foot on Bahrain we had a strong desire 
to examine the geology of the mainland in Saudi Arabia’; Chevron archives Box 120791, correspondence 
Loomis, Lombardi, Wallace, May - August 1930 and Box 120797 correspondence April - August 1930 
Fred A Davis and Bill Taylor in Bahrain and Standard Oil of California San Francisco. Note particularly 
August 12th 1930 Davis in Baghdad to Standard Oil of California apologising for not being able to carry 
out Loomis’ instructions saying “I am very sorry about this, for when I left the States I had very ambitious 
hopes of coming back from over here with a great fund of general information on oil, both geology and 
operations.”
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from being “oil pioneers” as the mythology would have it -  they found all they had to do 
was verify the substantial work Holmes had already completed.
The 1928 Rhoades' map that Davis said he checked in 1930 was a confirmation of 
Holmes' original geological work completed in 1926-1927. Rhoades reported to Gulf Oil 
that he had found Holmes' work so good that, taking time out for Arabian dinners and 
falcon hunting, he was able to complete his own survey in under six weeks instead of the 
nine months allotted.28
Holmes’ work on Bahrain prior to the entry of the Americans is documented in 1926- 
1927 correspondence found in Holmes’ personal papers and in the Ward papers at the 
American Heritage Centre. While boring the artesian water wells in Bahrain, Holmes 
reported he had “come into a very nice oil bearing shale. I was using three 2 foot drills at 
shallow depths. If I spot one or two more good sites for artesian wells I could progress 
the oil testing”. In late 1926 the Board of Eastern & General Syndicate were 
independently financing the development of the Bahrain concession. From Bahrain, 
Holmes wrote: “ I am extremely glad the Board of Directors have decided to drill for oil. 
I hope for success ... I have had some wells sunk, and find that the area over which the 
bitumen can be found is greater than was ever hinted at before. I have had a good look 
over the area surrounding the seepages, and the dome formation is exceedingly 
attractive. The oil indications ... are more promising and extensive than I had any 
conception o f ... ”
In December 1931, the Political Agent Kuwait, Colonel Harold Dickson, was 
determined to discover what it was that made Holmes so sure there was oil in Kuwait; so 
certain, that he endured the extreme opposition of the Government of India, and the 
slander and insults of that government’s officials in the Gulf, in order to obtain and 
develop the concession. Dickson was genuinely intrigued but also intent on secretly
28 Owen papers, Box la; October 11th 1974, Fred A Davis to G Gish “only in checking a very fine map”; 
Clarke pages 71-76 Ralph Rhoades report on Bahrain to William Wallace at Gulf Oil Corporation is 
reprinted in full; and March to April 1928 correspondence Holmes in Bahrain to Wallace at Gulf Oil in 
Ward papers Box 2 and Box 3 March 29th and May 17th 1928, Ward to E&GSynd
29 Holmes papers, April 12th 1926 Holmes in Bahrain to E&GSynd in London “showing slight traces of 
oil”, Note that Chisholm page 14 is in error when he locates this well ‘showing slight traces of oil’ in 
Kuwait and then states “this closely guarded secret greatly encouraged” the Gulf oil Corporation towards 
the Kuwait oil concession; Ward papers, Box 2, January 16th 1927 and March 28th 1927 Holmes in 
Bahrain to E&GSynd enclosed with letter E&GSynd to Ward dated June 9th 1927 “greater than ever 
hinted at before”
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forwarding whatever information he could gather to Holmes’ implacable competitor, the 
Anglo Persian Oil Company.
Because Dickson’s report appears to be the only surviving detailed explanation of the 
technical basis of Holmes belief in the existence of Arabia’s oil fields, it is quoted here 
at length. This “confidential” report was headed “Views of Major Frank Holmes of the 
Eastern & General Syndicate on the possibility of ‘oil’ being found in Kuwait, Bahrain 
and the Gulf generally” and included three sketch maps. He prefaced the report by 
warning that, during the discussion, Holmes had “emphasised that certain experts would 
by no means agree with everything he said”. Dickson’s report read:
“In the first place Major Holmes gave it as his considered opinion that 
there was a close connection between the ‘oil’ and the numerous fresh water 
springs (all of which were warm, some also very hot) which were to be 
found everywhere in the sea off the North-East coast of Arabia, on the 
islands of Bahrain, on the mainland of Hasa both in the vicinity of Qatif and 
up the whole length of the Wadi al Miyah (valley of waters), which series 
also obviously stretched up through Kuwait (where they weakened) and the 
country south of the Euphrates right up to the vicinity of Nejef (as instance 
the wells of Shagra Abu Ghar, Ruhba etc).
This water, Major Holmes was of the opinion, came from the Persian 
mountains and not from the highlands of Jejaz and Nejd as hitherto 
supposed, and passing under the Persian Gulf and the lower end of Iraq at a 
great depth (as instance the heat) was eventually forced up again on the line 
described in the preceding paragraph by a sort of fault in the earth’s surface 
which took the form, to use an easily understandable simile, of a great rocky 
wall or cliff, which came up from a great depth and ran in the North, West 
and South-easterly direction following the general line of the Persian Gulf 
and the valley of the Euphrates.
The same ‘cliff formation was in the same way trying to help the 
‘oil’ to the surface, as witness the ‘bitumen’ seepages which are to be found 
stretching from Hit on the Euphrates, past Tel al Magaiyir (Ur), Burgan in 
Kuwait territory, also Qatif and Bahrain. This line which, he said, followed 
the same source as the water springs mentioned above, Major Holmes was
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of the opinion, formed the Southern edge of the ‘oil’ bearing zone or line, 
and it was close to this line that the underground cliff so to speak ran.
There was another probable series of water and oil surface springs, 
said Major Holmes, which took the centre line of the Persian Gulf and 
passing through Halul Island, Arabi and Farsi Islands, Qarw Island, Mudaira 
on the north side of the bay of Kuwait and Jebel Sanem, proceeded in a 
north-westerly direction and parallel to the line mentioned above. At all the 
places mentioned except Jebel Sanam, traces of oil or bitumen springs are, 
he said, known to exist
The third great oil bearing line, said Major Holmes, was of course the 
well known one which passed through Kirkuk Shustar region and north of 
the Tigris and Persian Gulf and went in a south easterly direction. This line, 
as far as Major Holmes could see, probably also took a parallel course to his 
mid-Persian Gulf and Iraq line, and his Arabian coast and Euphrates line.
With the above data to go on Major Holmes was of the opinion that 
chances of striking oil either in Bahrain or at A1 Hasa or in the vicinity of 
Kuwait, were very bright. In spite of the fact that oil experts always 
pretended that surface oil indications never really meant anything, he, Major 
Holmes, said that he had yet to find an oil geologist who did not carefully 
follow such indications, or an oil company which did not find its eventual 
‘spouter’ in the vicinity of such indications.
As regards the formation of Jebel Durkhan at Bahrain, where he was 
now boring, Major Holmes volunteered the statement that never in his long 
and varied experience had he found such a perfect example of an oiliferous 
cone — everything including general strata and formation of the under 
surface rocks etc etc promised success. His ‘bore’ had gone down 800 feet 
or so and already ‘oily shales’ were being extracted. At Kuwait, on the other 
hand, there was, he said, a surface ooze of oil both at Bahra (close to 
Mudaira) and also in the sea close to Ras al Abid (visible at low tide) near 
the southern boundary of Kuwait. These are apart from the extensive 
bitumen deposits at Jebel Burgan on the southern border of Kuwait. All of 
these indicated every likelihood of oil being found if bored for. The
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attached sketch map, the original in the rough of which I persuaded Major 
Holmes to draw for me, will probably show better than I have been able to 
explain above, the theories and hopes held by Major Holmes.”'
Dickson set out to see for himself what it was that Holmes knew. He made “a careful 
search for the supposed oil seepage ... which Holmes said was visible at low tide, but 
was unable to find any trace of oil or bitumen. I also made careful enquiries from an old 
Arab official who knows the coast line there very well indeed, and he could give me no 
information of value,” he wrote to the Political Resident. “It is possible that Major 
Holmes with his expert eyes was able to see what I could not ...”31
Arnold Heim April-July 1924
Despite the vigorous and ongoing opposition mounted by the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company and its supporters in the Government of India, in late 1923 Holmes 
commissioned the highly respected Swiss geologist Dr Arnold Heim of the University of 
Zurich to provide a second opinion on his [Holmes] own positive conclusion and 
findings regarding the oil possibilities of Bahrain, A1 Hasa and Kuwait.
Heim, who was also a consultant to Royal Dutch Shell and others, arrived with three 
assistants in April 1924. The plan was for the group to spend four months in surveying 
but Arnold Heim and his cold clime assistants were unprepared for the oppressive 
summer heat of the Arabian desert. Heim, waiting in Bahrain to travel by sea to Kuwait, 
wrote to London that one of his assistants, “was leaving Hofuf for going to Koweit by 
Caravan following another route further inland. After the second day of travelling, 
however, he cut off the whole voyage on account of unsupportable heat, some of his 
people having become ill. The temperature of the sand blowing winds I measured at 118 
degrees Fahrenheit. It is true that the natives are used to travel also in summer time, but 
at night. Thus we could not do geological surveying.”
30 IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV, December 5th 1931, Confidential, Political Agent Kuwait (Dickson) to Resident 
(Biscoe). Unfortunately, the sketch maps are not with this file. See also March 3rd 1932, Confidential, 
Arnold Wilson, General Manager, Anglo Persian Oil Company, to Dickson thanking him for this report 
“which contains much of interest”
31 IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV, December 12th 1931, Confidential, Political Agent Kuwait (Dickson) to the 
Political Resident (Biscoe) “with his expert eyes”
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Undeterred by the fact that he hadn’t even seen A1 Hasa, let alone surveyed, Heim 
reported anyway. On A1 Hasa he said: “The result so far obtained is not encouraging for 
the coastal region in regard of drilling for oil. The reasons are ... the only seepages we 
have encountered are found along the shore and are formed of tar and asphalt blown in 
from an unknown source in the Persian Gulf. The rocks in situ did not show traces of 
impregnation. Almost throughout the large region of our journey as far as it is not 
covered by sand, is formed of tertiary or older rocks, especially limestones, of perfectly 
horizontal stratification. No signs of anticlines were encountered.”
In regard to the Bahrain Islands he wrote. “I am nearly through with the study of its 
formations and of its structure the latter being an unusually wide longitudinal dome or 
dome shaped anticline. The dips however are very slight, generally from 1 to 4 degrees, 
exceptionally 15 degrees. Bahrain thus is situated outside of the unfolded region of the 
Hasa table mountains. On the other hand, the formations of Bahrain are chiefly Niocene 
and Upper Cretaceous age. Thus, as far as I can judge already, I would not advise 
drilling for oil on Bahrain Island ”
Heim’s was the fifth geological inspection of Kuwait. He reported “the seepage at A1 
Bohara is small in comparison with those of Hit (Iraq), which produce as much as 2500 
tons of oil and tar per year, or 30,000 times as much! ... oil might be found by drilling at 
A1 Bohara but not in paying quantity ... Kuwait is a country of some possibility, but not 
of high promise”. He saw “no reason to recommend either the A1 Hasa or the Neutral 
Zone concessions for oil”. Furthermore, he believed “to drill on Bahrain would be a pure 
gamble”. In fact, Arnold Heim concluded. “The countries of Eastern Arabia thus rapidly 
traversed by the writer do not present any decided promise for drilling on oil.”
There would have been a number of factors at play in Holmes’ selection of Heim, a 
Swiss geologist. Confidentiality was obviously important, but Holmes may also have 
hoped for an approach free of preconceived opinion. Heim’s final report does make 
several references to the conclusions of Pascoe and Pilgrim, which he had “studied”, but 
perhaps it was coincidence that he was no more optimistic than his esteemed colleagues. 
While distinctly unimpressed with Arabia, Arnold Heim was anxious to get to Iraq for 
which Pascoe’s work, given to him “as a present from the author”, made him wildly 
enthusiastic. Pascoe’s work on Iraq, Heim wrote privately to Holmes, “is the most 
valuable study ... I think there is no other untested oil region of the world with such 
phenomenal promise”. Unfortunately for Frank Holmes, the report of Dr Arnold Heim
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reinforced the previous pessimistic opinions. But even more negative reports were to 
follow, all concluding that there was no oil on the Arabian side of the Gulf.
de Bockh 1923-1925
In 1923 Anglo Persian employed University of Budapest Professor Hugo de Bockh (he 
had changed his name from Von Bockh after the war) as Geological Adviser. De Bockh 
was a former Under Secretary for Mines and would go on to become Director of the 
Geological Survey of Hungary. He was brought to Persia to advise on geological work 
because many of Anglo Persian’s wells were coming up dry. He made two extensive 
field trips during the winter seasons 1923-24 and 1924-25. On the second trip, de Bockh 
was accompanied by Lister James, now promoted to the position of Anglo Persian Chief 
geologist, and his assistant G M Lees along with F D S Richardson.
Oman was included in the first season where “valuable information was gathered on 
Arabian tectonics, but no immediate oil prospects were revealed”. Which perhaps 
explains why a concession Anglo Persian began negotiating with the Sultan of Muscat in 
1924 was not finalised until 1937. De Bockh conceived the “lagoon theory” in which he 
supposed that oil would be found in large quantities “only in the Asmari limestone of 
the strongly folded foothills zone of Zagros mountains and only where that limestone 
had been deposited under lagoonal conditions ...” Without ever leaving the Persian side 
of the Gulf, de Bockh reviewed the work of Pilgrim, Pascoe and James, and pronounced
33the Arabian littoral “unpromising for oil deposits”.
32 University o f Zurich, ETH Bibliothek, Arnold Heim papers, June 10th 1924 Heim in Bahrain to 
E&GSynd “not do geological surveying” and “so far not encouraging” and “not advise drilling Bahrain”, 
Report: The Question of Petroleum in Eastern Arabia (Koweit, Hasa, Bahrein) Dr Arnold Heim, September 
5th 1924, reprinted in Chisholm page 103 “not high promise” and “pure gamble”; Arnold Heim papers, 
September 23rd 1924 Heim in Zurich to Holmes “present from the author” and “phenomenal promise”
33 Owen Trek page 1262 “coming up dry” and “Pascoe, Lees & Richardson”; Longrigg page 101 “no 
immediate oil prospects”; Ward page 20 “not finalised until 1937”; For de Bockh’s Lagoon Theory see 
Owen page 1263; Ferrier page 541 “unpromising for oil”
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George M Lees 1925-1932
When he was sent to survey, G M Lees agreed with his immediate superior, Lister 
James. Either side of de Bockh’s two seasonal surveys, Lees conducted an Anglo Persian 
sponsored six-year comprehensive study of South Eastern Arabia. His report agreed with 
the unfavourable opinion of the Arab lands as put forward by the company’s Chief 
Geologist Lister James and agreed by the company’s prestigious Geological Adviser, 
Professor de Bockh. The influential Geographical Journal published Lees’ study in 
1928 and each member of the survey was invited to lecture at Royal Geographical 
Society meetings. During the study, Kuwait was the subject of a sixth geological survey, 
this time by G M Lees, B K N Wyllie and A G H Mayhew in 1925-26. In the 
Geographical Journal, Lees reported “it is very improbable that, in the total absence of 
any direct geological evidence, a convincing case could ever be made out by this means 
for exploring the unknown depths of Kuwait territory with the drill”.34
G M Lees agreed with de Bockh, James, Pascoe and Pilgrim, that even if oil were found, 
it would be in such small quantities as to be economically of little value. His advice was 
that “in view of the agreement between the local evidence and the general regional 
geology and in the absence of any alternative hypothesis ... the opinion is that the 
company need not take any further interest in Kuwait” and was set out in a management 
memo dated January 6th 1931. The dismal state of Kuwait’s oil prospects was relayed to 
the members of the International Geology Party then combing Iraq. One American 
geologist reported “a Scotsman, B K N Wyllie, who was the reconnaissance man for 
D’Arcy Exploration, reported to the group having just finished a trek across Kuwait 
without finding any indications of structure ...”
When Lister James retired, George M Lees would go on to take his turn as Chief 
Geologist at the Anglo Persian Oil Company. He was thought to be a geologist of ‘great 
promise’ when he joined the company, after serving with the Anglo Indian occupation 
force in Mesopotamia and a spell as the Government of India’s Political Officer in 
Kurdistan. He followed the damning report on Kuwait with an equally negative report 
on the oil prospects of Bahrain. George M Lees was to forge a place in history as the 
man who promised he “would drink any commercial oil found in Bahrain”. His
34 Lees, G M, Geographical Journal, London: Royal Geographical Society, vol. LXX1 (January-June 
1928) pages 441-463; Ferner page 567 “very improbable”
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vehement vow came at the end of a speech in which he summed up the evidence for and 
against finding oil in commercial quantities in Bahrain. The respected Dr George M 
Lees opted for the negative. Just a few months after his speech, in June 1932, oil in
35commercial quantities flowed in Bahrain.
Peter T Cox 1932
The final “examination” of Kuwait -  the seventh -  was by P T Cox in 1931-1932. In 
later years Cox would claim his was a “restricted assignment” and that because of the 
depression he was on a “shoestring”. Cox and his team, including a driller, spent five 
months in Kuwait before being recalled in early April 1932. Following a now familiar 
pattern, Cox agreed with those who had been before him. His report concluded, 
“Kuwait’s prospects appear to be the possibility, even probability, of finding only very 
heavy oil accumulations.” In his tum, P T Cox became Anglo Persian Chief Geologist 
and, later, a director Of the Kuwait Oil Company. When Bahrain struck oil in June, just 
weeks after his report, Cox noted in an understatement, “Anglo Persian set about getting
36a concession from the Shaikh of Kuwait as a matter of urgency”.
Conclusion
The myth perpetuated by the oil companies that they did know there was oil on the 
Arabian side of the Persian Gulf is unsubstantiated. As has been shown, every geological 
survey, including the seven “examinations” of Kuwait, concluded that the Arab 
Shaikhdoms were oil-barren. To propose, as the propaganda does, that the oil companies 
produced misleadingly negative geological reports for the purpose of deterring possible 
competitors is highly improbable. Such a proposition would have required the jealously 
competitive geologists of the day to produce and publish survey and exploration reports 
that ran counter to the actual findings of their skilled expertise. It is simply not credible
35 Chisholm page 118 “need not take any further interest”; Owen Trek page 1296 “without finding any 
indications”; Ferrier page 428 “geologist o f great promise” and page 567 “unfavourably on Bahrain”; 
Chisholm page 162 “drink any commercial oil”
36 Owen Trek page 1336, P T Cox claiming “restricted assignment” and “of urgency”
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that the geologists would have risked their professional reputation and future career by 
pronouncing as barren an area they knew to be oil rich. The myth must be questioned.
All the evidence illustrates a scenario in which, far from following a clever strategy, 
Anglo Persian actually “did not particularly want” the Arab concessions because they 
were utterly convinced there was no oil on the Arab side of the Gulf. The company’s 
Resident Manager in Persia, Sir Arnold Wilson, for example, frequently recorded in 
both personal and official letters the company’s belief that “geological prospects on the 
Arab side are so uncertain, the prospect of finding oil is so speculative ...” Ferrier reports 
Wilson as saying, in 1926, “only Albania is hopeful ... Arabia appeared cto be devoid of 
all prospects’.”
Unless he believed it to be true, it is inconceivable that Sir John Cadman, ex Professor 
of Engineering at Birmingham University, Technical Adviser to the company from 
1921, Head of Turkish Petroleum and by 1927 Chairman of Anglo Persian, would go on 
record while attending the 1928 American Petroleum Institute Convention in Chicago 
declaring oil prospects on the Arabian littoral as “not impressive”.
Although he was personally aware of Frank Holmes’ belief in the oil riches of Arabia, 
Sir Percy Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and then High Commissioner of 
Iraq, opted for the safe, generally held view, in an article he authored for the 1929 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Sir Percy, fastidious as to detail, wrote “though very careful 
search has been made for possible oil fields along the Arabian littoral by the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company, and though seepages of oil, gas and asphalt are not uncommon, 
no potential field has yet been located near the coast”. He then expressed the prevailing 
belief with the comment, “oil and asphalt shows occur at Kuwait and Bahrein, but the 
prospects of oil being found in those territories in adequate quantities is slender”.
In Persia, Iraq, and Burma, where oil extraction already existed, the oil companies did 
well. But where the signs were not so glaringly obvious, they did not venture. The 
Shaikh of Kuwait, who firmly believed he had oil and desperately wanted it developed, 
was both bewildered and disappointed at being constantly overlooked. His grandfather, 
Shaikh Mubarak, had been so sure the British would find his oil “shows” as interesting 
as Persia that, merely on the prospect of the 1913 visit of Churchill’s Admiralty 
Commission, he had signed away Kuwait’s present and future rights to independently 
grant concessions. Unknown to Shaikh Mubarak, the die had already been cast. Since
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Pilgrim in 1904 the whole of Arabia, including Kuwait, had been judged as having no 
commercial oil potential.
In the coming years, no ambitious geologist disagreed with that judgement. Also 
unknown to the Shaikh in 1913 was the fact that the Anglo Persian Oil Company and its 
Government of India supporters had already blocked one person who may have made an 
objective assessment, George Reynolds, and would in future do everything in their 
considerable power to block the other, Frank Holmes.
Twenty-five years were to pass between Shaikh Mubarak confidently opening up his oil 
potential to the Admiralty Commission and his grandson’s witnessing of the first oil 
flow at Burgan in October 1938. When he was Ruler of Kuwait in 1931, Mubarak’s 
grandson, Shaikh Ahmad, encapsulated Kuwait’s two decades of frustration and 
disappointment when he defended his right to deal with Frank Holmes -  the only man 
who refused to write off Kuwait’s oil prospects -  by stating, “it was a stab to my heart 
when I observed the oil work at Bahrain and nothing here”.
37 Ferrier page 555 “only Albania”; Ward page 117 “not impressive”; Cox, Sir Percy, in Encyclopedia 
Britannica o f  1929, 14th Edition, vol.17, pages 547-607; Chisholm page 19 “stab to my heart”
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SECTION ONE 
The Background
Chapter Three
THE GULF RAJ
Introduction
In pursuit of the claim of this thesis, that rule by the Government of India prevented the 
development of Arabia’s oil after Holmes’ 1922-1923 discovery, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that authority and control of the area lay, not with the British Government, 
but with the Government of India.
The British most often defined the status of the Arab shaikhdoms rather vaguely as 
being “in special treaty relations with the British Government'’. This was a unique 
category, fitting neither Colony nor Protectorate. The British employed two basic 
models of colonialism, either direct rule or indirect rule. The first entailed 
administration directly by British colonial officials without the involvement of native 
authorities. Indirect denoted an area in which many administrative functions were in the 
hands of native institutions, but under the control of British colonial officials. The status 
of Aden, for example, moved from being part of the Bombay Presidency at its 1839 
occupation and annexation to that of a separate province of India in 1932. The 
Government of India Act of 1935 separated Aden from India and further legislation 
transformed it into a British Crown Colony, under direct colonial administration.1
A British Protectorate, even if it closely resembled a colony, was distinguished in that it 
did not become part of the national territory of the protecting power but remained 
legally a foreign country. Natives of a Protectorate were not British subjects. They did 
not owe allegiance to the British Crown although a limited duty of “obedience” was 
taken for granted. The right of the Crown to exercise legislative and administrative 
functions in Protectorates was based on, apart from treaties with the local rulers, the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890.
1 The East India Company assumed “Presidencies” in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, where its main 
commercial activities were located. See also Hawley, Donald, The Trucial States, London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1970, page 77, Aden was transferred to Bombay which “the island of Bombay was transferred 
to the British Crown as part o f the dowry o f the infanta of Portugal on her marriage to King Charles 11 
(1630-1685). ..the British Government sanctioned the take over o f Bombay by the East India Company in 
1688...the Company raised troops and maintained a civil administration”, for the status of Aden see 
Liebesny, Aden Colony and Protectorate, pages 335-396. For the status o f India and its gradual transfer to 
the British Crown see “East India Company” in Appendix-3 Who 's Who
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The Arab shaikhdoms were not colonies. Nor were they ever declared Protectorates. An 
example of how a Protectorate was created is that of the hinterland of Aden. This area 
was legally declared the Western Protectorate and the Eastern Protectorate by 
enactment of the Aden Protectorate Order of 1937. Under this, the Governor of the 
Crown Colony of Aden also became Governor of the two Protectorates. The post-World 
War One Mandates introduced another form of administration to the Middle East. But, 
as will be seen, this was not extended to the Arab shaikhdoms either. As late as 1947, 
Liebesny could still remark that “the exact status of the states along the coast of the 
Arabian Peninsula is not clarified.” 2
As the last official appointed by the Government of India did not retire until 1958, the 
Arabian Peninsula was actually the last bastion of the Raj, lasting a decade beyond 
India’s own Independence of 1947. What the Indians called the angrezi raj (English 
rule) extended into the Arabian Peninsula and can be dubbed the Gulf Raj. This chapter 
will examine the Government of India dimension — what it was, how it came about, 
and what its effects were on the Arabs of the Gulf, and on the development of their oil.3
It will be argued that, unlike Britain’s post-World War One administration in Egypt, 
Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, neither the Colonial Office nor the Foreign Office 
exercised direct authority in the Arabian Peninsula. Under the system set up at 
Churchill’s 1921 Cairo Conference, responsibility for the Arabian Peninsula was given 
over to the Government of India. Indeed, the system arrived at in Cairo would prove to 
be so unsatisfactory that in 1933 the Colonial Office would opt out entirely, passing 
over any interest it had in the area to the India Office
This chapter will also highlight the significance of the India orientation of the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company -  staffed by former members of the Indian military and Indian 
Civil Service -  with a strong investment in maintaining the dominance of the 
Government of India. These two institutions will be shown as complementing and 
reinforcing each other in blocking Elolmes and his proposals for developing the oil of 
Arabia.
2 Liebesny, International Relations o f Arabia, pages 148-168 “two types of colonial administration” and 
“Protectorate.. right of the Crown” and “not clarified”
3 The Residency was moved from Bushire to Bahrain in 1946. From 1947-1951, the Resident was 
Cornelius James Pelly and then, until his retirement in 1958, (Sir) Rupert Hay o f the Indian Political 
Service, ex Indian Army, one of World War One Acting Civil Commissioner Arnold Wilson’s handpicked 
and personally groomed “Wilson’s Young Men” in Mesopotamia, their careers favoured on the basis o f 
how finely their ideas attuned to Wilson’s own policies; see Hay, Sir Rupert, Ihe Persian Gulf States, 
USA Lord Baltimore Press, 1959, page 26 “the last member of the old Indian Political Service...in the 
Gulf, retired in 1958”, this was, o f course, Hay himself; James, Lawrence, The Rise and Fall o f the 
British Empire, UK: Abacus, 1998, page 219 “angrezi raj”
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The Persian Gulf: India’s Frontier
The British presence in the Persian Gulf dated from 1600. In 1763 the East India 
Company established a Residency at Bushire on the Persian side of the Gulf coast. The 
Company was at first entirely commercial, with a monopoly on silk exports from, and 
woollen imports into Persia. Further, it was granted freedom from all taxes with a 
promise that no other European power would be permitted to open a trading station in 
the area and eventually, and perhaps inevitably given its economic status, assumed a 
political character. By 1862 the head of the Residency had become “Her Britannic 
Majesty’s Political Resident in the Persian Gulf’; with the Persians and the Arabs 
calling him Balyoz, the term used by the Turks centuries earlier for the representative of 
the Venetian Republic at the Sultan’s Court. The purpose of the Residency and its work 
was given as protection of the route to India and development of influence, prestige and 
commerce. The British presence was given additional importance in 1903 with the 
declaration, aimed primarily but not solely at an expansionist Russia, that the British 
Government "would resist with all the means at our disposal" any attempt "by any other 
power" to establish a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf.
Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India 1898-1905, decreed this to be "our Monroe doctrine in 
the Middle East" and immediately set about strengthening the Government of India's 
grip on the area. He mounted a majestic tour of the Persian Gulf that same year. Lord 
Curzon, and the Government of India, had regard for Persia and for Mesopotamia, but 
scant respect for the people and prospects on the Arab side. Curzon described the Sultan 
of Muscat as "pathetic" and the Shaikh of Kuwait as "sinister". He was personally 
offended by the Shaikh of Bahrain's "chilly antagonism" to his proposal that customs 
dues (the Shaikh’s main source of income) be given over in order to help defray the 
Government of India's administration costs in the area.4
At the start of the First World War there were three high powered representatives of the 
Government of India in the region. At Bushire, the Government of India’s appointee 
now carried the ponderous title of “His Britannic Majesty’s Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf and Consul General for Fars, Khuzistan and Luristan”. He received his 
orders from the Bombay Government until 1873 and after that from the Government of 
India. Subordinate to this office were the Political Agents in the individual Arab 
shaikhdoms, also staffed and administered by the Government of India An entirely
4 Hay page 11 "commercial at first", page 13 "Balyoz"; Yergin page 140 "resist with all our means" and 
"Monroe Doctrine", Curzon's reference is to the doctrine promulgated by US President James Monroe 
(1758-1831) that no part o f the American continent should be colonised by any other power; Busch, 
Britain/Persian Gulf, page 179 "pathetic", page 225 "sinister" page 146 "chilly antagonism"
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separate establishment existed in Teheran. This was the office of the British Minister in 
Teheran, dating back to the 1617 appointment of the first British Ambassador to the 
Persian Court. The Political Resident at Bushire reported to the Government of India 
while the British Minister in Teheran reported to the Foreign Office in London; these 
two officials had no direct contact.
A second Government of India appointee was the Political Resident in Baghdad, with a 
Consul subordinate to him stationed in Basra. The Baghdad Resident, although drawn 
from the Indian Government’s Political Service, reported to London through the British 
Ambassador in Constantinople. The Political Resident officiating at Aden was a third 
Government of India appointee. After occupation by a British force in 1839, Aden had 
been annexed to India where it became part of the Bombay Presidency. The conquest 
and absorption of Aden -  an Arab land -  to India created a precedent. Aden provided a 
model to follow in the Government of India’s later goal of similarly absorbing Iraq, and 
the Persian Gulf, into the Indian Empire.5
The Government of India met the financial cost of all Persian Gulf officers and half the 
cost of the British Minister's establishment in Teheran, half the charge for subsidies for 
mail boats to Baghdad and paid an annual contribution to London for an Admiralty 
provision of navy patrols and "special" assignments as requested. This was 
jurisdictional confusion writ large. One British Official later commented, “the nature of 
our political association” in the Persian Gulf was “an association so unusual and so 
obscure as to be virtually incomprehensible to the layman ... and baffling even to the 
official mind.” In the Gulf, the Government of India’s Political Officers referred to the 
actual British Government as the “High” Government. To the people of the Arabian 
Peninsula the “High” Government was a remote and threatening concept.6
The dominance of the British position had been achieved through the Government of 
India’s officers. To underline their negotiations over the years they had frequently 
called in the troops of the Indian military and gunboats of the Indian Marines -  a 
favourite tactic of the Indian Political Service's Major Percy Zachariah Cox while he 
was Persian Gulf Resident 1904-1913. By the beginning of the 20th century, the Arab 
Rulers in the Gulf had signed away most of their rights through a series of treaties. They 
had pledged not to entertain overtures from any other power and not to sell, cede or
 ^ Hawley, page 74 “first British Ambassador to Persia”
6 Hawley, comment by Sir William Luce in his Introduction “virtually incomprehensible”; For the twists 
and turns o f authority for the Persian G ulf Residency see Penelope Tuson’s 1979 work for the India Office 
Library, London, entitled “The Records o f the British Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf ’ pages 
1-9. Tuson comments “the anomalous position in relation to internal Persian affairs and the affairs o f  the 
Gulf, respectively British and Indian Government spheres o f interest, were never really resolved until a 
hundred years later . .in 1946.”
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lease any part of their territory without first gaining permission from the “High” 
Government.
Ostensibly, the Gulf states had given away control only of their foreign relations, but by 
regular use of the men and ships of the Indian Marines, and their armaments, the 
Resident had no trouble in ensuring that his “advice” was followed in all matters. The 
smaller shaikhdoms were so locked into Government of India control by their 
agreements and treaties that they entirely lost their individual identities and were 
lumped together under the title “Trucial States”. The Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf was so powerful, his authority so absolute, that a satisfied Lord Curzon, while he 
was Viceroy of India, claimed “the British Resident at Bushire, who has always been an 
officer of the Indian Government, is really the uncrowned King of the Gulf’.7
Steps to “Indianisation”
An agreement was signed on July 29th 1913, though never ratified, between the 
Ottoman Imperial Government and the Government of His Britannic Majesty. Under the 
terms of this convention, the British recognised the Shaikhdom of Kuwait as part of the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkey renounced all claims to sovereignty over Bahrain and the 
Qatar Peninsula. While standing by the letter of this agreement and not openly annexing 
Bahrain, even as the convention was being signed the last of a "Three Step 
Indianisation" program was being completed. The program’s first stage, coincidental 
with Curzon's 1904 appointment of Cox as Political Resident, was the upgrading of the 
1900 post of Political Assistant in Charge to the position of Political Agent, reporting to 
the Resident. The Political Agent in Bahrain quickly gained jurisdiction over subjects of 
the British Empire on the island and the right to supervise their claims. In 1909 the 
second stage was completed with the Political Agent obtaining jurisdiction over all 
foreigners along the lines of the Indian Foreign Jurisdiction Order of 1890. The third 
and last step in "Indianisation" was the 1913 establishment of the "Bahrain Order-in- 
Council" that imposed on Bahrain the civil and criminal laws of British India "as if 
Bahrain were a district in the Presidency of Bombay".8
7 The Arabs o f  the Persian Gulf still refer to these tactics as Britain’s “Gunboat Diplomacy”; Busch, 
Britain/Persian Gulf page 258 “King o f  the G ulf’
 ^Faroughy page 96 gives the relevant provisions including “Government o f  His Britannic Majesty declares 
they have no intention o f annexing the Bahrain Island to their territories (Article 13)” and page 95 “three 
step Indianisation”; Rumaihi, Muhammad G, Bahrain Social and Political Change since the First World 
War, UK. Bowker, University o f Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies, 1976, page 168 
“Indian Foreign Jurisdiction Order 1890”; Faroughy page 101 “Bahrain Order-in-Council”, Rumaihi page 
169 gives hill detail o f the Order-in-Council, published London Gazette August 15th 1913; Marlowe,
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The effect of the Order-in-Council was to treat Bahrain as a Colony of the Government 
of India, "with the Political Resident Persian Gulf having much the same powers over 
Bahrain as a Colonial Governor". Similar Orders-in-Council would be applied to 
Muscat, the Trucial States, Qatar and Kuwait. Orders-in-Council were issued separately 
for each territory on the basis of India's Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 (as amended) 
and of agreements made with the individual rulers. The Indian codes and other 
comprehensive Indian legislation were imposed and appeals from the shaikhdoms' 
courts, presided over by the Political Agents and the Resident, lay with the High Court 
in Bombay.9
Kuwait was described in the 1913 Anglo Turkish Convention as an "autonomous Qada 
of the Ottoman Empire" using a Turkish flag with a Kuwait logo. But in November 
1914, in an attempt to gain the Shaikh of Kuwait's cooperation in the "liberation" of 
Basra, the British defined the status of Kuwait, in writing, as an "independent state 
under British protection". Sir Percy Cox later boasted to T E Lawrence that he, Cox, had 
personally "made an Arab flag for Kuwait". With a Government of India Political 
Agent, and the ceding of control of its commercial and external relations through a 
number of agreements and treaties, despite its “Arab flag” Kuwait was definitely in the 
British orbit, though lacking the final step to full "Indianisation". 10
Under the Anglo Saudi Treaty, signed by Cox and Bin Saud on December 26th 1915, 
the British Government recognised Nejd, A1 Hasa, Katif, Jubail and their dependencies 
(to be determined later) and their ports on the Persian Gulf as Bin Saud's countries, with 
Bin Saud as their independent Ruler and his sons and descendants after him. In return 
for this recognition, Bin Saud agreed to the usual clauses of not entering into any 
correspondence, agreement or treaty with any other foreign power. Like the other 
Shaikhs before him, he also agreed not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise 
dispose of any part of his territories to any other foreign power, or to the subjects of any 
such power, without the consent of the “High” Government whose advice he would 
follow unreservedly. By November 1916, “a combination of every sort of restrictive 
treaty concluded by Britain in the Gulf over the previous century”, including a 
Government of India Political Agent at Doha, would bring Qatar firmly into the fold.* 11
John, The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century, London: Cresset Press, 1962, page 40 “ a district in the 
Presidency o f Bombay”
9 Marlowe page 40 “as a Colonial Governor”; Liebesny, Administration, pages 33-42 “appeals. High 
Court Bombay”
I® Graves, Philip, The Life of Sir Percy Cox, London: Thornton Butterworth, 1939, page 203, Cox to 
Lawrence June 1916 “Arab flag”
11 Graves, page 197 “follow unreservedly” (this 1915 agreement is also referred to as the Treaty of 
Darin); Busch Britain/Gulf page 346 “combination o f ’
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In 1912, the Commander in Chief India, the Naval Commander in Chief India, Chief of 
Staff India and the Political Resident Persian Gulf drew up a plan for the occupation of 
Fao and Basra by the Indian military, which if successful would result in converting the 
“special privileges” in the area into those of rights by conquest. The plan was put into 
action in October 1914 when Britain’s war against Turkey was launched by the Indian 
Expeditionary Force, from Bahrain. India’s role in the Persian Gulf during World War 
One, and its aftermath, is of such importance to the political and economic situation 
that later prevailed, and to decisions affecting development of Arabia’s oil, that it must 
be closely examined here.12
Mesopotamia: India’s War
The necessity of safeguarding Persian oil supplies for Britain has frequently been given 
as the reason why London consented to India’s dispatch of this force to Basra. Briton 
Busch, for example, puts this forward in his 1970 Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914- 
1921, in which he touches on India’s goals in Mesopotamia. The British Cabinet 
decided to send the forces, Busch says, “to occupy Abadan Island to protect the oil 
tanks, refinery and pipe lines located there ... ostensibly, at least, the main objective 
was the protection of oil; there was a great deal of oil to protect”. In 1930 Arnold 
Wilson made this claim in Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914-1917. Wilson, however, 
placed the decision making in the hands of the Government of India. “Brigadier General 
Delamain of the Indian Army was in command,” Wilson wrote, “... to occupy Abadan 
Island in order to protect the oil refineries, tanks and pipelines, cover the landing of 
reinforcements and assure the local Arabs of our support against Turkey”.13
The notion that Britain went to war against Turkey to ensure its oil supply from Persia 
is a later interpretation that is not borne out by the original documentation. This 
conclusion is also reached by Marian Kent in her work Oil and Empire and by Philip 
Ireland in Iraq a Study in Political Development. Excellent documentation on this
Ireland, Philip Willard, Iraq, A Study in Political Development, New York. Russell & Russell, 1937, 
pages 22/28 The committee was Admiral Slade, Naval Commander in Chief, East Indies; Lt General Percy 
Lake, Chief o f Staff, India; Lt Colonel H. McMahon, Foreign Secretary, India; and Major Percy Cox, 
Political Resident Persian Gulf
l-3 Bush, Briton Cooper, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921, USA: University o f California Press, 
1971, page 4 “a great deal o f oil to protect”; Wilson, Lt Col Arnold, Loyalties: Mesopotamia 1914-1917, 
UK, Oxford University Press, 1930 page 8 “the Indian Army was in command”; Monroe page 98 also 
makes the point that Royal Assent was given to the Bill ratifying the British Government’s 51% purchase 
of the Anglo Persian Oil Company just six days before the outbreak o f World War One, “because of its 
date the purchase is often attributed to the fear of war then hanging over Europe. . . Churchill dispelled this 
notion saying ‘Nobody cares in wartime how much they pay for a vital commodity...
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whole episode, including the aims of the Government oflndia, can be found in Precis o f 
Correspondence regarding the Mesopotamian Expedition, Its Genesis and Development 
a very long, and secretly prepared report, by the Military Department of the India 
Office.14
Protection of Persian oil was not high on the list of priorities of the Indian Government. 
The Military Secretary to the Government of India placed oil as the last of five 
objectives to be gained by the sending of an Indian Expeditionary Force to the Shatt A1 
Arab. He advocated sending Indian troops, and landing them in neutral Persia, 
"ostensibly to protect the oil installations" (my italic). Churchill stated that European 
and Egyptian defence had priority and, anyway, Britain could get her oil elsewhere. At 
this point Persian oil was not of much importance to Britain. At its best during World 
War One, the Anglo Persian Oil Company supplied a mere one sixth of the British 
Navy's fuel; 80% of all allied oil supplies came from the United States. 15
Nevertheless, consent came from London, and so in the 1914 invasion of Mesopotamia, 
now known as Iraq, it was India that provided the men, the means and the initial 
management of the campaign. Mesopotamia was India's war, India's frontier and India 
wanted it as India's reward. On occupation, the Indian Government confidently 
expected to colonise Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf and so create an Indian Empire, 
on its own terms, ruled from Delhi. Indian officials saw no anomaly in the proposal to 
subordinate Iraq to an already subordinate government — Mesopotamia as a colony for 
India. Curzon’s successor as Viceroy oflndia, Lord Hardinge, distributed statements to 
this effect claiming that the Government of India was the logical controller of an 
occupied Mesopotamia because "the interests concerned, strategic, commercial, 
political and religious alike are mainly Indian".16
The Chief Political Officer with the Indian Expeditionary Force was Lord Curzon's 
"uncrowned King of the Gulf', the Political Resident Percy Cox. Supporting Cox's
14 PROAVO/106/52 Secret, Correspondence regarding the Mesopotamian Expedition - Its Genesis and 
Development; The name “Mesopotamia” (see Glossary) continued to be used by the British until, 
following the uprising o f 1920, plans were drawn up to institute a “provisional” government for what 
would now be called the State of Iraq. The area had been known as Al Iraq in antiquity and the Arabs had 
always used both Al Iraq and Mesopotamia interchangeably. In modem history others knew only 
Mesopotamia; the Ottomans used Mesopotamia. The revived name came into official usage in August 
1921 when Faisal was proclaimed King of Iraq.
^  Kent page 118 “during the early part of the campaign, Mesopotamia was clearly not a major 
battleground, and oil, whether Persian or Mesopotamian, was not a major factor in planning military 
strategy”; Ireland page 24-25 “General Barrow, Military Secretary to the Secretary of State India, 
September 1914 ‘ostensibly to protect the oil installations but in reality to notify the Turks we mean 
business’ Barrow placed oil as the last o f five objectives”; Kent page 118 “Churchill... noted ...buy her oil 
elsewhere”, Sampson pages 77-81 “80%. . .from USA” also Yergin page 174-175 for details o f Britain’s 
World War One oil supplies
16 Busch Britain/India/Arabs page 23 “mainly Indian”
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January 1917 move to be made High Commissioner of Mesopotamia, Lord Curzon 
wrote to him approvingly: "Nobly have you carried out the mission with which I 
entrusted you 18 years ago — you have made yourself the King of the Gulf When the 
war is over we shall consolidate that Kingdom and see that no one snatches away the 
crown."
Cox's own protege, his assistant and deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Arnold Wilson, 
reflected the thinking of many in the Indian Government when he declared: "1 should 
like to see it announced that Mesopotamia is to be annexed to India as a colony for 
India and Indians, that the Government of India will administer it, and gradually bring 
under cultivation its vast unpopulated desert plains, peopling them with martial races 
from the Punjab.” Wilson also believed that the British Legation in Teheran should be 
made subordinate to India. And in March 1915, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Under Secretary at 
the India Office, enthusiastically advocated that free Indian immigration into 
Mesopotamia would at once reward India's war effort while achieving the laudable goal 
of removing any excuse for Indian immigration into "white man's colonies".17
The "Indianisation" of Ottoman territory moved quickly. Occupation allowed for a fast 
tracking of the previous “Three Steps to Indianisation” program. Seven days after 
occupying Basra the military police were replaced with an India-modelled civil police. 
Customs, finance, the municipality and the government press were taken over. The 
Basra Times was published six times a week by the occupying force, in English, Arabic 
and Hindi. So called lunatics and criminals were disposed of by being sent to India. An 
Indian judicial system was imposed and Indian currency became the legal tender, as it 
was already in the shaikhdoms of the Gulf.18
Non-combatants from India provided the labour force for the army in Mesopotamia and 
Indian immigration boomed. Immediately after the war there were 10,000 British and 
65,000 Indian troops stationed in Mesopotamia. Some 50,000-70,000 Indian labourers, 
including 8,000 convicted habitual criminals promised sentence remission, were also in 
Mesopotamia. In addition, hundreds of Indian clerks and office workers were employed 
to administer the "government". Some 1500 private Indian citizens had taken up 
residence. Presiding over all this was the Indian Expeditionary Force’s Chief Political
17 Graves page 231 “no one snatches away”; Busch Britain/India/Arabs page 22 “a colony for India and 
Indians”, Marlowe Persian Gulf page 115 “Teheran Legation should come under India” and Page 41 
“white man’s colonies”; See Mansfield, Peter, The Arabs, UK: Penguin 4th reprint, 1982, page 216 
“imperialists in the British Cabinet argued that everything should be done to obtain ‘a continuity o f  
territory or o f control both in East Africa and between Egypt and India’.”
^  See Marlowe Persian Gulf pages 50/144/391/401 for “Indianisation” of Mesopotamia; 
IOL/R/L/PS/11/193 January 31st 1921 “Report o f the Interdepartmental Committee. . . to deal with 
mandated and other territories in the Middle East” note in this report “there is a Treasury o f the 
Government of India” at the Political Residency at Bushire
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Officer, now Major General Percy Cox, who was also, as he declared, "still the Political 
Resident of the Persian Gulf for all important matters".19
In the event, the Indian Government blew it. A British Parliamentary inquiry followed 
the 1915 debacle at Kut where, after a five-month siege the 14,000 strong Anglo Indian 
force surrendered to the Turks. An epic story of sheer incompetence, political intrigue, 
personal envy and backstabbing was revealed. The Indian Government’s management 
of the Mesopotamian campaign was shown to be so flawed that even Lord Curzon was 
moved to comment “a more shocking exposure of official blundering and incompetence 
has not, in my opinion, been made ... at any rate not since the Crimean War". In 1916, 
control of military operations in Mesopotamia was taken from the Government of India 
and transferred to the War Office in London. The Government of India hung on to civil 
control through the appointment of Percy Cox, strongly supported by Lord Curzon, as 
Civil Commissioner Mesopotamia. Cox was not entirely happy about this downgrading 
of his promised kingdom. He blamed the Foreign Office and his perceived rivals in the 
British administration of Egypt. He commented that “Cairo has practically forced us 
into agreeing not to annex these parts, but merely to administer them ...”20
While India had to concede that her dream of Mesopotamia as a colony for India had 
slipped away, she was not about to give up everything. India stuck by her view that if 
she was expected to continue providing resources, such as military manpower, financial 
contributions and other aid, then she must have a quid pro quo and some compensation 
for sacrifices already made. In the final trade off, despite the ineptitude, malingering 
and venality revealed by the British Parliament Inquiry into the management skills of 
officials of the Indian Government, India was allowed to keep her grip on the Arab side 
of the Persian Gulf. As before the war, power was to be exercised through the office of 
the Indian Government's own man, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
Settlement: India's gain
Despite the early treaties, Britain's postwar position in the Arabian Peninsula was, in 
international legal terms, an "assumed" one and therefore valid only in so far as it went
^ S ee  Wilson Mesopotamia, page 46, convicted Indian prisoners, originally designated 'Disciplinary 
Military Labour Corps' became known as the 'Jail Corps'; Graves page 209 July 1916 Cox to India Office 
“still Political Resident”, See Tuson, page 184 “Cox was titular Political Resident until October 1920 
although absent in Baghdad, on his 1918 appointment to Teheran, Lt Col Arnold Wilson took over as 
“absentee Resident” in Baghdad until October 1920”
20ßusch Britain/India/Arabs page 130 "official blundering and incompetence", page 150 Cox wanted the 
title o f  "High Commissioner" as in Egypt, Chamberlain compromised on "Civil Commissioner"; Monroe, 
Elizabeth, Philby o f  Arabia, UK: Quartet Books, 1973, page 52 “not to annex”
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unchallenged by any other power. Consequently, Britain decided as a matter of policy 
that "there was no question of submitting our longstanding relations with the Arabian 
Chiefs" to the judgement of the powers assembled at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.
After scenes that President Wilson described as "the whole disgusting scramble" for the 
Middle East, the technical extension of the Paris Peace Conference was the meeting 
held at San Remo for the assignment of the mandates — Syria and Lebanon to France, 
Mesopotamia and Palestine to Britain. France inherited the 25% share, previously held 
by Germany, of the old Turkish Petroleum Company of Mesopotamia, reconstituted by 
Britain as a legal ploy through which to exploit Iraq's oil. 21
At San Remo, the policy of not seeking Allied recognition of Britain's position on the 
Arabian Peninsula was maintained and the Gulf shaikhdoms were again purposely kept 
off the agenda. When negotiating the Treaty of Sevres signed with Turkey in August 
1920, Lord Curzon deliberately avoided any discussion of the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf In this way, it was only the Arab states of the Persian Gulf which were left totally 
unprotected after World War One.
Although they may well have been what T E Lawrence scathingly described as "a form 
of colonial administration that can benefit nobody but its administrators", the mandates 
were a step forward from the excesses previously possible under rampant imperialism. 
Under the mandates an operative document was drawn up defining the obligations to be 
undertaken on behalf of the League of Nations. The mandatory powers were supervised, 
and each year had to face a detailed review conducted by the international members of 
the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Implicit within the 
mandates was the understanding that they would end sometime.
The Arab shaikhdoms missed out in every way. They were not granted independence. 
They were not covered by a mandate that at least would have ensured international 
oversight through the League of Nations. They were not even declared as official British 
"protectorates" a legal status that would have, for example, guaranteed them defence 
against territorial predators among other benefits.
Busch Britain/India/Arabs page page 285 “no question o f submitting”; see also Monroe Britain’s 
Moment, page 32, the now infamous October 24th 1915 Palestine/Israel related letter from McMahon to 
Sharif Hussain o f Mecca promising to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs except in 
“areas lying west o f the districts o f Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo” had a second clause that also 
denied the possibility of Arab independence to “regions affected by our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs” 
meaning the shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf; Busch, Britain/India/Arabs, pages 304-308 this was the 25% 
of the pre-war Turkish Petroleum Company held by the Deutsche Bank and now under the control of 
Britain's Public Trustee of Enemy Property. Before the war, the Anglo Persian Oil Company had bought 
50% of Turkish Petroleum with the remaining shares allocated among Royal Dutch Shell, the Deutsch 
Bank and 5% held by Caloiste Gulbenkian
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In a superb display of diplomatic doublespeak, Britain would later explain Bahrain's 
status in the following terms: “The principality is an independent Arab State ... under 
the protection of His Majesty’s Government... but not a British Protectorate”. Instead of 
independence, a protectorate or a mandate, the Arab Peninsula was given over by 
Britain to the Government of India as compensation for failure to achieve its World 
War One goal of annexation of Iraq as a colony of India.22
When he took over as Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill arranged the 1921 Cairo 
Conference at which the method by which Britain was to control the Middle East was 
decided. The Colonial Office was to have responsibility for both policy and 
administration in Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan and Aden. The Foreign Office would be 
responsible for the Hijaz and relations with Sharif Hussain of Mecca. A special 
arrangement was agreed whereby, in recognition of his long relationship with Bin Saud, 
and with Kuwait, built up over his years as the Government of India’s Political 
Resident, Sir Percy Cox would retain command of these two areas until his retirement, 
though strictly on a personal basis and not officially attached to either the position of 
High Commissioner or the Government of Iraq per se.
With the temporary exceptions of Kuwait and Bin Saud’s domain, the Arab states of the 
Persian Gulf were to remain under the authority of the Government of India. The formal 
document stated that the Colonial Office would be responsible for all Arab areas of the 
Middle East. However, in the case of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, the Colonial 
Office was to be interested only in matters of “political significance”. Administration, 
and policy in general, was to be in the hands of the Government of India. Moreover, the 
Colonial Office would not deal with the various shaikhdoms directly, but only through 
the Government of India’s Political Resident.23
The extent of the Government of India’s dominance can be seen in the 1928 move by 
the British Air Ministry aimed at eliminating the Government of India from Arabia and
22 Monroe Britain’s Moment page 66 “disgusting scramble”, page 72 Monroe contends “the Permanent 
Mandates Commission o f the League o f Nations was the best body o f its kind ever so far constituted, 
particularly in its experience, impartiality and effectiveness”; see Busch Britain/India/Arabs page 388 for 
detail San Remo and Sevres; Monroe page 68 “form of colonial administration”; Al Tajir, Mahdi Abdalla, 
Bahrain 1920-1945, Britain the Shaikh and the Administration, UK: Croom Helm 1987 page 6 Britain’s 
submission to the League of Nations re Persia’s claim to sovereignty of Bahrain “an independent Arab 
state... under the protection of HMG... but not a protectorate”
22 IOL/R/L/PS/11/193 January 31st 1921 “Report of the Interdepartmental Committee...to deal with 
mandated and other territories in the Middle East” noted “ the Gulf is dealt with as a single administrative 
unit. . .the currency o f the Persian Gulf is almost exclusively Indian.. almost all trade is with India, the Gulf 
lives almost wholly on cereals imported from India. Indian merchants handle the bulk o f the trade”. The 
report also noted “the large Indian interests” in the area and said that “only the Political Resident” is 
sufficiently “in touch with the political, strategic and commercial interests involved to take 
responsibility... in times of stress in the Gulf’
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the Persian Gulf. Now that air traffic routes were being developed along the Arabian 
littoral, the Air Ministry claimed, it would be more efficient and economical to 
concentrate responsibility for these areas in the hands of a single department, in 
England. That the Air Ministry suggested this single department should be the Colonial 
Office can be taken as evidence that the Colonial Office did not then hold this 
responsibility. The Government of India countered that its handling of affairs in Arabia 
needed to be viewed in the context of Muslim reaction in India. Two sub-committees 
were formed to examine the issue. In July 1930, the question of future control of the 
Middle East was referred to Cabinet for a decision, thus ensuring its effective 
postponement.24
Further corroboration of the power of the Government of India in the Arabian Peninsula 
occurs in 1933 when the Colonial Office declared its intention to relinquish any interest 
in Gulf affairs (see chapter seven Meltdown). The Foreign Office put in a bid to assume 
responsibility on the basis that the foreign relations of the Arab shaikhdoms were now 
important, citing such matters as the Persian claim to Bahrain, American involvement 
in oil concessions and air routes linking the Gulf with Europe rather than with India. 
The Government of India threatened to withdraw its financial support from the Gulf 
establishment. The Cabinet decision of July 26th 1933 decreed that “the position of the 
Government of India in relation to the Gulf was to remain unchanged” and the India 
Office would now be the British Government point of contact.25
The reasons why this happened are central to this thesis. Given that the delegates at the 
Paris Peace Conference fought over every aspect of the award of the Middle Eastern 
mandates -  the Americans even insisted on sending their own King Crane commission 
of inquiry into public opinion in Palestine and Iraq -  why was the Arabian Peninsula 
completely ignored?26
24 Tuson, page 5, “eliminate India from Arabia” and “Muslim reaction in India”
25 Tuson page 5 “position of the Government of India.. remain unchanged”
26 See Klieman, Aaron S, Foundations o f British Policy in the Arab World, the Cairo Conference o f 
1921, USA: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970; see also Troeller, Gary, The Birth o f Saudi Arabia, Britain and 
the Rise o f the House o f Sa'ud, London: Frank Cass, 1976, pages 165-167 & 196-198; See also Busch 
Britain/India/Arabs pages 320-341; Dr Henry Churchill King, education activist of Oberlin College and 
Charles R Crane, philanthropist heir to the Crane bathroom fittings fortune, were sent by President 
Woodrow Wilson in 1919. Wilson suspected the share-out of the Midedle East privately agreed between 
Britain and France flouted Article X X I1 of the League of Nations Covenent. This stipulated the wishes of 
the local people should be “a principal consideration” in any new arrangements. King-Crane found they 
could not approve the scheme devised by Britain and France for the future of the Middle East, particularly 
so in Palestine. Note that it was never suggested the King Crane Commission visit the Arabs of the Gulf to 
ascertain their wishes. The King-Crane Report simply vanished at Versailles; it was never presented for 
discussion.
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The answer is oil — or rather continuing assumption of the absence of oil. After the 
war, the oil companies and their respective governments seemed so dazzled by 
prospects in Iraq, and so certain there was no oil in Arabia, that they had no interest in 
the Arab shaikhdoms. The lack of interest matched the long held opinion of the 
Government of India, and her officials, at least since Lord Curzon, that the entire 
Arabian littoral was of no value, politically, culturally or economically. In a perverse 
sort of way, it is possible the opinion of one generated preconceptions in the other and 
led into a circle of reinforced negative views.
Two issues are critical in examining the discovery and development of oil in Arabia. 
First is the hegemony of the Government of India that this chapter has now 
demonstrated did prevail. The second critical issue is the depth of Indian associations 
of the Anglo Persian Oil Company. There was an alignment of ideology between both 
groups of officials which was paralleled by their actions. If the Indian Government 
believed the Arabian Peninsula was worthless, the India-oriented Anglo Persian Oil 
Company was hardly likely ever to imagine the Peninsula as a treasure of oil reserves. 
Similarly, if the Anglo Persian Oil Company regarded the entire Peninsula as of no 
value, the Government of India was not inspired to review its opinion.
The fusion between the Government of India and the Anglo Persian Oil Company is 
exemplified in two men of influence at the close of the war: Percy Cox running Iraq 
while his Indian Army protege and ex Deputy Arnold Wilson was in charge of the 
Anglo Persian Oil Company. After making a triumphant return from Persia to 
Mesopotamia in 1920, with a knighthood, Sir Percy Cox had unparalleled authority as 
High Commissioner of Iraq, and with authority over Kuwait and Bin Saud's territory.
Arch-imperialist Arnold Wilson had exercised a deadly stewardship as "Acting" Civil 
Commissioner 1918-1920 while Cox was Minister in Teheran. Wilson presided over the 
tragic 1920 Iraq Revolt, which Britain spent some 40 million sterling in suppressing, 
with 450 British and 10,000 Iraqi deaths and thousands of casualties on both sides. In 
the subsequent inquiry, Arnold Wilson listed thirteen factors as having contributed to 
the uprising. He ignored the wholesale hangings, bombing of defenceless villages, 
waves of arrest and deportations that took place under his management prior to the 
uprising. Instead, his list included what he called “congenital” Iraqi “anarchy and 
fanaticism”, the liberal ideas of US President Wilson, intrigue by Syrians, the role of 
Mustafa Kemal Attatuk, and conspiracies among the American Standard Oil 
companies.27
See Wilson’s Loyalties Volumes One & Two; For detail of Wilson’s policies and actions see Busch 
Britain/India/Arabs pages 395-416; Fromkin, David, A Peace to End All Peace, Creating the Modem 
Middle East 1914-1922, UK: Andre Deutsch, 1989, page 453 “anarchy and fanaticism” and page 535
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When details of Wilson’s draconian policies became known, the British Government 
removed him from Iraq. In contrast, the Government of India rewarded him with a 
knighthood and the Anglo Persian Oil Company appointed him Resident Manager at 
Abadan with the promise, soon fulfilled, of a place on the Board of Directors.28
Both Wilson and his mentor Cox were, as Wilson's biographer observed, "raised in 
Victorianism and trained in Indian paternalism" and both were "the product of Indian 
attitudes and systems of government". Both men would continue to exert these 
influences on the last bastion of the Raj -  the Arab shaikhdoms of the Persian G ulf- 
one from a powerful government position and the other from the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company. Before looking at the Indian connections of the Anglo Persian Oil Company, 
it is instructive to examine the post-World War One impact of the Government of India 
on the Arabian Peninsula.29
Post-World War One: India’s Administration
Unchecked by any international body at the close of the First World War the 
shaikhdoms of the Arabian Gulf were left to struggle alone against the power of the 
British Empire and its proxy the Government of India. The Arabian Peninsula was 
written off by the great powers as of no value, either economically or politically. 
Leading geologists of the day were convinced that there was no oil and even the 
Peninsula’s geographical importance in protecting India had faded with the defeat of 
the Germans and Ottomans, the retirement of the Russians and the advent of aircraft. 
While much of the world was moving towards the end of colonialism and the 
achievement of political independence, the Arab shaikhdoms were subjected to a form 
of imperialism reminiscent of the mid-19th century. Britain handed over the Arabian 
Peninsula to the Government of India. The finest exponents of the imperial ideas of the 
Indian Raj, thwarted in the goal of annexing Iraq, were now rewarded for faithful 
service in the former Mesopotamia by being installed in positions of power across the 
water.
“British officials suspected American oil interests were behind the anti-British insurrection in Iraq and the 
Kemalist movement in Turkey. Allegedly an arrested insurrection leader had in his possession a letter from 
one o f the Standard Oil companies showing American funds were dispensed by the American consul in 
Baghdad to the rebels...”
2% For detail o f Anglo Persian’s hiring o f Wilson at a very generous salary, and promise o f a directorship, 
see Ferrier page 309; Marlowe, John, I Ate Victorian, The Life o f Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson, London: 
Cresset Press, 1967, page 194 for Wilson’s Knighthood from the Government o f India 
29 Marlowe Late Victorian, page 485 “Indian paternalism” and page 421 “Indian attitudes”
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Bahrain was selected for a lour de 'force display of administritive skills, India style. The 
Bahrainis soon began to grasp the full effects on their daily lives of being policed by the 
Government of India through the strict enforcement, from February 1919, of the Order- 
in-Council. The Political Officers controlled the Judiciary and the Religious Law 
Courts. The Political Agent, or his Indian assistant, issued judgements. They had the 
power to deport any person judged, by the Political Agent, ‘‘about to commit” an 
offence against the Order-in-Council or “endeavouring to excite enmity” between the 
people of Bahrain and the Government of India or the “High” Government. Who were 
subjects of the Shaikh by dint of being Bahrainis and who were under the jurisdiction of 
the Political Agent by virtue of being foreigners was not exactly defined.
A new Political Agent arrived in November 1919. This was Major H R P Dickson, 37 
years old, son of a British Consul General in Jerusalem and Damascus, and an Indian 
Army career officer. Dickson, like his immediate predecessor, had served as a Political 
Officer in Mesopotamia. He had been one of Wilson's handpicked "Young Men" whom 
Lord Curzon had criticised as, "young officers who are necessarily lacking in 
experience". Dickson soon crippled the island's business activities as he set about 
punishing the Ruler of Bahrain by suspending the settlement of the island’s commercial 
disputes. Dickson was forced to impose his will, he explained, because of an offence to 
his personal dignity, “... owing to the Ruler abusing his privileges and dismissing a 
member of the Majlis al Urf (the Commercial Court) without consulting me. As the 
Ruler refused to admit himself wrong, I, in turn, refused to allow the Court to meet”.30
Unfettered by surveillance from any other nation, the Government of India's Political 
Officers in the Trucial Coast advised gunboat action against the Shaikh of Sharjah for 
failing to collect a debt claimed by a British subject. The Political Resident in the 
Persian Gulf had no qualms about recording in the 1920 Administration report: “The 
Shaikh’s conduct, which amounted to the flouting if not defiance of the Representative 
of His Majesty’s Government, has been brought to the notice of the Government of 
India with the recommendation that the Shaikh should be fined three times the 
instalment he had failed to produce, and if necessary payment to be enforced by one of 
His Majesty’s Ships.” Some shaikhdoms were not even worth comment as the Political 
Resident’ Report noted: “The year 1923 was a fortunate one in Trucial Oman in having 
no history, there is practically nothing to record.” And for 1924: "Ras al Khaimah: 
Nothing to report. Umm al Quwain: Nothing to report. Ajman: Nothing to report."31
30 Marlowe Persian Gulf page 66 “Wilson’s Young Men” and page 158 November 1919 Curzon to Cox 
“lacking in experience”; Administrative Report for Bahrain for the Year 1919 (Dickson) “refused to allow 
the court to meet”
3! Administrative Report for the Persian Gulf Residency 1920 (Trevor) “payment to be enforced” and 
1923 and 1924 “nothing to report”
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Dickson in Bahrain faithfully copied the methods of his mentor, Arnold Wilson, and 
devised a scheme to “tax the town of Manama on the principles in force in the various 
towns of Mesopotamia”; the tax raised was to be mainly allocated to meeting the costs 
of Dickson’s Political Agency. The Ruler of Bahrain, Dickson declared, would be 
“persuaded” to sanction the enforcement of the tax and an Indian would be put in 
charge to collect. Opposition to Dickson from almost every level of Bahrain society 
grew steadily during his 12 months in Bahrain. His refusal to allow any authority 
outside that of his own office generated unrest among Bahrainis and ill feeling towards 
those designated non Bahraini and so “protected” by the Political Agent.32
Dickson's replacement in January 1920 was Major Clive Daly, another of Wilson’s 
“Young Men” of already formidable reputation for keeping “native” populations in 
check. Daly had been Political Governor of Diwaniya in Mesopotamia. It was in Daly’s 
region that the Iraqi Revolt began. He was a “tough single-minded soldier” who, like 
Dickson, vigorously pursued Arnold Wilson-style policies. Daly isolated the Ruler and 
disrupted the traditional structure, and created acrimonious division in Bahrain's 
society, by designating more and more individuals and groups as "foreigners" under his 
protection. He deported anyone who opposed him, whether "foreigners" or Bahrainis. 
He recruited Persians to build up what had previously been a small group of market 
guards into a "law keeping" force, answerable only to him. He convicted, and deported 
to India, the Ruler's Secretary for alleged conspiracy against the Order-in-Council and 
followed this a few weeks later by deporting, on the same charge, the progressive 
headmaster of Bahrain’s first modem school. Under Daly, Arab Persian and Shia-Sunni 
riots broke out and civil unrest became commonplace. The entire tribe of al Dawasir 
left their home in Bahrain and moved to Dhamman in Saudi Arabia.33
32 Busch, Britain/India/Arabs page 410 in Iraq “the Turks had collected only 2.5 million sterling per 
annum in taxes, the British were extracting 6 million”; For opposition to Dickson see Rumaihi Political 
Change, page 172; See St Antony’s College Oxford, Dickson Papers, Dickson was posted to Hillah in 
Mesopotamia where his Wilson-like ideas ran foul o f those advocating an Arab Government for the new 
state of Iraq and of the British officials supporting this, he was removed from Hillah in July 1922 (he was 
replaced by Stephen Helmsley Longrigg), from 1923-1928 Dickson was in India before returning as 
Secretary to the Resident Bushire and from May 1929 he was Political Agent Kuwait
33 Rumaihi Political Change page 186 “Daly’s region” Rumaihi cites Rihani’s Arabic edition of Kings o f  
Arabia saying Daly was demoted from Lt Col to Major for his role in the Iraq Revolt; see also Philby, H. 
St. J. B., Arabian Days: An Autobiography, London. Robert Hale, 1948, page 193 “Daly was one o f  
Wilson’s toughest men” Philby claims he “insisted” Daly be transferred out of Iraq, see also Violet Dickson 
page 158, citing Gertrude Bell, “the tribal rising is due mainly to hatred o f individual Political 
Officers. . . the fact that they hated Daly precipitated matters; it was in Diwaniya that it began”; Philby 
papers Box X V I1-9, July 31st 1923, Dickson to Philby, “ ...I was shocked greatly to see Daly's methods 
at close hand when my wife and I stayed in Bahrain. Never have I seen such a boor or anything so opposite 
to the word gentleman in his dealings with the local Arabs ...Daly's methods are worse than those o f a 
Persian Potentate...”; Rumaihi Political Change page 173 “single minded” and deportations, page 178 for 
decampment of Dawasir; also see IOL/R/15/2/88 “Dawasir Decamp to Nejd” (complete file August 1923- 
February 1924) and IOL/R/15/1/341/C25/19/166 (complete file 10/5/23-21/7/23) “Disturbance at Bahrein 
between Nejdis and Persians”
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In 1923, in humiliating circumstances, the Government of India's Political Resident, 
accompanied by gunboats and escorted by a Sikh platoon, forced the abdication of the 
Ruler of Bahrain in favour of Hamad, his reluctant eldest son. In his Administrative 
Report for the year, Daly remarked that the Ruler of Bahrain did not take kindly to the 
Government of India's "desire" that he should hand over full powers "including control 
of the Revenues". He was "finally informed", Daly reported, that he had no recourse "in 
the interests of his country" but to transfer everything "together with control of the 
Revenues". The Resident also found time ignominiously to deport to the mainland 
Abdulla Gosaibi, one of the brothers acting as Bin Saud's Representative in Bahrain (the 
eldest brother, Abdul Aziz, was on business in India). When Bin Saud objected, and 
specifically criticised Daly, the Resident replied that Daly was a trusted Officer "who 
discharges his duties with unflagging zeal".34
In response to the removal of their Ruler, the Bahrainis formed the "Bahrain National 
Congress" aimed at working towards gaining participation in their own government. 
One evening, the Political Resident invited them to meet with him at the Political 
Agency in order to discuss their demands. When they were assembled, the Resident and 
the Political Agent arrested the leaders and forced them at gunpoint onto an Indian 
Marines launch moored alongside the building. Within minutes, under cover of 
darkness, they were on the way to deportation in India, accused of being "agitators".
The Bahrainis sent envoys and messengers to all the Arab shaikhdoms asking for 
support against the removal of their Ruler and subsequent actions. The Government of 
India's Political Officers responded to the Bahraini campaign by intimidation, warning 
each of the Gulf Shaikhs they "should not receive any member of the A1 Khalifa family 
and should ignore their overtures". The sole protest to escape the wall of intimidation 
came from Mecca's Sharif Hussain who pleaded the Bahrain case with Sir Herbert 
Samuel, High Commissioner in Palestine. The British simply ignored him. There was 
no international reaction to Britain’s role in the forced abdication of the Ruler of 
Bahrain. With no international body responsible for oversight of the Arabian Peninsula,
34 Administrative Report Bahrain for the Year 1923 (Daly) “no recourse.. .in view of the Ruler’s advanced 
age and manifest inability to rule...he proved quite intractable and absolutely refused...he was finally 
informed the Government o f India would transfer”, Daly also refers to the “necessity” o f deporting Bin 
Saud’s representative “which Bin Saud resented”; For this incident see also Rumaihi page 177, citing 
letters from Political Agent to Resident and Resident to Government o f India; Busch, Britain/Persian Gulf, 
page 139 at the end of 1897, in retur5n for stationimg a Political Officer in Bahrain the Government of  
India recognised Hamad, one of Isa's four sons, as his father's designated successor. It was noted that this 
would be an excellent move "to tighten our hold on the place" and that while Britain was in a treaty 
position with “independent” Bahrain "We must however mean independent of all Governments except our 
own"; IOL/R/15/1/341 May 11th 1923, Resident to Government of India “I propose to take following 
action; arrest Abdulla Gosaibi and take him to Kuwait...and have him returned to Nejd for his master to 
deal with. ..I may have to get rid of a Persian or two as well. ..”; IOL/R/15/1/341 June 14th 1923 Resident 
to Bin Saud “unflagging zeal”
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unlike the areas under mandate, no questions were raised about Britain's assumption of 
control of the Arab shaikhdoms, nor of its passing this control to the 
Government of India.35
The Government of India was well aware of her Political Officers’ actions in Bahrain. 
Privately they expressed the opinion that "the Political Resident and Political Agent had 
shown a tendency to treat the island too much like a native state of India". The 
"impropriety" of the Political Agent running Bahrain, to all intents and purposes as if he 
were the Ruler, was criticised. But, lacking the impetus of world opinion, they did 
nothing to correct the situation. As late as 1927, after a visit to Bahrain, the Foreign 
Secretary to the Government of India remarked to the Political Resident: "Our 
involvement in Bahrain is more than is desirable. A British Financial Adviser, British 
Police Superintendent and British Customs Manager, this is more British than Katal, 
which is an Indian Border state.” On another occasion the Government of India's 
Foreign Secretary also noted that "Our present interference doubtless goes beyond what 
flows inevitably from our Treaties. But no Treaty could adequately cover it unless it 
were a Treaty extinguishing the Shaikh's sovereignty to a degree less than that possessed 
by an Indian Chief."36
Kuwait was not doing so well either. In the aftermath of the 1913 Anglo Turkish 
Convention, Sir Percy Cox admitted, "1 think we came off worse in Kuwait. The Ruler 
did not welcome the recognition of Turkish sovereignty. He did not like the loss of 
Umm Kasr and Safwan. He was most bitterly opposed to our admission of the right of 
the Turks to keep an Agent at Kuwait. This was what he had fought successfully all his 
life. The Ruler, Shaikh Mubarak, made a great fuss. I shall always carry an almost 
pathetic memory of my last interview with him. Of course, on the whole, he came off 
rather well considering that the Convention was a friendly give and take ...”37
At the end of November 1922 Sir Percy Cox presided over another friendly "give and 
take" that resulted in Kuwait being stripped of two thirds of its territory. At the 
Conference of Ujair, Sir Percy Cox "took" this area and "gave" it, along with its resident
Rumaihi Political Change page 179-183 for detail o f abdication and subsequent events; In the 1923 
Administrative Report Daly described the Bahrain response as a “calumnious campaign ostensibly aimed at 
what was termed British interference”; see also Administration Report o f the Bahrain Political Agency for 
the Year 1922 “A campaign has been conducted in the Persian Press (by) a few malcontents in Bahrain 
who designate themselves the ‘Nationalist Party’ ”
36 Rumaihi Political Change page 179-183 “native state” and “impropriety” page 182 cites a December 
1923 Telegram, Government of India to Resident, querying whether they had “gone too far”; A1 Tajir, 
page 5 “extinguishing the Shaikh’s sovereignty”
37 Graves page 168, September 1913 Cox to a British journalist “worse in Kuwait” and “pathetic 
memory”
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tribes, to Bin Saud resulting in the border of the previously recognised territory of 
Kuwait being pushed back by 150 miles.
The carve-up of Kuwait did not go before any international body for approval. Kuwait, 
like the rest of the Arab shaikhdoms, was neither a mandated territory nor independent 
and therefore had no recourse to the League of Nations, nor to any other international 
body. Cox also created two "neutral" areas, one between Kuwait and Nejd and another 
between Iraq and Nejd to allow for the tribal tradition, indeed necessity, of free 
movement for seasonal watering and grazing. Along with the two thirds of Kuwait, the 
areas of Jauf and Kaf were "taken" from Transjordan and also "given" to Bin Saud. But 
the Muntafiq and Shamiya Deserts, together with the inhabiting tribes, were given to 
Iraq despite Bin Saud's claim to these.38
Written off as of no importance, internationally ignored and virtually handed over to the 
Government of India after World War One, there was nothing to restrain the activities 
of officials such as Dickson, Daly, and Cox with his single-handed redistribution of 
territory. Meanwhile, over the Gulf waters in Abadan there was nothing restraining 
Arnold Wilson from utilising the active cooperation of the Government of India's 
Political Officers in furthering the goals of the Anglo Persian Oil Company. Hardly 
coincidentally, the company's goals were the same as those of the Government of India 
which were to maintain the status quo by keeping the Arab shaikhdoms free of any 
influence, other than their own.
Anglo Persian Oil Company: India's Pride
The notion of the Anglo Persian Oil Company as an icon of India was firmly fixed. In 
1909, when the D’Arcy Exploration Company needed an injection of funds it was the 
Burma Oil Company of India that came to the rescue. The Burma Oil Company had 
thrived through the Government of India’s blanket concession, given in 1889, that 
protected the Company from all foreign competition. In 1914 when the British 
Government purchased 51% of the Anglo Persian Oil Company, Burma Oil retained a
■*8 Dickson Kuwait, page 276 “back 150 miles”, it should be noted that Dickson, given to flights o f  
fantasy, is not a reliable source, better is Kostiner, Joseph, “Britain and the Northern Frontier of the Saudi 
State 1922-1925” in The Great Powers in the Middle East 1919-1939 ed. Uriel Dann, New York: Holmes 
& Meier 1988, pages 29-48; Perhaps even the British thought Cox had been too imperial see Troeller 
pages 198-211 two years later when presiding over the Kuwait Conference again dealing with borders, 
Colonel S G Knox, former Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was advised by the Colonial Office only 
"to guide" the delegates and not to participate actively; see also Abdul Aziz, Moudi Mansour, King Abdul- 
Aziz and the Kuwait Conference 1923-1924, London: Echoes, 1993
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third of the voting stock. The Chairman of Anglo Persian came from a career in India 
with Shaw Wallace, agents for the Burma Oil Company. Anglo Persian’s managing 
operators were Strick, Scott & Co, long associated with shipping and trade to and from 
India.
The Indian Army had been associated with the Anglo Persian Oil Company and its 
forerunner since the beginning. In 1907, a young Arnold Wilson of the Indian Army was 
posted to Ahwaz. His job involved being the British Officer in charge of Indian Army 
troops protecting the oil company site — against the native Persians. The connection 
with India was so strong that when oil was struck in 1908 in Persia, Arnold Wilson 
wired enthusiastically, "I hope it will turn out well as it will establish British influence, 
or rather Indian influence, more strongly in these parts than anything else could do." 
Immediately in the job of Resident Manager at Abadan, Wilson appointed a staff 
consisting almost entirely of British ex Indian Army Officers, mostly from the 
Mesopotamia campaign; they were military occupation officers now presented as ctoil 
men”.
Wilson’s empire-building would soon become so obvious that an internal Colonial 
Office memo would record the Arab Shaikhs' deep mistrust of Anglo Persian and note 
that "many officers formerly known to them as officials of Government are now met in 
the shape of officials of Anglo Persian". Another memo commented on "Sir Arnold 
Wilson and the many Indian Army ex officers and ex Mesopotamia Political Officers 
who served with him and under him in Iraq ... and are now serving with him and under 
him in the Anglo Persian Oil Company". Wilson's attempt to recreate with Anglo 
Persian the fiefdom he had had in Baghdad, complete with absolute authority, was 
attractive to fellow Britons in the Indian Political Department and Indian Military now 
serving in the shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. Some were cracking their necks to join 
him. All were seeking to preserve the strength of the Anglo Persian Oil Company as a 
kind of parallel power and sinecure for prestige employment after retirement from 
service with the Government of India, or bolt hole should they ever need a job. Wilson 
could call on these officials anytime. 39
39 Marlowe Life o f Cox, page 48 "from the native Persians" and page 52 "rather Indian influence"; 
IOL/PS/10 Vol 989 July 16th 1924 Secret, Political Department "in the shape o f officials o f APOC" and 
March 28th 1924 Resident to Colonial Secretary "the many Indian Army ex-officers"; Marlowe Life o f  
Cox, page-242, The Times o f London, April 20th 1921, letter from G.T. Garratt, Personal Assistant to 
Wilson when he was Deputy Chief Political Officer in Basra: “In Mesopotamia Sir Arnold, supported by a 
few Anglo-Indians, organised an autocratic form o f government which ...cost England some 50 million 
sterling a year and led inevitably to rebellion...For some years he deposed and sometimes exiled or 
imprisoned paramount Shaikhs who opposed his rule while his agents supplied him with an immense 
amount of secret information which he has no right to use in the service of a private trading company 
(APOC). There is something incongruous and undignified in a man appearing one day as the Chief 
representative of Government and the next as a private trader"
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Anglo Persian had expected to be given monopoly rights “over any portion of the 
Turkish Empire that may come under British influence”, in the same way as Burma Oil 
had its Indian monopoly. Whitehall had blocked this blanket concession, mostly 
because of Britain’s need to placate France in the matter of Iraq’s oil. But the 
Government of India’s Political Officers in the Gulf had proven most amenable in 
assisting Anglo Persian to obtain the next best thing to a monopoly. In response to a 
request from Arnold Wilson, the Political Agents and the Political Resident, using the 
Indian Marine’s HMS Lawrence, pressured the various Shaikhs to sign new conventions 
transforming the old “exclusion agreements” to open ended prospecting licences with 
the Anglo Persian Oil Company.
The new agreements did not contain any undertaking actually to prospect, or to initiate 
activity of any kind. The fact that “no payment would become due to the Chiefs” in 
return for these new agreements was stressed. By early 1923, only the Shaikhs of 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bin Saud, had failed to accept the Political Officers’ 
invitation to update to the new convention. 40
Curiously, the Political Officers seemed more interested in getting the Shaikhs to sign 
with Anglo Persian than was the Anglo Persian in getting such agreements. The 
company was Firmly convinced there was no oil. The events leading up to the final grant 
of the individual concessions for A1 Hasa, Bahrain and Kuwait are fully described in 
later chapters. Some points, however, are relevant here to illustrate the level of 
enthusiasm displayed by the Government of India’s Political Officers on behalf of the 
Anglo Persian Oil Company. For example, even though he was alerted well ahead by 
the Political Officers to the fact that Frank Holmes and Bin Saud would be discussing a 
concession at the Ujair Conference, Arnold Wilson did not bother to attend. Afterwards, 
when Cox and the Government of India’s Political Officers provided him with a 
window of opportunity in which to conclude his own concession, Arnold Wilson 
abruptly halted negotiations. Wilson would continue to insist “there is no trace of oil in 
A1 Hasa, nor is there any indication of a favourable geological formation”. 41
40 IOL/R/15/1/618/F52 May 12th 1921 APOC London to Under Secretary o f State Foreign Affairs India 
“no payment”; and December 22nd 1921 Wilson to Cox “...the Resident...accompany me (Wilson) to 
Kuwait in HMS Lawrence to assist me...” and same date Wilson to Resident " I solicit your personal 
assistance..." and January 10th 1922 Resident (Lt Col Trevor) to Denis Bray Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India “...best for the Political Agents (Kuwait and Bahrain) to do the preliminary 
negotiations...” and IOL/R/15/1/618 Vol:F.2 pages 39-51 Resident jubilantly reporting “March 3rd 1922 
two undertakings.. which I obtained during my recent tour on the Trucial Coast. These were given to me 
PERSONALLY by the two Shaikhs (Ras A1 Khaimah and Shaijah)... 1 hope to obtain similar undertakings 
from the other Shaikhs on my next visit...” In May “I fancy the Shaikh of Umm el Quwain is in a 
CONTRITE frame of mind at present ...and will sign an undertaking.” By May, Trevor had netted 
signatures from the Rulers of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Ajman and Umm A1 Quwain also see page 99 dated 
10/1/23 "the Sultan o f Muscat has signed"
41 Philby Papers, Box XV11-2, June 5th 1923, Wilson to Philby “no trace of oil”
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While his sons and officials were negotiating with Frank Holmes a concession for the 
oil possibilities he had brought to their attention, in an effort to please the Political 
Agent just days before his forced abdication, the Ruler of Bahrain made an overture to 
Wilson. In his usual fashion, Wilson issued orders to the Political Resident and to the 
Political Agent, and said he would come in a couple of weeks. To the horror of the 
Political Officers, the Bahrainis signed the Frank Holmes’ concession, which the 
Political Officers promptly set about cancelling. Ten years later, in 1932, Wilson was 
still convinced that Holmes’ well in Bahrain “is by no means favourable and I have 
little doubt that it will shortly be abandoned”. The Bahrain well came in before this 
letter of Wilson’s was delivered to its destination.42
The Political Officers’ opposition to Holmes came down to a blind support for their 
own India-associated Anglo Persian Oil Company together with a paranoid drive to 
preserve their own positions by keeping the Arab shaikhdoms free of any influence 
other than their own. Holmes was an outsider, not one of them. As will be seen, after it 
became known that Holmes had financial backing from the Americans, the fear of 
strangers entering their realm and shaking their power base drove them to desperate 
measures. The Political Agents routinely intercepted Holmes’ mail and reported his 
every move, also passing this information on to Anglo Persian (see Section Two, The 
Struggle).
To Whitehall, and to the Shaikhs, they branded Holmes an adventurer, a carpet bagger, 
a soldier of fortune and an unethical concession hunter. As will be seen, they colluded 
with Anglo Persian to employ an ex British spy to bribe the advisers to the Shaikhs to 
provoke anti Holmes sentiment among the various Ruling families. And most of all, 
they applied political pressure on the Shaikhs themselves in attempts to have Holmes’ 
concessions cancelled and given over to Anglo Persian. The alleged displeasure and 
anger of the “High” Government was a threat frequently invoked.
From 1929 Dickson was Political Agent in Kuwait. His advocacy of the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company was so ardent that some suspected he was moonlighting as the company’s 
agent. Both he and the Political Resident constantly entreated Anglo Persian to raise 
their financial terms above those offered by Holmes in order to keep the concession in 
friendly hands and thus protect the Government of India’s prestige and power in the 
area from any outside influence.
These men were so intent on maintaining the status quo that they were incapable of
42 IOL/R/15/1/618/F52 April 30th 1923 Confidential Wilson to Resident “ sometime in mid-May”; 
IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV, May 30th 1932 Wilson to Dickson “shortly be abandoned”
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compassion for the people supposedly under their “protecting” care. For example, in 
1931 and 1932 Dickson officially reported that “Kuwait is in such a state of poverty and 
economic distress” that “suffering and acute want among the lower classes of the town 
is a new and pathetic feature ... gangs of beggars are beginning to roam the town" and 
"some 2000 Kuwaitis died from smallpox in the town alone, in the four months between 
July and October”.43
Such crocodile tears for the "poor and hungry" people of Kuwait are hard to accept 
when Dickson, and most other Political Officers, were expending every effort to deny 
these same people the means of relief through allowing the Holmes-associated 
American oil concession. This was a particularly cruel denial when the economic boost 
that development of an oil concession could generate, even in the early stages, was 
already obvious from American oil activity in Bahrain.
The Americans would later claim, indeed still do, that it was diplomatic efforts from 
their State Department that broke through and forced the British to allow them to 
participate in the oil development, first of Bahrain, and later of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. In chapter seven, Meltdown, it is shown that the evidence does not support this 
claim. Rather, in each case it was political events that prompted Whitehall to put 
pressure on the Government of India to stand aside.
It will be shown that Persia's claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, put to the League of 
Nations, led to insistence from that objection be withdrawn to American investment in 
Bahrain. The need to build the oil pipeline from Iraq to the Red Sea in order to ensure 
the Turkish Petroleum Company’s monopoly of Iraqi oil would lead to the opening up 
of the Saudi Arabian concession area. For this purpose, the Government of India would 
actively assist Bin Saud to put down the Ikhwan rebellion before arranging a Treaty of 
Friendship between Bin Saud, Iraq and Kuwait. Construction of the Iraqi pipeline began 
almost immediately. By early 1933 Standard Oil of California would obtain a new lease 
on Holmes’ original A1 Hasa concession. It will be seen that Persia’s demand for a fair 
deal from its oil, followed by the 1931 unilateral cancellation of the Anglo Persian 
concession, impelled a change of attitude towards Kuwait.
43 Administrative Report for Kuwait for the Year 1931, and 1932 (Dickson) “such a state o f poverty”
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Conclusion
To compensate for failure to achieve its World War One goal of annexing Iraq into an 
Indian Empire, the Government of India was given control of the Arabian Peninsula 
which was believed to contain nothing of value. Survey after survey concluded that, 
unlike Persia and Iraq, there was no oil in Arabia. Having been thwarted in 
Mesopotamia, the Government of India was determined to "Indianise" the Arab 
shaikhdoms.
Personnel who had served with the repressive regime of Arnold Wilson in Mesopotamia 
were transferred to the Arab shaikhdoms where they again pursued policies of 
oppression and intimidation. The Anglo Persian Oil Company, with Arnold Wilson as 
Resident Manager at Abadan, was viewed as an extension of the power of the 
Government of India. Anglo Persian's goals and methods were frequently in concert 
with those of the Government of India's Political Officers, so much so that these officers 
considered it their duty to exert political pressure on the various Ruling Shaikhs on 
behalf of the Anglo Persian Oil Company.
Relief from endemic poverty, disease and backwardness would only come to the Arab 
shaikhdoms through Frank Holmes’ determination to develop the oil fields he had 
discovered. His linking up with American Financial backing would focus attention on 
the shaikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula and force Whitehall to review the Government 
of India's objection to "foreign" investment in the area. Development of their oil 
resources would eventually provide the means through which the people of the Arabian 
Peninsula could loosen the shackles of the Gulf Raj.
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SECTION TWO 
The Struggle
Chapter Four
A VERY PROMISING AREA
1920-1923
Introduction
Between October 1922 and May 1923, Frank Holmes consolidated the early work he 
put into identifying the Arabian oil fields. He agreed the terms by which he would prove 
and develop the oil of A1 Hasa, Bahrain and Kuwait. Contracts were signed with Bin 
Saud and the Shaikhs of Bahrain, and terms and conditions agreed with the Shaikh of 
Kuwait. As the parties pursued the commercial and implementation aspects of their 
respective agreements, neither Holmes, nor the Shaikhs, had any concept that they were 
arousing the wrath of officials in the area that would trigger a vehement reaction from 
the Government of India and its Political Officers.
In their determination to squash any perceived tendencies towards independent action, 
the Political Officers had no compunction in subjecting the Shaikhs to indignity. As 
retribution for dealing independently with the Shaikhs, character assassination was dealt 
out to Frank Holmes and his London syndicate.
The fact that it was oil concessions with which the Shaikhs were dealing was almost 
irrelevant. It was any leanings towards independence that would not be tolerated. 
Evidence of this is the immediate dismissal forced on Bin Saud of his “Personal 
Commercial Representative” after the Political Officers learned he was scouting for 
investors interested in developing Bin Saud’s territories. In the case of the oil 
concessions, the Government of India and the Political Officers had the cooperation of 
Anglo Persian Oil Company, making an ideal tool through which to impose their rule.
As will be seen, while Anglo Persian certainly did want the security of monopolising 
the region, the unwavering conviction that there was no oil meant there was no real 
interest in laying out either money or expertise on actual exploration or genuine 
concessions. This can be seen in the fact that the company baulked each time it found
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itself in a situation where it could have purchased the concessions. Moreover, in 
pursuing their own goals the Political Officers made promises in the name of the Anglo 
Persian that the company had no desire to fulfil.
It appears the matter of whether or not Frank Holmes had proven the Arab shaikhdoms 
did have oil did not enter into the thinking of the Government of India. The clearly 
defined goal was one of keeping out all influence other than her own. If the problem 
was that exploration was going to tempt “outsiders”, as it had Frank Holmes, then the 
solution seems to have been to shut off this avenue by bringing all possibilities for 
current and future oil exploration under the Anglo Persian Oil Company. The Anglo 
Persian Oil Company was in full agreement with this target, as long as it did not have to 
undertake the exploration.
It is necessary to examine how the policy of the Government of India developed, how it 
worked in practice, and how it influenced decision-makers in Whitehall. The following 
section examines the initial activities of Frank Holmes through Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 
and Kuwait in 1922-1923 and looks at the reactions of the Government of India and her 
Political Officers. Holmes signed the first concession, for A1 Hasa (Saudi Arabia) with 
Abdul Aziz bin Saud, on May 6th 1923, and this chapter deals with the machinations 
surrounding that agreement.
Aden 1920 - 1921
After relocating from Abyssinia to Aden in 1920, Frank Holmes made excellent 
progress with his technical examinations of Assir and Yemen. He struck up a friendship 
with Muhammad A1 Idrissi, the Ruler of Assir, during four weeks as his guest at Jizan. 
Holmes satisfied himself that oil prospects, particularly in the Farasan Islands, were 
worth pursuing and he was following through on the Salif salt concession. Holmes 
applied through E&GSynd to the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office for 
permission to negotiate for the Oil Exploration Rights for "the whole of the territory 
over which the Idrissi rules". Assuring London they were “not in any way out to exploit 
the Arab or his country” the application stated that the intention of the syndicate and its 
associates was to "carefully explore and prospect all areas likely to be oil bearing" and 
later to locate definite areas for exploitation on terms agreeable to both sides. 1
* PRO/CO/727/3 September 3rd 1921 E&GSynd to Under Secretary Colonial Office “not out to exploit” 
and October 26th 1921 to Under Secretary Middle East Department Colonial Office “explore and 
prospect”
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At the Colonial Office, however, Churchill was having second thoughts about the very 
validity of the British position in the Assir and Yemen. Soon after receiving Holmes' 
November 1921 application, Churchill wrote to Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary. 
The implications of His Majesty’s Government recommending the E&GSynd 
application to the Idrissi, "over whom we exercise a somewhat imperfect centre" was 
worrying Churchill. He reminded the Foreign Secretary that "the exact status of the 
Idrissi and of His Majesty’s Government position vis a vis that ruler remains 
undefined". In reality, Winston Churchill pointed out to Lord Curzon, "the extension of 
His Majesty’s Government’s influence to this portion of the Red Sea littoral has never 
been officially recognised by the Powers ..."
While he fully appreciated the "considerable benefits", both to the British Empire and to 
the Idrissi, likely to result from the exploitation of the oil and mineral resources of that 
territory by an all British firm "of substance and good standing" such as E&GSynd, 
Churchill said, he considered the political risk too high. It was Britain's policy to avoid 
any action that could result in scrutiny of the "special position" it had awarded itself in 
the Arabian Peninsula and across large parts of the former Turkish Empire in southwest 
Arabia. Winston Churchill had decided, as he informed Lord Curzon, to tell reluctantly 
E&GSynd that His Majesty’s Government "does not, at present, see their way to accord 
to them the desired permission." Curzon and the Foreign Office agreed, adding that the 
Idrissi was not in a position to grant valid concessions and that, even if he did, the 
British would not undertake to recognise them.2
Dr Alexander Mann
Realising that little could be achieved for the time being, at least until Britain could feel 
secure that there would be no challenge to its “assumption” of power in the region, 
Holmes returned to London in early 1922 for discussions with his syndicate colleagues 
and to plan the focus for the coming year. Holmes and his associates in E&GSynd were 
still committed to the Arab lands on the Red Sea and along the Persian Gulf and their 
interest in this region was known in the small circle of venture capitalists operating in 
the City of London. Mid-year, a Dr Alexander Mann came to speak with the syndicate's 
Chairman, Sir Edmund Davis.3 *
2 PRO/CO 727/3, November 6th 1921, Colonial Office to Under Secretary o f State Foreign Office; 11 vis a 
vis that Ruler remains undefined” and British firm “of substance and good standing”, Churchill expressed 
concern that "the Italian Government also has aspirations in this region"; Baldry pages 76-107 “British 
would not recognise them”
3 Arriving at the exact genesis o f Mann's association with E&GSynd is a riddle. Holmes has added to the
confusion by giving several versions. PRO/CO/730/26, December 20th 1922, Cox to Duke o f Devonshire
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Indirectly, Mann owed his new position of “Personal Commercial Representative in 
London of the Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies” to Sir Percy Cox. The political 
motivations of medical personnel at the American Mission in Bahrain were the subject 
of intense suspicion by the Government of India’s men in the Gulf In 1921, when the 
Sultan Abdul Aziz Bin Saud called again for medical assistance, Cox thought he could 
stall the American Missionaries by sending Dr Mann, then nearing retirement from his 
job on Cox’s own staff in Iraq. As the Political Officers had observed, it was true that 
Bin Saud, tending towards hypochondria as he did, had a particular weakness for 
medical doctors. In a very short time, Dr Mann was hired, on a four year contract, as 
Bin Saud’s personal representative and "Agent". He was also expected to carry on in his 
profession of Physician and Surgeon.* 4
Dr Mann knew of Edmund Davis through the London Jewish community, to which both 
men belonged and, in his new capacity as "Agent", wanted to discuss with Davis and his 
partners the possibility of financing development projects in Nejd. Mann was correct in 
assuming Nejd was of interest to E&GSynd. Eastern Arabia was one of the areas that 
Holmes had been researching since his arrival back in London. As already noted, he had 
been convinced of the existence of great oil reserves on the Arabian Peninsula since his 
first contact with the area during the war and had written his wife in 1918 of his belief 
in an “immense oilfield running from Kuwait right down the mainland coast".
re Holmes at Ujair “...The leader of Holmes’ Group is a well known Jewish financier named Davis 
operating in the City...Holmes said. Dr Mann was brought to Davis by a certain Captain Cheney... as a 
person in a position to obtain an oil concession from the Sultan of Nejd, whose Agent he was...”; 
PRO/FO/3 71/8944, August 2nd 1923; Cecil C Farrer, Foreign Office, Dept of Overseas Trade, Personal & 
Confidential to V A L Mallett, Foreign Office, re Holmes recent visit to the Persian Gulf “Holmes (said) 
last summer Sir Charles Addis of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank mentioned through a mutual friend 
that Holmes might be interested to meet a certain Dr Mann who was in the service of Ibn Saud. . .Holmes
introduced Dr Mann to E&GSynd”; IOL/L/PS/10 Vol 989, March 20th 1924 attached to letter of March
28th Political Resident (Trevor) to Colonial Office re interview with Holmes, “Holmes said. . .Dr Mann had 
been sent to him (in London I think) and told him Bin Saud had heard of him and had asked Mann to invite 
Holmes to come to Nejd”
4 Dickson papers Box 2a/Files 4a-4b, January 30th 1920 Arnold Wilson Acting Civil Commissioner in 
Baghdad to Government of India enclosing May 27th 1919 report of Captain Norman Bray Political Agent 
Bahrain December 1918-June 1919 "...considerable hostility to ourselves in Bahrain due to religious, 
economic, personal and war reasons assisted in a negative way by the American missionaries... I am not at 
all satisfied that the American government is not behind their activities...! view with suspicion their 
activities in Hasa they have entirely ceased to convert, are entertaining largely, are giving presents in great 
numbers, are holding majlis and are particularly friendly to all those whom I know to be hostile to 
ourselves..." The only Political Officer not drawn from the Indian Army, G H Bill Esq (Deputy Political 
Resident December 1917-Sep 1919) commented to Wilson on Bray's report, June 17th 1919 "...if devout 
Americans like to spend their dollars enlightening the Bahrainis, it is no concern of ours. . .I do not consider 
the case against the American missionaries as proved ...maybe idiosyncrasies rather than deliberate policy 
of their headquarters. The State Department is not paying attention to this region..."; PRO/CO/730/26, 
December 20th 1922 Cox to Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for India, enclosing agreement 
between Mann & Bin Saud, February 23rd 1922 (effective April 8th for four years), interestingly, this 
appointment was approved by Cox
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After the war, exploration of the Arabian Peninsula was the task he set himself, a task 
that would result, eventually, in the development of Arabia’s great oilfields. Holmes 
had drawn up a map detailing a string of possibilities he wanted to look into, running 
from Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf, to Qatar at its foot. Holmes told his 
London colleagues that he certainly wanted to undertake a geological examination of as 
much of Eastern Arabia as possible. He said that, as Dr Mann appeared to already have 
the confidence of Abdul Aziz Bin Saud, a visit in the company of Dr Mann should be 
worthwhile. Apart from Holmes’ drive to search for oil, the Davis groups identified a 
number of possibilities including harbours and inlets for the feasibility of port 
development along with an electricity supply for Riyadh and Hasa and the erection of a 
wireless station at Hofuf.5
Chairman Edmund Davis made an error of judgement that almost cost Holmes and 
E&GSynd all future prospects in the Arabian Peninsula. Davis decided it was not 
necessary to run the Eastern Arabia visit through the Colonial Office before setting out. 
The various Davis’ groups, and Holmes, had long dealt with the Colonial Office and the 
Foreign Office. As far as Abyssinia, Aden and Yemen were concerned, Frank Holmes 
was virtually a Colonial Office pet. But he had not come up against the Government of 
India before. His success with Bin Saud, Bahrain and Kuwait would plunge him, the 
Davis groups -  and the Colonial Office -  into a conflict of Gothic dimension with the 
Government of India and its Political Officers in the Persian Gulf; it would be a massive 
power play that would continue unabated until Kuwait, the last of Holmes’ concessions, 
was signed in December 1934.
Mapping Ai Hasa October 1922
At first there did not seem to be a problem as the arrangements made by Bin Saud to 
receive Mann and Holmes in Eastern Arabia did not arouse the attention of the Political 
Officers. They travelled via Bombay and arrived at Bahrain on September 28th 1922. 
The Sultan's guests were always welcomed by his Bahrain representative, Abdul Aziz al 
Gosaibi and his brothers, and accommodated in the rambling Gosaibi house on the 
seafront at Manama. Gosaibi was already hosting Major Harold Richard Patrick 
Dickson and his wife. Dickson occupies a major role in the story of the discovery and
 ^ At Ujair Holmes updated this map to delineate the Neutral Zones just created by Sir Percy Cox; Rihani 
Ibn Sa’oud page 85 reprints this map with acknowledgment to Holmes. Moore, page 21, mentions sighting 
the original map, with Holmes’ signature, attached to the Neutral Zone/Hasa Option documents in the 
Chevron Archives. I did not find it in my May 1999 search o f the Chevron Archives; Dickson papers Box 
2a/File 4a September 30th 1922, Dickson to Cox “identified a number of possibilities”
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development of Arabia’s oil. As noted earlier, many errors can be traced to Dickson’s 
own published version of events. When Dickson returned to the Gulf in 1929 as 
Political Agent in Kuwait, the obstructive role he then played should not be 
underestimated.
After his less than illustrious performances as Political Agent in Bahrain and Political 
Adviser at Hilla, Dickson was out of a job at the time Holmes arrived to Bahrain. With 
a remarkable talent for self delusion and aggrandisement, Dickson had convinced 
himself that Sir Percy Cox was personally going to "fix me up" with a permanent, “and 
important job”, with the Sultan of Nejd. Denied the official residence, the Dicksons had 
been in Bahrain since July.6
From his own days in Palestine in the 1880s, Dr Alex Mann remembered Dickson "in 
sailor suits" when Dickson's father was British Consul General in Jerusalem. They met 
again in Mesopotamia. Dr Mann was stationed in Diwaniyeh and Dickson in Nasriyah 
where, as Political Officer, he had distinguished himself by "providing" thousands of 
Arabs as labour for Britain's wartime railway construction. After one night in Bahrain, 
Holmes and Mann carefully stowed their gifts for Bin Saud on board two large motor 
driven dhows provided by Abdul Aziz Gosaibi. They had shopped in London and 
Bombay. The baggage now going across to Bin Saud included forty large boxes of 
medicines, fifty suitcases, an array of leather bags filled with gadgets and canned food 
delicacies, and a battery of small arms.7
Dickson and his wife whiled away the month that Holmes was in Eastern Arabia; they 
went horse riding and played cards. As his exile in Bahrain became months, Dickson 
took to barraging Cox in Baghdad with letters and voluminous "reports". One of these
6 Dickson papers Box 2/File 5 March 28th 1923 Dickson to his brother “I had hoped to get a permanent 
job in Hasa or Nejd with Saud”, October 1st 1922 Violet Dickson to her sister in law “we arrived here 
17/7/22...we stayed with Mespers’ agents for the first week but now have two rooms in a most palacial 
[sic] house on the shore lent to us by Gosaibi, Bin Saud’s agent...Harold has received no instructions 
whatsoever from Cox...we hope every day that he may come down to visit Bin Saud and also fix Harold 
up as special agent for Bin Saud we unpack nothing as we may move any day. . .Dr Mann was here. He 
had with him a Major Holmes an engineering expert out from London to examine the possibility of making 
Qatif a harbour for Saud”; Although they only had the use of two rooms in Gosaibi’s huge house, Dickson 
Kuwait page 269 in his brazenly self promoting fashion claims “Gosaibi came to me...said he would be 
obliged...if I could put up (Holmes and Mann) while they were in Bahrain”; Philby papers X V I1/9 May 1st 
1923, Dickson in London to Philby in Amman “I went to Bahrain and kicked my heels for three and a half 
months...no honour, no reward, after all I’ve done!”
 ^ Dickson’s father was British Consul Beirut 1879-82, Consul General Damascus, Homs and Jerusalem 
1882-1889; Dickson papers Box 2/File 2, October 16th 1918, Dickson to his Mother, “as Political Officer 
I provide the labour for the railway construction. I have 2,000 working now and hope to have 4,000 in a 
few days”; Dickson Kuwait page 269 “fifty suitcases”; Sadly, Rihani Ibn Sa’oud page 158 (after the British 
had had Dr Mann relieved o f his position) mentions seeing these boxes of medicines “open, half opened 
and all in a state of woeful neglect” and comments there was no one in Riyadh “who understood the use of  
these drugs”
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was a marathon 65-page handwritten effort in which Dickson enthusiastically outlined a 
grandiose proposal for setting up "a British Consulate General in Hofuf’ to which 
subordinate Consuls and Political Agencies, located at Bahrain and Kuwait, would 
report. Dickson’s not-to-be missed assumption was that he would be appointed as this 
powerful Consul General. Sir Percy Cox tried to bring him back to earth. As soon as he 
received the 65-page slab, he immediately cabled Dickson saying, “as regards yourself 
please remember that I have done no more than express pious personal hope my 
meeting with Bin Saud may result in some congenial opening for you".8
The return of Frank Holmes from the territory of the Sultan of Nejd at last gave Dickson 
some fresh material for his “reports”. He wrote to Cox that Holmes emphasised the 
need to locate fresh water supplies in Nejd. "Holmes says he will bet anything that there 
is an enormous volume of sweet water existing over the whole Qatif hinterland", 
Dickson told Cox. On the subject of oil, Holmes told Dickson nothing at all, merely 
remarking that the possibilities of the A1 Hasa area from a geological point of view 
were "full of interest". Distracted by his own dreams of fame and glory in Arabia, 
Dickson failed to notice that Holmes had spent more time on geological matters than on 
potential engineering prospects.9
Yet, on that four week expedition, Frank Holmes had identified precisely where the first 
oil would be found in what was to become the fabulous oil riches of Saudi Arabia. As it 
came out later, he had gone directly into the hinterland beyond the palm belt of the 
Qatif Oasis. Single handedly he had prospected in the dust and sand until he was 
absolutely certain he had indeed located a rich oil field. Holmes was so sure that, on the 
spot, he made a generous offer to Abdul Aziz Bin Saud for a concession for the area 
defined on his map. When he emerged from his weeks alone in the desert to join Bin 
Saud in Hofuf, Holmes had samples of "earth strangely impregnated with oil" that he 
had collected. 10
The geological samples didn’t mean much to Bin Saud. Until the first oil flowed in A1 
Hasa in 1938, in the area first identified and mapped by Holmes, Bin Saud never really
8 Dickson papers Box 2a/File 4a, 65-page handwritten “Report” dated September 30th-November 12th 
1922 the only snag, according to Dickson, was that the Government o f India would have to give up its 
hold over Bahrain, Kuwait and Nejd, in favour o f the Colonial Office. Bin Saud, Dickson confided, “would 
not dream o f  coming under the Indian Government’s influence again” when Cox retired; And October 12th 
1922 “Private” telegram Cox to Dickson “pious personal hope”
9 Dickson papers, Box 2a/File 4a, November 1st 1922, Dickson to Cox “returned on October 30th” and 
“Holmes hopes, from data already obtained by him, to lead a paper before the Society of Engineers when 
he gets home”
Dickson papers, Box 2a/File 4a, November 12th 1922 Dickson reporting to Cox detail o f Holmes’ visit 
to Bin Saud in Hofuf as revealed by Sa'ad A1 Gosaibi and Shaikh Jassim Bin Abdul Wahab o f  Qatif 
“directly into the hinterland” and “strangely impregnated”
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believed he had oil. But Frank Holmes’ enthusiasm was contagious. Like the Arabs 
themselves, Holmes was not fazed by the desert. He had lived and worked in the great 
desert barrenness of Western Australia, opening up the goldfields there with American 
President-to-be Herbert Hoover.
From his time in other countries particularly among the indigenous workers in the 
mines of Mexico, he had developed empathy for other cultures and peoples. He 
understood their pride and sympathised with their aspirations. He did not talk down to 
them. Abdul Aziz Bin Saud did not refuse him. If Frank Holmes wanted to dig in his 
desert, and pay generously for the privilege, that would be okay by Bin Saud.
Bin Saud sent his personal secretary to accompany Holmes on the journey to Basra 
where Holmes wanted a legal firm to translate the tentative agreement that he and Bin 
Saud had drawn up at Hofuf. Bin Saud’s Secretary and Scribe of the Diwan, Hashem 
Bin Ahmad, was a prominent Kuwaiti who had moved to Nejd after the death of his 
much loved wife to work in Bin Saud’s Amiri Diwan. Hashem and Frank Holmes 
became firm friends as they covered the distance from Hofuf to Basra by camel, foot 
and boat. In Basra, Holmes dropped his A1 Hasa geological samples into a laboratory 
for analysis. Within hours, Basra was abuzz with the news that Frank Holmes had been 
with the Sultan of Nejd and was now visiting a Basra legal office in the company of the 
Secretary to Abdul Aziz Bin Saud.11
Dickson heard this in Bahrain and, on November 4th 1922, cabled Sir Percy in Baghdad 
saying; "Major Holmes who apparently represents large provincial interests in London 
is believed to have attempted to get Bin Saud to sign an agreement permitting 
exploitation of oil etc in his dominions." Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Prescott Trevor, the 
Political Resident, had also been alerted, as had Sir Arnold Wilson at Anglo Persian’s 
office in Abadan. A barrage of cables began to fly up and down the Persian Gulf.
Three Intruders
Arnold Wilson cabled his London office. They wrote the Colonial Office saying Wilson 
had just informed them that a Dr Mann "accompanied by a Major Holmes" has 
submitted to Bin Saud, "on behalf of the Eastern & General Syndicate Ltd", a draft 
concession covering mines and oil wells in Nejd.
11 Hashem Bin Ahmad was well connected in Kuwait, he was a close friend o f Mulla Saleh, the private 
secretary to Shaikh Ahmad, the Ruler o f  Kuwait, and would in future be a consistent supporter of Holmes’ 
bid for the Kuwait oil concession
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Moreover, Anglo Persian had “heard” that Bin Saud was being visited "at frequent 
intervals" by an American citizen "who may be connected with American oil interests”. 
There was no need for Anglo Persian to tell the Colonial Office, the letter warned in 
reference to the mysterious American citizen, the "embarrassment" which might result 
from the grant of a concession to "such interests". The American citizen, whom Anglo 
Persian was warning Whitehall against as representing a danger to the British Empire, 
was the Lebanese American writer Ameen Rihani.
“We remind you of the application made by us on July 11th 1914, with the approval of 
the Foreign Office, to the Turkish authorities at Basra, for a permis de recherche for the 
area including Hofuf’, Anglo Persian wrote. Ignoring the fact there had been a war in 
between, and that Bin Saud no longer had any relations with Turkey, nor Turkey with 
the area in question, the Anglo Persian Oil Company claimed. “Any application made 
now would therefore be merely a renewal, or an expansion, of an application made 
before the war.” The company demanded that the Colonial Office immediately cable 
Cox "instructing him to support an application by the D'Arcy Exploration Company for 
an exclusive prospecting license over the whole of Ibn Saud's territory and to press for 
the prior claims of this company to be recognised.”12
Fresh from his triumphs extracting signatures to the Anglo Persian favouring 
“conventions” from the various Rulers along the Trucial Coast, the Resident Lieutenant 
Colonel Trevor immediately volunteered. He cabled the Government of India saying: 
"In the circumstances, the time has now arrived for me to open negotiations with Bin 
Saud ..." The Resident was reminded of the arrangement put in place by Churchill at the 
Cairo Conference, to which the Government of India had strongly objected. The reply 
came from India saying: "As Bin Saud's affairs are managed by the High Commissioner 
for Iraq please communicate your suggestions to him." Arnold Wilson tried to appear 
interested. He cabled Cox, “can meet Bin Saud with you if considered desirable.” 13
Dickson, not being in the loop, seemed unaware of the turmoil. It is possible to imagine 
that Dickson was somewhat distracted by his vision of the glorious Oriental future that
PRO/FO/3 71/8944, November 15th 1922, H E Nichols, General Manager, APOC to Under Secretary 
of State Colonial Office “a renewal or an expansion” and “American citizen” and “instruct him to support” 
It must be noted that exactly this legal ruse was being used at the time to reconstitute the Turkish 
Petroleum Company in order to take over Iraq’s oil. And November 24th 1922 Duke o f Devonshire to 
Cox "I should be glad to learn what ground there is if any for the reports as to the alleged frequent visits of 
an American citizen to Bin Saud (referred to by) APOC”; IOL/R/15/1/618/F.2 page 91 Memo November 
27th 1922, Petroleum Dept/Board of Trade to Under Secretary Colonial Office ”if there is any danger of 
American competition for these rights (Bahrain, Kuwait. Muscat etc) as is stated to be the case, it may be 
desirable to allow APOC to secure a definite license ”
H PRO/R/15/2/109/5/17 November 10th 1922 Resident to (Denys Bray) Foreign Secretary Government 
of India “time has now arrived”; PRO/FO/371/7716 December 4th 1922 Bray to Resident “Saud’s affairs 
are managed”; IOL/R/15/1/618/F.52, November 13th 1922 cable Wilson to Cox “can meet Bin Saud”
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he believed Cox would deliver him. In Dickson’s view, Holmes’ visit to Bin Saud was 
an excellent event inspiring him to confide to Cox that “the arrival of Major Holmes is 
distinctly optimistic and gives me hope that Bin Saud is seriously contemplating the 
question of opening up Hasa” Dickson had heard from the local bank manager that 
Holmes was associated with “a trust syndicate of at least 14 companies in London 
interested in oil and other development schemes”.
Back from Basra, Holmes had ten days before he was due to meet Bin Saud again. 
Unknown to Dickson, he was examining Bahrain’s seepages and ashphalt shows 
previously written off by Pilgrim, Pascoe and James. Dickson passed on the message 
that Cox wanted to speak to Holmes and reported back that the “very reasonable” 
Holmes would be available for a meeting in Bahrain when Cox arrived on the way to 
the Ujair Conference. On November 21st he cabled Cox the meeting would have to be 
moved to Ujair because, “Mr Holmes, the engineer mentioned in previous reports, left 
hurriedly for Hofuf yesterday having been summoned there by Bin Saud”.14
The Political Officers of the Government of India, and the Anglo Persian Oil Company, 
had three intruders in their sights, Dr Alex Mann, the suspicious American citizen 
Ameen Rihani, and the New Zealander Frank Holmes who, if the rumours were correct, 
had brazenly walked into their territory and, right under their noses, clinched an oil 
concession with Bin Saud.
Perhaps wisely, Dr Mann returned from Hofuf and left immediately, travelling directly 
to Bombay. But this did not save him. Dickson had done him no favours when he 
“reported” to Cox some of Mann’s proposals for improving Bin Saud’s revenues. These 
included issuing passports for “the thousands of Nejdi merchants who annually leave 
for foreign countries ... and every pilgrim proceeding to the Haj”. He also had an idea 
for a postal service, involving the issue of the territories’ own stamps. Dr Mann quickly 
became a victim of the Government of India’s Political Officers. Heated exchanges 
between these officers, the Government of India, and the Colonial Office, resulted in 
Cox dictating a dismissal letter, which Bin Saud duly signed, and the Colonial Office 
forwarded to Mann in January 1923.15
14 Dickson papers Box 2a / File 4a 65 page handwritten “Report” from September 30th to November 
12th 1922 “gives me hope”; November 14th 1922 cable Dickson to Cox “very reasonable”; 
IOL/R/15/1/618/F.52 November 21st 1922 Dickson to Cox “at least 14 companies” and “summoned by 
Bin Saud”
15 Dickson papers Box 2a / File 4a Sept 30th-Nov 12th 1922 “report’ Dickson to Cox “I suggested as 
suitable stamps something in the nature o f  a dhow, an oryx and a camel with two palm trees”; 
PRO/CO/730/26, January 12th 1923 Duke o f Devonshire to Dr Mann “consider your appointment to have 
terminated”; Philby papers Box X V I1/9 May 1st 1923 Dickson to Philby “after Mann had been got rid
of...”
A Very Promising Area 112
Ameen Rihani was cleared of the charge of being associated with American oil 
interests. Cox dismissed his importance telling the Duke of Devonshire: “Anglo 
Persian’s reference to an American citizen no doubt means Ameen Rihani ... a guest of 
Bin Saud while I was at Ujair ... he showed no indications of being specifically 
interested in oil ... Bin Saud told me he regards him as a well meaning idealist with a 
very great admiration for America and the American people ... he made no attempt to 
disguise his Christianity.” The fact that Rihani had been vouched for by Cox did not 
relieve the Political Officers’ suspicion of him. They continued to watch Rihani and 
intercept his mail as long as he remained interested in the Gulf.16
Unaware that he was arousing intense animosity, Holmes arrived from Bahrain on his 
way to Hofuf to find Bin Saud’s people busy setting up camp at Ujair in readiness for 
the arrival of Sir Percy Cox and his official party, accompanied by a delegation from 
Iraq, that would settle borders between Bin Saud’s territory, Iraq and Kuwait. Well- 
versed in the requirements of British officials, the Gosaibis had shipped in, to what was 
no more than a windswept sand dune, Indian cooks, Perrier water and crates of 
crockery, cutlery and glassware to be laid out on white linen draped dining tables. The 
British were to be accommodated in tents fully furnished with proper European beds 
and mattresses, dressers and wash stands, writing tables and overstuffed armchairs. To 
go under the European beds, the Gosaibis thoughtfully supplied porcelain chamber pots.
The Ujair Conference: November-December 1922
What became known as The Ujair Conference lasted five days, from November 28th - 
December 2nd 1922. As Holmes was ill in Hofuf, Bin Saud had gone ahead. When he 
joined the group on November 30th, Holmes found Bin Saud had wasted no time in 
raising the issue of the concession with Sir Percy Cox. Despite all the earlier fuss, Sir 
Arnold Wilson of the Anglo Persian Oil Company "decided after consulting" with Sir 
Percy Cox, not to "accompany" him to the meeting with Bin Saud. With no great 
enthusiasm he did write to Bin Saud’s Agent in Baghdad attending the conference, 
whom he knew from his time in Mesopotamia, saying he would be coming "soon" to
PRO/FO/371/8944 December 24th 1922 Cox to Duke o f Devonshire “idealist”; IOL/R/15/5/237 
V o l.ll, February 22nd 1924, Resident (Trevor) to Political Agent Kuwait (More) "extract from 
intercepted letter dated 20th January 1924 from Abdur Rahman al Naqib, Kuwait, to Professor Ameen 
Rihani Beyrouth, received from Baghdad" And February 28th 1924 Political Agent Kuwait to Resident "I 
was very much interested in the intercepted letter to Ameen Rihani, extract o f which reached me yesterday 
afternoon". Even Rihani’s letters to the Shaikh of Kuwait were intercepted see Rihani papers June 3rd 
1924 Holmes in Kuwait to Rihani "Your letters dated April 30th and May 4th have not reached me. The 
Shaikh of Kuwait says that he did not receive his and Mulla Saleh says the same"
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see Bin Saud and "maybe we can strike a deal about oil". Responsibility for quashing 
Bin Saud’s dealings with Frank Holmes, using Anglo Persian’s demand that its 
somewhat dubious “prior claims be recognised”, was left to Sir Percy.17
Cox began by "explaining" to Bin Saud "his position and obligations in the matter” and 
reminded him of the clause in the Anglo Saudi Treaty of December 1915 by which he 
had agreed not to “cede, sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise dispose of any part of his 
territories to any other foreign power, or to the subjects of any such power, without the 
consent of the British Government whose advice he would follow unreservedly”. Cox 
told Bin Saud that, while Holmes and his investors did not appear to be “foreign”, he 
personally did not know the syndicate and, anyway, the important detail here was the 
wording “whose advice he would follow unreservedly”.
Bin Saud was shocked. He protested that he had the right to enter into "preliminary 
negotiations” with Holmes. He had raised himself to the status of a Ruler through his 
1913 capture from the Turks of the Hasa district between Qatar and Kuwait. In 
November 1914, as Britain launched its war against Turkey, from Bahrain, Sir Percy 
Cox had personally written to Bin Saud promising guarantees against reprisals, and 
recognition of independence, in return for aid against the Turks. Subsequently, Bin 
Saud had signed the treaty with Cox. Nevertheless, agreeing that he would not 
"conclude or sign anything until he had obtained the advice of His Majesty's 
Government", Bin Saud gave Cox a copy of the document prepared in Basra adding that 
there were some minor alterations to be made that he "would discuss with Holmes" and 
proceeded to do exactly that.
Not wanting to "humiliate" Bin Saud by ordering him not to speak with Holmes, Cox 
tried another tack. He called Frank Holmes back for a man-to-man. He invited Holmes 
to consider the reality that the "Arab potentates in this region, eg Nejd, Bahrain, 
Kuwait", while they may be thought of as "quasi locally independent rulers", were in 
fact, "the creation of Great Britain" and His Majesty's Government was "bound to 
mother them as unsophisticated Arabs". He said it was obvious that, because Bin Saud 
accepted "the spirit" of this mothering, he had not actually signed the concession with 
Holmes before "consulting" with Sir Percy. In fact, Cox told Holmes, HMG had been 
approached some time back by "other parties" who had been told no "serious project" 
could be negotiated in Bin Saud's territory because HMG had not yet “determined” 
either "his frontiers, or his relations with his neighbours”. The "other parties", he said,
17 PRO/FO/3 71/8944, August 2nd 1923, Personal & Confidential, Cecil C Farrer Department o f Overseas 
Trade to V A L Mallett at the Foreign Office; “...Major Holmes contracted cystitis (in Egypt) which 
remained with him for most o f the trip.:”; PRO/FO/371/8944 December 23rd 1922 Cox to Duke of 
Devonshire “Wilson decided not to accompany”
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had "contemplated" obtaining an exploring or prospecting license with a "prior right" to 
negotiate for a concession, should they ever want this.
As the “other parties” had only “contemplated” a no commitment low cost -  or, in the 
case of Anglo Persian, no cost -  prospecting license, Cox was curious to learn what was 
inspiring Holmes to make an immediate generous offer for a serious concession. 
Holmes knew enough not to give anything away. He said his month of geological work 
was “a quite superficial examination”. Carefully, he told Cox that while he had found 
“no specific signs of oil”, he thought “on the whole his principals would be justified in 
risking a few thousands to get a concession and make experiments”. Disarmingly, he 
told Cox that in his opinion, there might even be potash of commercial value. Cox made 
his pitch. The best idea now, he said, was for Holmes to take all his geological findings 
and “the result of his discussion" with Bin Saud along to Sir Arnold Wilson. He 
suggested Holmes should make an effort, with Wilson, to come up with a "joint 
proposal" for Bin Saud's territory. Cox clinched his argument saying he would not 
“allow” the Sultan "to sign anything" until the whole matter had been submitted back to 
His Majesty's Government. 18
But Holmes had not come this far to be so easily intimidated. He had not trekked up and 
down during the war, carefully researched Admiralty maps in London, and spent an 
exhausting month alone in Bin Saud’s desert discovering and mapping his A1 Hasa oil 
find, to pass it all on to the Anglo Persian Oil Company because Sir Percy Cox said so. 
Holmes was confident of his own and his syndicate’s relationship with officials at the 
Colonial Office and Foreign Office. He wrote it down for Cox. He was sure, he said, his 
principals, in London, “would be pleased to come to an arrangement” with the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company that “would remove Your Excellency’s and the Home 
Government’s objections”. In the meantime, he said, he had arranged with Bin Saud to 
grant him the concession subject to “the approval of Your Excellency and the Home 
Government. Trusting this will meet your approval”.
In fact, this did not meet with Cox’s approval at all. Just hours before the conference 
broke up, Cox sent the text of a letter to Bin Saud with the demand that he sign and 
have it delivered to Holmes. Although Bin Saud refused three times, eventually he gave 
in to Cox and signed. The letter, written by Cox, informed Holmes that "before final 
discussion of and before entry upon a project of such magnitude and importance" Bin 
Saud felt himself "called upon" to "profit by the friendly advice of my friends the 
British Government". The letter promised that as soon as "their views", together with
18 PRO/CO/730/26, December 20th 1922, Secret Cox to Duke o f Devonshire “rights and obligations”, 
“follow unreservedly”, “not conclude or sign”, ‘"when not doing political business with me Bin Saud was 
discussing the document with Holmes”, “creation o f Great Britain”, “other parties” and “joint proposal”
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the "expression of their opinion in respect of the details" reached Bin Saud, he would 
"be ready forthwith to enter upon a transaction on this basis". Confidently, Sir Percy 
reported to London that Frank Holmes would now “take the course indicated”, ie give 
all his geological information and negotiated documentation to Sir Arnold Wilson at the 
Anglo Persian Oil Company.19
All in all, for an imperialist, Cox had had a pretty good conference. His authority was 
absolute over all the parties involved as he held the position of High Commissioner of 
Iraq and, since Churchill’s Cairo Conference, also had authority for Bin Saud’s 
territories and for Kuwait. He had not even bothered inviting the Shaikh of Kuwait 
although the issue to be discussed was setting the borders between Bin Saud’s realm, 
Iraq and Kuwait. Sir Percy Cox could have done the whole thing by himself, which in 
essence he did, merely offering a facade of consultation.
When Sir Percy Cox departed Ujair on December 3rd 1922, he had stripped Kuwait of 
two thirds of its territory, redistributed swathes of the Muntafiq and Shamiya Desert, 
along with the tribal inhabitants, from Nejd to Iraq, swiped a couple of areas from 
Transjordan and passed these over to Bin Saud and created two "Neutral Zones", one 
between Kuwait and Nejd and another between Iraq and Nejd.20
Cox had also put paid to “the apparent inclination of Bin Saud to absorb the Qatar 
principality”. Cox had spotted that “Bin Saud had apparently included the Qatar 
Peninsula within the tract of country for which he was prepared to negotiate a 
concession” with Frank Holmes. The High Commissioner “at once took Bin Saud to 
task” by reminding him that under the terms of his 1915 Treaty with Britain, he had 
“nothing to do with Qatar except to respect it”. While Bin Saud accepted this reprimand 
“without argument”, Cox informed London, he was “fully prepared to return to the 
attack if there should be any fresh evidence of disposition on the part of the Sultan to 
encroach upon Qatar”.
Of major importance to Bin Saud at this conference, beside the borders, was the 
withdrawal of the annual subsidy of 60,000 sterling which Britain had been paying. 
Prudently, Cox left this matter until after he had achieved the borders he wanted. The 
subsidy dated from November 1917 when Cox had sent, from his own office, the Indian 
Civil Service’s H St John Philby to persuade Bin Saud to do more to support the British
19 IOL/R/15/1/618/F. 52 December 2nd 1922 Holmes in Ujair to Cox “my principals”; Rihani Ibn Sa’oud 
page 85 “will Sultan please write letter in above terms to Major Holmes and send me (Cox) a copy o f it . . .”; 
PRO/CO/730/26 December 20th 1922 Cox to Duke o f Devonshire “the course indicated”
2° See Dickson Kuwait page 276 “Major More (attended the conference) on behalf o f the Shaikh o f  
Kuwait, throughout the talks More, who was supposed to be watching the interests o f the Shaikh o f  
Kuwait, said nothing”
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campaign against the Turks. Philby’s mission to Bin Saud recorded no advantage for the 
British but he did take the opportunity to further his own personal glory by travelling, 
unauthorised, from Riyadh to Taif, where his appearance added to the distrust and 
tension between the Sharif Husain of Mecca and Bin Saud.
Though Bin Saud did nothing to help their war effort that the British could point to, it 
was thought expedient to continue the subsidy in order to stop him from doing what he 
wanted to do, which was to attack his rival, Sharif Husain of Mecca — Britain’s 
protege in the Arab Revolt being led by Colonel T E Lawrence. Cox added insult to the 
injury of withdrawing Bin Saud’s subsidy by preventing him from closing the 
concession with Holmes, for which there was an immediate cash payment, and instead 
pushing him towards an agreement with Anglo Persian Oil Company, which was not 
offering any money at all.21
At the close of 1922 the loss of Churchill as Colonial Secretary was a new factor whose 
effects could not be predicted. He lost his Parliamentary seat in Prime Minister Lloyd 
George’s disastrous snap election of November 15th 1922. Middle Eastern issues had 
figured strongly in the election campaign (as usual, not including the Arab shaikhdoms 
of the Persian Gulf) and the British public had been treated to the extraordinary 
spectacle of a slanging match between then Colonial Secretary Churchill and Foreign 
Secretary Lord Curzon over matters related to the Middle Eastern Mandates. The Duke 
of Devonshire was appointed the new Colonial Secretary.
A1 Hasa signed May 1923
Curiously, while the officers of the Government of India in the Persian Gulf were 
targeting Holmes, and defending territory for the Anglo Persian Oil Company, the 
Colonial Office, now under the Duke of Devonshire, was actively seeking his help in a 
sensitive undertaking. Before being interrupted by Winston Churchill’s fear of
IOL/R/15/5/242 V ol.V ll, January 19th 1923, Cox to Government o f India, “Bin Saud’s apparent 
inclination”; After Bin Saud signed with Cox the December 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty Britain supplied him 
in early 1916 with 20,000 sterling plus 1,000 rifles. The cash had gone for debts and the rifles to his own 
guards. The monthly 10,000 sterling subsidy, plus extras, was originally intended to cover the cost o f Bin 
Saud mounting limited offensives around Ha'il to echo those being played out in the Hijaz under Lawrence; 
see Troeller pages 164-167 for detail o f all subsidies to the various Shaikhs. Troeller says by March 1920, 
Bin Saud had received 265,000 sterling to which must be added three more years, making a grand total o f
283.000 at the time of cancellation. See also Rihani Ibn Sa’oud page 78 “I’m afraid he also fears losing his 
annuity” and page 76 “Five months later I met in Baghdad Bin Saud’s agent who had come to the 
Residency to urge the payment of the sum o f money agreed upon in cancellation of the yearly stipend of
60.000 Stirling which the British Government was paying to Bin Saud”
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attracting attention to Britain’s “assumed” powers in the region, Holmes’ negotiations 
with the Idrissi had covered two separate concessions, one for oil on Farasan and the 
other for the salt operations at Salif. As the Idrissi was now in active conflict with the 
Imam Yahya of Yemen, he requested a cartridge making machine as part payment for 
the salt concession. In January 1923, following “a confidential dispatch received from 
the military adviser in Aden”, the Colonial Office decided a cartridge making machine 
for the Idrissi was a good thing. The task should be “effected through Major Frank 
Holmes, personally, and not through the Eastern & General Syndicate”, the Duke of 
Devonshire suggested to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon who agreed absolutely that the 
task should be conducted “through the intermediary of Major Holmes”. And Lord 
Curzon sent letters to the India Office and the War Office telling them so.22
Holmes carried out this mission for the Colonial and Foreign Offices while still working 
at coming to grips with the oil he was certain existed on the Arabian Peninsula. In mid 
February 1923, Bin Saud wrote Cox that he had received from Frank Holmes a copy of 
the agreement “which is to be made between me and the Eastern & General Syndicate 
of London.” He made his intention quite clear telling Sir Percy, “my desire in granting 
the concession in question has considerably increased because I have already promised 
the company that I shall agree to grant the concession. Therefore I request that Major 
Frank Holmes may be approached for starting with the work urgently.”
Cox may have thought he had put paid to this deal. Irritably, he reminded Bin Saud that 
Anglo Persian had “previously contemplated entering into negotiations with you” and 
they were a “stronger and more expert organisation”. He advised Bin Saud to give 
Anglo Persian a year “in which to select a section of your territory so arranged that the 
whole sea board is not taken up”. After that, he said, “negotiations with E&GSynd 
could then be resumed by you”; presumably, for whatever might be left over. Cox then 
assured Bin Saud that Anglo Persian had “expressed their willingness” to give terms “at 
least as favourable ... in many aspects” as those offered by E&GSynd. He added that 
Anglo Persian’s representatives had now been “instructed” to open direct negotiations.23
Cox’s “instructions” did not move the company along. A full month passed before 
Wilson dispatched “Mackie, formerly in the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, 
accompanied by Sampson, formerly in the Sudan Civil Service”, by the slow mail boat, 
to Bahrain en route to visit Bin Saud on behalf of the Anglo Persian Oil Company. The
22 See Baldry page 85 while Baldry confuses some dates, most particularly whether certain events 
occurred in 1922 or 1923, “The Powers and Mineral Concessions in the Idrissi Imamate o f Assir 1910- 
1929” is a valuable contribution on a mostly unfamiliar subject; PRO/FO/371/8945 January 8th 1923, 
Duke o f Devonshire to Lord Curzon and January 16th 1923 Lord Curzon to Duke o f Devonshire 
22 PRO/CO/730/39, February 25th 1923 Bin Saud to Cox “starting the work urgently” And March 12th 
1923 Cox to Bin Saud “terms at least as favourable”
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company's previous interest in the area, “contemplated" or otherwise, had been so 
minimal that they did not even have a map. Wilson requested the Political Resident to 
“furnish them with one copy of Philby’s recent map of Neid".24
The permanent Political Resident Lieutenant Colonel Trevor, previously so 
enthusiastically pro-Wilson and pro-Anglo Persian, was beginning to have second 
thoughts about the seriousness of the oil company's intentions. Perhaps he perceived the 
Officers of the Government of India in the Gulf were more keen for Anglo Persian to 
gain the concessions than was Anglo Persian itself. He was due for six months’ leave at 
the end of April. Before handing over to Acting Resident Lieutenant Colonel Stuart 
George Knox, Trevor cabled the Political Agent in Kuwait who was still trying to fulfil 
the instructions issued to Bahrain and Kuwait to talk up the new agreement, replacing 
the 1913-1914 convention in favour of Anglo Persian. The instructions were to continue 
talking “until they detected signs of the Shaikhs being willing to sign", at which time a 
representative of Anglo Persian would appear with a draft contract “for final discussion 
and signature".
The Resident told the Kuwait Agent that Wilson had not replied to his cable for two 
weeks and advised, “you should not discuss Wilson’s draft agreement with the Shaikh 
until you are certain that Wilson is determined to push the arrangement through, despite 
our doubts". When Wilson’s reply did come, Trevor's suspicion that Anglo Persian did 
not actually want the Arab concessions seemed to be confirmed. Wilson's reply stressed 
“... the highly speculative nature of the undertaking. The traces of oil are meagre in the 
extreme. There is an almost total absence of visible geological structure: no previous 
exploration has been attempted and Kuwait territory is not an easy place to operate".25
By now Bin Saud was becoming testy. It was some eight weeks since he had flagged his 
“considerably increased desire" to grant the concession to Holmes and five months 
since he had been prevented from doing so at the Ujair Conference. On learning that 
Mackie and Sampson were on their way to visit him, he fired off a letter to the Resident 
saying. “I have already informed the High Commissioner that it would be inconvenient 
for me to break my word given to the Eastern & General Syndicate, unless the syndicate 
is not English, in which case I should not accept on any account." Moreover, he stated, 
he had been “formerly approached on the matter by the Anglo Persian Oil Company".
24 IOL/R/15/1/618/F.52, April 9th 1923 telegram Wilson to Resident “recent map of Nejd and also to 
arrange, in the circumstances, that quarantine regulations be waived”
25 IOL/R/15/1/618/F.52, April 15th 1923, telegram Resident (Knox) to Political Agent Kuwait 
(More).”no reply from Wilson”; April 28th 1923 Wilson to Resident (Knox) as shown in chapter two No 
Oil in Arabia, Wilson’s claim of “no previous exploration attempted” was entirely untrue
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He said he had found it “difficult to come to any lasting agreement with them” and 
therefore “find it difficult to break my promise to Holmes".
Sir Percy Cox again replied in person, and promptly. He enclosed a copy of the letter he 
had demanded Bin Saud give to Holmes at Ujair. Sir Percy reprimanded Bin Saud 
saying “there was no understanding that this decision of yours depended only upon 
whether the company proved to be English or not”. Cox would not take “No” for an 
answer. He informed Bin Saud he would “not take any special action upon Your 
Highness communication” until he received a further letter “in case your conversations 
with Mr Mackie should have prompted you to change your mind”. Knowing Bin Saud’s 
weakness for medical doctors, Cox quickly sent Dr Abdullah Damlouji, who frequently 
acted as physician to Bin Saud, to join Mackie and talk to Bin Saud.26
But Mackie was not doing at all well. Bin Saud was very clear indeed on the terms that 
he wanted in any agreement and these were not the same as those in Mackie’s 
instructions. After receiving Bin Saud’s demands in writing, Mackie cabled these to 
Arnold Wilson suggesting that perhaps Wilson should come and personally negotiate 
with Bin Saud on the basis of the terms put forward. Far from being willing to give 
terms “at least as favourable” as those offered by E&GSynd, as Cox had promised, 
Wilson called the whole thing off. Mackie could do little but write to Bin Saud on May 
1st: “Today 1 received a reply from His Excellency Sir Arnold Wilson informing me 
that, as Your Honour does not agree to open negotiations on the basis of the terms 
offered by our company, he can see no use in proceeding in person to meet you, and that 
I should not prolong my stay here.” Prudently, Mackie added that he was leaving for 
Bahrain as soon as possible.27
Deeply offended, and very angry, Bin Saud called Holmes from Baghdad to Hofuf. On 
May 6th 1923, just five days after receiving Wilson’s rebuff, Bin Saud signed his 
concession to the Eastern & General Syndicate. Sir Percy Cox may have been surprised 
to read in Frank Holmes’ letter to Ameen Rihani describing the scene that “our good 
mutual friend Dr Abdullah Damlouji” was of great assistance to him. In this letter 
Holmes commented to Rihani, “I know Bin Saud is doubtful about there being oil in 
Hasa. I do not agree. I think it a very promising area.” Bin Saud made sure his wrath 
was obvious at the cavalier fashion in which Wilson and the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company had treated him. Before finalising the agreement, he insisted that Holmes sign
IOL/R/15/1/618/F.52, April 15th 1923, Bin Saud to Cox via Political Agent Bahrain and repeat to 
Political Resident “inconvenient to break my word”, “difficult to break my promise”; PRO/CO/730/39 
April 19th 1923, Cox to Bin Saud “change your mind”
PRO/L/PS/lO/Vol 989 May 1st 1923, Mackie o f Anglo Persian to Bin Saud “no use proceeding in 
person”
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for him an undertaking that read: “The Syndicate shall not sell to the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company, either as to the whole or part thereof, any oil or mineral concession or 
concessions that may be granted by Your Highness to Eastern & General Syndicate.”
The Sultan may have had his doubts about there being any oil in his territories, but he 
was willing to take a punt, which he would do through genuine participation in the 
company profits. Apart from the upfront payments, as Holmes explained in a letter to 
Rihani, “Bin Saud receives free 20% of the Capital of any company formed to work the 
Hasa Concession, and has the right to take up for cash an additional 20% of any 
company. Therefore if he exercised his right of purchasing 20% of the Capital, he 
would hold 40% of the company.” The financial terms were 6,000 sterling to be paid 
within sixty days of the grant of the concession. Once activities had begun, there would 
be payment of 3,000 sterling each six months for “security protection” provided by the 
Sultan for the men and equipment working in the leased area.28
Anglo Persian Insulted May 1923
Holmes had also discussed the Nejd Kuwait Neutral Zone and other possible areas in 
Nejd. Although these had not been finalised, Bin Saud had written to Shaikh Ahmad of 
Kuwait recommending that they jointly award the Neutral Zone concession to Frank 
Holmes. From Bahrain, Holmes cabled his London office asking them not to wait the 60 
days but to immediately credit 500 sterling to Bin Saud’s account at the Eastern Bank 
Baghdad. This would, he told his colleagues, “assist me materially to secure a very 
strong hold, over not only the Territory of Nejd other than the Hasa Concession Area, 
but also over the Kuwait territory and Bahrain”.29
As Holmes was moving on to Bahrain and Kuwait, the Government of India’s people, 
and Anglo Persian’s officials, were up in arms about the Hasa Concession; they viewed 
the clause specifically excluding transfer to, or joint operation by, the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company as a direct insult not just to them but also to the British Government as the 
majority shareholder. Sir Percy Cox had officially retired at the end of April. The new 
High Commissioner of Iraq was Sir Henry Dobbs, formerly of the Indian Civil Service
2% Rihani papers, August 1st 1923, Holmes in London to Rihani “a very promising area” and November 
22nd 1923 Holmes in London to Rihani “would hold 40% o f the company”; the original concession 
document is among Frank Holmes papers in Peter Mort’s collection UK, it is written between “Abdul 
Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal bin Saud, Sultan o f  Nejd and its Dependencies and Major Frank Holmes 
of 20 Cecil Street SW London in his capacity as the true and lawful attorney o f the Eastern & General 
Syndicate”
29 Chisholm page 98, May 13th 1923 Holmes in Bahrain to E&GSynd “to secure a very strong hold”
A Very Promising Area 121
and the administration of Mesopotamia. He addressed a “please explain” to Bin Saud. 
He also enclosed a copy of the letter written by Cox, signed by Bin Saud, and delivered 
to Holmes at the Ujair Conference.
Bin Saud appears to have been thoroughly sick of seeing this letter. In high dudgeon he 
responded to Dobbs. He referred to “the zeal we have noticed in British officials for the 
protection of our interests” and said: “We addressed that word to Major Holmes 
because Sir Percy Cox, as he confided to us verbally, said he was not acquainted with 
the company of E&GSynd. Nothing else was sought except this point; although the 
wording of our letter was not clear as regards the point, that the question depended 
solely upon whether the syndicate was English or not. I cannot find in the contents of 
that letter anything, explicit or implied, that constitutes a cause for the suspension, or 
giving up of, the negotiations between us and E&GSynd ”
Bin Saud emphasised that, even so, “we have acquiesced” in the request to consider 
Anglo Persian’s terms before taking a final decision. Scornfully, he continued to Dobbs: 
“Accordingly we have received the representative of that company and considered their 
terms, which it was impossible for us to accept owing to the inferiority of the terms 
offered in comparison with E&GSynd. Lastly, when we laid our own terms before that 
company, which terms did not differ from those accepted by the E&GSynd, Anglo 
Persian were unable to accept them and they gave up the matter in a letter written to us 
by their Agent Mr Mackie. I am able to state that we have acted and behaved in strict 
accordance with the spirit of our letter to Major Holmes.” 30
Holmes’ colleagues in London were also feeling the heat. They had been called to the 
Colonial Office and hauled over the coals. Holmes had not taken his findings in A1 Hasa 
and the "result of his discussion" with Bin Saud to Sir Arnold Wilson as confidently 
expected by Sir Percy. Instead, to appear to meet Cox's demands, the London office of 
E&GSynd had made an approach to the London office of Anglo Persian, although it 
appears they had little serious intention of pursuing Cox's vision of a "joint venture". It 
was suggested that Frank Holmes himself had instigated the Anglo Persian exclusion 
clause and, furthermore, perhaps E&GSynd had a secret agenda to sell the Hasa 
Concession to a “foreign” company. E&GSynd vehemently rejected both allegations. 
They emphasised “our right as a purely English company”. They vowed that the 
syndicate “has no intention of selling to any foreign company” and declared they would 
indeed be prepared to “work jointly” with Anglo Persian Oil Company, “... if the
Cox’s last official act was the signing o f the Anglo-Iraq Treaty on April 20th 1923, although Sir Henry 
Dobbs had already been in Baghdad for several weeks and had taken on much of the work. Sir Percy Cox 
departed Baghdad on May 1st 1923: PRO/L/PS/10 Vol 989, May 21st 1923, Abdul Aziz bin Saud to Sir 
Henry Dobbs High Commissioner for Iraq “acted and behaved in strict accordance”
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undertaking given to the Sultan is cancelled”.
E&GSynd would not agree, under any circumstances, with the Colonial Office request 
that they themselves bring about a retraction from Bin Saud. “It is probable the Sultan 
would regard our initiative in such a matter as a breach of faith”, they pronounced. 
Nevertheless, they did agree that the Eastern & General Syndicate would not object to 
the cancellation of Holmes’ undertaking “provided it is made clear in any instructions 
sent to the Political Resident that the request for such cancellation does not emanate 
from this syndicate”.31
The Duke of Devonshire’s subsequent instruction to the Political Resident, while it met 
E&GSynd’s condition, would not have pleased them either. He advised that the text of a 
letter to Bin Saud should read: “... it must not be hid from you that E&GSynd, though a 
reputable and solid organisation, have not had as much experience in working oil as the 
Anglo Persian. It was not unnatural that they should have sought, as soon as their 
representative approached Your Highness with a view to obtaining a concession in 
Nejd, to make an arrangement with Anglo Persian for cooperation and the joint working 
of the concession. These negotiations had already proceeded some way when the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company learned that Major Holmes had undertaken that no part of the 
concession should be sold to that company ...” 32
At the retirement of Sir Percy Cox as High Commissioner of Iraq, Bin Saud requested 
that his dealings with the British Government be transacted directly with the Foreign 
Office. Strident representations from the Government of India, and the Political 
Resident in the Gulf, saw to it that Bin Saud’s request was denied. He then asked to be 
allowed to cable directly to London and for permission to station a representative there. 
This too was denied. He was told emphatically that his channel of communication was 
the Colonial Office -  but never directly - contact was permitted only with the 
Government of India’s Political Resident who would, at his discretion, pass on 
messages to the Colonial Office. Machinations from the Officers of the Government of 
India in the Gulf, and accompanying pressure on the Colonial Office, would now 
intensify. They were aimed at both the repeal of the offending Anglo Persian exclusion
31 PRO/CO/730/54, May 24th 1923, E&GSynd to Under Secretary Colonial Office, “re Mr Janson's 
interview (your office) today...as a breach o f faith , does not emanate from the Syndicate”; Curiously, 
Rihani Personal Papers, June 3rd 1924 Holmes to Rihani contains an intriguing reference speaking of  
matters in Assir, “I would much like to see Abed with you He could be told that we have not only 
American money but American directors on the board o f the ILastem & General' (my emphasis)
32 PRO/L/PS/IO Vol 989, October 1923, Colonial Secretary (the Duke o f Devonshire) to Acting Political 
Resident (Knox) “have not had as much experience”
A Very Promising Area 123
clause and total annulment of the A1 Hasa Concession given to Holmes.33
Sir Arnold Wilson explained it in a letter to H St John Philby, his former colleague in 
Mesopotamia: “Bin Saud has given Holmes a concession for 70 years with a clause in it, 
inserted by Bin Saud, prohibiting transfer to Anglo Persian of whom he is suspicious 
owing to its governmental connections. I sent Mackie to see him but Bin Saud was in no 
way prepared to do any business with us at all, and after a certain amount of fencing 
told us that unless we were prepared to adopt Holmes system (ie payment of a 
percentage of profits to Bin Saud instead of the Colonial Office system of royalty on oil 
exported) it was no good our discussing the matter.” Arnold Wilson may have been 
hoping that Philby would pass to Bin Saud the pointed, and exaggerated, remarks in his 
letter. He continued: “Frank Holmes represents a man called Edmund Davis, a Jew with 
many connections in the gold mining industry, but with no experience in oil. Edmund 
Davis is trying to sell the concession to us. But I doubt whether we should want it at the 
price Davis is paying for it as there is, as far as I know, no trace of oil in A1 Hasa, nor is 
there any indication of a favourable geological formation. It seems improbable that 
Davis will be able to raise the capital and all the necessary technical knowledge to work 
as a private venture and the whole thing is likely to peter out... “ 34
Conclusion
Despite the urging of the Government of India’s Political Officers, the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company failed to act to obtain the A1 Hasa concession, even after Frank Holmes 
had delineated the area of oil probability. Arnold Wilson did not bother attending the 
Ujair Conference where he knew the concession was to be discussed. When Sir Percy 
Cox personally created an opportunity for Anglo Persian with Bin Saud, even promising 
the company would match Holmes’ offer, Wilson refused to consider serious 
negotiations and arbitrarily closed down the discussions and ordered his negotiator out.
At the time of the Ujair Conference Sir Percy exerted power over Bin Saud, backed by 
the annual subsidy paid by Britain. The subsidy was withdrawn at the close of the 
conference, after Cox had achieved the border arrangements. Even though Bin Saud was 
no longer receiving a subsidy, and despite Cox having promised him in 1914, in writing, 
“recognition of independence”, he was unable to free himself from the Government of
33 Troeller pages 196-198 “the Colonial Office acceded to the importunities o f India . Bin Saud’s request 
to be dealt with through the Foreign Office was rejected”
34 Philby papers, Box XVII-2, June 5th 1923, Wilson to Philby “unless we were prepared to adopt 
Holmes’ system” and August 18th 1923, Wilson to Philby “a Jew with many connections in gold mining”
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India. After the retirement of Cox he was placed in precisely the same position as the 
other shaikhdoms, that is under the authority of the Government of India and able to 
communicate with the Colonial Office only through the Government of India’s Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf.
When he did take an independent action, by signing the concession with Holmes, Bin 
Saud included a clause specifically excluding Anglo Persian from his territories. This 
clause was taken as a direct insult and so aroused the ire of the Government of India’s 
officials in the area that they increased their efforts to rid themselves of Holmes and 
pressured the Colonial Office in London to block the syndicate. They then set about 
trying to get the clause repealed and to bring about the annulment of the agreement 
made between Holmes and Bin Saud for the A1 Hasa concession.
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SECTION TWO 
The Struggle
Chapter Five
Resolute Rulers
May -  December 1923
Introduction
The Government of India was consolidating its domination of the Arabian shaikhdoms. 
In pursuit of this, Political Officers would tolerate no outside influence that might dilute 
its hegemony. The Anglo Persian Oil Company was the tool through which the 
Government of India sought to prevent Frank Holmes and his Eastern & General 
Syndicate developing a commercial relationship with the Shaikhs that could not be 
directly controlled by the Government of India and her Officers.
Political pressure was brought to bear on individual Shaikhs in an effort to force them 
to break off all contact with Holmes. That the Government of India was more than 
capable of carrying through her threats is shown by the ease with which the removal of 
the Ruler of Bahrain was effected. The stubbornness with which the Shaikhs continued 
to resist such pressure illustrates the depth of resentment towards their assumed 
“protection” felt by the people of the Arab shaikhdoms. This resentment included the 
Anglo Persian Oil Company that was viewed, by all parties, as an extension of the 
power of the Government of India in the area.
The Colonial Office became the mediator between the Anglo Persian backed by the 
Government of India, and Eastern & General Syndicate backed by the Shaikhs. 
Nowhere in the documentation is there any indication that the Colonial Office 
contemplated actually asking the Shaikhs themselves what their wishes were in the 
matter. From the arrangements set in place at Churchill’s 1921 Cairo Conference, the 
Colonial Office did not question the Government of India’s authority in the area, and 
accepted that the Government of India’s Political Officers spoke for the Shaikhs. The 
post-World War One agreement between the Colonial Office and the Government of 
India precluded Whitehall officials directly approaching the Gulf Rulers; the Political 
Resident remained the gatekeeper to the Arabian Peninsula.
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The Colonial Office, busy administering the mandates of Palestine and Iraq and the 
Crown Colony of Aden, seems to have elected not to see that the Arabian Shaikhs were 
voting with their feet. Their obstinate refusal to annul the concessions with Holmes, or 
to break off discussion, or to sign agreements with Anglo Persian, was the best example 
of what it was the Shaikhs wanted; their wishes were simply ignored.
By following Holmes through the first grant of the Bahrain concession, the Letter of 
Intent from Kuwait and the ongoing furore over A1 Hasa, this chapter illustrates the 
depth and dimension of the resistance of the Shaikhs to blandishments, instructions, 
advice, and threats, issued by the Government of India’s Political Officers
Bahrain signed May 1923
Holmes’ absolute conviction that the Gulf states did have oil, and as he pointed out to 
the Shaikhs, that tapping this resource would quickly begin to alleviate the Arabian 
Peninsula’s severe economic disadvantage, was in sharp contrast to the negative 
approach of Wilson and Anglo Persian. Holmes’ enthusiasm was so contagious that it 
drew people to his side. His sheer optimism won over Bin Saud's representatives in 
Bahrain, the Gosaibi brothers, in whose house Holmes was accommodated. The 
Gosaibis introduced Holmes to the Yateem family, influential Bahraini merchants with 
connections throughout the Gulf and in Bombay. Muhammed Yateem of Bahrain joined 
Holmes as his personal assistant and would stay with him through the ups and downs of 
the years to come.
Ameen Rihani became a Holmes’ devotee almost from the moment they shared tea on 
the deck while sailing from Basra to Bahrain before the Ujair Conference. Although 
Holmes told him he was “travelling in Arabia for his health”, Rihani was fascinated by 
his worldly companion. A Pan Arabist, Rihani was ideologically opposed to the stifling 
“protection” by the Government of India of the Arabs of the Gulf. He believed in 
Holmes’ vision of the potential oil wealth of the Arab shaikhdoms, so much so that he 
offered to apply his good offices among his excellent personal network on Holmes’ 
behalf. Holmes put this understanding on a businesslike, legally-documented footing 
and Rihani, to all intents and purposes, became an active participant.1
* See Rihani Ibn Sa’oud pages 69-89. And Rihani Papers, August 1st 1923, Holmes to Rihani, “Your 
interests are safeguarded and you have done right in sending the letters (I gave you) to Brown Shapely & 
Co. (your London bankers) All that is in order and you will have your interests in this new company 
(formed to explore and exploit the Hasa Concession). I hope we do well, I feel certain we will”
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Three days after signing the A1 Hasa Concession, Holmes was back in Bahrain 
discussing a concession for the area he had examined while waiting to travel to Ujair. 
He followed up the letter Bin Saud had sent recommending Holmes to the Shaikh of 
Kuwait. He cabled to Shaikh Ahmad of Kuwait saying: “I have most important letters 
from Ameen Rihani, who has made enquiries concerning myself and Company, 
advising Your Excellency not to grant oil concessions to any other company without 
first seeing the terms offered by my company.”
At the same time Muhammad Yateem cabled his close friend, Mulla Saleh, who was 
Secretary of the Council of State and Personal Secretary to the Shaikh of Kuwait. 
Saying he would come immediately and Holmes would follow within the week, Yateem 
“strongly urged” Saleh to advise the Shaikh to see the “liberal terms offered” which 
“has been successful” with Bin Saud. Yateem added that he considered the question of 
a concession “most important and vital for your country”. 2
The political situation in Bahrain had been volatile for some twelve months past, and, 
as previously noted, would climax within days with the arrival of two British Gunships, 
carrying a Sikh platoon and the Acting Political Resident in full dress uniform, coming 
to carry out the instructions of the Government of India to depose the Ruler of Bahrain. 
In the period leading up to this humiliation, the elderly Ruler of Bahrain, Shaikh Isa, 
had attempted to avoid pressure from the Political Agent by retiring to his court on 
Muharraq Island. Behind him, in Manama town, both the exercise of authority and the 
peoples’ support had veered between Isa's two sons, Abdulla and Hamad. Holmes spoke 
first with Abdulla and then with both brothers as Hamad joined the discussions.
Gossip concerning oil negotiations with Bin Saud had been circulating in Bahrain since 
Holmes’ visit to Hasa in October. Isolated in his court on Muharraq, Shaikh Isa was 
nevertheless aware of his people talking of possible oil wealth on his islands. Previously 
he had been adamant in his refusal to even discuss with Sir Arnold Wilson, or the 
Resident, the new, no fee, exclusive prospecting licence to Anglo Persian that was 
represented as updating the earlier “convention” he had signed in 1914. Just three 
months before, in January, the Political Agent reported to the Resident that fulfilling his 
instructions to persuade Shaikh Isa to sign was a tough assignment. The Political Agent 
was absolutely certain that Shaikh Isa of Bahrain would not under any circumstances 
grant a concession to the D’Arcy Exploration Company; “he will never agree ... except 
under pressure”.
2 Chisholm page 5, cable May 9th 1923, Holmes to Shaikh Ahmad o f Kuwait. Mulla Saleh had also held 
this combined position to the two previous Rulers of Kuwait; Saleh and Muhammad Yateem were best 
friends Bin Saud’s Kuwaiti Secretary, Hashem Bin Ahmad, who accompanied Holmes to Basra, was also 
close to Mulla Saleh, he too wrote to Saleh recommending Holmes
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Although the Political Officers carefully spoke of the D’Arcy Exploration Company 
rather than the Anglo Persian Oil Company, all the Arabs of the Gulf knew they were 
really one and the same.3
Then Shaikh Isa made a totally unexpected move. Perhaps, closeted on Muharraq, he 
was confused and thought it was Anglo Persian, rather than Holmes, that was the 
instigating party to the talks with Bin Saud about A1 Hasa. Perhaps he hoped to reaffirm 
his authority by personally initiating a development project. (Much of the Government 
of India’s declared justification for removing him from office charged that he was anti 
development.) Whatever may have prompted him, Shaikh Isa contacted Mackie as he 
passed through Bahrain on his way to what would be abruptly abandoned negotiations 
with Bin Saud. After meeting with Shaikh Isa, Mackie cabled Wilson reporting the 
Shaikh wanted Anglo Persian to "consider the question of developing the oil resources 
of the islands and make an arrangement with him in the way that we are now trying to 
make one with Bin Saud". He had given the Shaikh of Bahrain "a very non committal 
reply", Mackie told Wilson.4
Wilson failed completely to take advantage of Shaikh Isa's overture. He sent a 
confidential cable to the Acting Political Resident saying he would talk to him about it, 
probably in a fortnight or so. In his usual fashion, Wilson issued orders as to how the 
Political Resident should act on behalf of Anglo Persian. He said he would tell Mackie 
to contact Shaikh Isa when he returned from A1 Hasa, but it was best that any action 
should be "deferred" until "you (the Resident) and I have discussed the question 
together". Telling the Resident that he was "quite prepared" to negotiate with Shaikh Isa 
without the assistance of the Political Agent and "in some respects it is probably 
preferable to do so", Wilson requested the Resident to instruct his Political Agent in 
Bahrain "not to impede the course of negotiations". Any offer he might make to Shaikh 
Isa, Wilson informed the Political Resident, would be on the basis of a draft agreement 
recently prepared by Anglo Persian for negotiating with Kuwait except that, for
3 The task o f removing the Ruler of Bahrain fell to Acting Political Resident Knox. Due to retire, Knox 
would go on to chair the abortive, farcical even, Kuwait Conference which the Colonial Office scheduled 
for the end o f 1923 to settle the outstanding problems Nejd was maintaining with Transjordan, the Hijaz 
and Iraq. After a number of adjournments, Knox dissolved the conference altogether; Rumaihi page 177 
citing January 1923 letters from Political Agent to Resident “except under pressure” and Resident to 
Government o f India; ILO/R/15/1/618-F5 2 December 22nd 1921, Wilson to Cox, Resident, Political 
Agents, “.. .negotiations (with the Arab Shaikhs) should be conducted on behalf o f the D'Arcy Exploration 
Company”
4 IOL/R/15/1/618-F. 52, April 16th 1923 Mackie in Bahrain to Wilson “(Please tell me) by wire what 
attitude I should adopt in dealing with this subject. I understand that Gaskin sent samples o f the bitumen 
and the surrounding rock some years ago and it may be you have other information which will give you an 
idea whether there is any likelihood o f there being any oil in these islands”
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Bahrain, if ever oil was found, "the guarantee of minimum royalties will be omitted".5
While Wilson was proceeding in his stately fashion, Holmes was in and out of A1 Hasa 
and finalising the Bahrain concession. The Bahrainis had not hesitated. They too were 
infected by Holmes’ conviction, backed by his technical arguments, that there was oil in 
their land. On May 12th, only six days after signing the A1 Hasa Concession, Shaikh 
Isa’s misconceptions had been corrected and he, along with his two sons, Shaikh 
Hamad and Shaikh Abdulla, signed an agreement granting Frank Holmes an exclusive 
concession over oil in their territory. Just five days later on May 17th, under powerful 
pressure from the Government of India, Shaikh Hamad reluctantly succeeded his father. 
As the Political Agent reported, “Hamad took up the Rulership, in spite of the 
opposition of all his family and others.” No doubt this was because the Political 
Resident threatened him that, otherwise, “we would take the rule out of the hands of his 
family, the A1 Khalifa”.6
While he was in Bahrain orchestrating Shaikh Isa’s abdication, the Acting Political 
Resident was not aware that Frank Holmes and the Shaikhs of Bahrain had signed the 
concession. He did know that Holmes had been in discussion with the Bahrainis on this 
subject. Perhaps he did not investigate more carefully because Wilson had instructed 
that he, Wilson, would personally handle the matter in his own time. It was after the 
Acting Resident departed that the Political Agent learned the concession had indeed 
been signed. Immediately he informed the Acting Resident adding that Abdulla and 
Hamad had brought the concession along to a meeting, intending to show it, but, “they 
were taken aback when you said that Government strongly disapproved of Holmes’ 
company and were frightened and dropped the matter”.
He said the Bahrain concession contained a clause that “it should not take effect if 
officially disapproved by Government, in accordance to Shaikh Isa’s 1914 
undertaking”. The Political Agent then said that “after much hesitation” Abdulla had 
told him, in the strictest confidence, that Bahrain would not deal with Anglo Persian 
“unless compelled” because everybody regarded it as a Government concern with 
Government of India officials “who brought political pressure to bear”. The Agent said 
he had “disabused” him but to no avail. Shaikh Abdulla vowed that Bahrain “would 
prefer no concession to the Anglo Persian Oil Company”.
5 IOL/R/l 5/1/618/F.52 April 30th 1923, Confidential, Wilson to Resident “be omitted”
6 10L/R/15/2/96 Vol. 1, May 22nd 1923; cable, Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to Acting Political Resident 
(Knox) “Shaikh Abdulla informs me that Isa with his and Hamad’s approval gave Holmes an oil concession 
on May 12th ”; Rihani Papers, August 1st 1923, Holmes to Rihani “signed by Isa, Abdulla and Hamad”, 
Holmes said Isa had asked to see Holmes’ concession with Bin Saud; PRO/L/PS/10 Vol 989; 
Memorandum March 17th 1924, Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to Political Resident (Trevor) 
“Hamad . best serve his family” See also Rumaihi page 178
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The Agent said he had next summoned Frank Holmes and interrogated him as to “why 
he had concealed from Government the fact that he had got the concession”. Holmes 
answered that he had intended to apply to the Acting Resident for approval while he 
was in Bahrain, but before he could do so, the Acting Resident had told him in no 
uncertain terms, that he (the Resident) was personally “all out against him (Holmes)”. 
The Political Agent reported Holmes had said “seeing you (the Acting Resident) were 
not neutral, as he expected”, he preferred to report first to his directors who were 
approaching His Majesty’s Government in London. Holmes had assured him there was 
no clause in the Bahrain concession excluding Anglo Persian as in the A1 Hasa 
concession. “He asked me whether I officially disapproved, and, if so, on what grounds 
and said that his directors would get satisfaction in London. 1 said 1 had no authority to 
reply but would report to you”, the Agent informed the Acting Resident. Adding that 
Holmes had “complained bitterly of our support of the Anglo Persian Oil Company”, 
the Political Agent confirmed Holmes’ suspicions by closing this cable to the Acting 
Resident saying, “Mackie has been informed”.7
Political Officers Rally to Anglo Persian
The Acting Resident was told that Holmes was “endeavouring to get an oil concession 
out of Shaikh Ahmad” for which purpose his “emissary”, Muhammad Yateem, was 
travelling to Kuwait. The Resident immediately cabled the Kuwait Agent, “if you think 
there is a likelihood of the Shaikh being tempted, remind him of his grandfather's 1913 
convention which we consider binds him and his successors”. He instructed that Shaikh 
Ahmad be told “Major Holmes is no way a person appointed from the British 
Government". Major James Carmichael More, the Political Agent Kuwait, was 
supremely confident of the total authority of the Government of India in Kuwait and 
replied, “I do not think there is any fear of Shaikh Ahmad giving a concession without, 
or contrary to, our advice”. But perhaps he was mindful of Lieutenant Colonel Trevor’s 
warning before going on leave. He added: “At the same time it is known here that Bin 
Saud has turned down the Anglo Persian offer and is dealing with Holmes. It is 
presumed that Sir Percy told Bin Saud that Holmes’ syndicate was sound as it is known 
Bin Saud asked him to find out. If I am asked why we should favour the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company, over another sound British firm, what reply should I give?” 8
7 IOL/R/15/2/96 Vol l, May 22nd 1923; cable, Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to Acting Political Resident 
(Knox) “frightened and dropped the matter”, “you were all out against him”, “get satisfaction in London”
 ^ IOL/R/15/2/96 Vol l, May 22nd 1923; cable Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to Acting Political Resident 
(Knox) “endeavouring to get”; IOL/R/15/5/237 Vol. l l ,  May 13th 1923, cable Acting Resident (Knox) to
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This time, spurred on by the agitation of the Government of India’s Political Officers in 
the Gulf, Wilson moved a lot faster. He arrived in Kuwait on May 31st. He was joined 
next day by the Acting Political Resident who, "in the face of Major Holmes' active 
methods", saw himself on a mission for which he was determined to "interpret as 
literally as possible my obligation to assist the Anglo Persian Oil Company". For the 
persuasion of the Shaikh of Kuwait, Wilson brought with him the company’s Basra- 
based lawyer who was in partnership with Shaikh Ahmad’s own legal adviser.
He also brought along the Shaikh of Muhammerah who had been ardently pro Anglo 
Persian since the company’s refinery was constructed in his territory at Abadan. On 
June 2nd, joined by the Kuwait Political Agent, the powerful group of five called on 
Shaikh Ahmad who had, only three months before, become the Ruler of Kuwait 
following the untimely death of his uncle, Shaikh Salim.* 9
The Acting Resident, Lieutenant Colonel Knox, seems to have been strangely 
insensitive to the atmosphere prevailing in the Arab shaikhdoms. He appears to have 
been oblivious to Kuwait's bitter reaction to the excision of two thirds of its territory. He 
seems to have had no concept of the depth of Bin Saud's anger at being forced back 
under the authority of the Government of India after Cox's retirement, and humiliation 
at the arbitrary deportation of his agent, Abdulla Gosaibi, from Bahrain.
Nor does he seem to have appreciated the seething resentment in Bahrain at the removal 
of their Ruler, in which he personally played the prominent role. While he and every 
other Political Officer viewed Anglo Persian as an extension of the power of the 
Government of India, he does not seem to have recognised that the Arabs viewed it in 
exactly the same way — but to them, this was a good reason for avoiding it.
This total inability to comprehend the far-reaching effects on the Arabs of actions and 
policies of the Government of India must be emphasised. Because they failed to 
understand that the Shaikhs' uncooperative spirit -  disobedience as some Political 
Officers termed it -  had its roots in their own conduct, they appear to have looked for 
other forces to blame.
Political Agent Kuwait (More) “we consider binds him and his successor”; and Kuwait Agent reply of
same date “favour Anglo Persian”
9 PRO/FO/371/8945, July 20th 1923, Acting Resident (Knox) to Colonial Secretary the Duke of  
Devonshire “my obligation to assist APOC”; Chisholm page 210 the lawyer, Mirza Muhammad, was legal 
adviser in Basra to APOC his colleague, Gabriel, was attorney to Shaikh Ahmad o f Kuwait; In fact, the 
Arab Shaikhs were contemptuous of the Shaikh o f Muhammerah, for example, IOL/R/15/2/96 Vo l l ,  June 
14th 1923 Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to Acting Resident (Knox) quotes Shaikh Hamad saying “APOC 
is too much mixed up in politics and Khazaal of Muhammerah is a tool in their hands”; Shaikh Ahmad’s 
official date of accession is March 29th 1923. Bom in 1885 Shaikh Ahmad was 36 years old when he 
succeeded his uncle Shaikh Salim in February 1923
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The Outsider, New Zealander Frank Holmes, provided a ready scapegoat. An 
illustration of such scapegoating is the apparent sincerity with which Acting Resident 
Knox could advise the Government of India: “Hostility to Anglo Persian has only 
manifested itself seriously since Holmes arrived on the spot and it is difficult to resist 
the conclusion that it is chiefly due to him and his agent.”10
Shaikh Ahmad of Kuwait did not commit himself during the meeting with the powerful 
group of five, nor would he sign anything. Nevertheless, the Acting Resident reported 
that, although he personally would have preferred the Shaikh to sign immediately, Sir 
Arnold Wilson had declared himself satisfied. Acting Resident Knox was certain the 
meeting with Shaikh Ahmad would result in “the disappearance of Major Holmes from 
the scene”. Almost in passing, he reported, “for their part Anglo Persian are in no hurry 
to exploit the Shaikh’s territory; their chief anxiety was to be certain that no other party 
would be able to obtain a footing there”. Triumphantly, Knox declared “in this we have 
succeeded”. (The copy of this report circulated at the Colonial Office has a handwritten, 
unsigned, note in the margin stating "This may be very unfair to the Shaikh, who 
presumably wants revenue?”)* 11
The Government of India was well pleased. The Acting Resident was instructed to 
officially inform the Shaikh of Kuwait that “any oil concession granted to Holmes will 
not be confirmed" as his syndicate "is not a firm approved by Government”. He was told 
to ignore Holmes' Bahrain agreement and "now make every effort to induce Shaikh 
Hamad to conclude an agreement with Anglo Persian”. He was also directed to 
“similarly endeavour to persuade the Sultan of Nejd” to withdraw from his contract 
with Holmes. In the very least the Acting Resident was to ensure the immediate 
cancellation of the offending Anglo Persian exclusion clause.
Less than a week after Wilson revealed Anglo Persian's true intentions -  or non 
intentions -  in Kuwait, the Acting Resident was again clearly told that Anglo Persian 
had no interest whatsoever in sinking any effort, or money, into the Arab shaikhdoms 
which they considered geologically worthless. Major Daly, the Political Agent in 
Bahrain, sent Acting Resident Knox a personal cable saying, “Mackie yesterday told 
me, in confidence, that Anglo Persian have no desire to work a concession in Bahrain ...
^  One or two officials did appear to appreciate the real situation, see for example, Ireland page 198 
quoting an India Office official on the treatment of Bin Saud: “There has been recently a most unfortunate 
conjuncture o f circumstances in our relations with Bin Saud -  the withdrawal of his subsidy, the expulsion 
of his Agent from Bahrain, and the change in the channel of communication must have had a deplorable 
cumulative effect ”; IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989, June 3rd 1923 Acting Resident (Knox) to Secretary of State 
India "due to Holmes and his agent"
11 IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989, June 3rd 1923 Acting Resident (Knox) to Secretary of State India "no hurry to 
exploit", the margin note is on this document “very unfair to the Shaikh”
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their object would be secured if they could block other companies from getting a 
concession here.” Daly, at least momentarily, seems to have had some sympathy for the 
Bahrainis as he added, “this seems to be a pity from the point of view of Bahrain 
development and the Shaikh’s interests”.
Knox was singularly untouched and replied: “Please take action on instructions. At the 
same time inform Shaikh Hamad that the Anglo Persian are a firm approved by High 
Government and give Mackie such assistance in obtaining the concession as he may 
properly ask from you by using your influence with Shaikh Hamad.” 12
Knox followed through with a letter designed to put Hamad firmly in his place. He 
commanded Shaikh Hamad of Bahrain to “inform that gentleman (Holmes), in writing, 
that you already consider that agreement void and of no effect, since you have received 
an official intimation from the representative of the High Government in these waters 
that it is not approved.” Knox ordered Hamad to furnish him with “a copy of your 
written communication to Major Holmes”. Pompously, Knox warned the new Ruler of 
Bahrain: “I trust this letter will impose caution on yourself for the future.” But Hamad 
held his ground. He answered that the terms and conditions offered by Anglo Persian 
were not “considered satisfactory by me or by our subjects” and “we have done nothing 
opposed to our agreement with Government.”
The Bahrain Political Agent reported Hamad as vowing, “if Government cancelled the 
present concession, he preferred to give none at all, unless he were allowed to deal with 
some company other than Anglo Persian”. Daly was now getting anxious about his own 
position in Bahrain. He told Knox: “Hamad appealed to my friendship to ask 
Government not to force him (to sign with Anglo Persian). It is evident that they will 
not yield short of compulsion. Such action would be unfortunate for my relations with 
the Shaikhs which are now very satisfactory. I have done all I can to persuade them.” 
Knox wrote again to Hamad. Taking the high moral ground, he said he was “surprised 
to notice in yourself and others that while you are scrupulously mindful to observe your 
promises to a man like Major Holmes you appear to be very unmindful and neglectful 
of the promise made by your respected father to the High Government”. He instructed 
Hamad he must now “make the only reparation in your power” and inform Holmes that 
“owing to a previous promise made to Government, which for the moment you forgot, 
you must ask him to consider all these negotiations null and void.” 13
IOL/R/15/2/96 Vol l, June 10th 1923, Telegram, Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to Acting Resident 
(Knox) “this seems to be a pity”; IOL/R/15/2/96 Vol l June 12th 1923, telegram, Acting Resident (Knox) 
to Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) “using your influence with Shaikh Hamad”
I3 IOL/R/15/2/96 Vol l, June 12th 1923, Acting Resident (Knox) to Shaikh Hamad, “inform that 
gentleman” and June 14th 1923, Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to Acting Resident (Knox) ’’will not yield
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Kuwait Letter of Intent June 1923
Despite the Acting Resident’s best endeavours, Holmes, while in Kuwait, had outlined 
for Shaikh Ahmad Bin Jabir A1 Sabah his suggested terms for a concession to develop 
Kuwait’s oil. Holmes’ motivation was his absolute certainty that the area was abundant 
in oil. For him, the returns expected from the rich oil fields that he visualised more than 
justified generous investment in terms and conditions. Three weeks after the Acting 
Resident and his high-powered visitors had left Kuwait, Shaikh Ahmad called a meeting 
of his Council and put both offers before them.
For a 70-year concession, Holmes' initial upfront payment was 2,000 sterling against 
Anglo Persian's 750. Under the somewhat loose category of “protection” Holmes' 
annual minimum payment was 3,000 sterling against Anglo Persian's 2,300. Moreover, 
although this amount was designated as "protection", under Holmes' terms salaries of all 
men provided by the Shaikh were to be paid by E&GSynd, including guards, and the 
Shaikh would not be held responsible for raids, forays or attacks. There would be a 1% 
export duty paid on all oil leaving the country and customs duty paid on everything 
E&GSynd brought into the country, except machinery. From Holmes, the Shaikh was to 
receive 20% of the net profits and the right to subscribe to a further 20% of the capital, 
the same as in Bin Saud's agreement. Anglo Persian would not countenance paying 
either customs duty or tax, and certainly would not consider profit sharing of any 
description, payment was strictly on the basis of royalty. It did not take the Shaikh and 
his Council long to decide in favour of Holmes and his Eastern & General Syndicate.14
The next day Shaikh Ahmad wrote to the Kuwait Political Agent:
“I beg to inform you that Major Frank Holmes, the accredited 
agent of E&GSynd, has come to Kuwait and has submitted to me a draft 
concession for mineral oil in Kuwait territory which, on careful 
consideration, I find to be beneficent and profitable. What I particularly
short of compulsion” and enclosing Hamad’s reply “by me or by our subjects”; June 26th 1923, Acting 
Resident (Knox) to Shaikh Hamad Bahrain “to a man like Major Holmes", Knox charged that as Hamad 
and his brother Abdulla were concerned in the negotiations they were “therefore equally guilty in breaking 
the promise”
Details o f  Holmes’ 1923 Kuwait offer are in the original documentation in Frank Holmes papers, also in 
Ward page 17 and Chisholm page 23; see Chisholm page 97 citing August 17th 1923 Wilson to Anglo 
Persian Managing Director London, even Knox later conceded that Holmes' terms were "so much more 
favourable" than anything ever put forward by Anglo Persian; IOL/R/15/5/23 7 Vol 11, June 25th 1923 
Confidential Political Agent Kuwait (More) to Acting Resident (Knox) Holmes was so keen to get the 
concession, More reported, that “he is said to have agreed at once to any and every alteration to the draft 
agreement that the Shaikh suggested”
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like about it is that it is a British company and that it undertakes not to sell 
the concession to any but British companies. In addition to this, I propose 
inserting a clause to the effect that this concession will only come into 
force if approved by His Majesty’s Government and that, if Government 
do not approve, it becomes null and void. I feel confident that if I grant 
this concession to the company in question, His Majesty’s Government 
will raise no objection as my friend Shaikh Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Nejd has 
granted them a similar concession and HE Sir Percy Cox, who was present 
at the time, raised no objection and as my friend the Ruler of Bahrain has 
given them a similar concession, and there was no objection to this either.
I hope therefore from the justice of Government that this will also be 
approved.” 15
Major More, the Kuwait Political Agent, forwarded this letter to the Acting Resident 
with the comment, “Holmes is said to have assured the Shaikh there will be no question 
whatever of His Majesty’s Government not approving the proposed agreement, as this is 
a question which will be settled in London”. He said Holmes had told Shaikh Ahmad 
that “it is only the Political Officers of the Government of India who are trying to 
‘boom’ Anglo Persian for reasons of personal friendship etc and they will go back on 
what they had said when taxed with it from London as Sir Percy Cox had done in the 
case of Bin Saud”. Major More felt sure that the selection of Holmes' offer was "not 
looked upon with favour by the majority of the leading merchants and other influential 
men in the town”. Furthermore, he reassured Knox, “Shaikh Ahmad is a man of no 
strength of character and I do not think it at all likely that he will try and take his own 
way in opposition to both public opinion and your advice, if, as 1 presume will be the 
case, you still advise him to deal only with the D'Arcy Exploration Co”.16
Holmes was assured of Kuwait’s intention to sign the concession. He was also 
confident, as he had told Shaikh Ahmad, that once outside the Gulf, he would not have 
difficulties dealing with the officials in London. Holmes was well aware the Political 
Officers were supporting Anglo Persian in order to block any company entering into the 
Government of India’s area of influence. Holmes departed for London.
He was anxious to begin arrangements for a geological team to check his own opinion 
of the oil fields in A1 Hasa, Bahrain and Kuwait, where he now held, or almost held,
15 10L/R/15/5/237 V o l.ll, June 23rd 1923, Shaikh Ahmad al Jabir as Sabah Ruler of Kuwait to Political 
Agent Kuwait (More) “from the justice of Government”
16 10L/R/15/5/237 Vol . l l ,  June 23rd 1923, Political Agent Kuwait (More) to Political Resident (Knox) 
“a question which will be settled in London”; June 25th Confidential Political Agent Kuwait (More) to 
Political Resident (Knox) “Ahmad is a man of no strength o f character”
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concessions. He also needed to be in London to complete registration formalities for the 
new companies that would be formed to explore and develop in A1 Hasa, Bahrain and, 
he expected, Kuwait. His Bahraini colleague, Muhammad Yateem, remained in Kuwait 
with the draft agreement in readiness for the Shaikh of Kuwait to sign; both parties to 
this agreement expected he would soon be officially permitted to do so.
The Shaikhs hold their Ground
When he received the Ruler of Kuwait's letter, with Major More's comments, Knox 
immediately addressed a “stiff remonstrance” to Shaikh Ahmad who noted in reply: “I 
of course recognise Government as the foundation of my welfare and that of my 
country, to whom obedience is incumbent on me, and I indeed strive to render it that I 
may enjoy lasting favours.” Nevertheless, like Hamad in Bahrain, Shaikh Ahmad stood 
by his decision and declared that he regarded his intended acceptance of the Holmes’ 
agreement “in no way contrary” to the 1913 convention signed by his grandfather. Knox 
reported to the Government of India that the attitude of Shaikh Hamad in Bahrain was 
“hostile” and that of the Shaikh of Kuwait no better. He was, he said, “awaiting a visit 
from Sir Arnold Wilson before taking any further definite action".17
In the meantime, Knox turned his attention to the third recalcitrant, Abdul Aziz Bin 
Saud of Nejd. He drafted a long paternalistic letter and forwarded this to the Colonial 
Office for authorisation. He began by sharply reminding Bin Saud that he was obliged 
to conduct all business through the Government of India’s Political Resident “in 
accordance with the arrangement lately come to by my Government”. Next he told Bin 
Saud, “Your Highness, of course stands on an entirely different plane from the Sheikhs 
of Bahrain and Kuwait over whom, for long years, in their interests, His Majesty's 
Government have established a protectorate.” In a contorted display of bureaucratese, 
considering the reminder just given, he continued "naturally we do not deal in the same 
way with Your Highness, who is an independent sovereign, as we do with these two 
Shaikhs”. Knox declared himself “sorry to say” that both these Shaikhs had 
“undoubtedly broken their promise and have entered into negotiations with Major 
Holmes who is not in any way a person approved by Government”.
17 IOL/R/15/5/237 Vol l 1, June 28th 1923, Ruler of Kuwait, Shaikh Ahmad, to Acting Resident (Knox) 
“obedience is incumbent on me”; 10L/R/15/2/96 V ol.l, July 2nd 1923 Acting Resident (Knox) to Under 
Secretary o f State for India London repeat to Viceroy India “hostile” and “awaiting a visit from Wilson”
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Knox was verging on the hysterical, if not the libellous, in this draft, as he continued:
‘i f  in the future, Holmes or his company should deal treacherously, 
dishonestly or oppressively with either of the Shaikhs concerned, 
Government have no hold on either the man himself or on his company and 
can in no way bring pressure to bear on him to act honestly and rightly. It is 
therefore not in the least surprising that both Your Highness and the Sheikhs 
of Bahrain and Kuwait should have found Major Holmes much more 
amenable and complaisant and desirous to promise all that Your Highness 
and these two Shaikhs may require of him.
But it is not necessary to remind Your Highness, who is thoroughly 
well versed in the affairs of the world, that it is a very long way from 
promise to performance. The Eastern & General Syndicate have no 
experience of working oil and it is quite likely that they will find it very 
unprofitable to attempt to look for oil and exploit oil, if found in Your 
Highness' dominions ... oil exploration and exploitation in the field, even 
of Eastern Arabia, is a restricted one and there is no room for two British 
companies to work there ... The probabilities are that the weaker, the 
Eastern & General Syndicate, will go to the wall in a conflict between the 
two companies ... Their only hope of working successfully is to sell a 
portion of the concession to the more powerful company, Anglo Persian, 
and get them on their side ...”
Sending this draft to the Duke of Devonshire at the Colonial Office, Knox said he 
would dispatch it "after consulting Sir Arnold Wilson in one week's time". He had a 
plan, Knox confided to the Duke. "I think I can force Bin Saud into the open", he said 
and "get him, in a fit of pique, to cancel the concession. Kuwait and Bahrain will at 
once desert E&GSynd and come into line.” The two Shaikhs were also on the receiving 
end of a strong line from Knox, he said, as part of this “Plan B”. Knox explained his 
alternative possibility entailed "if we can secure Bahrain and Kuwait, Nejd in the end 
may follow”.
Even though he was well aware that Anglo Persian did not want the Arab concessions, 
and even though he admitted that Holmes’ terms were “so much more favourable” than 
anything ever put forward by Anglo Persian, Knox had no hesitation in castigating 
Holmes who, he said, “has acted unscrupulously and deserves no consideration”. 
Sanctimoniously, Knox stated that, presumably unlike the men of the Government of 
India, or the personnel of Anglo Persian, Holmes was furthering “his own selfish 
interests” and in doing so had “done a great deal of harm here”. Nevertheless, he
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reassured his superiors, “it is very unlikely that, in view of our opposition, the 
agreement between Nejd and Holmes will come to anything” . 18
Replying to Knox’s request for prompt instructions, the Duke of Devonshire thought it 
prudent not to mention the fact that the British Government was the majority 
shareholder in D'Arcy Exploration Co, through its holding in Anglo Persian, “unless 
specifically referred to by Bin Saud”, in which case it should be made clear that “HMG 
do not interfere in the policy of the company and that company has no political 
significance whatever”. The Duke considered it perfectly acceptable to imply that Bin 
Saud may have been coerced by Holmes into excluding Anglo Persian, but not to state, 
as Knox had, that in doing so Holmes had “exceeded his instructions”. Advising Knox 
to again stress that “unlike D'Arcy Exploration, the E&GSynd have no experience of oil 
development", the Duke of Devonshire gave Knox virtual carte blanche by instructing 
him to take “whatever steps you consider advisable and justifiable to secure 
cancellation of Nejd concession, or failing that, of condition excluding Anglo Persian, 
and to induce Kuwait and Bahrain to come into line” . 19
But before Knox could launch his plans, Arnold Wilson succumbed to cold feet. The 
matter of Bin Saud now involved, not just the Government of India, but also the 
Colonial Office. Knowing Anglo Persian's true lack of interest in the area, Wilson 
appears to have hesitated when the Duke of Devonshire himself became involved. 
Acting Resident Knox had to back down and again write to the Duke saying that he had 
“discussed the whole matter today with Sir Arnold Wilson”. Wilson had informed him, 
Knox said, “that he is not very anxious that we should approach Bin Saud with any 
haste as he is not quite certain what the attitude of his company will be in the event of 
Bin Saud suddenly cancelling Holmes’ lease altogether”. Knox could no longer ignore 
the fact that, no matter how much the Political Officers wanted it, even if Holmes’ 
concession was cancelled Anglo Persian did not seem ready to step in and conclude its 
own arrangements with Bin Saud. But Knox was not giving up altogether. “In the 
meantime,” he suggested to the Duke, he would send the letter anyway.20
^  IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989, July 9th 1923, Acting Resident (Knox) to Duke of Devonshire Under Secretary 
of State Colonial Office “force Bin Saud into the open” and “a great deal of harm here”; Even the 
committed Knox had his doubts about Anglo Persian see IOL/R/15/2/96 Vol. 1, June 18th 1923, 
Confidential, Acting Resident (Knox) to Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) “Wilson may, or may not, be 
correct when he says that it is quite impossible for the E&GSynd to work the concession they have 
obtained from Bin Saud without the aid of Anglo Persian”
^  IOL/L/PS/IO vol 989, July 13th 1923, telegram from Duke of Devonshire, Under Secretary o f State, 
Colonial Office to Political Resident (Knox) “unless specifically referred to by Bin Saud” and “to secure 
cancellation o f  Nejd concession”
20 IOL/L/PS/IO vol 989 July 17th 1923, Acting Resident (Knox) to Duke of Devonshire “in the event of 
Bin Saud cancelling Holmes’ concession”
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For Kuwait -  "on an entirely different plane" from Nejd -  Knox and Wilson simply 
ignored the letters written by Shaikh Ahmad. They instructed Major More, the Political 
Agent, to speak to the Shaikh of Kuwait. More told Shaikh Ahmad he had just received 
a cable from Wilson asking when the Shaikh could be expected “in Abadan to discuss 
the agreement further”. Shaikh Ahmad, far from being a man of “no strength of 
character”, as Major More had described him, was now getting very annoyed indeed. He 
replied firmly to the advice that he should conclude an agreement with the D’Arcy 
Exploration Company by saying he had already written to “my friend” Arnold Wilson 
telling him it was impossible to conclude an agreement on “those” lines and “definitely 
rejecting his draft agreement”. To the surprised embarrassment of Major More, Shaikh 
Ahmad produced a copy of his letter written to Wilson three weeks previously, on June 
23rd 1923, the day after his Council meeting. It read: “In answer to your letter of 3rd 
June sent me on your departure from Kuwait, I have the honour to state that the draft oil 
concession which you offered me has been, after deliberations, found unsuitable to our 
private and public interests and I regret to inform you of our rejecting it.”21
London July 1923
When Holmes arrived to London at the end of July 1923, he had a concession signed 
from Bin Saud and another signed by the Bahrainis together with the Kuwaiti’s firm 
intention to conclude an agreement for their own territory and to share with Bin Saud in 
the Neutral Zone. On arrival he found an encouraging letter from Rihani in Beirut 
saying, “the news of your success has been coming to me from all quarters -  from 
Baghdad, Kuwait, Bahrain ... The Kuwait concession will yet be signed ... Shaikh 
Ahmad wrote me about it.”22
Holmes set to work in London. By August he reported to Rihani, “we begin work in 
November of this year at the A1 Hasa Concession. We will begin at the same time in 
Bahrain.” He explained that a new company, with a capital of 300,000 sterling, had 
been formed to explore the A1 Hasa Concession. “This amount is ample money” for the 
A1 Hasa exploration work, Holmes said. To “explore and bore” the Bahrain Concession, 
the capital of E&GSynd had been increased from 50,000 sterling to 250,000. “We have
IOL/R/l5/5/237 V o l.ll, July 14th 1923, Confidential, Political Agent Kuwait (More) to Acting 
Resident (Knox) enclosing copy of Shaikh Ahmad’s June 23rd 1923 letter to Wilson, More told Knox “I 
pointed out the advice was yours not mine” and added, “I fancy (Shaikh Ahmad) thinks that, when Major 
Holmes arrives in England his syndicate will bring pressure to bear on Government and get them to reverse 
their decision”
22 Rihani papers; July 17th 1923, Rihani in Lebanon to Holmes in London: “...Great opposition you have 
overcome and you will overcome yet in Kuwait”
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more than 200,000 sterling now available in E&GSynd” with which to begin work on 
the Bahrain Concession, Holmes told Rihani. He planned to leave London in mid 
September taking with him “an expert staff of geologists” to undertake the required 
preliminary work on the concessions, prior to beginning actual operations in November.
As Holmes expected to be in the Gulf for quite some time managing the development of 
the concessions, his wife, Dorothy, would set up a home for them in Bahrain. He was 
still planning to “see about the Neutral Zone Concession and get same signed by both 
Sultan Bin Saud and the Shaikh of Kuwait”. He was also attending to matters related to 
his negotiations in the Red Sea, including the Salif Salt Concession. Holmes was 
pleased with his visit to the Colonial Office where he discovered the officials “rather 
amused” to find that “Wilson did not have it all his own way”. He told Rihani, "here in 
England they did not think anyone could upset Anglo Persian as they had heard the 
company was much liked out there.” 23
Anglo Persian's London management may have been thinking along similar lines as 
Wilson was forced to defend himself in a letter to his Managing Director. Referring to 
himself in the third person -  and adopting the royal "We" -  Wilson wrote: "We venture 
to point out that there seems little reason to think that the personality and past career of 
your General Manager (Wilson himself) or the Government shareholding have been 
factors of importance in deciding the attitude of the Shaikh of Kuwait.” Wilson claimed 
he had seen Shaikh Ahmad in 1922 and that the Shaikh had "expressed anxiety to come 
to an agreement as soon as possible". Wilson laid blame on the London management 
saying he had then been instructed "it was not desired that we should take active steps 
in the matter of the Kuwait agreement". He also criticised the Acting Political Resident 
saying Knox’s opinion had been to "sit tight and do nothing for some time", presumably 
until Holmes had been forced out of the region as Knox expected. Frank Holmes was, in 
Wilson's view, entirely at fault. The Shaikhs were refusing to cooperate with Anglo 
Persian, Wilson confidently told the London management, because "the market has 
been spoilt by Holmes' proposals".24
Holmes did not expect to have any problems complying with the Colonial Office 
request that “for political reasons” the syndicate should now apply “as they wish us to 
do (ie through official channels)”. This was a mere formality, Holmes said, because 
“the Government have told us that they will support us if we make an application
23 Rihani papers: August 1st 1923 Holmes in London to Rihani in Lebanon “begin work in November at 
A1 Hasa and the same time at Bahrain” and “did not think anyone could upset Anglo Persian”
24 Chisholm page 98-99 August 17th 1923 Wilson to Anglo Persian Managing Director London “sit tight 
and do nothing” and “has spoilt the market”
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through them”. The process of requesting approval of the Bahrain Concession was 
already underway. The Colonial Office had told him that, under pressure from Anglo 
Persian, they had recently written to Kuwait stating that the British Government “do not 
approve of the E&GSynd application and that they will not ratify any agreement” 
concluded on the basis of this application.
Holmes said the Colonial Office stressed "they had made it clear that it is the 
application and not E&GSynd that is not approved” [sic]. Percy Cox was also 
supportive of Holmes. "He talks most openly with me. I wish I could send you one or 
two of his letters to me so that you could gauge our relationship", he told Rihani. Since 
Wilson called off the negotiations with Bin Saud, Sir Percy had been suspicious of 
Anglo Persian's sincerity. Holmes said Cox had told him "many times" since his arrival 
in London that he was "extremely glad my people have got the A1 Hasa Concession as it 
is his desire that his friend Bin Saud gets as fair a deal as possible and that his people 
secure in full measure the benefits of oil and mineral developments in their country". 
Holmes commented that “the British Government are really fed up with the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company and the company does not get all the support the people in the 
Persian Gulf might think”. 25
The message that the Government of India's Political Officers, and Anglo Persian 
personnel, were spreading throughout the Gulf, particularly since Holmes’ departure, 
was different. The Colonial Office statement had been distorted to one of Holmes 
himself being a person “not approved” by the British Government and E&GSynd also 
being condemned as a company of which “His Majesty’s Government do not approve”. 
Word of this soon got back to the City where it caused quite a buzz in the business and 
financial circles of London. The Chairman of the Eastern & General Syndicate, 
Edmund Davis -  he would later be knighted for service to British industry -  was 
involved in some 82 companies and syndicates. Hearing the rumours from the Persian 
Gulf, an affronted Edmund Davis and his directors in E&GSynd addressed an official 
letter to the Secretary of State at the Colonial Office protesting the harm to their 
investments and business that could result from such a slur on their reputations. They 
wrote the Duke of Devonshire that they felt sure “Your Grace did not wish such an 
impression to be conveyed”. Therefore, “as any such wrong impression may act in a 
most detrimental manner upon our Syndicate”, they “respectfully requested that you 
will kindly take such measures as you deem necessary” to correct the situation. Edmund 
Davis had to be taken seriously.
25 Rihani papers, August 23rd 1923, Holmes in London to Rihani in Lebanon “they will support us if we 
make an application through them”; August 30th 1923 Holmes to Rihani “I am very friendly with Cox” 
Holmes also noted "As regards the oil concession from the Sultan of Sahej (Yemen) the Colonial Office 
are urging us to conclude with him at once as they have agreed our terms with the Sultan"
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There was a very real possibility that Davis and his colleagues might turn to the national 
press and accuse the current Government of running a smear campaign and protecting 
its own investment in Anglo Persian by secretly assisting to block competition. Both 
Anglo Persian and E&GSynd had advocated their cases to the various government 
departments. Anglo Persian claimed they had followed the correct procedures which 
E&GSynd, by going directly to the Shaikhs, had not. In requesting official approval of 
their transactions with the Shaikhs, E&GSynd pointed to the superior merit of the terms 
and conditions they offered. The official letter of complaint from Davis and his 
directors brought things to a head. The Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State at the 
Colonial Office, was called upon to make an adjudication.26
The Duke wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Knox, still Acting Resident in the Gulf, and 
clarified the earlier statement. He sought to mollify the Political Officers and the 
Government of India by assuring them that the mandatory requirement to obtain 
permission before approaching any Shaikh in the Persian Gulf still stood. He reaffirmed 
the Colonial Office's adherence to the protocol that any communication with, or about, 
the Shaikhs of the Arabian Peninsula must be solely through the Political Resident. 
Frank Holmes, he said, “avowedly and probably actually” had not been aware he 
needed government permission before he could speak to any Shaikh in the Persian Gulf. 
The Duke then took some pains to emphasise it was only "the irregular manner" in 
which E&GSynd's business offers were made that was not "approved". He stressed there 
was no objection to Holmes personally, nor to E&GSynd which, the Duke now 
declared, was “a substantial and reputable firm”.
But the Duke was enough of an imperialist to “feel very strongly” that the Shaikhs 
should “not be allowed to disregard their solemn undertakings with impunity”. Nor 
could a precedent be established by allowing “unapproved firms” to “secure 
concessions the terms of which had not previously been submitted to His Majesty’s 
Government”.
The Duke of Devonshire thought Anglo Persian's offer to the Shaikh of Kuwait left 
"much to be desired", so much so that he could not, in all fairness, inform the Shaikh 
that his rights and interests would be adequately protected. The Duke of Devonshire did 
not like E&GSynd’s idea of introducing the Shaikhs to rea/business through becoming 
shareholders in the companies formed to exploit their resources, he preferred the old
26 IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989, March 20th 1924, Resident (Trevor) to Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(Thomas) “. . .Holmes had been associated for 28 years in the service of his company -  an engineering firm 
with connections in the Far East ...one of the 82 companies with which Mr Edmund Davis is connected”; 
IOL/L/PS/10 Vol 989, August 24th 1923, E&GSynd to Duke of Devonshire Secretary of State Colonial 
Office “necessary to correct the situation”; Bilovich, Quest Oil Bahrain, page 254 draws on a Colonial 
Office Minute expressing fear of critical news coverage
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style of royalty based on output. But, he said, E&GSynd had “volunteered" to modify 
their contracts “in such a manner” to conform to his wishes. He told Acting Resident 
Knox that once he was “satisfied” the syndicate was “in a position and intend to carry 
out to the full” the obligations towards the Shaikhs as they proposed, he could not “feel 
any strong objection to their candidature”.
Nevertheless, the Duke now rewarded Anglo Persian by decreeing that, in view of their 
"prior application" and correct procedure, and if they were prepared to offer terms at 
least as favourable as those submitted by Holmes, he would withhold recognition of the 
E&GSynd agreements with the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait. He loaded the dice in 
favour of Anglo Persian by directing that refusal of the Shaikhs to sign with Anglo 
Persian would only be considered if they attached a detailed list of their technical 
objections in order to allow Anglo Persian the chance "to modify accordingly". If, after 
all this, Anglo Persian could not agree with the Shaikhs, then the Duke would approve 
E&GSynd's contracts, suitably recast to his satisfaction, provided Holmes’ terms were 
as favourable to the Shaikhs as those rejected from Anglo Persian.
Having dealt with Bahrain and Kuwait, the Duke of Devonshire next tackled the Sultan 
of Nejd. He wrote the Acting Resident that he was now “not satisfied that it is either 
possible or desirable to maintain so strong a line of resistance to the claims of 
E&GSynd” as he was “first inclined to adopt”. He was no longer convinced by the 
Political Officers' accusations, as he had now learned that “Major Holmes has not, in 
fact, overstepped the bounds of legitimate commercial competition”.
Obviously with Edmund Davis' letter in mind, the Duke of Devonshire confided that the 
government's majority shareholding in Anglo Persian “makes me anxious to avoid” any 
line of action which might be “represented” as a “championship” of that company 
“based on motives of direct financial interest”. "In view of all the circumstances", he 
said, he now agreed to Holmes being granted a joint concession over the Neutral Zone 
by the Sultan of Nejd and the Shaikh of Kuwait. The Duke said he had “reconsidered 
the whole situation” and had concluded “it is not desirable” for the Political Resident to 
take any action which might “have the effect of causing the Sultan to cancel the A1 
Hasa concession” granted by him to Holmes. He had, he said, been "informed" that the 
syndicate were at present “engaged in negotiation with another company for working 
the Nejd Concession” so cooperation with the D’Arcy Exploration Company may no 
longer be “a matter of immediate importance”. 27
27 Chisholm, reprinted in full page 99-103. September 6th 1923, The Duke o f Devonshire, Secretary of 
State, Colonial Office to the Acting Political Resident (Knox) in the Persian Gulf
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The Duke of Devonshire’s cryptic reference to E&GSynd being “engaged in negotiation 
with another company" for working the Nejd Concession, did have a factual basis. Soon 
after Holmes’ arrival back in England, the syndicate had held talks with the only 
company capable of facing down Anglo Persian in the Persian G ulf- Burma Oil. As the 
Duke of Devonshire's letter shows, by judiciously leaking the fact that E&GSynd and 
Burma Oil were in discussion, Anglo Persian's power to monopolise the Persian Gulf 
was undermined in the eyes of many Whitehall officials.
Holmes had referred to the possibility of working with Burma during a friendly visit to 
one of his contacts at the Department of Overseas Trade, who had predicably forwarded 
this snippet to both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. To the Department of 
Overseas Trade, Holmes had floated the possibility that development of the A1 Hasa 
Concession might be financed by "20% of the shares held by Bin Saud, who cannot 
dispose of them until he has offered them to the Syndicate, 41% to the Burma Oil 
Company and 39% to the Eastern & General Syndicate”.28
Regardless of whether or not it was ever seriously intended to bring Burma Oil into the 
A1 Hasa Concession, E&GSynd continued independently towards registering the new 
company and also finalising arrangements for a team of geologists to travel to the Gulf. 
Rather than getting away in mid September, Holmes was still in London in November 
waiting, as he wrote Rihani, for Bin Saud to decide whether or not he would take up the 
additional shares. Holmes explained to Rihani that, if Bin Saud chose to renounce his 
right to the additional 20% of shares, E&GSynd could then sell them on the London 
market, “the proceeds of which will of course be utilised as working capital no matter 
whether proclaimed by the Sultan or the London people”. Meanwhile, so that he could 
get started “at once” on the A1 Hasa exploration work, the syndicate was now forming 
an exploration company with capital of “about sterling 100,000. But this Exploration 
Company will not have the right to remove ANY oil, either for sale or otherwise, from 
the A1 Hasa territory”.29
The Duke of Devonshire, with his insistence on payment by royalty, may have been 
surprised by the understanding of modem business displayed by the Shaikhs of the
28 Sampson page 70-71 Burma Oil still held 23% of Anglo Persian; PRO/FO 371/8944, August 2nd 1923, 
Personal & Confidential, Cecil C. Farrer, Department of Overseas Trade to Mallett at the Foreign Office, 
in reporting E&GSynd’s discussions with Burma Oil, Farrer also refers to “the ruling fear of the Arabs, 
under Persian inspiration, is o f economic penetration by HMG under guise o f Anglo Persian in which, they 
well know, HMG has a controlling interest. The personality of Sir A T Wilson is also cordially detested by 
the Gulf Arabs.” Mallett notes Farrer “has already written to the Colonial Office in the same sense”
29 Rihani papers, October 17th 1923 Holmes in London to Rihani in Lebanon “whether or not he would 
take up the additional shares”; November 22nd 1923 Holmes to Rihani “so we can get started at once on 
Hasa”
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Persian Gulf. As Holmes was departing London on December 20th 1923, en route to the 
Gulf, an advertisement appeared in the Arabic version of the Times o f Mesopotamia 
regarding The Nejd Oil Company. It read:
“It is announced to the natives of Nejd resident in Iraq, India and 
the Persian Gulf that His Highness the Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies 
has granted an oil concession, in the districts of A1 Hasa and Katif an 
Ainain, to the Eastern & General Syndicate and, as the company is now 
issuing 300,000 shares of sterling pounds one each, it has been decided that 
3, that is 60,000 shares, shall be allotted to the Sultan personally and 
another 3, that is 60,000, shall be allotted among his subjects resident in 
Nejd and its neighbourhood and Iraq, Syria, Hedjaz and all other countries.
And as the conditions of this concession are the most favourable 
conditions which up to date Governments have obtained, His Highness the 
Sultan is especially anxious that natives of Nejd should have full 
opportunity of joining in this important and useful enterprise. Notice is 
now given that, whoever wishes to take up the shares now offered, should 
forthwith register his name and pay cash to the Eastern Bank. We do not 
think that natives of Nejd, who are famous for their quickness to learn, and 
desiring to progress special advantages for their country, will abstain from 
subscribing. Nor do we think that they will be slow to take this 
opportunity. The remaining shares will be distributed shortly. God is the 
giver of health and property. Signed: Abdullah Sayed, Representative of 
His Highness the Sultan.”
Arnold Wilson forwarded a translation of the advertisement to Lieutenant Colonel 
Trevor, the permanent Political Resident now returned from vacation. In high dudgeon 
Wilson commented scathingly: “I have ascertained that the Eastern Bank have only 
received one enquiry since the publication of this notice, and that only a casual one on 
the telephone. The manager has received no instructions with regard to receiving 
allotments. In fact, no communication whatsoever from the Tfew Company' and, until 
he does so, no application to the Bank will be entertained. I enclose three spare copies 
of this letter and enclosure, in case you may wish to send copies to Kuwait and Bahrain 
who may be interested. The publication of a notice of this sort in England, or India, 
would I believe render the company liable to prosecution!”30
■*0 IOL/R/15/5/237 V o l.ll, December 22nd 1923, Arnold Wilson to Resident (Trevor) attaching 
translation of Times o f Mesopotamia advertisement
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Although it was almost six months since the Duke of Devonshire had authorised the 
granting of a joint concession in the Neutral Zone to Holmes, Government of India 
Officials in the Gulf had not passed on this important Colonial Office decision. When 
the Political Agent Kuwait became aware Holmes was expected soon from London, he 
wrote the Resident enquiring “should I now tell the Shaikh there is no objection to his 
giving a joint concession with Bin Saud in the common territory?”
In Bahrain, Major Daly, the Political Agent had as usual, read a letter written by Shaikh 
Hamad to Holmes as it passed through the postal system. Hamad had stated in no 
uncertain terms that he would not give “any concession” to Anglo Persian because it 
was “common knowledge” that the government had “large share interests” in that 
company “which contains ex Government officials”; he wondered whether government 
could be “unbiased and neutral arbitrators” in protecting his interests. Daly took 
personal offence at this criticism of the Political Officers and Anglo Persian staff. Not 
at all disturbed by revealing that he knew the contents of the Shaikh’s private 
correspondence, he tackled the Ruler of Bahrain. Grandly, he rebuked Shaikh Hamad 
telling him it was “unnecessary” to “give his views” to Holmes. It was “sufficient”, he 
said, to state only that he “had received no further application from Anglo Persian”.
Unexpectedly for Daly, his dressing down provoked a heated response from the usually 
mild mannered Hamad. He told Daly the people of Bahrain believed that the 
Government of India deposed his father, Shaikh Isa, because he had given a concession 
to a company other than Anglo Persian “which all Arabs regard as Government pure 
and simple”. He said that if he (Hamad) now gave in to the pressure being exerted on 
him to agree to Anglo Persian having the concession, he would be accused “by the 
whole family as well as other Arab Rulers” of having “sold his country in return for 
being made Shaikh”.
Major Daly soon discovered that Shaikh Hamad was correct in his reporting of public 
opinion in Bahrain. The people also believed that Bin Saud’s agent and friend, Abdulla 
Gosaibi, “would not have been deported from Bahrain if Bin Saud had given his 
concession to Anglo Persian” rather than to Holmes. Shaikh Hamad very clearly 
understood the current position as being that opposition to Holmes’ application would 
be withdrawn in London if Anglo Persian failed to clinch a deal in the near future. 
“There is no doubt that Hamad has quite made up his mind to refuse to deal at all with 
Anglo Persian”, Daly reported to the Resident.31
IOL/R715/5/237 Vol . l l ,  February 28th 1924, Political Agent Kuwait (More) to Resident (Trevor) 
"should I now tell the Shaikh?"; Rihani papers April 4th 1924 Holmes in Kuwait to Rihani "enclosing
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Conclusion
The Shaikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait, and the Sultan of Nejd, refused to bow to pressure 
from the Government of India and the Political Officers to drop Frank Holmes and 
E&GSynd and sign agreements with Anglo Persian. In refusing to sign with Anglo 
Persian the Shaikhs were, for the first time since World War One, testing their freedom 
to act within their own territories.
That their independence was severely curtailed in most issues was made clear to all the 
Arab shaikhdoms by the ease with which the Government of India had severed Kuwait’s 
territory, removed the Ruler of Bahrain, deported individuals and threatened to 
disinherit the whole A1 Khalifa ruling family.
By insisting that oil concessions were purely commercial transactions, to be awarded on 
commercial merit only, the Shaikhs hoped to avoid invoking the retaliation of the 
Government of India with her gunboats and Sikh platoons. While the Government of 
India viewed any transaction with the Arab Shaikhs not under her direct control as 
political interference, the Colonial Office initially accepted that the granting and 
proposed development of oil concessions were business dealings. The Colonial Office, 
however, remained constricted by the terms of the agreement reached at Churchill’s 
1921 Cairo Conference that gave authority to the Government of India for administering 
the Persian Gulf in everything, except matters of “political significance”.
The Duke of Devonshire at the Colonial Office came to suspect that he may have been 
misled about Frank Holmes’ activities and “reconsidered the whole situation”, although 
his adjudication can be read as favouring Anglo Persian. Nevertheless, mindful of 
British public opinion -  and the delicate position of the British Government as the 
major shareholder in Anglo Persian -  the Colonial Office did not use its overriding 
authority for policy in the Persian Gulf to support the Government of India by forcing 
the Shaikhs into a liaison with the Anglo Persian Oil Company. The situation became 
one of the Colonial Office acting as middleman between the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company, championed by the Government of India, on the one hand and Frank Holmes 
and the Eastern & General Syndicate, backed by the Shaikhs, on the other.
translation o f  a letter from Shaikh Hamad Bahrain. You will see that he says straight out he will not have 
anything to do Anglo Persian"; IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989, March 17th 1924 Political Agent Bahrain (Daly) to 
Resident (Trevor) “unnecessary to give his views” and “sold his country” and “would not have been 
deported” and “quite made up his mind to refuse”
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SECTION TWO 
The Struggle
Chapter Six
The Model
1924-1925
Introduction
As the negotiations and development of the oil concessions in Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia were affected by regional factors external to those areas, it is necessary to 
record what was happening in neighbouring Iraq, and Persia, and to a lesser extent Assir 
and Yemen. Other influential factors included the campaign to capture Mecca launched 
by Abdul Aziz Bin Saud and his Ikhwan warriors that was waged alongside the 
intensifying civil war between Assir and Yemen.
Iraq’s grant of its oil concession to Turkish Petroleum dashed Holmes’ hopes of 
obtaining a concession in Iraq. As will be seen, this, coupled with the financial 
reorganisation of the Eastern & General Syndicate following divestment by its chairman 
and chief investor, and Arnold Heims' negative geological report, plunged the syndicate 
into a cash flow crisis. Holmes undertook a number of civil engineering projects, 
including a successful program of drilling for artesian water in Kuwait and Bahrain -  
thereby earning the distinction of being the first person to produce drinkable water in 
what was previously believed to be a totally arid area.
It will be argued that Britain’s dominance of Iraq’s oil was achieved through a series of 
political moves that included intimidation of Iraq’s Constitutional Assembly, pressure 
to sign the Anglo Iraq Treaty with all its British created clauses, a “British Nationality” 
clause in the regulations governing Iraqi oil concessions, and 50% of Turkish Petroleum 
being held by British interests. Some, if not all, of these factors became models for 
attempts at similar British dominance in the oil concessions of the Arab shaikhdoms.
The focus on Iraq’s oil, and Britain’s insistence on ensuring its own dominance, caused 
Persia to realise the true value of its oil fields. The Persians took a closer look at what 
benefits they were receiving from this resource, an exercise that immediately raised 
domestic discontent and anti-imperial movements aimed at the 51% British 
Government owned Anglo Persian Oil Company.
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Ramifications from both Iraq and Persia were felt right throughout the Persian Gulf and 
served to strengthen the Shaikhs’ resolve not to enter into liaison with the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company. Illustrating the attitudes of the time that frequently spilled over into a 
contempt for the “Eastern Mind”, felt by many Europeans in the Persian Gulf, Anglo 
Persian, with the assistance of the Government of India’s Political Officers, ventured 
into espionage and attempted bribery in an effort to block Frank Holmes before the 
expiry of their “priority” exclusive negotiating period.
Iraq Oil: March 1924
As well as the concessions in the Arabian Peninsula, Frank Holmes was vying for the 
upcoming oil concessions of Iraq. He arrived in Baghdad before the Constitutional 
Assembly of Iraq opened on March 27th 1924 with its primary duty being consideration 
of the Anglo Iraq Treaty through which future relations between Britain and the new 
state were to be governed. The treaty contained a clause requiring Iraq to honour 
pledges made by Britain in all agreements and treaties she had previously signed, as the 
Mandatory Power, on Iraq’s behalf. Once Iraq signed this treaty it would be required to 
accept the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company’s (TPC) claims -  and also accept 
the “advice” of the High Commissioner to award Iraq’s oil rights to TPC. By 1924, 
Turkish Petroleum was 50% British (this was Anglo Persian 25% and the now British 
Royal Dutch Shell 25%) and 25% French; through efforts initiated by then US Secretary 
of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Britain and France had been forced to grant a 25% 
interest to combined American participation.1
That Iraq had a wealth of oil reserves was never in doubt. As early as 1920, while there 
was still strong argument about the form the future government of Iraq would take, 
British officials, including Prime Minister Lloyd George, had factored in anticipated 
income from oil in calculating the cost of administering the mandate of Iraq. The form 
of government now being developed was an Arab one, eventually to replace the British 
mandate, and therefore the cost of administration would fall on the new Iraq
1 Shwadran page 204 At the commencement of World War One, the Royal Dutch Shell submitted to 
British control in order to continue to operate on the high seas, company manager Henry Deterding 
became a British subject and the company’s headquarters moved from the Hague to London Deterding 
was knighted in 1920 for his services to the British Empire; For in depth background to the Iraq 
concessions, and American participation, see Shwadran pages 193-265 and page 209 “Hoover took it upon 
himself to invite the big American oil companies to Washington to interest them in Mesopotamian oil and 
work out a plan of action”
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Government and not Britain. Nevertheless, it seemed, the British were not about to let 
the prospect of substantial oil profit slip from their grasp.2
Holmes did have contacts in Baghdad. As usual, his relations were stronger among the 
Arabs themselves than with the British officials who were “advising” the Iraq 
Government. Rihani was doing his best to support Holmes’ endeavours and wrote 
telling him that “His Excellency, Ja’far Pasha, (Iraq Ministry of Finance) has written me 
saying you have been to see him and that he did what he could for you. The rest, he 
said, is for the High Commissioner and yourself to settle. I think he mentioned London 
also. I hope you scoop up something in Iraq too".
In India, Dickson was also hoping Holmes would do well. He wrote to Philby, who was 
already looking tenuous in his position as British Adviser in Amman: “Holmes has been 
knocking about the Gulf for sometime ... the A1 Hasa concession is through and Holmes 
has, I believe, every intention of starting work before long ... How would you like to 
offer our services to Holmes’ company as go between him and Bin Saud, a sort of 
resident political officer to the Nejd petroleum company with headquarters at Hofuf or 
Qatif... I gather great things are expected of the concern ... Holmes is now in Baghdad 
... with you as Chief Administrator political and 1 as your second string ...” 3
From Baghdad, Holmes travelled down the Gulf to organise the survey that Swiss 
geologist Arnold Heim was to lead. As Holmes told Rihani, he "saw Bin Saud and 
stayed at Hofuf for ten days ... I arranged all my business with him and bought sixty 
camels for the engineers to make their inspection trip". He moved on to Bahrain where 
he and the permanent Resident, Lieutenant Colonel Trevor, met for the first time. 
Trevor reported this meeting to the Duke of Devonshire saying, in his view, Holmes 
"appeared to be quite frank and above board”. Trevor said Holmes “impressed me 
favourably by his frank demeanour and his apparent desire to have all his cards on the 
table. Perhaps he is a bluffer but he did not strike me as one”. Trevor now proved to be 
more amenable than had Knox during his six-month assignment as Acting Resident.4
Holmes raised the subject of Qatar, where he had planned to negotiate for a concession 
in 1922, after A1 Hasa. He told Trevor he had recently received “special messengers”
2 Shwadran page 239n March 25th 1920 The Times o f London commented that Lloyd George seemed to 
think the oil would pay the cost o f administration “we doubt it, for oil profits generally seem to find their 
way by some invisible pipeline into private pockets”
3 Rihani papers March 10th 1924, Rihani in Lebanon to Holmes in Baghdad “scoop up something in Iraq”; 
Philby papers X V I1-6, February 13th 1924, Dickson in India to Philby in Amman “offer our services to 
Holmes”
4 IOL/L/PS/10 Vol 989, March 20th 1924, enclosed with letter o f March 28th: Political Resident (Trevor) 
to Secretary o f State Colonial Office (Duke of Devonshire) Note of an interview with Major Holmes, 
representative of the Eastern & General Syndicate “impressed me favourably”
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and a personal letter from Shaikh Abdulla A1 Thani of Qatar “imploring him” to come 
across and make an arrangement on the same terms Holmes had given for A1 Hasa. 
Holmes pointed out he was unable to act on Shaikh Abdulla’s request because he had 
been “instructed by the Colonial Office” not to make an agreement with the Shaikh of 
Qater and he was “loyally obeying” this instruction. Trevor told the Duke of Devonshire 
he had confirmed, after “making some enquiries” in Bahrain, that “the Shaikh of that 
place (Qatar) was very keen, on financial grounds to give a concession, but not to Anglo 
Persian, for similar reasons to those actuating Shaikh Hamad”.
Trevor agreed with Holmes that he would, finally, now inform the Shaikh of Kuwait he 
was free to grant to Holmes the Neutral Zone concession jointly with Bin Saud. There 
was the matter of the boundaries of the Neutral Zone. In his October directive, the Duke 
of Devonshire had remarked: "I observe that E&GSynd appear to consider that a large 
part of the actual territory of Kuwait is within the Neutral Zone." Holmes had puzzled 
over the Duke’s remark and had compared his own map with that on file at the Baghdad 
Map Office. As far as he could see there was no difference. He had taken the two maps 
to Sir Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner in Iraq, who also could not see any 
difference between Holmes’ map and that on file. The Resident could not see any 
difference either. The Duke of Devonshire, it seems, had not caught up with the fact 
that, since Sir Percy Cox's virtuoso performance twelve months earlier at Ujair, a large 
part of the actual territory of Kuwait was indeed now within the Neutral Zone.5
Anglo Persian “priority” defined: April-May 1924
Trevor’s meeting with Holmes, and his recognition of the “very determined opposition” 
to Anglo Persian, provided an insight into the true situation prevailing in the 
shaikhdoms. Trevor remarked that a year ago, before he went on leave, he had not 
noticed such hostility towards Anglo Persian “but it is very prominent now”. Like Knox 
before him, Trevor did not make the connection between this opposition and the way in 
which the Shaikhs of the area had been treated during the preceding twelve months.
He did point out that “any ill-wishers of the British, or of Anglo Persian, never lose an 
opportunity of impressing upon their hearers that it is a government concern and that to 
grant a concession to this company is tantamount to giving it to Government”. But he
5 IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989, October 1923, Duke of Devonshire, Secretary o f State Colonial Office to Political 
Resident (Knox) “...E&GSynd have submitted to me a draft from which 1 observe they appear to consider 
a large part of the actual territory of Kuwait is within the Neutral Zone...”
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did not explore why this possibility was so odious to the Arabs, even though he thought 
the hostility might be related to the “considerable number of ex-military and ex- 
Mesopotamian political officers having been imported into Anglo Persian”.
Nevertheless, Trevor reported objectively, this was the current position. He advised that 
a decision was required as to whether “we should keep the matter undecided for an 
indefinite period in the interests of Anglo Persian” or whether “we should agree to the 
Shaikhs of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar closing with the offer of E&GSynd”. For the first 
time in official reports coming from the Persian Gulf, Trevor raised the injustice of the 
situation saying, “it hardly seems fair to prevent them from granting the concessions 
and consequently from receiving the revenue therefrom for an indefinite period”. He 
said, “the principal object of Anglo Persian ... is to prevent other companies from 
coming in. Their object will be achieved if they simply wait and do not press for the 
concessions themselves”. Trevor was concerned, he said, for the “the interests of the 
Shaikhs”. It would seem fairer “if Anglo Persian, as the company first in the field, were 
requested to send an official to negotiate with the various Shaikhs within a specified 
time”. If their offer is then definitely refused, “we should authorise E&GSynd to 
conclude its concessions with the Shaikhs concerned”, he advised.6
To witness the granting of the Neutral Zone concession on his behalf, Bin Saud sent to 
Kuwait his representatives, all friends of Holmes, including Hashem Bin Ahmad, Dr 
Abdullah Damlouji and Shaikh Hafez al Wahba. Though making little effort himself 
towards reaching agreement with the Shaikh of Kuwait (or any of the other Shaikhs) 
Arnold Wilson was still keeping track of Holmes. On the day Bin Saud’s representatives 
arrived, Wilson cabled the Kuwait Political Agent “let me know as soon as you can 
what the present position is between the Shaikh of Kuwait and Major Holmes”. 
Obligingly, Major More responded, “so far as I know Shaikh has not yet actually signed 
joint concession but I believe he has promised to do so. Holmes is leaving as soon as 
this is signed”.
The prospecting party, on its sixty camels and with a 25 man escort provided by Bin 
Saud, finally departed from Kuwait on April 28th for what the Resident described as a 
“preliminary survey in Nejd, Kuwait Neutral Zone and Al Hasa”. Soon after, the 
Colonial Office did take note of the Resident’s advice and officially informed Anglo 
Persian that its “claims to priority” would be recognised only until the end of March
6 IOL/L/PS/10 Vol 989, March 28th 1924 Resident (Trevor) to Secretary o f State for the Colonies, re 
Anglo Persian’s desire to obtain concessions from the Shaikhs on the Arabian littoral o f the Gulf, “hardly 
seems fair to prevent them from granting the concessions”
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1925. If they failed to reach agreement by that date, the Shaikhs would be free to 
negotiate concessions with other “approved” parties, meaning E&GSynd.7
Water search begins
Holmes was already certain he knew where the oil would be found; he had identified 
this on the maps he drew for A1 Hasa, Bahrain, the Neutral Zone and Kuwait before he 
began negotiating for the concessions. What was obvious to Holmes was that, to carry 
through his plans for developing the oil fields, he needed a constant supply of water, 
both for the drills and machinery and for the men working them. As he had told 
Dickson, Holmes thought an “enormous volume of sweet water” existed in the 
hinterland behind the Qatif oasis in A1 Hasa. Consequently, his instructions to the Swiss 
prospecting party were as much concerned with confirming his identification of the 
sources of water as they were with verifying the oil strength of his concessions.
Like Holmes, Dr Arnold Heim also clearly understood this basic need and would later 
remind the directors of E&GSynd that “drilling on oil in countries off from the rivers is 
impossible without the right for drilling on water”. Heim agreed completely with 
Holmes’ original assessment that water prospects in A1 Hasa were good. In his 
preliminary “report on water and oil” to the London office of E&GSynd, Heim said he 
thought “part of the A1 Hasa Concession might become a great country for drilling on 
artesian water”. Holmes had impressed on him that “the question of drilling for water 
on Bahrain is of great importance”. He and Holmes were “acting in perfect 
understanding”, he wrote, adding that Holmes’ directions were that “it will be to the 
Syndicate’s interest if I fill in the time until the next ship to Kuweit in examining and 
reporting on this question of water in Bahrain”. This was certainly a matter of vital
7 Rihani papers April 4th 1924, Holmes in Kuwait to Rihani “Bin Saud sent his representatives”; 
IOL/R/15/5/237 Vol l 1, April 4th 1924, Telegram Wilson to Political Agent Kuwait (More) “let me know 
as soon as you can”; IOL/R/15/5/237 Vol 11, April 7th 1924, Telegram Resident (Trevor) to Political 
Agent Kuwait “...the party may be allowed to start provided HMG have not broken off relations with Ibn 
Sa’ud...” Political Agent reply April 29th 1924 “The Prospecting Party left here on 28th April 
accompanied by a representative of Ibn Sa’ud. The Shaikh agrees that they will be quite safe ”; 
IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989 May 16th 1924, Telegram Resident (Trevor) to Secretary of State for the Colonies 
“if failed to successfully reach agreement by that date”; Note that this attitude was gaining adherents 
among officials in London. See IOL/L/PS/IO Vol 989, July 16th 1924, Political Department/Secret/ 
Persian Gulf Oil attitude of the Shaikhs to Anglo Persian “(The Arab’s) view is Anglo Persian and 
Government are in effect one and the same... reinforced by...many officers formerly known to them as 
officials o f Government now met in the shape of officials o f Anglo Persian -  a transformation which 
curiously enough does not seem so suspicious to the Persians as to the Arabs... whether it is fair to the 
Shaikhs to keep them waiting for possible profits they might get from E&GSynd if they won't deal with 
Anglo Persian is, as Colonel Pryor points out, a question that needs decision...Holmes impressed Trevor 
face to face as eminently open and honest”
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importance for Holmes, who had already raised with both Shaikh Hamad and the
8Political Agent the possibility of finding ‘sweet’ water for the people of Bahrain.
For some years Bahrain had suffered from interruption to the supply of fresh water. This 
was gathered mostly from under sea springs and could be both salt contaminated and 
difficult to harvest in poor weather. In 1922, the Political Agent had reported “the town 
is in urgent need of water supply. At present all drinking water is brought in from a long 
distance at high cost.” And again, in 1923, he commented, “Shaikh Hamad is desirous 
of introducing a water supply”. Since his First talks with Hamad, Holmes had assured 
him that, although he would be drilling for oil, he could indeed produce water. Now 
they agreed that Holmes should produce water first, oil later. This would also allow the 
time to pass that the Colonial Office had allotted to Anglo Persian for its exclusive 
negotiations. Together, Shaikh Hamad and Holmes made an arrangement with the 
Political Agent, Major Daly, that for his work finding fresh water, Holmes would obtain 
“certain reports and maps which otherwise would be unobtainable”. 8 9
Anglo Iraq Treaty signed: June 1924
Holmes returned to Baghdad to organise the equipment for water drilling and to follow 
up on his bid to obtain a concession. He had applied for oil rights “dealing with the 
whole of Iraq”. He was certain his terms were “very favourably received” by the Iraq 
Government and had heard that “90% of the Government” was “with me”. Despite the 
“full force” of the High Commissioner (Dobbs) being behind the Turkish Petroleum 
Company, Holmes told Rihani, the Iraq Government had not awarded the concession to 
TPC. For a marathon eight months the members of the Iraq Government resisted 
pressure from the High Commissioner and the TPC; they had then announced their 
intention to delineate several concession areas, rather than one monopoly.
Consequently, in the lead up to the sessions of the Constitutional Assembly that opened 
in March, British reaction had included a propaganda campaign warning that, if the 
Anglo Iraq Treaty was not signed, the British Government intended to withdraw from 
Iraq and, furthermore, would not support the Iraq Government in its claim for Mosul.
8 Heim papers, November 2nd 1924, from Heim in Zurich to Holmes in London , after Heim’s trip to the 
Gulf, reporting on his meeting with E&GSynd directors “for drilling on artesian water” and June 10th 
1924, Heim in Bahrain to E&GSynd
9 Administrative Report of Bahrain for the Year 1922, and for 1923 (Daly) “urgent need o f water” and 
“desirous of introducing a water supply”; Rihani papers, June 3rd 1924, Holmes in Basra to Rihani 
“certain reports and maps”
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Covering all possible outcomes, Arnold Wilson had gone to Constantinople armed with 
“a pre-war letter addressed to Turkish Petroleum by a pre-war Prime Minister of Turkey 
in which is stated that Turkey was willing to grant a concession to the Turkish 
Petroleum Company provided suitable terms could be arranged covering Mosul and 
Baghdad vilayets”.
From the Iraqi viewpoint, Holmes wrote Rihani, the only conclusion to be drawn was 
that Anglo Persian Oil Company, through the person of Arnold Wilson, was “quite 
willing to sell out the Iraq Government” and support the awarding of Mosul to Turkey, 
rather than to Iraq, “provided Anglo Persian gets the oil rights of any territory handed 
over to the Turks”. Anything Anglo Persian now obtained from the Turks would “only 
be at the expense of Iraq”, he said. In disgust, Holmes commented, “truly as unclean a 
deal as I have ever heard of and supported by the British Government at that”.10
Holmes had supplied bank references to the Iraq Government giving E&GSynd’s 
financial status as “from immediate 5,000,000 sterling to drawing power of 15,000,000 
sterling”. It was also self evident, Holmes wrote, that E&GSynd “offer liberal terms and 
are free from political bias”. He added, “I am fairly certain that if this Anglo Iraq Treaty 
is not signed in its present form I will secure the concession”. He firmly believed “the 
Iraq Government are quite prepared to give me the Iraq oil concession, provided they 
have a free hand”.
The very next week, on June 11th 1924, when only 69 of the 100 delegates were 
present, the Constitutional Assembly approved the Anglo Iraq Treaty by a vote of 37 for 
and 24 against with eight abstentions. On the boundary with Turkey the Assembly’s 
resolution affirming the treaty declared: “This Treaty and its subsidiary agreements 
shall become null and void if the British Government fail to safeguard the rights of Iraq 
in the Mosul vilayet in its entirety.”11
By the end of July Arnold Heim had handed in his geological report to the directors of 
E&GSynd. From his discussions with Heim in Bahrain, and again in Baghdad as he 
passed through on the way to London, Holmes already knew Heim's negative opinion on 
the oil possibilities of the concession areas was totally opposed to his own positive
10 Rihani papers, June 3rd 1924, Holmes in Basra to Rihani. Though expressing disgust at the action o f  
Wilson and APOC in approaching the Turks, Holmes was not above suggesting that Rihani “write to one 
or two o f  your influential Turkish friends and lay my case before them so that it would find its way before 
the Turkish Minister and hold up Anglo Persian until I could reach Constantinople”. Holmes would then 
let the Turkish Government know E&GSynd “are prepared to offer better terms for any territory over 
which they wish to grant oil concessions”. Once the Turks were aware that better terms were available, he 
told Rihani, “they will delay matters and give me a chance to apply for both the territory north o f  Mosul 
and any territory they may secure in the Mosul area”
11 See Shwadran, page 236 “when only 69 o f  the 100 delegates were present”
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findings. He was concerned that, after the syndicate read Heim's deeply pessimistic 
report, combined with the doubt now on Iraq, they might baulk at committing the level 
of financing previously planned.
After all, Arnold Heim had been hired to present his internationally acclaimed "expert" 
recommendation. All along Holmes had been alone in his conviction that Nejd, and 
Hasa in particular, Bahrain and Kuwait did indeed hide very rich oil deposits. Anglo 
Persian did not think so. Neither did Bin Saud. Now the expert that the syndicate had 
hired to give an independent opinion did not think so either.
Persia rethinks Anglo Persian’s terms
As E&GSynd in London were digesting Arnold Heim’s report, the Shaikh of Kuwait 
was being treated to a VIP visit to Anglo Persian’s operations. He was personally 
escorted to the oilfields, and around the Abadan refinery by General Manager T L Jacks, 
who now shared this title jointly with Arnold Wilson. The company believed the 
Shaikh’s “first sight of such operations in actual progress” would so impress him that he 
would forget Holmes and immediately sign an agreement with them. Shaikh Ahmad,
however, remained unmoved. Anglo Persian was also trying to entice Shaikh Hamad of
12Bahrain to visit Persia, but he had not taken up the invitation.
Anglo Persian’s managers seemed unaware that the Shaikhs were fully informed on the 
situation between the oil company and the Persian Government. 1917 was the first year 
the company made a profit. From that year’s net profit of 344,109 sterling, Persia had 
been allocated a mere 3,829 as her share. However, the Persian Government did not get 
even this token payment. The company withheld the 3,829 against what it claimed as 
the cost of damage resulting from the cutting of pipeline by Persian tribesmen. Persia 
had no return from the overall profits of the company, receiving only a royalty on the 
sale price of oil exported from the country, some of it passing to the British military at a 
heavily subsidised rate.
Revenue gained from Persia’s oil was not reinvested in that country. For example, in 
1923, Anglo Persian used a substantial amount from its “General Reserve” to write off 
investments, outside Persia, that had already been abandoned. A second substantial
12 Chisholm page 11 “first sight of such operations”, in 1921 Wilson was appointed Managing Director in 
Persia, Mesopotamia and the Gulf o f Strick Scott & Co, Managing Agents o f Anglo Persian. From 1923 
he was General Manager of Anglo Persian, jointly with T L Jacks, at Abadan until his transfer in 1926 to 
head office in London
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amount went towards writing off other investments, also outside Persia, that were about 
to be abandoned. Together, these two write offs totalled ten times more than the 
payment Persia received for the year. The situation, as it existed in reality -  and was 
further amplified by anti Anglo Persian sentiments “kept at fever pitch by the sedulous 
activities of Persian agents with whom the Trucial States were over run” -  certainly 
would not have swayed the Shaikhs in favour of the company, no matter how impressed 
they may have been by the sight of operations. 13
Bin Saud’s Mecca Campaign begins
The Shaikhs of Kuwait and Bahrain were prevented from signing any oil concessions 
with Holmes for a further seven months, until the end of March 1925, by the Colonial 
Office ruling that Anglo Persian had a “priority”. Holmes’ anxiety that, after receiving 
Heim’s report, the E&GSynd directors may hesitate on advancing the A1 Hasa 
Concession was now overtaken by Bin Saud’s own diversion away from economic 
development to military matters. Tensions had increased after the Knox chaired Kuwait 
Conference had failed to settle the differences between Bin Saud and his neighbours, 
the Hijaz, Transjordan and Iraq. Bin Saud and his Wahhabi warriors began a series of 
campaigns around these borders that would culminate two years later with the capture 
of Mecca, the abdication of Sharif Husain and Bin Saud’s adoption of the title “King of 
the Hijaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies”.
Recognising the practical impossibility of drilling for oil in A1 Hasa while these 
conflicts raged, Holmes arranged for the sixty camels to be cared for in Hofuf and 
stored the tents and camping equipment in Bahrain. He wrote to Bin Saud, who was 
busy attacking the town of Ta'if, telling him he would bring the prospecting party out 
again the next year to work on the A1 Hasa Concession.14
13 See Shwadran pages 153-164, this inequality remained unchanged until 1933, for example in 1931, from 
a net profit of almost 2,500,000 sterling the Persian Government received a royalty o f 134,750. In 1934, 
the percentage of income in the Iranian Government’s budget derived from its oil, and Anglo Persian 
operations, was a minute 7%; PRO/FO 371/8944, August 2nd 1923 Farrer at Overseas Trade to Mallett at 
Foreign Office “sedulous activities of Persian agents”; Administrative Report Bahrain 1923 (Daly) “Persian 
residents in Bahrain who are responsible for anti-British propaganda in the Persian press, are persons o f no 
standing, who engage in this pastime apparently out of a desire for notoriety”
14 These campaigns included skirmishes (and intrusions) along the borders with Kuwait, Iraq and 
Transjordan. Bin Saud captured Ta’if in August 1924, Mecca capitulated on October 13th (following the 
October 3rd abdication of Sharif Husain) followed by Jedda and the remainder of the Hijaz in November 
1925; Heim papers, January 2nd 1925, Heim in Zurich to Holmes in Baghdad and September 24th 1924, 
Holmes in Kuwait to Heim in Zurich “one month ago I wrote Sultan Ibn Saud you were coming out again 
next year”
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Assir-Yemen Civil War: August 1924
With his hands full in A1 Hasa, Bahrain, Kuwait, and now Iraq, Holmes had left his bid 
for the Salif salt and Farasan oil concessions in the hands of E&GSynd’s Red Sea 
Representative, retired Commander C E V Craufurd, employed personally by Sir 
Edmund Davis, the syndicates’ own chairman and chief investor. Craufurd had spent 
the war patrolling up and down the Red Sea in command of HMS "Minto" and had 
accompanied Holmes to Aden in 1921 when they opened the syndicate’s first peninsula 
business, the English Pharmacy at Steamer Point. Taking him at his own word, Edmund 
Davis believed Craufurd had "considerable experience of dealing with Arabs and is 
persona grata with the Idrissi". Craufurd seems to have oversold himself in London. 
Although he did have good contacts among the British officials in Aden, he did not 
have equal contacts among the Arabs and he did not know the Idrissi, Ruler of Assir.
In fact Craufurd was, if not at the time then certainly later, a genuine eccentric. He 
became obsessed with locating the site of King Solomon's Mines. He eventually became 
convinced he had traced them to the port of Makalla, not too far from Aden. As late as 
1933 he was still delivering speeches in London with titles like "Treasure of the Lost 
Lands of Ophir".
Craufurd’s passion is raised here because in 1927, when American engineer Karl 
Twitchell arrived in Yemen on a mission for American philanthropist Charles Crane, 
Craufurd would infect him with a similar obsession for locating King Solomon’s Mines. 
Twitchell came to believe they were in Saudi Arabia. Twitchell’s search for gold in 
Saudi Arabia, his specious claim to have discovered the oil of Al Hasa, and he and 
Philby’s role in Standard Oil of California’s 1933 purchase of Holmes’ lapsed Al Hasa 
concession is referred to throughout this thesis. Unfortunately, space does not permit a 
fuller exposition of Twitchell’s role and claims.15
15 Prominent investors in E&GSynd were pharmaceutical manufacturers Allen & Hanburys, Holmes got 
"The English Pharmacy" up and running and the English pharmacist/manager reported to him. It was sold 
in 1925. PRO/CO/727/3, June 2nd 1921, Department o f Overseas Trade (Development & Intelligence) 
And PRO/R20/A2 A/96/10/1 contains a letter o f introduction on behalf o f Craufurd to the Idrissi from the 
Resident in Aden; Twitchell papers (uncatalogued), Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, personal 
diary for 1927 records Craufurd frequently calling on Twitchell, they spent Christmas Day 1927 together. 
Interesting also is March 15th 1967, Twitchell to Myles A Walsh NY, commenting on “Walsh’s book on 
Yemen”, “was surprised to see that the great Salif salt deposit was not mentioned. That is about the only 
commercial deposit I saw in the Yemen. In 1928 I made the Imam Yahia a fair proposal (for the Salif salt 
concession) on behalf of London friends but after some months o f consideration the Imam turned it down. 
Subsequently I learned that my Syrian interpreter advised the Imam against my proposal!!!”
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Since his last visit to Assir, in January 1923 to deliver armaments at the behest of the 
Colonial Office, Holmes had directed communications with the Idrissi by letters to 
Craufurd. This had not been a satisfactory arrangement. As Holmes remarked to Rihani 
in May, “Craufurd, our representative in Aden, has done nothing. He has wired me now 
that owing to the disturbed state of Assir nothing can be done until November.” 
Unexpectedly, in August, Mustafa al Idrissi in Hodeidah contacted Holmes in Baghdad 
offering to grant him the Salif Salt Concession for terms that included military supplies. 
When Holmes arrived in the Red Sea port, Mustafa’s revolt against his kinsman Ali al 
Idrissi, installed in Jizan, was already underway. Holmes found Mustafa focused on 
securing upfront the armament factor in the proposed terms but little interested in 
finalising the serious detail of the concessions.
On the assumption that, like Arnold Wilson with Iraq and Turkey, he should reach 
agreement with both contenders so that after the civil war he would be holding a valid 
agreement whoever proved victorious, Holmes moved on to meet with Ali. Negotiations 
here became a mirror image of those he had just had in Hodeidah. Ali offered Holmes 
both concessions, Salif Salt and Farasan, to be operative after the civil war. But both 
parties seemed more intent on getting hold of immediate supplies of ammunition, or 
cash with which to purchase this, than they were on concluding investment in their 
territories. Leaving the door open for further negotiations, Holmes told both Mustafa 
and Ali he would come back later, and returned to Baghdad.16
Kuwait water: September 1924
In September, Holmes successfully sank an experimental water well in Kuwait, the first 
on the Arabian Peninsula to tap into the artesian water sources. This success was 
particularly noteworthy because Anglo Persian’s managing agents, Strick Scott & Co, 
had previously constructed with great fanfare a water desalination plant in Kuwait. 
Unfortunately, it never worked. While on board ship back to London at the beginning of 
October, Holmes wrote Heim of this success.
Heim was ecstatic, even though Holmes had actually drilled where he thought, and not 
where Heim had recommended. “Excellent. The new well at Koweit! I suppose you
16 Rihani papers, May 25th 1924, Holmes in Baghdad to Rihani in Lebanon “disturbed state of Assir”; 
Baldry, page 86 in December 1925, Ali al-Idrissi was overthrown by another members o f this family, 
Hassan al-Idrissi. In 1926, after the surrender of Jedda and the remainder o f the Hijaz to Bin Saud and his 
Ikhwan warriors, Hassan al-Idrissi signed The Mecca Agreement with Bin Saud that placed the Assir 
under a virtual Saudi Protectorate. In 1930, the whole o f the Assir was officially annexed by Bin Saud
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would not mention it if the water would not be good. Thus a large new field will be 
opened”, he congratulated Holmes. “As you know, I would have commenced at Jahara 
where I thought the prospect of striking good water would have been less risk. The 
better of course if you have it even at Koweit!” he said. Still Heim could not resist 
offering his expert opinion: “Now you should make the next bore at Ujair where I think 
there is almost no risk! Then Jubail etc. If Iraq will be successful, what I hardly doubt, 
an immense field will be opened and a large Artesian Company (I would propose
17Artesian Orient Co.) should be floated.”
On the way to London Holmes had stopped in Baghdad. There he discussed with the 
Arab officials his ideas for possible artesian water projects. Even after signing the 
Anglo Iraq Treaty, the Iraq Government was continuing to employ delaying tactics in its 
talks with the representatives of the Turkish Petroleum Company. Holmes used the 
opportunity this presented to follow up on his own bids for the Iraq oil concessions. His 
meetings with Arab officials prompted the High Commissioner of Iraq, Sir Henry 
Dobbs, to contact London urging intervention on the grounds that “Major Holmes was 
making advances to King Faisal”. The Foreign Office received Dobb’s request, but 
curiously refused to act. They took the view that if the Iraq Government did not want 
Turkish Petroleum, “it will not be possible to force them to grant a concession to the 
Turkish Petroleum Company”.18
Bahrain water: January 1925
In London, Holmes recruited T George Madgwick. Madgwick's deceptive claim to have 
discovered Bahrain's oil is frequently repeated in the literature, and the part he played in 
alerting Thomas Ward and the Americans to Holmes' identification of Bahrain oil 
possibilities is important. Hence, Madgwick's role is given attention, as follows.
An engineer, at the time in a consulting partnership in London, during World War One 
Madgwick had been involved in the sinking of water wells in Gallipoli and Salonika for 
the Anzac Army. He also had experience as a petroleum engineer and had lectured in 
this field at Birmingham University. Without giving him further information about 
E&GSynd’s various prospects across the Persian Gulf, Holmes hired Madgwick to work 
only on the Bahrain water project. The documentation submitted for his visa application 
showed his qualifications and experience as that of a “water engineer”.
17 Heim papers, October 14th 1924, Heim in Zurich to Holmes in London “I propose Artesian Orient Co”
18 Ferrier page 586 “making advances to King Faisal” and cannot “force them”
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When Anglo Persian learned of the Bahrain water project, they demanded that the 
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, “instruct the Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf to prevent E&GSynd from beginning these operations". Madgwick arrived on 
January 1st 1925 to find the Resident had issued orders that he could not enter Bahrain. 
Madgwick later described his welcome: "I found my landing at all on the Islands hotly 
contested by Anglo Persian. The Resident had forbidden it, and it was only on the very 
active intervention by the Bahrain Political Agent that I was allowed ashore, more or 
less on sufferance."
The Colonial Office sent a sharp directive to Anglo Persian endorsing Holmes' boring of 
two artesian wells "on the opposite side of the island from that in which the presence of 
oil has been indicated".19
Anglo Persian employs Agent Provocateur
T L Jacks, Anglo Persian's joint general manager with Arnold Wilson in Abadan had 
been with the company in Persia since 1910. He now launched an extraordinary 
escapade involving the Government of India's Political Agent in Kuwait, Major More. 
Jacks’ proposal to More was that outright bribery of the officials surrounding the Rulers 
was the only sure way to get the Shaikhs to sign with Anglo Persian. In a letter marked 
“secret” written four days after the demand to the Colonial Office, Jacks put his scheme 
to Major More. “Holmes appears to keep himself in sympathy with the Advisers of the 
Shaikh of Kuwait, as also the Advisers of the Shaikh of Bahrain, by means of presents 
suitably distributed”, he alleged. Displaying the Orientalist view taken by many British 
in the Persian Gulf for the people among whom they lived and worked, Jacks told More, 
“and I fully realise the influence this action has on the Eastern Mind”.
Incongruously, he then repeated the view generally held by Anglo Persian personnel 
about the negligible prospects on the Arabian littoral by reminding More that the 
Bahrain and Kuwait concessions “when and if obtained are of little, if any, real value 
until costly geological examination followed by actual testing of certain areas has been 
carried out”. Nevertheless, Jacks had a reputation to uphold, and he wanted to get the 
Kuwait concession by fair means or foul. He now laid out a plan for getting it by foul. 
With his personal convictions about the workings of the “Eastern Mind”, Jacks seemed
19 Ward papers, Box 1, August 11th 1936, Madgwick in Canada to Ward in USA: “...my early experience 
in Bahrain...” IOL/ L/PS/10 Vol 989, December 15th 1924, H G.Nichols APOC London to Under 
Secretary o f State Colonial Office “prevent E&GSynd from beginning”; IOL/L/PS/10/989 January 3rd 
1925 Colonial Office (Amery) to APOC London “on the opposite side o f the island”
The Model 162
unable to conceive that Holmes could have achieved his success with the Shaikhs other 
than through corruption. “My own feeling in this matter is that the Advisers of the 
Shaikh of Kuwait will endeavour to hinder the Shaikh from actually granting the 
concession as long as there is any prospects of their getting further bribes from 
Holmes”, he charged.
Coming to the crux of the matter, Jacks put it to More that “it has occurred to me that, if 
we were definitely in a position to guarantee payment of suitable cash rewards 
immediately following the actual granting of a concession to us, we might successfully 
overcome the antagonism to Anglo Persian which has been worked up by Major 
Holme”. Assuming the Kuwait Political Agent would share his line of thinking, Jacks 
told Major More, “I should very greatly appreciate your views in this connection and an 
indication of what you consider would be the total amount of suitable rewards.”
More was very careful in his reply saying "I have no actual knowledge of Holmes giving 
any presents to anyone in Kuwait except the Shaikh himself'. Artfully, he went on, "if 
Holmes did give such presents he would not do so himself, but through some Arab 
agent". This was, said More, exactly what he "presumed" Jacks intended to do if he 
decided on "trying the plan". Almost apologetically, More added, "1 am afraid I cannot 
advise you as to the amount to give in such presents". Jacks already had the perfect 
candidate for the job. Neither he, nor More, would risk getting their hands dirty. He 
would send Hajji Abdullah Williamson. “1 have explained matters to him and I will let
you know if he is able to obtain information by back-door methods calculated to assist
20us”, Jacks promised.
In a confidential letter to the Resident towards the end of the month, Major More 
described Hajji Abdullah Williamson: “He is an Englishman bom in England who I 
believe ran away to sea as a boy. He led a roving life in America as an officer on an 
American whaling boat in the South Sea islands etc and finally gravitated to Aden some 
twenty five years ago.” The title “Hajji” and "Abdullah", More explained, resulted from 
his having “‘got religion’, as the British soldier calls it, and belonged to some queer sect 
or other, from which he became a Muslim, quite a genuine one 1 think, and has lived as 
an Arab ever since”.
Major More wrote that during the war, Williamson had volunteered “soon after we got 
to Basra and was used for intelligence, chiefly counter-espionage work all through the
20 IOL/R/15/5/238 Vol . l l l ,  December 19th 1924, Secret, Jacks at Abadan to Political Agent Kuwait 
(More) “Eastern Mind” and “total amount o f suitable rewards” and January 13th 1925, Jacks to More, 
“information by back door methods”
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war”. More did not need to spell out for the Resident the fact that Williamson was on a 
very similar mission right now, in Kuwait and Bahrain, while on the payroll of Anglo 
Persian.“1
Williamson arrived to Kuwait during a most unusual cold snap in which the 
temperature plummeted below freezing and snow fell. This, however, did not cool his 
enthusiasm for the job at hand. Within hours he was cabling Jacks, giving his contact 
address in Kuwait as “through the Political Agent” and reporting that Holmes was in 
Bahrain but expected shortly in Kuwait. “Letters have been received from him but I 
have been unable up to present to find out their substance but hope to get some 
information in a day or two”, he said.
He followed with a long report that began, “on my arrival here I found the whole of the 
leading class against the giving of the oil concession to Anglo Persian”. The rich pearl 
merchants, he said, were against the granting of the concession to anyone believing that 
if the fields were developed either at Kuwait or nearby “the pearl divers would be 
enabled to earn money between seasons and so get out of debt and command their own 
price for their labour”. The majority of Kuwaitis were against Anglo Persian and “for 
E&GSynd”, he said, on the grounds that “Anglo Persian is really the Government and as 
soon as they acquired the Kuwait oil concession they would take over Kuwait as a 
British Possession and, as in Bahrain, interfere with the liberty of the people”. 
Williamson’s response may not have soothed Kuwaiti fears as he told them “Bahrain 
was no criterion" because "it might happen anywhere when the Ruler was weak and his 
people divided that a strong Political Agent might take over the direction and 
government of the place ...”
Williamson coerced a servant of the Shaikh of Kuwait, who was being sent with letters 
from Shaikh Ahmad to Bin Saud in A1 Hasa, “to report carefully on all he can find out 
about Major Holmes and his movement in that part of the world”. He also managed 
“several conversations and interviews” with Mulla Saleh whom he convinced to write 
down what he thought were the objections to Anglo Persian. This, however, was not 
very enlightening as Saleh’s note amounted to the information that the Shaikh of 
Kuwait intended “delaying any decisions”.
21 IOL/R/15/5/238 V o l . l l l ,  January 27th 1925, Confidential, Political Agent Kuwait (More) to Resident 
(Prideaux) “chiefly counter espionage work”; For a very admiring, “Boy’s Own” style biography, see 
Hope, Stanton, Arabian Adventurer, the Story of Hajji Williamson, London: Robert Hale, 1951, page 325 
mentions Frank Holmes^-individual initiative in putting Arabia on the map as a great oil producing land” 
and says Holmes and Williamson “detested each other” adding “one imagines there would not have been 
room in the same desert for two such individualistic and forceful characters”; Does not mention this 1925 
mission for APOC although, page 328, he does refer to Williamson acting as “interpreter, translator and 
general factotum” to Archibald Chisholm in Kuwait in 1934
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Without giving any evidence, Williamson concluded that Saleh “has been promised 1% 
above all payments made to the Shaikh for himself and has already received a good 
present through Muhammad Yateem who he put up when he was here with Major 
Holmes”. It does not seem to have occurred to Williamson that this “good present” may 
have amounted to the equivalent of room and board, traditionally given when leaving a 
host home after an extended visit. While conceding that, in his terms for the Kuwait oil 
concession, “Holmes made larger promises and better offers" than Anglo Persian,
Williamson recommended to Jacks “a ‘grant’ of at least Rs5000 or perhaps Rs8000 to
22be given privately to Mulla Saleh”.
While they had no knowledge of the machinations in the Gulf involving the Kuwait 
Political Agent, Anglo Persian's general manager and the not so ex spy, the officials in 
London were watching developments. Prompted by a request from Anglo Persian for an 
extension of their “priority” period for the Kuwait negotiations, an inter department 
memorandum dated February 2nd 1925 was circulated. It recorded: “Up to the end of 
October Anglo Persian had made no progress in their negotiations with the Shaikh of 
Kuwait. They have been equally unsuccessful in Bahrain and it is quite clear that, 
innocent as may be the immediate plans of Major Holmes, E&GSynd stand to gain 
much influence with the Shaikh of Bahrain if the water wells are successfully sunk, and 
should have little difficulty in securing an oil concession after the expiry of Anglo 
Persian's claim to priority on 31st March."“
Meantime, Jacks, More and Williamson were doing their utmost to outflank Holmes, by 
any means, before the deadline expired. Sure now he had the trump card, Jacks cabled 
Major More on February 9th: “We have received sanction from London to pay Mulla 
Saleh 100 sterling down and 500 more if the Agreement is signed with us before March 
31st. We have therefore wired to Williamson who is now in Bahrain to return to Kuwait 
at once and report to you. Would you kindly convey this information to him? We send 
you herewith Rsl,500. Would you be good enough to hand it over to Williamson when 
he reports to you?”24
22 Dickson papers, Box 3/File 6, Kuwait Political Report 1925 ( More) “during the last 10 days of January 
the cold was intense the thermometer falling below freezing for several nights in succession -  and snow 
actually falling on one occasion”; IOL/R/15/5/238 Vol l 11, January 22nd 1925, Williamson in Kuwait to 
Jacks at Abadan “a strong Political Agent might take over” and “be given privately to Mulla Saleh”
23 See Chisholm page 12, as well as the time extension, Anglo Persian also requested the withdrawal of 
Colonial Office insistence that customs exemption in Kuwait be limited to ten years. Both requests were 
refused on March 24th; IOL/L/PS/10 Vol 989 February 2nd 1925, Minute, Secret, Political Department, 
Oil Concessions in the Persian Gulf - Kuwait and Bahrain “should have little difficulty”
24 IOL/R/15/5/238 Voll 11, February 9th 1925, Confidential, Jacks at Abadan to Political Agent Kuwait 
(More) “sanction from London to pay Mulla Saleh”
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While Williamson was snooping into his affairs in Kuwait, Bahrain and A1 Hasa, 
Holmes was once again in Aden, the Assir and Yemen. After he and Madgwick had 
located the sites for two water wells in Bahrain, and set up the drilling machines, 
Holmes returned to the Red Sea. Writing to Rihani from Jizan, he described the 
situation in the area as “awful chaos”. Again he discussed the two concessions. Again 
he found the focus on the supply of ammunition. It seemed to Holmes that Ali was 
trying to strike a deal with the Italians for the Farasan oil concession in return for 
ammunition. Ali did want to talk to Holmes about the salt concession, to be paid for in 
cash, but Holmes concluded that “this is out of his control now”. Ali had held his 
ground in Assir against the Mustafa led rebellion, but Holmes was not impressed. “I 
have not seen a man handle his country in a more disastrous manner than in my 
experience with Ali. It is really painful”, he confided to Rihani. Prophetically, Holmes 
reported the “general opinion” that Bin Saud would come and take “what remains of 
Ali's territory while the Imam Yahia will retain what he has recently conquered” in 
Yemen.25
Iraq signs with Turkish Petroleum: March 1925
On March 24th 1925, the Iraq Government signed an agreement with the Turkish 
Petroleum Company. Although this had actually been agreed in January, its passage 
through the Iraq Legislative Assembly was stormy. Two Ministers resigned in protest at 
the terms of the agreement.
In the deal originally reached at the San Remo Conference, there had been a clear 
stipulation that the State of Iraq would hold 20% participation in the concession. This 
was not included in the agreement put to the Legislative Assembly. Nor could Iraq 
achieve any return through mechanisms such as taxation; the oil company designed 
itself as “non profit making” through the device of selling the oil, to its own members, 
at cost price. This device left Iraq limited to a small royalty (four shillings per ton) 
calculated on the oil at extraction, for 20 years, to commence after the completion of
25 Holmes papers, February 13th 1925, Dorothy Holmes in England to Heim in Zurich; “My husband is 
somewhere in the neighbourhood of Aden 1 believe now... Things seem rather upset in that part of the 
world at the moment”; Rihani papers, March 29th 1925, Holmes in Jizan to Rihani in Lebanon “...I have 
been here more than a month ...the awful chaos that Ali has allowed to come about. He has driven 
everybody from his country who could be of any help to him. There only remains one or two slaves to 
whom he will listen. Imam Yahia and the tribes of Arabia have now driven him out of Yemen and he has 
lost the towns of Hodeidah, Salif Ibn Abbas, Lahaj and may possibly have to give up Nudi. Mustafa has 
gone back to Egypt” In April 1925 Holmes did get the Salif Salt Concession but, see Ward page 24 
“unfortunately the Salif salt business fell through due to the death of the Idrissi and nothing more was done 
about the salt concession”
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the pipeline. After 20 years, payment would be based on the market value of oil, but 
averaged over ten year periods.
Furthermore, the agreement the British reached with the Turks, on Iraq's behalf, decreed 
a 10% share to be paid to Turkey, not from the oil company, but from Iraq's paltry 
royalty on oil extracted from Mosul.
Any real benefit to Iraq was further excluded through the provision that the company 
must remain a British company registered in Great Britain with its chairman to be at all 
times a British subject. In order to ward off international criticism of British “oil 
grabbing” a vaguely worded sop was included allowing for the Iraq Government, after 
four years and in consultation with the company, to put up for public auction by sealed 
bids 24 concession plots of eight square miles each. (This would never happen).
T George Madgwick and Thomas Ward: July 1925
In Bahrain, Madgwick, assisted by two drillers, including one who brought his wife 
along for an exotic experience, were soldiering on with the water wells. Two days 
before expiry of Anglo Persian's privileged negotiating period, Madgwick reported to 
the Ruler of Bahrain: "On behalf of E&GSynd I have the honour to inform you that, in 
Well No.l, we have encountered the water bearing horizon ... I am confident that the 
source of this water can be tapped ... in the town of Manama itself and ... Muharraq ... 
there will be no difficulty in making each a self contained unit of distribution through 
the medium of a simple assemblage of taps.”
At this point, Madgwick's job was still concerned only with water. He was not in 
Holmes' confidence as to the location or plans for his Bahrain oil concession But when 
the Anglo Persian priority period expired, Madgwick realised that E&GSynd had
26 Heim papers, February 17th 1925, Heim in Zurich to Holmes in Aden, “E&GSynd told me on Jan 21st 
that according to your news the Iraq Government has granted the oil concession to the Turkish Petroleum 
Syndicate and that you will cable from Aden about arrangements for me.” Also Rihani papers, March 29th 
1925, Holmes in Jizan to Rihani in Lebanon "I see that APOC got the Mosul oil"; Shwadran page 248 “the 
company had never meant to abide by (this agreement) nor by the provision eliminating TPC as a bidder at 
public auctions (a provision inserted in the concession simply to meet the stubborn insistence o f  the US  
State Department)” and “on August 30th 1925, the strip o f  territory transferred from Persia to Turkey in 
1913, known as the ‘transferred territories’ was recognised as part o f  the APOC concession. On April 20th 
1932, The British Oil Development Company obtained a 75 year concession covering all the lands in the 
vilayets o f  Mosul and Baghdad west o f  the Tigris and north o f  the 33rd parallel, ten years later this 
concession was transferred to the Mosul Petroleum Company, a subsidiary o f Iraq Petroleum. On 
December 4th 1938, the Basrah Petroleum Company, also a subsidiary o f  Iraq Petroleum, obtained a 
concession covering all lands not included under previous concessions”
________________________
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interests other than water in Bahrain. Hopefully, he wrote the London office, “1 am not 
in your council as to what you hope to do here ... but Holmes and I could tie up things
27pretty well together, 1 fancy'’.
Holmes reached an agreement at the end of April to bore 14 water wells, seven at 
Manama and seven at Muharraq. All fourteen would be successful. As Holmes was 
about to depart for London from Kuwait, Madgwick reported a breakdown in the 
drilling engine in Bahrain. Holmes told him to get the spare parts in Basra and then 
come on and meet him in Port Said. With the embargo off at the end of March and 
having closed the agreement on the water wells in Bahrain, and the prospect of an 
immediate water contract in Kuwait, Holmes could afford to keep Madgwick a couple 
of weeks longer in Bahrain. There was also the opportunity of Major Daly being out of 
Bahrain escorting Shaikh Hamad on an official visit to London. Holmes had no 
difficulty in persuading Madgwick to extend his contract by several weeks; as 
Madgwick had confided to Ward, he did not have a contract to follow. Holmes revealed 
to Madgwick his own opinion and geological observations of Bahrain and asked him to 
discreetly undertake an examination of the surface structures. It would seem Holmes
was hoping that Madgwick’s opinion would second his own. With this he could lessen
28the impact on the syndicate’s investors of Arnold Heim’s negative reports
Madgwick appears to have had a fondness for cloak and dagger, and an eye for the main 
chance. When he first arrived to Bahrain he had written his friend, Thomas E Ward, 
proprietor of Oilfield Equipment Company whom the Petroleum Age once described as 
an “Export Ace”, saying he was “worrying myself to a skeleton how I can send along a 
nice fat order for your equipment” and suggesting “meantime, can I send you a nice 
little line in pearls?” After the meeting in Port Said with Holmes, Madgwick seems to 
have visualised himself as an integral factor in E&GSynd plans. He wrote again to 
Ward confiding “there is (don’t breathe a word) a possibility we might want to put
29down a geological hole in this part of the world ...”
In years to come, as Madgwick inflated his claim to have identified the oil of Bahrain, 
he would describe Pilgrim as “no oil geologist”, de Bockh as “that fancy Hungarian”,
27 Holmes papers, March 28th 1925, Madgwick to Shaikh Hamad “with a simple assembly o f  taps” and 
April 6th 1925, Madgwick in Bahrain to E&GSynd London (Corporate Secretary Mr. Adams) “Holmes 
and I could tie up”
28 Ward page 24 says Holmes came from Aden and met Madgwick at the Marine Palace Hotel, Port Said. 
Holmes “requested Madgwick to (return to Bahrain and) make a fairly close examination o f  the surface 
structure with possibility in mind o f drilling a test well for oil”
29 Administrative Report o f  the Bahrain Political Agency for the Year 1926 (Major C C J Barrett) 
“Holmes’ wells “gave a plentiful supply o f  drinkable water” and proved to be “an immense boon to the 
inhabitants”; Ward papers Box 2 February 26th 1925 Madgwick in Bahrain to Ward “a nice fat order” and 
“little line in pearls”, also June 3rd 1925 “don’t breathe a word...we might want to put down”
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Arnold Heim as “posing as an oil geologist’' and Holmes as “knowing nothing about 
oil”. Yet, Madgwick had spent four months on Bahrain Island and had not noticed any 
indications of oil until Holmes sent him back from Port Said with instructions of where, 
and how, to look. Even then he had nothing to add.
He returned to London at the beginning of July 1925, six weeks after Holmes. In 
Bahrain he had a copy of Pilgrim's work, lent by Major Daly for its assessment of water. 
In London, Madgwick stated that as far as Bahrain’s oil was concerned, he had found it 
"impossible to go into more detail than Pilgrim had done". He said the approaching hot 
weather had deterred him and getting in "better equipment" to work with "did not fall 
within his duties". Later, he told Ward "my work was done. I came merely to find 
water." The opinion on Bahrain’s oil he gave to E&GSynd was the fairly safe 
assumption that "only the drill could decide".30
Holmes regains Bahrain: December 1925
In London, instead of reviewing Holmes’ proposed contracts for Bahrain and Kuwait, 
the Colonial Office suggested replacing them entirely with a document originally 
penned personally by the Duke of Devonshire and intended for use by Anglo Persian If 
this was what the Colonial Office really wanted, Holmes said, it was fine by him but, he 
warned, the Shaikhs might not like it as the terms were far less than Holmes had already 
offered. More than that, he told the Colonial Office, the Shaikhs liked the idea of 
participation in the developing company through a shareholding much more than they 
liked the idea of royalties as applied to Persia and Iraq. The Shaikhs of Bahrain and 
Kuwait were no different to Bin Saud in this preference, Holmes said, and this was the 
system adopted by Bin Saud for the A1 Hasa concession.
30 Madgwick’s claims to have “discovered” the oil in Bahrain became more and more outrageous over the 
years; see for example in the Ward papers numerous letters, beginning after the Bahrain oil strike and 
continuing to the late 1930s, to E&GSynd, to Ward, to Standard Oil o f California, in which Madgwick 
seeks “more generous treatment than I have so far received for my share in the work on the Bahrain 
Islands". To Ward, Madgwick claimed to have reached "the conclusion that Bahrain was probably a big 
oilfield, before 1 left the Island" and to have sold "my enthusiasm to Holmes". He further claimed to 
Standard Oil o f California, and to Ward, that it was he who "called Edmund Janson's attention to the really 
encouraging prospects " and that "it took some persuasion to get the Syndicate to regularise the oil 
concession as the water seemed to be simpler and they knew nothing of the oil business." Madgwick 
completely ignores .Holmes' original mapping and the 1923 concession. Moreover, Madgwick did not 
arrive back in London until July by which time Janson and Holmes were already in advanced discussions 
with the Colonial Office for renewing the Bahrain concession and negotiating that o f Kuwait. It is most 
unfortunate that Madgwick's invented, and self serving, version appears in T E Ward's own 1961 self 
published record and is then imported unquestioningly into most subsequent writing on this subject
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The Colonial Office could not consider allowing Holmes to offer shareholding, given 
the terms just imposed on Iraq, the original concession with Persia, and the agreement 
recently offered by the D’Arcy Exploration Company to the Sultan of Muscat, none of 
which offered participation. It was finally agreed that the Colonial Office document 
would be taken as the general draft for the Kuwait and Bahrain oil concessions, with 
E&GSynd adding their own improved financial terms as previously offered, but paying 
royalties, not shares. The Colonial Office officially advised the Political Resident on 
September 3rd that he should no longer obstruct Frank Holmes in concluding 
agreements with the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait on behalf of E&GSynd.31
Holmes headed back once again to the Gulf, where almost eight weeks since the 
Colonial Office had sent its instructions in the matter of the Bahrain and Kuwait oil 
concessions, the Political Resident was still prevaricating. The new Resident, since 
April 1924, was Lieutenant Colonel Francis Beville Prideaux. When he finally went to 
Bahrain to tell Shaikh Hamad he was now permitted to conclude an agreement with 
Holmes, and to deliver the new E&GSynd draft as approved by the Colonial Office, he 
could not resist giving Anglo Persian a last free kick. He took Mackie with him. He did 
not include this snippet in his report to the Colonial Office but he did put forward a 
number of proposals suggesting he could use these to “oppose the signing of the 
concession in Bahrain”.
On December 1st, the Political Resident wrote to Arnold Wilson admitting defeat. He 
told Wilson that the Secretary of State at the Colonial Office “after 25 days 
consideration of my suggestions” had replied that he could see no reason “to obstruct 
the grant of the Bahrain oil concession to the Eastern & General Syndicate”. On 
December 2nd 1925, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa A1 Khalifa of Bahrain and Frank Holmes 
signed a contract granting the Bahrain Oil Concession to E&GSynd, a full two and a 
half years since the original agreement of May 1923 that offered better terms than
32Bahrain would now receive under the Colonial Office documentation.
31 PRO/CO/727/11, July 24th 1925, Minute by J H Hall, Eastern Division, Colonial Office records Holmes 
arguing in favour o f offering shareholding; It is important to note also that E&GSynd’s original draft 
concessions, now superseded by the Colonial Office document, did contain a specific clause in which the 
syndicate undertook not to transfer the concession/s to a non British company. The only relevant clause in 
the Colonial Office draft merely stated: “the right conveyed by this lease shall not be conveyed to a third 
party without the consent of the Shaikh acting with the advice o f the Resident in the Persian Gulf. Such 
consent shall not be reasonably withheld”; Oil exploration did not begin in Oman until 1954, the first oil 
was produced in 1967, until then the country relied mainly on exports of dried limes, dates, frankincense 
and tobacco, worth about one million sterling annually
32 IOL/R/15/1/649 c.30, October 31st 1925 Resident (Prideaux) to Secretary of State for the Colonies 
details Prideaux’s own four point plan for “opposing the signing o f the Bahrain Concession” including 
instructing Shaikh Hamad he should not finalise with Holmes “as a sign of his real contrition for breaching 
the convention signed by his father in 1913” and November 2nd 1925, Resident (Prideaux) to Wilson at 
Abadan “Mackie with me”; IOL/R/15/1/649, December 1st 1925 Resident (Prideaux) to Wilson at Abadan
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The Political Agent, Major Daly, recorded this event in the official Administrative 
Report for Bahrain for the Year 1925. He noted “a concession for the exploitation of oil 
in Bahrain was granted by the local Government to the Eastern & General Syndicate.” 
Daly, like Anglo Persian, and most of the British, did not believe there was any oil to be 
found in the Arab shaikhdoms. In the very next entry of this annual report, headed 
“Trade”, Daly displayed little optimism for the future of the oil concession. He advised 
that in the absence of any stable industry other than pearling, “the Ruler may be well 
advised to consider the possibility of the introduction of some industry”. He suggested 
sailmaking might be just the thing.
Holmes’ Civil Engineering projects: February 1926
Almost coincidentally with the grant of the Bahrain concession, the syndicate’s 
chairman and chief investor, Sir Edmund Davis, was appointed to head the prestigious 
British South Africa Company. The appointment required Davis to divest most of his 
directorships and attached investments. The loss of Davis came uncomfortably close to 
the failure to secure Iraq, or the Red Sea, and Arnold Heim's negative report on the Arab 
concessions. Although control of E&GSynd passed uncontested to Davis’ son in law, 
Edmund W. Janson, and Percy Tarbutt, the transition period caused a contraction in the 
capital immediately available to the syndicate for ongoing work and development of 
existing investments. In London, Janson was so preoccupied with rearranging the 
Eastern & General Syndicate and its finances that Holmes’ success with the Bahrain 
concession brought little joy. As the concession entailed the immediate outlay of the 
syndicate’s now precious available cash, and the expense of development, from 
Janson’s point of view it only added to their difficulties.
Unknown to Holmes, or any member of the Eastern & General Syndicate, Madgwick, in 
London for some four months and still with no prospects other than Holmes’ Bahrain oil 
concession, seemed to be seeking an opportunity for himself. Madgwick again wrote to 
Ward saying, “strictly between ourselves, do you know anyone who would come in and 
test the area for oil where I have been lately? My friends have the concession all right... 
I think that a group over here will do it but I am by no means certain ... I need hardly say 
that the big groups who operate in that part of the world are keen on it, but I don’t want 
to let them get in. This is a case where you and I could put by a little something for our 
old age because I think it is a good thing”. Madgwick’s mysterious hints of fortunes to
“I suggested grounds on which the agreement could be held up indefinitely... (but now) there is nothing 
more to be done”
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be made struck a chord with the entrepreneurial Ward. Not unreasonably, he assumed 
that Madgwick was a principal in the prospect he was offering. Ward assured Madgwick 
that he saw no reason why he should not “be able to do the needful with your 
property”.33
Holmes took on a number of civil engineering contracts as a means of keeping a cash 
flow for E&GSynd. In Baghdad he purchased building materials and discussed a 
scheme for electric lighting and a telephone system for Bahrain where he was already 
constructing a seawall, open to allow boat passage, and a six-foot wide road. He made 
inquiries about the feasibility of a swing bridge “that either lifts straight up and down or 
that swings. The simpler the better as it has to be operated by rather primitive Arabs.” 
Though Madgwick’s contract had ended, the two drillers were still working on the 
Bahrain water projects.34
Bin Saud takes Mecca, Jedda, Assir
The year 1925 closed with Abdul Aziz Bin Saud’s triumphant entry into Jedda on 
December 23rd. after a twelve month siege following the conquest of Mecca. On 
December 25th Bin Saud officially announced that the Nejd Hijaz War was ended and 
on January 8th 1926 he was proclaimed “King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Nejd and its 
Dependencies”. Bin Saud informed the British Consul at Jedda that he had been 
“invited by the Idrissi”, ruler of Assir the province between the Hijaz and Yemen, “to 
take over that government”. The Mecca Agreement, signed shortly afterwards between 
Hassan al-Idrissi and Bin Saud transformed the Assir into a virtual Saudi Protectorate,
35after which the Idrissi concentrated on the threat posed by Imam Yahia in Yemen.
33 Ward papers, see Madgwick’s letters to Ward detailing his pressing financial difficulties, including the 
cost o f private schooling for his two children, and the lack of any offers o f work. Ward papers Box 2 
October 30th 1925, Madgwick in London to Ward “strictly between our selves... you and l could put by a 
little something”; November 11th 1925, Ward in New York to Madgwick in London “the needful with 
your property”
34 Holmes papers, see correspondence including February 1st 1926 from Cotterell & Greig Ltd Baghdad, 
Basra and London to Frank Holmes at Eastern Bank Bahrain and contract with the Bahrain Government 
(Shaikh Hamad) dated April 6th to build the seawall and road also February 1926 to Richardson & 
Cruddas Engineers, Baghdad, in which Holmes asks for quotes on swing bridges
35 Jedda actually surrendered on December 5th 1926, followed by Yanbu, but officially, in the presence of  
the British Consul, on December 21st; see Wahba page 165, “In 1919 the Turks evacuated the eastern part 
of Assir, with resultant chaos, and Abdul Aziz promptly annexed it. A year later the Idrissi tribe recognised 
his importance in Eastern Assir and ceded him the remainder of the province. (Later, in 1926, the Tihama 
of Assir came under Abdul Aziz’ protection, and in 1930, by arrangement with the Idrissi, its titular 
sovereigns, was finally annexed to the Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia.)”
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On the heels of Bin Saud’s capture of Mecca, Harry St John Philby moved to Jedda 
where he believed, and had convinced his London City financial backers, that his 
personal acquaintance with Bin Saud would serve to gain him a commercial foothold in 
Bin Saud’s expanding territory. Since resigning his position as Chief British 
Representative to Shaikh Abdulla of Transjordan -  just hours ahead of his intended 
sacking -  he had been talking to a company called Midian Ltd which was acting to 
resume oil and mineral concessions in the Hijaz originally granted by the Ottoman 
Government and discussed while King Husain was still Ruler of Mecca. Philby’s job 
with Midian, as discussed after his retirement from the Indian Civil Service, was to 
“embark on negotiations with Bin Saud” for ratification of these concessions. Midian 
soon became embroiled in complications about succession to Turkish assets involving 
the D’Arcy Exploration subsidiary of Anglo Persian. However, as will be seen in the 
following chapters, Philby would secretly act as agent for Standard Oil of California in 
the purchase of Holmes’ lapsed A1 Hasa concession; he would then perpetuate the myth 
of Twitchell’s discovering A1 Hasa’s oil and maliciously engage in the maligning of 
Holmes’ reputation.
Conclusion
At the close of this period the Anglo Persian Oil Company was stronger than ever. The 
company had its monopoly over Persian oil and access to Iraq oil through its clear 25% 
interest in Turkish Petroleum. Additionally, the territory transferred from Persia to 
Turkey in 1913, known as the ‘transferred territories’, was now included in Anglo 
Persian’s concession. Anglo Persian’s success was gratifying to the Government of 
India and her Political Officers in the Persian Gulf. There was, however, one cloud on 
the horizon. This was the American entry into Iraq achieved by a consortium of 
American oil companies, known collectively as Near East Development Corporation, 
that held a 25% shareholding in Turkish Petroleum.
36 For details o f  his relationship with Midian, Remy Fisher and Sharqieh see Philby Oil Ventures pages 8- 
34 and Monroe Philby o f  Arabia, pages 119-133 describes the inglorious end o f  Philby’s role in 
Transjordan and page 132 “the Colonial Office granted (the) request for permission to dismiss him, but 
Philby acted first. By the time London’s permission arrived, Philby had handed in his resignation”. On 
pages 140-159 Monroe says that to induce Fisher to back him financially Philby sent his wife Dora, whom 
Fisher had met and admired, on a holiday to Fisher’s home “making it plain that the exercise o f her 
charms...would serve all their interests”. Monroe, on page 147, relates that when Philby did meet with Bin 
Saud, on November 28th 1925, he stated his current plight had come about because o f Bin Saud Philby 
claimed he had been more or less forced to retire from British Government Service “as l had always 
backed you (Bin Saud) against the Sharifian party”. Philby would rely on this claim for years in order to 
obligate Bin Saud to him
37 At various times the American group included Gulf Oil Corporation, Atlantic Oil, Mexican Oil, Sinclair 
Oil, Texas Oil Company, Standard Oil New Jersey and Standard Oil New York (which became Socony 
Vacuum in 1931).
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This American presence was seen as a threat to the hegemony of the Government of 
India by the Political Officers posted to the Arab shaikhdoms. A further factor, in 
October 1928, would be the appointment of Sir Gilbert Clayton to replace Sir Henry 
Dobbs as High Commissioner of Iraq. Until Clayton’s appointment, Iraq was 
administered by men whose training and experience was in India. The India orientation 
of administrators in Iraq, and direct appointment by the Government of India of the 
Political Officers administering the Arab shaikhdoms, had ensured a harmony of 
approach right throughout the Arabian Peninsula.
Nevertheless, the Iraq experience, with its successful outcome of ensuring British 
dominance of Iraqi oil, inspired confidence that this position could be attained 
elsewhere. Similar mechanisms as used in Iraq, including the “British Nationality 
Clause”, would now be employed in attempts to block the Americans from expanding 
their presence in the area through investment in Holmes’ Bahrain and Kuwait 
concessions.
All the building blocks and personalities were in place to ensure that resolution of the 
struggle over the granting and development of the Arab concessions would be enacted, 
although the final concession of Kuwait would not be finalised until December 1934.
38 Collins, Robert, O, An Arabian Diary, Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clay toil, University o f California Press, 
1969, page 266. Clayton replaced Sir Henry Dobbs as High Commissioner of Iraq in October 1928. Dobbs 
died September 11th 1929, in Baghdad, of a heart attack following a game o f polo, “Until Clayton became 
High Commissioner Iraq had been administered by men whose experience had been in India and who 
frequently sought to govern Iraq more like an Indian province than an Arab state. Clayton came from a 
different Imperial tradition, the Egyptian, where the role of British officials had for long been that of  
Advisers rather than Masters ..”
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SECTION THREE 
Resolution and Legacy
Chapter Seven
Meltdown
Introduction
This thesis contends that it was the reinforcement after World War One of the authority 
of the Government of India in the Arabian Peninsula that held back the development of 
the area’s oil. This section aims to substantiate that contention by showing that only 
when the power of the Government of India was affected by events that took place 
outside the immediate area could development take place.
The Americans claimed, and still do, that it was diplomatic efforts by their State 
Department which broke through and forced the British to allow American participation 
in oil development, first of Bahrain, and later Kuwait. The relevant documentation does 
not support this claim.
American diplomatic initiatives did, however, have the effect of involving the Colonial 
Office in the case of Bahrain, and the Foreign Office in the case of Kuwait. The 
argument of this thesis is enhanced in that it can be shown that the Colonial Office, and 
in turn the Foreign Office, took over decision-making processes from the Government 
of India. The Colonial Office found dealing with the Government of India in the Persian 
Gulf so frustrating, particularly over the matter of oil concessions, that they formally 
relinquished all involvement in 1933. From this point on the India Office in London 
became the liaison point with the British Government with the Government of India 
retaining its position in the Persian Gulf.
It will be shown that, in each case, it was political events outside the shaikhdoms that 
prompted Whitehall to put pressure on the Government of India to stand aside. The first 
of these was Persia's claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, put to the League of Nations, 
that forced a rethink of the previously absolute opposition generated by the Government 
of India and her Officers to American involvement in the Bahrain oil concession.
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I
While giving in to the pressure of external events, British officials, buoyed by their 
success in Iraq and pushed by the Government of India, sought to retain “maximum” 
control of the commercial companies formed to develop the oil fields. The instrument 
of control, which was known as the “British Nationality Clause”, was modelled on that 
imposed on Iraq.
To clear the route for a pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean -  and thereby 
ensure the monopoly of the Anglo Persian/Turkish Petroleum Company (renamed Iraq 
Petroleum Company) -  the Government of India combined with the British 
Administration of Iraq in a military operation that brought to an end the Ikhwan 
rebellion in Bin Saud’s territories. By the beginning of 1930, the Iraqi oil pipeline was 
secured. Bin Saud was released from the authority of the Government of India and his 
independence recognised. Iraq’s sovereignty was also recognised and preparations 
undertaken for her to join the League of Nations two years later.
With the Americans in Bahrain, Bin Saud now independent, and Iraq about to join the 
League of Nations, the Government of India was determined to hold on to Kuwait as 
fortification of its authority in the area. Once again external events played a role. In 
November 1931, Persia unilaterally cancelled the concession held since 1908 by Anglo 
Persian. The Anglo Persian Oil Company, strongly backed by Officers of the 
Government of India, responded by attempting to pressure Kuwait into an oil agreement 
for the purpose of visibly demonstrating to Persia that an alternative was available. 
After Holmes’ Bahrain concession struck oil in 1932, far harsher conditions were 
demanded for Kuwait than the five requirements in the “British Nationality Clause” for 
Bahrain, eventually culminating in a secret “Political Agreement” drawn up by the India 
Office and signed by the Kuwait Oil Company, a joint venture between the Gulf Oil 
Corporation USA and the Anglo Persian Oil Company.
Bin Saud’s release from the embrace of the Government of India and relinquishment by 
the Colonial Office of interest in the Arabian Peninsula, reopened the possibility of the 
A1 Hasa concession. With the devious involvement of H St John Philby, secretly acting 
for Standard Oil of California while advising Abdul Aziz Bin Saud on the negotiations, 
Holmes’ lapsed 1923 A1 Hasa concession was resold to Standard Oil of California in 
1933 -  on terms lower than those agreed by Holmes and Abdul Aziz Bin Saud a decade 
earlier.
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Bahrain
American entry barred: June 1928
E&GSynd set about raising the capital with which to develop the concessions they now 
held, particularly Bahrain, the Neutral Zone and A1 Hasa and also to raise the upfront 
payment required for Kuwait and Farasan, both of which they hoped soon to finalise. In 
London, Janson approached previous investors in the various Edmund Davis syndicates, 
the City financiers, Burma Oil, Royal Dutch Shell and, finally, Anglo Persian. Neither 
Burma nor Shell were willing to compete on what they viewed as Anglo Persian's home 
turf, particularly as the company was now in such a strong position with the addition of 
Iraq. Anglo Persian’s Chairman, John Cadman, refused to consider E&GSynd’s 
approach. Cadman had now received the latest geologists’ reports and these reinforced 
his own opinion that the Arab concessions were “not worth pursuing”, as he had 
personally advised the company’s managing director several months earlier. Arnold 
Wilson remained convinced the area was oil barren, proclaiming all of Arabia “devoid 
of all prospects”.1 2
Meantime, Thomas E Ward had made contact with E&GSynd. In September 1926, 
Elolmes extended a planned visit to Canada and America to give presentations in New 
York to what he dubbed “the really big New York Shaikhs”, including Standard Oil 
New Jersey and the Gulf Oil Corporation. These meetings, facilitated by Ward, failed to 
produce a firm undertaking. Having exhausted the possibility of a joint venture with 
British or American finance, the members of Holmes’ Eastern & General Syndicate 
made the financial commitment to go ahead independently with developing the Bahrain 
field. Holmes was making good progress with the preparatory work in Bahrain when, in 
January 1927, the Americans communicated a strong interest in E&GSynd’s 
concessions in the Arabian Peninsula/
1 Chevron archives Box 120791, December 28th 1928, E&GSynd (Adams): memorandum of Colonial 
Office meeting for Janson’s various approaches, see also Ward pg 24, also correspondance in Holmes 
papers including January 26th 1926 from Cory Bros to Janson, January 29th 1926 Janson to Holmes in 
Bahrain, Baldry page 82 for Cory Bros previous association with Davis’ syndicates, particularly Farasan, 
Note that Ward, page 27, is mistaken in stating it was Madgwick who approached Cory Bros “one o f his 
London clients”. Clarke page 62 repeats Ward’s error; Ferrier page 567 “Arab concessions not worth 
pursuing”; Ferrier page 555 “devoid o f all prospects” Wilson stated that only Albania was hopeful; Also 
note here that Holmes is in »the Gulf 1925-1926 and so could not have “toured the London clubs and 
offices searching for financial investors and become ‘an interminable bore’,” as claimed in some 
publications
2 Ward papers, Box 2, August 19th 1926 E&GSynd to Ward “Frank Holmes will be visiting...on other 
business... and will call on you in New York”. This visit is documented in Ward papers Box 2
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With Ward acting as broker, two separate agreements were eventually signed on 
November 30th 1927 betwen E&GSynd and the Gulf Oil Corporation. The first was an 
option on outright purchase of the Bahrain Concession; the option was valid until 
January 1st 1929 and during the option period Gulf Oil would meet the concession rent 
and the cost of a survey, which Frank Holmes would organise and assist. The second 
was an agreement containing three further options, on A1 Hasa, Kuwait and the Neutral 
Zone; Holmes was obliged to exert every effort to finalise negotiations for Kuwait and 
revalidate A1 Hasa and the Neutral Zone, all to be transferred to the Gulf Oil
3Corporation should the options be exercised.
Alerted by the presence of three Americans from Gulf Oil on Bahrain, the Political 
Resident, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Lionel Berkeley Haworth, arrived for the purpose of 
ascertaining what, exactly, might be the dimension of Holmes' involvement with 
Americans. Remarking to Holmes that Anglo Persian was "dreadfully" annoyed at the 
possibility that Holmes had secured American financial backing, he inquired whether it 
was too late to make the Bahrain Oil Concession "a real strong British concern". 
Haworth was a man who paid attention to detail. Although he had no information on 
E&GSynd’s contractual agreements with Gulf Oil, he considered the possibility that 
there might be more to it than extending a line of finance. He went to the files and 
examined the contract between E&GSynd and the Shaikh of Bahrain; as mentioned, this 
was based on the document personally composed by the Duke of Devonshire and 
insisted upon by the Colonial Office. Haworth picked up the inconsistency in this 
document and advised the Colonial Office that “the agreement ... contains nothing to 
prevent the rights under it from being transferred to an American, or other, foreign 
concessionary”. The Resident suggested that, in future, all such agreements should 
contain a special “British Nationality Clause”.* 34
Flushed with the success of imposing just such a limitation on Iraq, the Colonial Office 
believed they knew how to create a “real strong British concern”. In June 1928 (the 
month Herbert Hoover was nominated as the Republican Party’s candidate for the
correspondence E&GSynd, Holmes, Madgwick, Ward from August to November 1926; Alexander Lawrie
& Company and Paterson Symons & Company were new investors in E&GSynd. Ward papers, Box 2, 
January 16th 1927 and March 28th 1927 Holmes in Bahrain to E&GSynd included in E&GSynd to Ward 
June 9th 1927, “ I am extremely glad the Board of Directors have decided to drill for oil...”
3 Ward papers, Box 2, June 9th, June 15th, June 16th 1927, E&GSynd to Ward, September 14th 1927, 
E&GSynd (Adams) to Ward “memorandum of terms for the sale of our oil interests in Arabia” you already 
have copies of the concessions and other documents which Holmes left with you last year. ..Holmes 
says...there is no doubt your friends will strike oil at Bahrain”; October 7th 1927 Ward to William 
Wallace, Chief Vice President Gulf Oil Corporation forwarding “the document package. . .including a map 
“especially marked by Major Frank Holmes”
4 Ward papers, Box 2, March 12th 1928 Holmes in Bahrain to Gulf Oil “dreadfully annoyed...real strong 
British”; Bilovich Quest for Oil in Bahrain page 256 citing IOL/LPS/10/993/3299 April 2nd 1928 
Resident to Colonial Office “nothing to prevent”
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forthcoming American Presidential elections) the Colonial Secretary himself replied, in 
confidence, to the Resident stating that His Majesty's Government would require any 
company involved with the development of the Bahrain concession to be a British 
company registered in Great Britain or in a British Colony. Moreover, as in Iraq, the 
chairman and managing director, a majority of the other directors, the local general 
manager and as large a percentage of the local staff as possible should be British 
subjects. The Colonial Secretary drew up a clause dictating that "neither the company, 
nor the premises, liberties, powers, and privileges ... nor any land occupied for any of 
the purchases of the lease, at any time to be, or become, directly or indirectly controlled 
or managed by a foreigner or foreigners or any foreign corporation or corporations ..." 
The definition of foreigner was given as “any person who is neither a British subject nor 
a subject of the Shaikh”. A foreign corporation was any corporation “other than a 
corporation established under, and subject to, the laws of some part of His Majesty’s 
Dominions and having its principal place of business in those dominions'.5
Americans enlist diplomatic assistance: March 1929
By late 1928, Gulf Oil had reached agreement to onsell its interest in the Bahrain 
concession to Standard Oil of California. Gulf Oil would retain its rights, under the 
second agreement with E&GSynd, to options on Kuwait, A1 Hasa and the Neutral Zone. 
The full extent of American involvement with E&GSynd became known to the Colonial 
Office when complete detail of the arrangements between E&GSynd and Gulf Oil was 
included in the offer laid before the October 30th Board Meeting of Turkish Petroleum 
-  in which the Anglo Persian Oil Company was the dominant shareholder. (Repeating 
the mantra that there was no oil in Arabia, the Board decided it had no interest in 
Holmes’ Arabian concessions.)6
At the end of November, immediately on the heels of the election of the protagonist of 
the American’s entry into Iraq’s oil, Herbert Hoover, as 31st President of the United
5 Bilovich, Quest Oil Bahrain, page 257 citing IOL/LPS/10/993/3299 June 19th 1928, Secretary of State 
for the Colonies (Amery) to Resident (Haworth), also reprinted in full in Clarke page 82
6 Gulf Oil had been losing interest in Bahrain since Holmes told them there was no possibility whatsoever 
of renegotiating lesser terms, including reduced royalties, with the Shaikh of Bahrain as Gulf Oil requested. 
See Ward page 103-109, Gulf Oil claimed to be “duty bound” to pull out of Bahrain to “honour” the 
restrictive “Red Line Agreement” signed with Turkish Petroleum on July 31st. Kuwait was outside the Red 
Line Agreement, but the claim to be adopting a moral stand is tarnished by their retaining the options for 
A1 Hasa and Neutral Zone, both of which were clearly inside the Red Line Agreement. The revelation to 
the TPC Board of E&GSynd’s business affairs is the subject of heated correspondence, see Ward pages 
106-110 and Ward papers, Box 3, December 11th 1928 Ward to Holmes in Bahrain, Box 1, December 
20th 1928 E&GSynd to Ward, Box 3 January 7th 1929 Ward to E&GSynd
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States of America, the Colonial Office in collaboration with the India Office produced a 
“British Nationality Clause”. This, they insisted, must now be -  retrospectively 
inserted into the Bahrain agreement. E&GSynd responded by reminding the Colonial 
Office that the already-signed Bahrain Agreement read, “the rights conveyed by the 
Lease shall not be conveyed to a third party without the consent of the Shaikh acting 
under the advice of the Resident in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, they pointed 
out, the next clause stated, "such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld”. They 
also stressed “no stipulation as to the British character of the Assignee is imposed”. 
E&GSynd contended that inevitably Gulf Oil would seek to sue, an action that could 
“only result” in the syndicate being forced into liquidation “with the loss of the whole 
of the capital invested in the Arabian oil propositions”.
Acceptance of this clause, as both E&GSynd and the Colonial Office well knew, would 
prevent the transfer of the Bahrain concession, either wholly or in part, to any non- 
British company. E&GSynd was in a bind. The Americans were adamant that they 
expected E&GSynd’s “compliance” to the contract with Gulf Oil. Besides, they asserted 
grandly, the Colonial Office condition was at variance with international agreements 
“between our two governments” regarding oil matters and “until our USA government 
states such conditions are justified, Gulf Oil does not propose to seriously consider 
them”. The Americans believed they could handle the Colonial Office better than the 
British members of E&GSynd could. The American oil companies had experience of 
the British Government, and Anglo Persian, from their efforts in breaking into Iraq. 
Gulf Oil, wanting the Kuwait concession, and Standard Oil of California, wanting the 
Bahrain concession, agreed to cooperate in “the presentation of the matter to our State 
Department”.7 8
Both Standard Oil of California and Gulf Oil were well-connected with the State 
Department. Gulf Oil’s Andrew W Mellon was Secretary of the US Treasury. Judge 
Frank Feuille, the New York-based Legal Adviser to Standard Oil was, before joining 
Standard Oil, Legal Adviser to the Panama Canal 1910-1920. When Standard Oil of
7 IOL/R/15/297Ü, December 19th 1928, E&Gsynd to the Secretary of State Colonial Office pinpointing 
various clauses in the already signed Bahrain agreement and “being forced into liquidation”; see also 
Political Agent Bahrain alarm at prospect of Americans in 1OL/R/15/1/649/C30, December 17th 1928 
Political Agent Bahrain (Major Barrett, replaced Daly) to Resident (Haworth) “American influence is 
already strong in Bahrain owing to the activities of the American Mission. . .any increase of American 
influence is strongly to be deprecated , the (present) agreement gives the syndicate such large powers that, 
in time, they would practically control the Government o f these small islands...”
8 Ward papers Box 3, January 4th and January 7th 1929 Ward to E&GSynd “compliance” and February 
4th 1929 Ward to Holmes in Bahrain and February 15th 1929 Ward to E&GSynd “until our US 
government states... ”; Chevron Archives Box 120791 January 31st 1929 Judge Frank Feuille Legal 
Adviser to Standard Oil o f California to F Vane Manager Land & Lease Division “we have...the 
remarkable case in which the Colonial Office has forced a British company, under British control, to lose a 
valid concession...” and “presentation to our State Department”
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California began its involvement with taking over the Bahrain Concession, the person 
most experienced with the company’s foreign operations was Francis B Loomis. His 
official title was Washington Representative and he was a former Under Secretary in 
the US State Department; when the Secretary of State fell ill, it was Loomis who took 
over the negotiations for the Panama Canal concession. Loomis and Feuille were thus 
longtime colleagues. The Mellon family of Gulf Oil, and the two men at Standard Oil of 
California, had strong links with members of the American Administration.
The grievances against the British were outlined at a March 20th meeting with US 
Secretary of State, Frank B Kellogg. Ignoring the fact that the British reaction would 
have been the same no matter what the nationality of a non British company trying to 
enter the Persian Gulf, they charged that it was Americans who were being 
discriminated against. Kellogg had been Ambassador to London during the American’s 
Iraq saga, it still took him eight days to initiate any follow up at all from this meeting. In 
a mildly written instruction to the US Charge d’Affaires in London, dated March 28th, 
Kellogg said the State Department “desired” him to discuss this case “informally” with 
the appropriate British authorities. The Charge d’Affaires was told to point out “in 
conversation” that US legislation was extremely liberal in regard to foreign controlled 
petroleum operations in its territories. In a follow up, he was instructed to also tell the 
British that the US Department of State would be “glad” to obtain a statement of British 
Government policy regarding the holding and operation by foreigners of petroleum 
concessions in territories “such as Bahrain.” Not until April 3rd did the US Charge 
d’Affairs call on the Foreign Office to discuss the matter “informally” as instructed.
Although the Charge d’Affaires and the US Secretary of State did not know it, there 
was now no difficulty over Bahrain. In fact, on the very same day, March 20th, that the 
oil companies were briefing Kellogg in Washington, the Colonial Office in London was 
advising the various government departments concerned that it was withdrawing 
opposition to American investment in the development of oil in Bahrain. The Colonial 
Office officially declared their decision “to abandon the idea of opposing the 
introduction of American capital to operate the concession and to concentrate upon 
obtaining such a degree of British control as may be practicable”. The Mines 
Department replied that, anyway, in their opinion, it was doubtful “whether any 
considerable oil production could be anticipated in Bahrain”. The Foreign Office judged 
that “Britain would not be on strong ground in insisting on the exclusion of US capital 
from this particular concession”. And even the Admiralty conceded “in view of the 
absence of a British control clause it is impossible to stop the transfer...”9
9 That all non British nationalities were being discriminated against, see for example, Administrative 
Report for Bahrain for the Year 1927 “...three Germans wished to disembark at Bahrain on SS “Bandra”
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Influence of Persian claim to sovereignty of Bahrain: May 1929
Much has been made of the American diplomatic initiatives. American diplomacy is 
frequently credited with breaking down Britain’s commercial stranglehold on the 
Arabian Peninsula. However, as has been shown, the decision to withdraw objection to 
American investment in developing the Bahrain concession was circulated some three 
weeks before British officials became aware there was an American diplomatic 
initiative. This leads to the question that, if not American diplomacy, then what was it 
that led to a relaxing of the long held policy of keeping “foreigners” out of Bahrain?
The seeming sudden turnaround on opposition to the involvement of the Americans in 
Bahrain appears to have sprung from a root far different than a desire not to antagonise 
their American friends, as the State Department came to believe. Since November 1927, 
Persia had been actively pursuing a claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. The Persians had 
taken offence to a clause in the Treaty of Jahra, signed in May 1927 between the British 
and Abdul Aziz Bin Saud. The offending clause read: “Ibn Saud undertakes to maintain 
friendly and peaceful relations with ... Bahrain, who is in special treaty relations with 
His Britannic Majesty’s Government.” A Persian protest, addressed to the British 
Minister at Teheran, stated “the article is contrary to the territorial integrity of Persia”. 
The Persian Government requested the British Government to “promptly take necessary 
measures to relieve its implications”.
The next day the Persian Government invoked Article 10 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all member states. In a note to the 
Secretary General, Persia asked the League to “guarantee her undisputed rights over 
Bahrain”. In January 1928, Britain defended its presence on Bahrain to the League by 
stating it was there “to insure that the pacific development of the island and the 
prosperity of its Arab inhabitants are not troubled by unjustified advances coming from 
her neighbours and having in view the subordination of the inhabitants to foreign 
domination.”10
on June 18th but the master o f the vessel was informed that no Germans are allowed to land at this 
port...another German named Karl Lindner wished to land in Bahrain in connection with pearl shell 
business but he was not allowed to do so...” And for the Year 1929 “...the Bahrain Government decided 
not to allow Russian steamers to call at Bahrain”; For a systematic revision of the American claim that 
“State Department intervention was the decisive factor in facilitating the American entrance into Bahrain” 
see Bilovich thesis Part 111 “British Nationality Clause versus the American Open Door” Bilovich says 
this claim was “first initiated by the State Department in 1945 and since repeated”; See also Shwadran 
pages 373-374 also page 388 concerning Kuwait “as in the case of Bahrain, the State Department claimed 
credit... ”; Bilovich pages 151-154 “abandon the idea of opposing” and “impossible to stop”
10 For detail o f this episode see Faroughy pages 102-103
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With a completely straight face Britain was not referring to it self as the “foreign” 
dominator, but to Persia. In a superb display of diplomatic double speak, Britain defined 
Bahrain’s political status thus: “The principality is an independent Arab State under the 
protection of His Majesty’s Government, but not a British Protectorate”. An Orwellian 
legal ruse was then employed. As the Political Agent recorded, “owing to the claims to 
sovereignty advanced by the Persian Government, Shaikh Isa on behalf of himself and 
his islands gave His Majesty’s Government authority to represent the Bahrain State in 
rebutting Persian pretensions before the League of Nations.” This was the same Shaikh 
Isa whom the British had so acrimoniously forced to abdicate in 1923; they had left him 
with the title of Ruler of Bahrain while transferring the exercise of total authority to his 
son, Shaikh Hamad, as Deputy Ruler.11
The Persian claim to Bahrain was still simmering in 1929 when the Colonial Office 
became aware of American interest in E&GSynd”s concession. It is possible the 
Colonial Office calculated that an American presence on Bahrain -  suitably hedged and 
strongly controlled by Britain -  might help to bolster its position before the League of 
Nations against Persia’s claim to sovereignty, despite the US not being a League 
member.
Certainly, driving a respectable British company like E&GSynd into liquidation by 
refusing to allow American investment could hardly be construed as “insuring the 
development and prosperity” of the inhabitants of Bahrain, as Britain claimed to be 
doing in her submission to the League. Besides, as already noted, the Foreign Office 
judged that, in international eyes, “Britain would not be on strong ground in insisting on 
the exclusion of US capital”. From Britain’s point of view, there probably was nothing 
to lose anyway, as it was doubtful “whether any considerable oil production could be 
anticipated in Bahrain”.
A flurry of responses from the Government of India was generated by the Colonial 
Office decision and the accompanying Foreign Office draft in reply to the American 
State Department request for a statement of British policy. Mindful that when they had 
solved the American’s challenge over Bahrain where “existing arrangement gives no 
sure ground on which to oppose transfer” they would need to deal with the Americans 
on Kuwait, the proposed reply was cagey.
The text was to read: “His Majesty’s Government feel bound to reserve to themselves 
the right to consider on its merits and in light of circumstances obtaining at the time
11 A1 Tajir page 6 “under the protection of...but not a British Protectorate”; Administrative Report for 
Bahrain for the year 1928 (Barratt) “Shaikh Isa gave HMG authority , to rebutt Persian pretensions...”
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each proposal for holding or operation of petroleum concession by foreigners in 
territories such as Bahrain islands and find themselves unable to make any statement of 
their policy on questions such as American Embassy desire to have."
The contention that Persia’s claim to sovereignty over Bahrain was driving British 
decision-making is borne out by comment from the Colonial Office. Forwarding the 
text of the proposed reply to the State Department for approval by the Government of 
India, the Colonial Office warned “the matter is urgent and cannot wait for settlement
of the question of the future status of Bahrain”, a reference to the ongoing Persian claim
• 12to sovereignty over Bahrain.
Government of India response: October 1929
The turn taken by Whitehall, in a region which the Government of India considered its 
own, did not please India’s officials. The Viceroy of India replied personally, saying, 
“we have assumed throughout that Eastern Company’s [sic assume E&GSynd] 
agreement had to be read with our basic Treaty rights and that Article 3 of our Treaty of 
1892 gave monopoly rights to Great Britain against foreigners and our special oil 
understanding of 1913 gave us control over selection of even British Companies.” The 
Government of India had been confident that “existing treaties seemed to suffice against 
external encroachments on our position in Bahrain,” the Viceroy wrote. If this was not 
correct then the future was not looking good, he warned.
“Our general position is seriously compromised if His Majesty’s Government feel this 
contention is untenable, because practical control of a petty government like Bahrain 
might easily pass into the hands of powerful foreign financial institutions”, he advised. 
“It will be difficult to prevent ground being cut under our feet all along the coast if we 
give way over Bahrain”, he continued, “for our exclusive agreements are all on the 
same model”. Nevertheless, the Viceroy conceded there might be matters of “wider 
consideration the importance of which we do not appreciate” that could preclude “a 
rigid stand being taken on our Treaty rights in the case of Bahrain”. For the protection 
that it may give “elsewhere” the Viceroy endorsed the wording of the Foreign Office 
reply to the Americans. He stressed that, no matter what eventuated in Bahrain, it would 
be vital to “secure maximum British control and insist on British personnel locally”.13
12 IOL/R/15/297 Vol ii, May 10th 1929, Telegram, Secretary o f State for India, London, to Viceroy, 
Foreign & Political Department, Government of India Simla, enclosing text of proposed reply to State 
Department and comment “cannot wait for settlement of the question o f future status Bahrain”
13 IOL/R/15/1/649/C.30, May 12th 1929 Telegram “Important”, Viceroy Government of India Simla to 
Secretary of State for India London “our general position is seriously compromised” and “difficult to 
prevent ground being cut under our feet along the coast’ and “secure maximum British control”
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Knowing what really precarious ground they were on legally, and internationally, with 
their assumption of total control of all matters related to Bahrain, the officials 
themselves seemed surprised at just how much they were actually getting away with. 
The Secretary of State for India confided to the Viceroy that “the right of His Majesty’s 
Government to impose certain restrictions has not been questioned, either by the 
Americans or the syndicate”. And the India Office marvelled at their luck that neither 
the Americans nor the syndicate had “discovered the lacunae in our legal position of 
which we ourselves are conscious after a careful diagnosis of our case”. There were 
those who believed they had, if not exactly a legal right, then a moral one because “by 
sacrifice of men and money” the British had “made the Gulf safe for enterprises of this 
character” and therefore “had every right” to impose conditions “on the conduct of 
commercial enterprises in those regions”. The Secretary of State for India advised the 
Viceroy that the solution was insistence on American compliance with five conditions 
which “if we can secure them” would probably be “the best we can hope for”, and 
continued “if they are accepted, and fully implemented ... they should give us a degree 
of control”. A little wistfully, he added, “it is also, of course, always possible that on 
closer investigation by the company the oil prospects may prove insufficient to justify 
their continued interest”. 14
Belgrave, the Adviser in Bahrain, offered a timely reminder that he wanted included in 
the conditions that there should be “no imported Persian labour until Persian question 
settled”. The Resident was less than thrilled and stated “I should have preferred to 
exclude the Americans altogether but as Secretary of State for India has decided that 
this is impossible the arrangements outlined seems to keep in our hands as much control 
as we can expect.” He laid “great stress” on one of the conditions, the one that dictated 
that “all dealings of the company with the Ruler of Bahrain” must pass first through the 
(British) Chief Local Representative who, in turn, “should address the Political Agent”. 
Presumably, the Political Agent would then decide whether or not the Shaikh of 
Bahrain should actually receive the message intended for him from the oil company.
This condition was too much even for the Viceroy of India who commented “actually, 
this would be going beyond even the practice in Indian States”. The Viceroy suggested 
a well-practised Government of India tactic for putting this condition in place. “It would 
seem very desirable”, he advised, “to arrange that the Shaikh of Bahrain himself should 
insist on this stipulation” . 15
14 IOL/R/15/297 Vol.ii: August 15th 1929, Telegram, Secretary of State for India London to Viceory 
Simla cc Political Resident “has not been questioned”; Bilovich page 150 “men and money” citing Colonial 
Office Minute July 17th 1929 and “lacunae in our case” citing India Office Minute August 15th 1929
15 IOL/R/15/297 Vol.ii: August 16th 1929, Telegram Resident (Biscoe) to Political Agent Bahrain (now 
Cpt Charles Geoffrey Prior) “prefer to exclude the Americans altogether”; August 17th 1929 Urgent The 
Adviser Bahrain Government (Belgrave) to Resident (Biscoe) “until Persian question settled”; August
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The Shaikh of Bahrain would have been very interested to be approached for this 
purpose for, while the barrage of letters and cables were crossing London to India, and 
London to the Gulf, he was the one person kept completely out of the loop. Although it 
was his country -  and his oil -  that had been the subject of such highly charged 
discussions, meetings, cables and letters for at least eight months, nobody had bothered 
talking to him about it. The Adviser, Belgrave, whose sole job it supposedly was to take 
care of the Shaikh’s personal and financial interest, reassured the Resident “the Shaikh 
has heard nothing about the question of company’s nationality”. Belgrave airily 
dismissed this disloyal, but deliberate, oversight by offering his opinion that the Shaikh 
“would have no feelings on it as long as money resulted”. In a confidential note to the 
Government of India, not circulated to the British officials in London, the Resident 
affirmed “the Shaikh has no inkling of our suggestions” and guaranteed “so long as he 
gets his royalties he is not concerned with the nationality of the controlling company”.16
Americans claim victory: October 1929
Although their diplomatic initiative had achieved little -  the Colonial Office decision to 
allow the Americans into Bahrain was taken before the approach from the Charge 
d’Affaires, and the Foreign Office’s vaguely worded statement on British oil policy in 
the Persian Gulf promised exactly nil -  the Americans were convinced they had slain 
Goliath, as subsequent State Department claims attest.
After weeks of communications between all parties, the five conditions finally arrived 
at were the “Britishness” of the company defined as registered in British territory, the 
right of the British Government to nominate one director to the Board, as many 
employees as possible to be either British or Bahrain subjects, the company to guarantee 
not to obstruct British plans for proposed sites for aircraft landing and a seaplane station 
in Bahrain, and the appointment of a British Chief Local Representative, approved by 
His Majesty’s Government, as the “sole person empowered to deal direct with the local
19th 1929 Telegram Resident (Biscoe) to Government of India Simla cc Secretary of State for India, 
London “all dealings o f the company must first pass through”; August 20th 1929, Telegram, Viceroy, 
Government of India Simla to Secretary of State for India London cc Resident (Biscoe) “Shaikh of 
Bahrain himself should insist”
16 IOL/R/15/297 Vol.ii: August 17th 1929 Urgent The Adviser Bahrain Government (Belgrave) to 
Resident (Biscoe) “Shaikh has heard nothing”; IOL/L/PS/10-10R 13188.9.Vol 993, Resident (Biscoe) “To 
Government of India ONLY” [sic] “Shaikh has no inkling”; Criticism o f the autocratic methods of Bahrain 
Political Agent, Major Daly, led to the appointment of Charles Belgrave in 1926 supposedly as an 
independent “Financial Adviser” to the Shaikh. However Belgrave, who was selected by Daly and the 
Resident and hired by the India Office, soon displayed autrocratic tendencies as pronounced as Daly’s, 
within a very short time he was personally in charge of administration, financial affairs, the police and the 
judiciary. He remained in Bahrain as “Adviser” until 1957
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authorities and the population of Bahrain.” For this important position, on which they 
“laid great stress”, the Colonial Office nominated Major Frank Holmes. They had 
earlier canvassed the interested parties concerning their advocacy of Holmes to this 
position.
The Bahrain Adviser had replied, “don’t think Holmes could stand five summers”. This 
inspired the Resident to advise the Viceroy of India: “Holmes is not an ideal choice for 
the position. He is an elderly man whose health broke down a year and a half ago with 
bad effects on his temper. I doubt whether he could stand the summer climate of 
Bahrain for five years.” (Holmes was to confound them by living, in very good health, a 
further 18 years.) Although Holmes did not have schooled Arabic, he did have “a 
wonderful way” with the Arabs, the Resident said, adding that “in a small community” 
Holmes was “a social acquisition” and was “probably the best choice that can be made, 
as we have taken his measure”.
Still uncertain regarding their legal grounds, the Colonial Office insisted that Janson 
and Holmes travel to New York without delay to “personally discuss the whole 
position” and obtain American agreement to the five conditions required to approve the 
transfer. While the Americans were quite happy at the prospect of having Holmes in the 
position of Chief Local Representative, they hesitated at the five year term laid down by 
the Colonial Office; a guaranteed period of employment was a benefit that no American 
company ever offered. Holmes did not seem too bothered by the fuss, an attitude 
clarified by the Vice President of Standard Oil of California who told his colleagues
“Janson explained to us, privately, that the Colonial Office had offered to make Holmes
18the Petroleum Adviser to the Iraq Government at a salary of 5,000 sterling per year”.
The Americans came to the conclusion that the Colonial Office wanted Holmes because 
of the “undoubted confidence Sultan Ibn Saud, the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Shaikh of 
Kuwait have in him. They view Holmes as a strong factor in assisting the British
17 IOL/R/l 5/297 Vol.ii. August 16th 1929, Telegram, Resident (Biscoe) to Political Agent Bahrain, cc 
Belgrave “will Holmes’ health permit five years continuously in Bahrain?”; August 17th 1929 Urgent 
Belgrave to Resident (Biscoe) “Don’t think could stand five summers”; August 19th 1929 Telegram 
Resident (Biscoe) to Government of India Simla cc Secretary of State for India, London “wonderful way 
with the Arabs” and “we have taken his measure”
18 IOL/R/l 5/297 Vol ii, August 15th 1929 Secretary of State for India London to Viceroy Government of 
India copies to Political Resident, Political Agent Bahrain, detailing the five conditions; Ward page 167 
September 20th 1929, Holmes in London to Ward “(we must) carry out the Colonial Office wish and see 
you personally”; Chevron Archives Box 120797 August 2nd 1929 Davis in London to Gulf Oil cc 
Standard Oil California and October 24th 1929 Gulf Oil to E&GSynd and October 24th 1929 Standard Oil 
of California (Loomis to Berg) discussing the Colonial Office insistance on Holmes as Chief Local 
representative. Vice President Loomis said although the Iraq Oil Adviser position was extremely attractive 
“because o f his long connection with E&GSynd and the Kuwait and Bahrain conditions, Holmes felt that 
he ought to stay with the syndicate”
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Government to quiet existing unrest and maintain peaceful conditions in those regions 
and particularly to uphold British prestige in view of change in British policy in 
permitting American capital, and consequently American influence, to secure a footing 
in the Persian Gulf...”
The final arrangement was the appointment of Holmes, for five years or as long as the 
arrangement was “mutually satisfactory”, at US$25,000 a year plus expenses, paid one 
third each by Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California and E&GSynd. Both American 
companies declared themselves “on the whole” satisfied with this arrangement and 
Standard Oil of California believed “Major Holmes should be able to take care of the 
interests of Gulf Oil and the E&GSynd in relation to Kuwait, as well as doing all he is 
able to do for us in Bahrain”. 19
Having fulfilled the requirement of obtaining, in person, the two American oil 
company’s agreement to all conditions and so facilitating the transfer of the Bahrain 
Concession to Standard Oil of California, Janson and Holmes headed back to London. 
As they crossed the Atlantic, the US stock market recorded its worst ever trading day, 
wiping out $14 billion by 3 pm on October 29th 1929, a day that went down in history 
as the beginning of the Great Depression. The Colonial Office still held all the cards. 
Throughout this entire period of negotiation, and formal and informal govemment-to- 
govemment contact, the Colonial Office had succeeded in keeping any discussion of 
Kuwait off the agenda.
Saudi Arabia
The need to build the oil pipeline from Iraq to the Red Sea in order to ensure the 
Turkish Petroleum Company’s monopoly of Iraqi oil brought about the next political 
episode to impact on the development of the Arabian Peninsula’s oil resources. To clear 
the way for the Iraqi oil pipeline, Britain and the Government of India intervened 
militarily on Bin Saud’s behalf to bring an end to the Ikhwan rebellion. On completion 
of this campaign, the previous ruling that Bin Saud communicate only through the 
Government of India’s Political Resident was dropped and Abdul Aziz Bin Saud’s
19 Chevron archives, Box 120797 January 17th 1930 Gulf Oil’s Wallace to Judge Feuille “they view 
Holmes as a strong factor”, the Americans had selected a Mr Montague Grant Powell whom they wanted 
to place as either British Director, or-Chief Local Representative. January 18th and January 22nd 1930 
Feuille to Loomis and January 23rd 1930 Telegram Loomis to Wallace and January 24th 1930, Wallace to 
Feuille. Loomis and Gulf Oil’s Wallace agreed “both our American companies, in fact, have the highest 
and most sincere regard for Major Holmes and are convinced that he is the best man available for the post 
on account o f his proved abilities”
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independence was endorsed. At the same time, Britain recognised Iraq’s sovereignty 
and eventual admission to the League of Nations. In pursuit of the argument that 
external events led to Britain’s compelling the Government of India to stand aside -  and 
thus opened access to the Arabian oil fields -  this episode is now examined.
Influence of Iraq oil pipeline: 1929-1930
Due to Bin Saud’s military campaign, culminating in his capture of Mecca and Jedda, 
followed by the two waves of the Ikhwan rebellion in that area, Frank Holmes had not 
been able to operate his 1923 A1 Hasa concession and, after keeping up the payments 
for three years, it had lapsed. He and Bin Saud continued to exchange friendly letters. In 
January 1928, Bin Saud wrote to Holmes asking him to delay a planned visit because 
“the present business that is before us does not allow us”. Bin Saud said he hoped soon 
to be free “from our present business”; the “present business” was the Ikhwan rebellion 
protesting, in part, at Bin Saud’s relations with the British and other foreigners. In April, 
Bin Saud told Holmes he would soon return to Riyadh where he intended to call the 
tribal leaders concerned in the raids and border troubles to "adjust their difficulties". He 
told Holmes he expected to send for him in late August to discuss "our business of 
concessions".20
When Holmes returned from New York and London, oil concessions were not top 
priority on Abdul Aziz Bin Saud's mind as he fought to contain the rebellion that 
threatened to destroy his work of thirty years. British intelligence sources reported that 
over the previous twelve months Bin Saud had become increasingly unpopular and “had 
temporarily ceased to exist as a political factor”. The British were now openly afraid 
that the Ikhwan rebellion would succeed in bringing about a change of leadership in 
Nejd. While this would expose Britain’s mandates in Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan to 
attack, more importantly, it would interfere with plans to build the Turkish Petroleum 
Company’s pipeline from the Iraq oilfield to Haifa from where the oil could be 
transported to the markets of Europe.
The High Commissioner of Iraq warned the Colonial Secretary that: “If some means 
cannot be devised of controlling Ikhwan raiding, the whole desert, at least as far north 
as a line from Rutbah to Damascus, will become untenable and the pipeline and railway
20 Ward papers Box 2 December 23rd 1927 Holmes in Bahrain to Abdul Aziz Bin Saud, January 2nd 1928 
“I am ready to come at once to any place agreeable to you”; Abdul Aziz Bin Saud to Holmes in Bahrain 
“would have been pleased to fix up the time...but with great regret...”; Ward page 61 citing April 21st 
1928 Holmes to Gulf Oil reporting he had received a messenger from Bin Saud, Holmes was also asked for 
“particulars o f Caterpillar tractors, building materials and many little things”
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must take a northern route through Syrian territory." This would take the pipeline out oi 
the areas under British control and place it predominantly within the French mandate, 
something distinctly unpalatable to Britain. 1
From June 1929, construction of the pipeline had taken on immediate urgency. Under 
the terms of its original 1925 concession Turkish Petroleum was given 32 months in 
which to select 24 plots each of eight square miles. The Iraq Government would then be 
free to make its own selection of 24 plots to be offered on the open market by sealed 
bids. The oil company’s selection should have been completed by November 1927 but 
they had obtained a twelve month extension. In May 1928 they sought a further 
extension. While the company was delaying, an independent British Italian syndicate, 
the British Oil Development Company, approached King Faisal to obtain oil leases that 
should soon become available; British Oil Development’s offer included a promise to 
build a railway from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Turkish Petroleum moved to keep 
British Oil Development out of the game. If they were granted a two year extension on 
final selections, they countered, they would immediately commence the survey for the 
pipeline, and build a railway to the Mediterranean. Simultaneously, the company 
initiated discussions with the Iraq Government aimed at modifying the terms of the 
original concession and, prudently, declared they had changed their name from Turkish
Petroleum Company. From now on they would be known by the patriotic “Iraq
22Petroleum Company".
British end Ikhwan rebellion: January 1930
With the stakes now being the monopoly of Iraq's oil, the British were determined to 
bring the Ikhwan troubles to an end in order to ensure the construction and security of 
the oil pipeline. Every assistance was extended to Bin Saud. The Government of India 
supplied arms and ammunition. The British positioned an entire unit of aircraft and 
armoured cars to patrol the frontiers of Iraq and Kuwait, cutting off access to grazing by 
the tribes and preventing their obtaining even basic supplies. As though herding sheep, 
the British pushed the tribes into an area where Bin Saud, fortified with British supplied 
modem armaments, could finish them off. As the India Office reported to the Colonial 
Office: "The rebellious forces are to some extent hemmed in ... in deference to a request
21 Helms, Christine Moss, The Cohesion o f Saudi Arabia, London: Croom Helm, 1981, page 235 “ceased 
to exist as a political factor”; Helms page 228 citing February 28th 1928 High Commissioner Iraq to 
Secretary o f State for the Colonies “the whole desert . . . will become untenable”
22 Shwadran page 247 details the BOD approach and the original “selection” requirement, on page 248 
Shwadran states “the British had never meant to abide by this system...”
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for cooperation from Bin Saud a zone has been cleared some 15 miles deep along the 
frontier of Kuwait... Bin Saud has further been assured that, should the rebels cross the 
frontier line into Kuwait or Iraq, steps will be taken to eject them, and that instructions 
have been given for the concerting of military measures to this end."
In the last quarter of the year, Abdul Aziz led his army, outnumbering the rebels three to 
one, to deliver the knockout blow. The Ikhwan were caught in the deadly crossfire of a 
dozen British supplied machine guns, the existence of which Abdul Aziz had carefully 
concealed, and were pursued across the desert by automobiles and trucks carrying 
mounted guns, also supplied by the British. Royal Air Force (RAF) ground forces, 
situated inside the Saudi frontier, prevented any escapes.
The British were not merely observers in the defeat of the Ikhwan. On December 30th 
the rebellious Aman and Mutair Tribes surrendered to the RAF, on the Iraqi side of the 
border. The British told them to go back, and after much discussion, they did so, but 
into Kuwait territory. Several days later, RAF planes and armoured cars caught up with 
them and, through the simple expedient of dropping bombs in a circle around the 
village where they were sheltering, pinned them until the Political Agent Kuwait could 
arrive to “persuade” them to surrender to Bin Saud. On January 9th 1930 the three 
leaders surrendered, to the RAF, and were sent by air to Basra. The RAF then rounded 
up stragglers and used armoured cars to “escort” them to also surrender to Bin Saud. 
“Escorted” by the Commander of a British warship and the Political Agent Kuwait, the 
three leaders were flown from Basra to Bin Saud’s war camp, and ceremoniously 
handed over to Bin Saud by the Government of India’s Political Resident. In an elegant 
understatement, Bin Saud’s Minister recorded, “the King thanked the British for their
23friendship and kindness of which they were continually offering fresh proof.”
The way for the Iraq Petroleum oil pipeline was cleared by a Treaty of Friendship 
signed by Abdul Aziz Bin Saud and King Faisal of Iraq on February 24th 1930. The 
British set up this meeting on board HMS Lupin, under the supervision of the High 
Commissioner of Iraq. Bin Saud’s independence was recognised and British 
representation at Jedda was raised from a consulate to a legation. On March 24th, a new 
agreement was signed with the Iraq Petroleum Company giving sole rights to all land
23 Williams, Kenneth, Ibn S a ’ud, The Puritan King o f Arabia, UK: Jonathan Cape, 1933, page 235 “the 
value of arms and ammunition supplied by the Government o f India was 31,500 sterling. . .provision has 
been made for the British taxpayer to repay to the Government o f India two-thirds o f the amount”; Helms 
page 271 citing January 2nd 1930 Minute India Office (Laithwaite) “to some extent hemmed in”; For this 
episode see Helms page 250-274, Lacey pages 204-214, Howarth, David, The Desert King, UK: Quartet 
Books, 1980, pages 152-164, Glubb, Brigadier John Bagot, The Story o f  the Arab Legion, UK . Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1948, pages 61-64 saying “the plain was strewn with dead and dying men and animals. The 
RAF were sick with killing...(we) followed the retreat and took prisoners”; Wahba page 143 “friendship 
and kindness”
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east of the Tigris, covering an area of 32,000 square miles; the company guaranteeing 
prompt construction of the pipeline. In June 1930 a new treaty with Iraq was signed by 
which Britain renounced its mandatory rights and recognised lull sovereignty, thus 
allowing Iraq to join the League of Nations. This would bring to an end what could be 
termed the “rule by British Advisers” that had existed since 1927 when Britain had 
ostensibly recognised Iraq as independent, but had used the Anglo Iraq Treaty to lock in 
a 25 year “alliance”.24
If taken in chronological sequence, the breakthrough for actual signing of the 
concessions occurred more or less simultaneously in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This 
thesis will look first at Kuwait where the Government of India and Anglo Persian 
continued to dominate, before proceeding to the resolution of the A1 Hasa concession, 
in which Standard Oil of California takes centre stage
Kuwait
The argument of this thesis, that rule by the Government of India was the prime factor 
that impeded development of Arabia’s oil fields, is best illustrated by the case of 
Kuwait. Despite the seven negative surveys and Anglo Persian’s insistence that Kuwait 
was oil dry, the Kuwaitis really did believe they had oil. Yet, 25 years passed from 
Shaikh Mubarak’s willing agreement to the 1913 exclusive “convention” with the 
British until the first oil flowed in October 1938.
Kuwait became a casualty of Britain’s aiding of Bin Saud’s put-down of the Ikhwan 
rebellion that raged across the area where construction of the pipeline was planned. As 
British attention focused on Iraq, and Bin Saud’s independence was recognised as a 
factor in ensuring the Iraq pipeline, Kuwait was viewed as a bargaining chip to be 
played either with Bin Saud or Iraq as the occasion demanded.
24 Shwadran page 251 the first pipeline was a parallel 12 inch line from Kiruk to Haditha a distance o f 150 
miles, where it branched off in two directions, one line going to Haifa (Palestine) for a distance of 470 
miles and one to Tripoli (Lebanon) a distance of 380 miles; construction was completed in 1934. Anglo 
Persian and Dutch-Shell received their share of Iraq oil at Haifa, the Americans and French received theirs 
at Tripoli; The hostility of the Iraqis, displayed by the 1920 Iraq rebellion, prompted the British to 
manipulate Faisal Bin Husain A1 Hashem (son of Sharif Husain o f Mecca) into position as King o f Iraq in 
August 1921, by this means they hoped to continue “indirect” rule. However, King Faisal 1, and the 
emerging Iraqi nationalists, were commited to achieveing full sovereignty. See Hitti, Philip, K, History o f  
the Arabs, London: Macmillan 10th edition, 1970, pages 752-753, Goldschmidt Arthur, jr, A Concise 
History o f the Middle East, USA: Westview Press, 3rd edition 1988, pages 202 and 276
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Kuwait’s discomfort was increased as the Government of India fought to retain its 
authority against encroachment by Whitehall and the British administrators of Iraq. As 
will be seen, when the Acting High Commissioner of Iraq advocated absorption of 
Kuwait into Iraq the Officers of the Government of India countered by seriously 
proposing full military occupation similar to that of Gibraltar.
The external factor that released Kuwait was Persia’s demand for a fair deal from its 
oil, followed by the 1931 unilateral cancellation of the Anglo Persian concession. The 
tactic adopted was an attempt by Anglo Persian, backed by Officers of the Government 
of India, to persuade the Shaikh to grant them the Kuwait concession; it was calculated 
the realisation that Anglo Persian was pursuing an alternative concession, in Kuwait, 
would pull the Persians back into line.
Kuwait’s delicate political position: 1930
Unlike Bahrain, where Persia’s claim to sovereignty had placed the status of Bahrain 
before the League of Nations, there was no international spotlight on Kuwait. 
Additionally, the conviction that Kuwait had no oil led to it being characterised as of no 
intrinsic economic value. British officials in Iraq were now openly advocating the 
absorption of Kuwait. The Acting High Commissioner advised that the British 
Government “should, in fact, assist any tendency there may be in the direction of
25encouraging the absorption of Kuwait by Iraq”.
The possibility of allowing Kuwait to pass quietly to Iraq had been under discussion 
since the end of the Ikhwan rebellion. It is telling that, although the stated purpose of 
the HMS Lupin conference was to draft a new frontier agreement, and so directly 
concerned Kuwait, the Shaikh of Kuwait was not invited to attend. After the Anglo 
Saudi Agreement, and the Treaty of Ujair, this was the third agreement involving its 
own borders on which Kuwait had had no input. Although predictable, the result was 
the same. Kuwait gained nothing at all. The severing of Kuwait's territory enacted at 
Ujair was confirmed. Moreover, Bin Saud was not required to lift his ruinous blockade
on trade with Kuwait; this was to continue for a further seven years, with very little
26objection from the British.
25 Bilovich page 185 citing Colonial Office memo o f August 1930 that quotes July 24th 1930 Acting High 
Commissioner Iraq “encouraging the absorption of Kuwait by Iraq”
26 Bin Saud imposed a fierce trade boycott against Kuwait in 1921, the year before the Ujair conference. 
He coveted the customs dues earned by Kuwait (and Bahrain and Iraq) on goods passing into his territory. 
His goal was to gain these tariffs by forcing the people to use his own ports which, he believed, would then 
develop to rival the long established entrepot trade of Kuwait and Bahrain After the Ujair conference,
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The whole discussion of the status of Kuwait highlighted the tension between the 
British Officials and the Colonial Office holding overall responsibility for policy, 
including towards Iraq and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand and the authority of the 
Government of India administering Kuwait and the shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf on 
the other. The prospect of Kuwait being taken from her outraged the Government of 
India. Having been deprived of the goal of gaining Mesopotamia as a colony for India, 
they were not about to stand by and see their post-World War One compensation 
package -  authority over the Shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf -  picked off one by one.
The Political Agent in Kuwait was now Colonel H R P Dickson, rehabilitated from 
India through the good offices of friends, promoted from Major to Colonel, and posted 
to Kuwait after twelve months as Secretary to the Resident in Bushire. Kuwait was 
considered a backwater; the arrival of Dickson and his family in May 1929 brought the 
number of European residents to eleven. He experienced a flurry of excitement while 
the British were cracking down on the Ikhwan rebels on Kuwait’s borders and a 
moment of glory when he accompanied the Political Resident overseeing the rebel 
leaders’ surrender to Bin Saud. Since the end of the Ikhwan rebellion, Kuwait had sunk 
back into insignificance so much so that its absorption into Iraq could be 
contemplated.27
When he thought, in 1923, that he was going to be attached to Bin Saud, Dickson drew 
castles in the air for his superiors of a powerful British High Commission overseeing 
Bahrain, Kuwait and the Trucial States, with its headquarters in Riyadh, and himself as 
High Commissioner. Now he sketched a scene in which Kuwait would be “the future 
Gibralter of the Gulf’ under a “form of military occupation”. Dickson’s idea was that 
“especially after 1932 when Iraq will obtain her independence” Kuwait, under military 
occupation, could dominate the Gulf, protect the eastern air route and provide a base 
from which the British could “threaten” Basra, Muhammerah, the Euphrates Valley and 
Nejd. From Kuwait, Dickson said, Britain would be able to “strike at the flank” of 
either Bin Saud’s territory or Iraq should they be at war with each other “and it is to our 
advantage to come to the assistance of one or the other.” Dickson claimed the Ruler of 
Kuwait “would welcome” being under British military occupation.
Kuwait struggled under the combination of Bin Saud’s boycott and the loss o f 70% of its revenue in the 
form o f taxes it used to collect from the tribes in the territory now excised by Percy Cox. An unintended 
consequence was a healthy increase in trade for Bahrain. Most goods intended for Nejd, no longer able to 
move overland, passed through Bahrain and on to Bin Saud's ports o f Jubail, Qatif and Ujair 
27 Dickson’s wife, Violet, says page 66 her husband was given the job of Secretary to the Political Resident 
in the Persian Gulf in 1928 through “the good offices” o f his then employer, the Maharajah of Bikaner; 
Freeth, Zahra, Kuwait Was My Home, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956, page 11 “in 
1929 ..Europeans and Americans numbered only eleven”, Zahra Freeth is Dickson’s daughter
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The Political Officers viewed the possibility of Frank Holmes and his American 
partners gaining a foothold in Kuwait as a threat to their hegemony. In the guise of 
objecting to American involvement, the Officers were in fact arguing for a tightening of 
the Government of India’s grip on Kuwait. Dickson forwarded his long and detailed 
scheme for the “Gibraltar of the Gulf’ to the Political Resident, Lieutenant Colonel 
Hugh Vincent Biscoe, with a personal letter enthusiastically agreeing with the 
Resident’s own objections to Holmes’ concession proposals. Dickson declared, “the 
points you have also noticed and mentioned in your letters to London ... Holmes’ 
ambitious schemes of railways, telegraphs, canals, ports etc. Fancy if all came true and 
we found them all in American hands! It would be an intolerable position.” The 
Resident had warned the Colonial Office that, if Holmes’ syndicate succeeded in its 
development propositions, “the Shaikh would become a puppet in the hands of the 
Americans and Britain would, to a large extent, lose the influence it had exercised and 
its whole position in the Persian Gulf would be threatened.” The Resident advised that
“on strategic grounds it is desirable to maintain the independence of Kuwait”. Dickson
28concurred wholeheartedly, particularly "as Iraq is now going from us".
The Government of India won the day. As Holmes was returning to London once again 
to discuss the Kuwait concession with the Colonial Office, the instruction was being 
circulated that there would be no change in policy towards Kuwait. Iraq would not be 
encouraged to absorb Kuwait. It would be maintained as before, as an unofficial 
“protected state” administered by the Government of India, through the Political 
Resident and the Political Agent. Conveniently, it would also serve as a “buffer” 
between Bin Saud and Iraq. There would be no difficulty in maintaining this position, 
the officials stated, because they could easily “command obedience” from the Shaikh of 
Kuwait -  as long as he was kept aware that protection from the territorial ambitions of 
both Bin Saud and Iraq depended solely on British good will. Cheerfully, they
29concluded, “this fortunate situation may be expected to continue”.
28 IOL/R/l5/5/28 V o l . l l l  September 22nd 1930 Secret Political Agent Kuwait (Dickson) to Resident
(Biscoe) "Gibralter of the Gulf', "could threaten", "would welcome" and "in American hands!" see also 
IOL/R/l5/638/D73 September 25th 1930 Personal Political Agent Kuwait (Dickson) to Resident (Biscoe) 
"if Holmes succeeded...(we could) say goodbye to our ever getting a decent harbour and landing place for 
our flying boats, ships, store depots and godowns . not to mention the pleasantest part of Kuwait for our 
personnel, officers and men" and September 30th 1930 Confidential Resident (Biscoe) to Lord Passfield, 
Colonial Secretary; “In my despatch o f April 30th 1930 I expressed the view that on strategic grounds it 
was desirable to maintain the independence of Kuwait...”, see also October 6th 1930 Confidential Resident 
(Biscoe) to Colonial Secretary (Lord Passfield) cc Government o f India, Political Agent Kuwait, in which 
the Resident advocates that Holmes appointment as Chief Local Representative be used to confine him to 
Bahrain “...some arrangement under which Holmes (would have to) reside for some stipulated period, say 
nine months in each year, at Bahrain” rf ^
29 Holmes may have been glad to get back to London, see Holmes papers, August 10th 1930, Holmes in 
Kuwait to Dorothy “I have been working out here for five years. During this time I have only had about 
ten months with you, that is rather a little, ten months out of 60 months...”; Bilovich page 185 quoting 
Colonial Office memo of August 1930 “this fortunate situation”
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Americans again enlist diplomatic assistance: December 1931
The Shaikh of Kuwait continued to resist all persuasion to cease dealing with Holmes. 
When Well No.l was spudded in Bahrain, Holmes predicted, “so we are on the way to 
prove if there be oil or not. I have much faith we will have luck and strike a good flow.” 
He was anxious to be doing the same in Kuwait where the concession was effectively 
blocked to him by a new definition of the “British Nationality Clause”. The new 
definition dictated not only control, but the capital also, of the concessionaire company 
must remain purely British and transference of any concession rights could only be 
effected to another purely British company, with the specific approval of the British 
Government. The new definition was moving back to the concept of the 1913 
“convention” which the Viceroy of India had noted “gave monopoly rights to Great 
Britain against foreigners and ... gave us control over selection of even British 
Companies”. This was exasperating to Holmes who wrote his colleagues “we have been 
patient and considerate to a fault ... we are now justified in making use of every
30weapon, diplomatic or otherwise, that we possess”.
The suggestion of “diplomatic means” acted like a starting pistol on the Americans at 
Gulf Oil. They truly believed it was their diplomatic representation that had made the 
breakthrough in the Bahrain Concession. They had no grasp of the significance of 
Persia’s claim to sovereignty over Bahrain and subsequent submissions to the League of 
Nations. In their corporate view, it was American diplomacy that had bent the British to 
its will and, if they had done it once, they could do it again. Within days of receiving a 
copy of Holmes’ letter, Gulf Oil officials were in the State Department in Washington 
again pouring out their woes with the Government of India, the Colonial Office and the 
51% British Government owned Anglo Persian Oil Company. On December 3rd 1931 
the State Department instructed the American Embassy in London to take up the matter
o  i
with the Foreign Office.
30 Administrative Report for Bahrain 1931 (Pryor) describing Well N o.l “Shaikh Hamad worked the drill 
for the first few blows. The rig quivered under the impacts and His Excellency glanced at it and said ‘the 
machine is drunk!”; Clarke page 127 citing November 2nd 1931 letter from Holmes to Ward ’’much 
faith. . .strike a good flow”; IOL/R/15/1/649/C.30, May 12th 1929 Viceroy, Government o f India Simla to 
Secretary o f State for India, London “monopoly rights to Great Britain”; the previous definition was “a 
British company registered in Great Britain or a British Colony” without specific mention of the source of 
capital, The Bahrain Petroleum Company was registered in Canada, at the time Canada allowed total 
repatriation of profit to a parent company, in effect all profit from Bahrain, received in Canada, could be 
repatriated to Standard Oil o f California in San Francisco; Chisholm page 130, November 1st 1931, 
Holmes in Kuwait to E&GSynd “.. it has been proven the Shaikh is willing to grant the concession to 
E&GSynd without the Nationality Clause if the Colonial Office permits.. .they, not the Shaikh, are the 
stumbling block. . .the Shaikh is anxious to commence at the earliest opportunity” and “now justified”
31 Chisholm pages 130-141 reprints all related American State Department and Embassy correspondence 
and Foreign Office replies. Bilovich page 193-230 examines this episode in detail
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The Foreign Office was displeased. They had no responsibility for the Arab states in the 
Persian Gulf. In their opinion, any matter related to the shaikhdoms could only be of 
minuscule importance in their global responsibilities. Yet the Foreign Office was 
currently involved in two issues for which they certainly needed to maintain the utmost 
goodwill of the USA. On the agenda was a request to the USA for a postponement, 
because of the Depression, of repayment of Britain’s substantial World War One debt. 
They also wanted American cooperation in restraining Japanese expansion in the Far 
East, particularly China. The Foreign Office did not want to antagonise the State 
Department over an area as peripheral as the Arab shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf.
On examination, the Foreign Office concluded it would be impossible to “justify, to any 
impartial tribunal, insistence upon stricter conditions in the case of Kuwait than in the 
case of Bahrain”. As it became clear to them that so many departments were now 
involved -  the Government of India, the India Office, the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, 
the Petroleum Department and the Colonial Office -  the Foreign Office took on the task
32of mediating a solution.
By previous bureaucratic standards, the Foreign Office made rapid progress, nudged 
along it must be said, by Andrew Mellon, now United States Ambassador to London 
appointed by President Herbert Hoover. On April 9th the Foreign Office officially 
replied to the United States Embassy that the British Government would no longer 
object if E&GSynd renewed its application to the Shaikh of Kuwait for an oil 
concession, to be subsequently transferred to the Gulf Oil Corporation. Two days later, 
the Foreign Office called in John Cadman to inform him of this message to the 
Americans. Anglo Persian’s latest geological survey, enthusiastically applauded by 
Dickson as an opportunity to “hold things up” for Holmes in Kuwait, had done no better 
than the previous six. Cadman told the Foreign Office that, according to this latest 
geological information, some oil might exist in Kuwait but it would be of a very heavy 
nature that in the long run would be of no interest. From Anglo Persian’s point of view,
32 The correspondence is in IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV, February 3rd 1932, India Office to Government of  
India. IOL/R/15/1/639/D78, March 15th 1932 Secret Memorandum by Admiralty; PRO/FO371/16001, 
March 16th 1932, Admiralty to Foreign Office; IOL/ R/15/1/639/D78, March 19th 1932, Air Ministry to 
Foreign Office; IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV Feruary 25th 1932 Viceroy o f India to India Office and February 
6th 1932 Resident (Biscoe) to Government o f India and February 5th 1932 Resident (Biscoe) to Political 
Agent Kuwait (Dickson). And Bilovich page 200; The Admiralty objected to “what appears to be an 
assertion that Kuwait is independent”, the Viceroy referred to “FIMG policy in the Gulf region 
authoritatively defined by the Secretary o f State in the House o f Lords May 5th 1903” by which he meant 
Curzon’s invoking of the Monroe Doctrine and added “we regard the Shaikh of Kuwait and other Arab 
Rulers as our wards”; The Resident (Biscoe) warned “in a short time Arab shaikhs would look to foreign 
interests, who would doubtless not stint money, rather than to the British government as dispensers of  
favours and we should, to a large extent, lose the influence which we now exercise and the whole position 
which we have laboriously built up would be threatened’; Bilovich pages 205-206 Biscoe personal note to 
Dickson “Foreign Office are very sensitive on the subject of the Americans and we are never anxious to 
define or emphasise our special position in the Gulf’
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he said, “the Americans are welcome to what they can find there”. Anglo Persian had 
decided to abandon Kuwait and “take no steps” to acquire a concession.33
Bahrain oil strike: June 1932
Informed by Anglo Persian’s geologists, Arnold Wilson in London assured Dickson that 
“the latest information that has reached us from Bahrain as to the progress of Holmes’ 
well there is by no means favourable, and I have little doubt that it will shortly be 
abandoned”. Before this letter reached Dickson in Kuwait, a cable arrived from the 
Resident. It read: “Political Agent Bahrain reports that Bahrain Petroleum Company 
have struck oil and that well is making over 70 tons a day.”34
Ten days after the Bahrain well came in, despite the definite statement to the Foreign 
Office that they had no interest whatsoever in Kuwait, Anglo Persian put another 
proposition to the Shaikh, although it does seem to have been a half hearted gesture. In 
contrast to Frank Holmes’ unwavering relations with Shaikh Ahmad maintained over 
nine years, this was the first occasion since Arnold Wilson’s visit in 1923 that any
33 The 77 year old Andrew W Mellon took up this position in February 1932, he personally retained 
substantial financial interests in Gulf Oil Corporation; Chisholm page 128 January 20th 1931, Petroleum 
Department to Anglo Persian and lOL/R/15/5/238 Vol 111 Confidential Colonial Office to Resident 
(Biscoe), when Cadman was approached by British officials early in 1930 as to whether he would “be 
prepared to undertake exploration for oil in Kuwait” in order to keep Holmes and the Americans out, 
Cadman claimed that for Bahrain and Kuwait, “very little detailed geological work has been done and 
reports leave little room for optimism” and that the search for oil was “a very long shot” on which 
expenditure would be futile and that geological information he possessed decided him “not to take any 
further steps in the matter”. However, IOL/R/15/1/621/F79 August 25th 1931 Anglo Persian to Petroleum 
Department/Mines Department/Board of Trade and IOL/L/PS/lOR/1388.9 Vol,993 October 11th 1930 
Petroleum Dept, to Colonial Office authorised a geological party “at no expense to APOC” to Kuwait, 
under P T Cox, to “make a thorough examination”, including drilling, (Cox was also instructed to try to 
win favourable Kuwait public opinion and throw a spoke in Holmes’ wheel). Dickson was so pleased he 
wrote personally to Arnold Wilson, see IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV, September 25th 1931 “You can rely on 
me to try and get the Shaikh of Kuwait to hold up things where Holmes and his crowd are concerned 
pending your people coming to a decision. Between ourselves l feel confident of doing this. Let me know 
if ever I can be of further assistance. I am very Imperialistic and cannot stand the thought of an American 
concern getting in here”; Bilovich page 218 “welcome to what they can find there”; IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol 
IV, April 13th 1932 APOC Abadan (Elkington) to Dickson “as a result of our investigations at Kuwait, 
our London principals have decided to abandon operations in the area and to take no steps at present to 
acquire a concession from the Shaikh”; IOL/R/15/1/639/D78 April 14th 1932 Dickson to Resident 
(Biscoe) Dickson was devastated and fumed “I see Holmes’ and his friend Mellon’s hand in this”; The 
Resident renewed his campaign to have Holmes restricted to Bahrain for nine months of the year, or better 
still, dismissed as Chief Local Representative
34 IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV, May 30th 1932, Wilson to Dickson “shortly be abandoned” and continued “this 
increaes the prospects of unfavourable results at Kuwait, and makes us correspondingly the less inclined to 
leap into negotiations without looking, but I need say no more as you will be in touch with Abadan”and 
June 4th 1932, Telegram, Resident (Biscoe) to Political Agent Kuwait (Dickson). Oil was actually struck 
in Bahrain on the night of May 31st 1932. The well was tested next day, June 1st, and proved to be in 
commercial quantities
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Anglo Persian official had even bothered to visit the Shaikh of Kuwait. This time their 
idea was that Shaikh Ahmad should accept their offer of a prospecting licence only. 
Although the Deputy General Manager Abadan was accompanied by a persuasive 
Dickson, the Shaikh’s reception was “extremely frigid”. He rejected Anglo Persian’s 
latest proposal out of hand. He said that what he required was a draft oil concession, on
35the same lines as that submitted by Holmes.
At the end of June, Anglo Persian Chairman John Cadman issued instructions to 
prepare a concession, similar to Holmes’, that would combine exploration, prospecting 
and mining licence into one agreement to be presented to the Shaikh of Kuwait. 
Although Anglo Persian knew exactly what was in Holmes’ draft -  because Dickson 
had passed them a copy -  they still offered lower royalties, the same as they were 
paying in Iraq and Persia.
Influence of cancellation of Anglo Persian’s concession
Anglo Persian’s strange behaviour seems to have had more to do with Persia than with 
Kuwait. For more than two years, Persia had been agitating for a fair deal from Anglo 
Persian. The Persians now clearly understood that a wealthy and powerful industry had 
been developed in their country in which they had no real share and little financial 
reward. The Persian press consistently depicted the Anglo Persian concession as serving 
the interests of imperialists and capitalists. Newspaper reports portrayed the original 
granting of the concession as one perpetrated by ignorant officials bribed by 
unscrupulous foreigners. Persia was demanding a shareholding in the company, a 
percentage of the profits from all the company’s operations, not just those in Persia, and 
elimination of all “free” allowances to both Anglo Persian and its personnel. Now in 
June 1932, the annual statement for 1931 had just been completed. Royalty payments to 
Persia for that year were to be 307,000 sterling. The Persian Government protested, 
refusing to accept the royalty, and things were not looking good.
35 Chisholm page 25 “prospecting licence only”, Bilovich pages 235-239 “extremely frigid”
36 The growing Persian disaffection is noted in Ferrier page 600-607 and Shwadran page 42. On August 
7th 1931, Cadman declared Anglo Persian would no longer contemplate a revision o f the concession 
because “the demands o f the Persian government were greatly in excess of anything which the company 
could accept”. Discussion continued on the basis for calculating the 16% net profit to which the Persian 
Government was entitled. Persia claimed it was owed money from previous years. Ferrier page 618 says 
that Anglo Persian viewed Persia’s demands as threatening “future developments elsewhere”, Shwadran 
page 42 says Persia’s “excessive demand” was for a guaranteed annual income o f 2,700,000 sterling, 
Shwadran page 42 “Persian Government protested”
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By feigning interest in Kuwait and lodging an offer, albeit one unlikely to be accepted 
because it contained terms lower than those offered by Holmes, Anglo Persian could 
play up the appearance of having an alternative to its Persian oil and by this means 
shake the confidence of the Persian protests. This tactic was having some effect in 
Persia where officials began to attribute Anglo Persian’s “bad faith" in refusing to 
seriously renegotiate to an intention to transfer future development activities elsewhere.
In September, the British Government undertook a comparison of the two applications 
for the Kuwait concession, one from E&GSynd and now one from Anglo Persian. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, they concluded that Anglo Persian’s was the most 
advantageous. The comparison was remarkably creative when reporting on Anglo 
Persian’s lower royalty and refusal to pay customs duty. The report hypothesised that a 
lower royalty “will have the greater inducement to produce oil” while “too high a 
royalty will retard production”. Anglo Persian’s offered royalty, it was noted, “is 
approximately” the same as that in Iraq.
Both companies had negotiators in Kuwait. Holmes was acting for Gulf Oil. Anglo 
Persian’s negotiator was thirty-year old, Oxford educated, Archibald Chisholm. His 
“general assistant and interpreter” was Hajji Abdullah Williamson. The same Hajji 
Williamson, the not so ex-spy, whom Anglo Persian sent to Kuwait in 1925 charged 
with discrediting Holmes and bribing the Shaikh’s advisers. Dickson, and the Resident, 
continued to pressure the Shaikh to grant the concession to the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company. Dickson made frequent visits to the Shaikh for the purpose of “making it 
quite clear to him”. Dickson never wavered in maintaining a steady stream of subtle, 
and not so subtle, innuendoes and threats. He referred to the “efforts and intrigues of 
Kuwait’s neighbours”, Bin Saud and Iraq. He reminded the Shaikh of Bin Saud’s trade 
blockade and Iraq’s tax on his date gardens. Dickson warned Shaikh Ahmad, “it would 
be the greatest pity if you in any way now alienated HMG’s sympathy and support by
38opposing their well known wishes and doing anything foolish ...”
37 Chevron archives, Box 0426154, February 8th 1933, Holmes in Kuwait to E&GSynd, enclosing a copy 
of the British Government “comparison” passed to him by the Shaikh of Kuwait. Bilovich page 250-253 
gives the State Department reaction as noting “not one favourable comment is made with respect to the 
E&GSynd draft; on the contrary, some of E&GSynd’s offers are twisted and misrepresented in such a 
manner as to make them appear unattractive even when they are obviously more advantageous to the 
Shaikh than are the terms o f Anglo Persian’s draft”; APOC’s royalty was Rs2.10 per ton. E&GSynd’s was 
Rs3.8. E&GSynd offered 1% custom duty on all oil produced, calculated on the value of the oil at the 
wells while APOC offered “no similar provision”. The report stated “it is not usual to impress a customs 
duty in addition to a royalty”
38 Hewins page 219 quotes Chisholm telling him in a personal interview that APOC was “not interested in 
finding oil in Kuwait ‘But we had to get the concession so as to protect our huge investment in Persia’.”; 
IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol IV October 3rd 1932 Confidential Dickson to Resident (Biscoe) “knowing the 
Shaikh, as 1 do, he is easily swayed and not possessed o f much strengh o f character.’’and “great pity if now 
alienated”; Dickson papers. Box 3/File 5, October 3rd 1931, Personal Dickson to Resident (Biscoe) 
suggesting “granting Holmes a visa for Kuwait may have to be reconsidered"; IOL/R/15/5/239 Vol TV,
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The Shaikh of Kuwait understood that the implied threat was of being left naked before 
the territorial predations of his neighbours. Now he was also under pressure to grant the 
concession on the basis of the British Government’s identification of the superior offer. 
The Shaikh perceived he was being used as a pawn in a bigger game, the Persian 
concession, and he was convinced Anglo Persian had no intention of faithfully looking 
for oil, much less working his concession.
Unlike Bin Saud, and even the Shaikh of Bahrain, Shaikh Ahmad A1 Sabah had always 
believed there was oil in his territory. The belief had passed to him from Shaikh 
Mubarak who, sure that doing so was the initiating act to development of his country’s 
oil, had signed the 1913 “convention” with the British while urging them to go with his 
son to see “the place of oil”.
The Shaikh of Kuwait could not afford to let any resource he may have remain idle. 
Kuwait was in dire economic distress. Dickson’s Report for 1932 was even more heart­
rending than that of 1931. In Kuwait, he reported, “... suffering and acute want among 
the lower classes of the town is a new and pathetic feature ... gangs of beggars began to 
roam the town ... some 2,000 starving Persian refugees arrived, driven across to the 
Arab coast from their own country by hunger ... they filled the streets and byways 
imploring all and sundry to assist them, they were followed by a wave of Persian 
fishermen. The Ruler decreed all Persians without visible means of support be 
repatriated to their own country ... (Kuwait) sent them in dhows and dropped them on 
the left bank of Shatt A1 Arab ... some 2000 Kuwaitis died from smallpox in the town 
alone, in the four months between July and October”.40
Like Kuwait, Persia was in desperate need of money. Now Persia turned the full force 
of her frustration on the foreign entity in her midst. The Shah of Persia personally 
announced, at a Cabinet Meeting on November 26th 1932, the outright cancellation of 
the concession held by the Anglo Persian Oil Company from the Persian Government. 
He charged that the company had never allowed Persia to inspect expenditures in order 
to safeguard the supposed 16% of net profit, that the company had never submitted to 
the Persian Government any detailed account or other evidence of its expenditures nor 
the expenditure of all its subsidiaries, that it had refused to pay Persia a share of the 
royalty of subsidiary companies and refused to pay income tax (introduced in 1930).
October 10th 1931 Dickson to Resident (Biscoe) Very Confidential (I told the Shaikh) I would write 
requesting his written assurance he would definitely insist on a “Nationality Clause”, as given him 
previously, being inserted. I would write a second letter, for the Shaikh to sign, as a reply “in suitable 
terms”. I told the Shaikh only in this way could he recover all lost ground and obtain HMG’s approval and 
support...” The Shaikh o f Kuwait refused Dickson’s proposal
39 Chisholm page 89 October 27th 1913 Shaikh Mubarak A1 Sabah to Percy Cox “to show the place”
40 Administrative Report Kuwait 1932 (Dickson) “suffering and acute want”
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Furthermore, Persia stated it could not accept that, according to Anglo Persian, all it 
was owed from the 1931 net profit of some three million sterling was 307,000 
sterling.41
While Anglo Persian was reacting with intense hostility to Persia’s action, Bahrain’s 
second oil well came in with a rush, on December 25th 1932. Belgrave, the Adviser in 
Bahrain, captured the historic moment. In his memoirs Belgrave wrote: ‘The area was 
covered in great ponds of black oil and black rivulets were flowing across the sand. Oil, 
and smoke like gas, was spouting gustily from the drilling rig and machinery. The 
workmen were dripping with oil.” Belgrave said; “It was a great day for Major Frank 
Holmes, who now saw the visible proof of what he had always believed.”4“
By January 1933, when the dispute between the Persian Government and Anglo Persian 
went before the League of Nations, the British were publicly threatening Persia that 
they would “take measures” to “preserve” Anglo Persian’s rights. The Persians could 
not miss the implications of the British warships that appeared in the Gulf. Arguing on 
behalf of “a British company”, the British Government dismissed much of Persia’s 
claims as “ancient history” and argued that “exploitation of oil had brought nothing but 
good to Persia, as evidenced by the total of 11,000,000 sterling”, paid over some thirty 
years, “in royalties to the Persian Government”. The Persian Government pointed out, 
among other issues, that “as to the 11,000,000 sterling, which it had received in 
revenue, customs duties alone for the period 1901-1932 would have amounted to almost 
20,000,000 sterling, had the company paid them.” In February, the League of Nations 
hearing was suspended in favour of another attempt at negotiations between the two 
parties. Negotiations began in Geneva on February 4th and continued in Paris on the 
10th and 11th with no result. At the end of February, it was agreed to take the 
negotiations to Teheran.43
Colonial Office bows out: April 1933
It is necessary to divert at this point in order to look at several developments having an 
impact on the Kuwait oil concession. One was the Colonial Office decision to step 
away from any involvement in the Persian Gulf. Another was the successful campaign 
of the incoming India Office to have Frank Holmes dismissed from his position as Chief
41 Ferner details the unilateral cancellation on page 628 and Shwadran on page 45
42 Belgrave, Charles, Personal Column, London. Hutchinson, 1960, page 83 “visible proof’
43 Shwadran pages 44-50 details this episode including “British warships did appear in the Persian Gulf’
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Local Representative of the Bahrain Petroleum Company. A third factor was initiation 
by John Cadman, Chairman of Anglo Persian, of the principle of an international oil 
cartel.
The Colonial Office had by now had enough of the whole subject of the Persian Gulf. In 
particular, they were exasperated with the quarrels over oil. As has been shown, 
administration of the Gulf States had been left to the Government of India, with referral 
to the Colonial Office only in matters of “political significance”. The Persian claim to 
sovereignty over Bahrain came into this category.
But the Colonial Office found that the matter of oil was dragging them ever deeper into 
a quagmire of inter departmental quarrels, plots and counter-plots, and activities that by 
no stretch of the imagination could be characterised as aiming for the best interests of 
either the people or the Rulers of the Persian Gulf. The Colonial Office wanted out. 
Expressing extreme irritation, it recorded that, in its view, “oil was an unclean subject” 
and “we are not in control, we are not interested, and the Middle East Department is not 
staffed to deal with it”.44
Colonial Office interests were soon formally passed to the India Office, thereby 
removing any objective oversight of the Government of India towards the Persian Gulf. 
At the final meetings before transfer of responsibilities the representatives of the 
Government of India, and the India Office, agreed that Frank Holmes’ “activities” 
would be a hindrance to the smooth implementation of the decisions being agreed at the 
meetings. The solution, according to the India Office, was the one promoted by the 
former Resident (Biscoe) that Holmes, in his capacity of Chief Local Representative of 
the Bahrain Petroleum Company, should be confined to Bahrain. The Colonial Office 
pointed out that at the time of the Agreement of June 12th 1930, “Holmes’ appointment 
was in fact made at the insistence of His Majesty’s Government. It was HMG, and not 
the company, who wanted Major Holmes appointed.”
That was too bad, the other members at this meeting agreed. They said the company 
should now be told that “Major Holmes’ activities are not regarded with favour by 
HMG. It was essential that a representative of the company should be continually 
resident in Bahrain and, perhaps, another representative should be appointed in Holmes’ 
place.” This meeting was reminded that, in the opinion of the Bahrain Political Agent 
(Prior), “if Major Holmes were required to reside in Bahrain for, say ten months in 
every year, he would probably resign the appointment, if only for reasons of health”. 
The meeting thought this an excellent prophecy. “If so”, the minutes of the meeting
44 Bilovich page 256 citing February 20th 1933 Minute of the Colonial Office
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noted, “insistence on such a period of residence might well be the easiest way out of our 
difficulties”. The Colonial Office remarked that it “would prefer not to take any action 
in this matter” and bowed gracefully out of the Gulf.4>
The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office had appealed for common sense rather than 
what they viewed as unnecessary spite and had pointed out that the proposed 
replacement, the American manager of the oil company, “would be a reversal of HMG 
policy” because the whole idea of the Chief Local Representative was “based on the 
necessity of his being a British subject”. Nevertheless, they were outvoted. The follow 
up came in an August 25th “secret” telegram from the Secretary of State for India in 
London, to the Political Resident and the Government of India. The Bahrain Petroleum 
Company, the Secretary of State for India reported, after being subjected to “oral 
presentations” had “decided to replace Frank Holmes as Chief Local Representative”. 
The Political Officers promptly told all the Gulf Shaikhs that Frank Holmes had been 
“exiled” and would not be permitted to return. They were to be furious when he 
bounced back as the negotiator for the Gulf Oil Corporation in its Kuwait Oil Company 
joint venture with Anglo Persian.46
The second matter of significance to the Kuwait concession was the behaviour and 
management policies of John Cadman. The discovery of oil at Bahrain had embarrassed 
him in June and questions had been raised in Parliament. Persia’s cancellation of Anglo 
Persian’s concession had added to his discomfort. In November 1932, ten days before 
Persia’s unilateral move, Cadman delivered a speech at the American Petroleum 
Institute Convention, in which he advocated the benefits that would accrue to the oil 
companies by the formation of an international “oil cartel” designed to lock out
45 IOL/R/15/1/623 Vol 82 & 86, Confidential Record of a meeting held at the Colonial Office on April 
26th 1933 to discuss various questions relating to oil in the Persian Gulf. And IOL/R/15/5/242 Vol.VII, 
Final Record of a Meeting (adjourned from April 26th 1933) held at the Colonial Office on May 3rd 1933 
to discuss various questions relating to oil in the Persian Gulf.
46 IOL/R/15/5/242 Vol. VII, Draft of a Meeting held at the Colonial Office on July 26th 1933 to discuss 
Certain Questions Connected with Oil in the Persian Gulf; Present. Colonial Office, Foreign Office, India 
Office, Admiralty, Petroleum Department. From the Minutes of this meeting the suspicion arises that the 
matter of the granting of Bahrain Petroleum Company’s application for an extension may have been 
“linked” to the demand that Frank Holmes be relieved of his position as Chief Local Representative. And 
August 25th 1933 Secretary of State for India London to Resident (Fowle) and Government of India 
“decided to replace Frank Holmes”, tellingly, the letter adds, “company will not renew application for 
extension of prospecting licence, for the moment, but propose to do so once Holmes has ‘handed over’.”; 
Clarke page 143, the Shaikh of Bahrain told Holmes that, in the matter of replacing Holmes, the “British 
political people had attacked him with sail and oars in action.” And Clarke page 144 the company’s 
opinion was that they had little option to asking Homes to resign “but it should be definitely -  and 
obviously -  forced by the India Office” and not Standard Oil of California. Holmes tended his official 
resignation on September 14th 1933 and the Bahrain Petroleum Company’s London office commented “no 
doubt the voice of the British Government will (now) play an all important part”. The extension requested 
by the company was granted shortly afterwards; Chisholm page 39 “exiled”, Chisholm asked the Shaikh of 
Kuwait if he could expect an improvement in Anglo Persian’s negotiations “now that Major Holmes is 
apparently unemployed”
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competition and tighten supply through the allotment of regional oil production quotas.
Approaching Cadman after this speech, Gulf Oil executives accused him of blocking 
their company even though Anglo Persian had shown nothing but disdain for Kuwait 
since the early 1920s. From the documentary evidence, it appears that this was the 
occasion where Cadman personally created the myth that Anglo Persian would maintain 
forever after, rather than admit its technical failures and Holmes’ geological skill.
When E&GSynd had first come to them, Cadman said, they did not want the concession 
“at that time”. He said Anglo Persian had continued to believe they could permit 
Kuwait “to lie fallow” and probably make a much better trade with the Shaikh of 
Kuwait at “some later date”. He said the company thought it was “good trading tactics 
to advise Holmes they were not interested”. Cadman maintained that Anglo Persian did 
not think “for a moment” that anybody else might come in and take over the 
concession. This was a remarkably unconvincing excuse from Cadman as Anglo 
Persian had already experienced precisely this scenario unfold in Bahrain, which they 
had also turned down. Now Cadman strongly advised Gulf Oil to agree to a partnership 
with Anglo Persian, along the lines just detailed in his speech.47
Perhaps recognising that the Shaikh of Kuwait was not going to change his mind and 
favour Anglo Persian, Cadman followed up with a personal approach to American 
Ambassador Andrew Mellon in London. He stated that Gulf Oil and Anglo Persian 
bidding against each other would raise the price of the Kuwait concession. He said the 
two companies should come together to exploit “this region on a 50-50 basis”.
Cadman defined “50-50” as Anglo Persian “working the concession at such a rate as 
would be compatible with world market conditions.” In other words, Cadman was 
putting into practice the cartel principle he had enunciated to the American Petroleum 
Institute of fixing prices by regulating production and blocking competition.48
Cadman made a great show of stopping in Kuwait on his way to reopening negotiations 
with the Persian Government in Teheran. Cadman’s tactics were well understood by the
47 Chevron archives, Box 0426154, Principal Documents in Regard to Kuwait Organisation (1951) Part- 
11, Background o f the Kuwait Oil Concession, its 50-50 ownership by the D ’Arcy Exploration Company 
(Anglo Iranian Oil Company Ltd) and Gulf Exploration Company (Gulf Oil Corporation) through the 
Kuwait Oil Company, And the restrictions o f the Agreement of December 14th 1933, page 18 for Cadman 
remarks. See also Ward page 176, March 16th 1933, Department o f State Division of Near East Affairs 
Memorandum regarding Cadman’s conversation with Gulf Oil; See also Ward papers, Box 2, September 
12th 1933, Madgwick to Ward “Beeby Thompson tells me Cadman is wild at having missed Bahrain. His 
geologists turned it down”
48 Chisholm page 176, March 1st 1933, John Cadman to APOC’s Sir John Lloyd and page 175 March 16th 
1933 Memorandum Department of State Division of Near East Affairs
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Foreign Office. They agreed Cadman should not go directly to Teheran, but should 
detour to Kuwait, and make the Shaikh an improved offer. There would, they said, be 
advantages in not “showing any undue haste to reach Teheran" and “keeping the 
Persians guessing” as to what he might be doing in Kuwait. Approvingly, the Foreign 
Office commented that the Persians must inevitably imagine Cadman “was negotiating 
another concession on which to fall back if his negotiations for a renewed Persian 
concession did not go well”.
The Shaikh of Kuwait again turned down Cadman’s offer saying he had “given his 
promise” to Frank Holmes that he would not close with Anglo Persian without giving 
him the opportunity to revise his offer. Cadman did not take this very well. Before the 
meeting closed, he mercilessly warned the Shaikh that should the concession go to the 
Americans, Anglo Persian in their own interests would be compelled to declare an “oil 
war” that would hinder development of any Kuwait oil.49
British officials were buoyed by the announcement on April 29th 1933 that Anglo 
Persian had signed a new agreement with Persia. The Report of the League of Nations 
noted, “the dispute between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the 
Imperial Government of Persia, which was brought before it last December, is now 
settled”. While Persia had improved some of its conditions, most particularly a 
minimum income guarantee and the right to have a representative view selected 
documents and observe some board meetings, it was by no means a clear victory for the 
Persians. The unresolved issues would simmer for years and culminate in 1951 with the 
acrimonious nationalisation of Iran’s (Persia) oil industry.
Gulf Oil joins Anglo Persian: December 1933
Fresh from negotiating success with the Imperial Government of Persia, John Cadman 
now turned to Gulf Oil and laid out the only chance it would ever have of moving into 
Kuwait. He warned them Gulf Oil “will not get a concession over our opposition”. He 
said he had “no objection to Gulf Oil as a joint partner” but they must realise that he
49 Bilovich pages 278-280 citing March 16th 1933 Minute by Foreign Office “keep the Persians guessing”; 
Chisholm page 177 citing APOC Minutes o f Sir John Cadman’s interview with Shaikh Ahmad on March 
25th. 1933 “declare an oil war”; See also page 180, May 17th 1933 Frank Holmes to E&Gsynd “APOC 
has told the Shaikh that (Gulf Oil) approached him with the view to combining forces in obtaining and 
working the Kuwait concession ”. And Bilovich page 281 noting that a myth has been perpetuated that 
Holmes made a “dawn” visit to the Shaikh before Cadman arrived in order to extract the promise that he 
could top any offer Cadman made. As Holmes was in Cairo on March 25th, this is obviously impossible. 
Ward gives this dramatic story on page 227 and seems to have got it from Dickson, whom he interiewed in 
1955 see Ward 2nd Appendix page 255(a). This myth has been made much of in subsequent publications
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was not prepared to commit to “any set development program” for Kuwait. Cadman 
made it quite clear that he would countenance development of Kuwait “only at such a 
rate and at such times as would meet the needs of Anglo Persian for crude oil”. Had the 
Shaikh of Kuwait been at these meetings, he would have heard Cadman clearly spell out 
exactly what he had long suspected -  that Anglo Persian had no intention of faithfully 
exploring and developing Kuwait’s oil. Cadman was adamant, moreover, that “under no 
circumstances would he deal with E&GSynd”. Cadman’s message was that Gulf Oil 
must break its contract with Anglo Persian’s long time nemesis, E&GSynd, or he would 
see to it that Gulf Oil’s prospects in Kuwait were completely crushed.50
Gulf Oil concluded pragmatically that while the Shaikh may not “willingly” grant his 
concession to Anglo Persian he would be prevented giving it to an American owned 
company. Despite Gulf Oil’s constant entreaties, and active cooperation, the American 
Government had proved unable, or unwilling, to exert the level of pressure required on 
the British Government. The State Department had declared itself satisfied with a 
Foreign Office undertaking that, despite the British Government’s reporting that Anglo 
Persian’s offer was superior, the decision on awarding the concession would be that of 
the Shaikh of Kuwait alone. Gulf Oil decided to ditch E&GSynd and throw in their lot 
with Anglo Persian. Gulf Oil did, however, insist that Frank Holmes remain as its 
representative in the negotiations. 51
It is probable that Holmes and E&GSynd refused to sign the “Release & Quit” Gulf Oil 
needed unless this point was first agreed. Holmes had promised the Shaikh of Kuwait 
he would do his best to protect his interests. Chisholm observed that the Shaikh of 
Kuwait “was content to bide his time ... due to his faith in his old friend Holmes’ 
willingness, and ability, to get him the best possible terms, in any circumstances”. The 
Shaikh himself had confidently predicted that Holmes would return, that he would not
50 Chevron archives, Box 0426154, Principal Documents in Regard to Kuwait Organisation (1951) etc etc, 
Gulf Oil recognised Cadman’s move to initiate an oil cartel, a 1932 memorandum from Gulf Oil’s Chief 
Vice President Wallace in this file observed; “Anglo Persian has recently completed its combination with 
the Dutch Shell for the protection of their present ‘as is’ position. . .they are frankly afraid this situation will 
be disturbed and possibly upset if we are left at liberty to proceed in Kuwait without any let or hindrance”
51 See Shwadran page 388 citing US Senate American Petroleum Interests in Foreign Countries, pages 
318-319, as in the case of Bahrain, the State Department claimed credit for the arrangement between Gulf 
Oil and Anglo Persian, claiming “the continued representation of our Government had secured equal 
American participation in this important field, which otherwise might be wholly British”; Chevron archives, 
Box 0426154, Principal Documents in Regard to Kuwait Re-Organisation (1951) etc etc, page 22/24/25, 
in this file is the secret “private preliminary” agreement between Gulf Oil and Anglo Persian, signed 
December 14th 1933, that restricted Kuwait Oil Company from “ever injuring” APOC’s markets 
“wherever situated, at any time, directly or indirectly”. Ward page 233 reprints the lengthy document of 
Gulf Oil’s dissolution of contract/s with E&GSynd, implemented January 30th 1934 paying 36,000 
sterling for E&GSynd’s “release & quit” allowing them to combine with Anglo Persian; the Kuwait Oil 
Company was formed on on February 2nd 1934; Hewins page 222 refers to the combination of Anglo 
Persian and Gulf Oil as “ganging up” on the Shaikh of Kuwait
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“throw me to the wolves” and that he would “preserve me both politically and 
commercially”. Holmes had kept his house in Kuwait and in November his cook and 
servants had returned there. In the negotiations for the Kuwait concession that would 
now be conducted on behalf of the new Kuwait Oil Company, Gulf Oil appointed Frank 
Holmes as their negotiator. The legalities had been taken care of by specifically
52including Frank Holmes, by name, in the E&GSynd release documents.
Subsequent negotiations conducted jointly by Holmes and Anglo Persian’s Archibald 
Chisholm on behalf of the Kuwait Oil Company, the venture formed between Anglo 
Persian and Gulf Oil, are covered in Chisholm’s The First Kuwait Oil Concession 
Agreement: a Record of the Negotiations 1911-1934 and Thomas Ward’s Negotiations 
for oil Concessions in Bahrain, El Hasa (Saudi Arabia), the Neutral Zone, Qatar and 
Kuwait. However, neither publication dwells on the conclusion that becomes evident in 
the chronology and documentation, that in the face of the formidable odds presented by 
the combination of Anglo Persian and Gulf Oil, the Shaikh of Kuwait and Frank
53Holmes joined forces in order to obtain the best deal possible for Kuwait.
The Shaikh of Kuwait and Frank Holmes had been close personal friends for some 
eleven years. They were relatively close in age; in 1933 Ahmad was 47 years old and 
Holmes was 58. They shared many character traits; both were affable and enjoyed a 
joke. They shared a liking for good food, good coffee and good tobacco. Both men had 
carried responsibility from a young age. Holmes was not yet 18 when he was sent to the 
South African goldfields where he took part in the Jameson Raids. He had experienced 
the Boxer Rebellion, uprisings in Mexico, earned recognition at Gallipoli and lived 
through Flanders. Ahmad was an admired veteran of desert warfare and had 
distinguished himself at the 1920 Battle of Jahra. The two men had first formed a bond 
based on the implicit belief each held that Kuwait did have substantial oil resources; 
their shared goal was to liberate those oil riches.
There were signs that Holmes and the Shaikh were working together, but none of the 
other participants seemed to notice, at least for some time. Relevant signs included the 
fact that Holmes’ estimates of what the Shaikh would accept on a given detail were 
consistently higher than those of Chisholm. His predictions that the Shaikh would be 
immovable on a given point, such as the royalty, were invariably proved correct. And 
the Shaikh appeared to have an uncanny knack for throwing in an additional demand,
52 Chisholm page 38 “faith in his old friend Holmes” and page 39-40 “not throw me to the wolves” also 
citing cable from Yateem in Kuwait. And IOL/R/15/5/242 Vol.VII, November 18th 1933 Kuwait Political 
Agent (Dickson) to Political Resident (Fowle) “...it is common property in Kuwait” Holmes will shortly 
arrive “to start fresh negotiations with the Shaikh for an oil concession”
53 See Chisholm page 38-41 by which it seems that Chisholm did suspect the Shaikh and Holmes had 
drawn together in the face of adversity.
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such as an annual petrol provision at no cost, each time he appeared about to give on a 
detail -  a negotiating tactic that had long been associated with Holmes’ style. Several 
times Chisholm remarked how prescient Holmes was in his forecasts of the Shaikh’s 
behaviour but put this down to a “sixth sense” arising from Holmes’ close acquaintance 
with Kuwait affairs and long friendship with Shaikh Ahmad.54
Secret “Political Agreement” Kuwait: April 1934
The Colonial Office had now stepped away completely leaving the India Office, in 
tandem with the Government of India, fully in charge of both policy and administration 
in the Arabian Peninsula. The Shaikh of Kuwait had been told there would be some 
form of agreement with the Kuwait Oil Company designed to “safeguard” British 
interests. But as both the Resident and the Political Agent assured him this matter 
would not concern him, the Shaikh did not expect anything more onerous than the five 
conditions in the “British Nationality Clause” imposed on Bahrain. Neither did Holmes 
who, although entrusted with negotiating all the terms and conditions of the concession, 
was not informed in advance by either Gulf Oil or the Kuwait Oil Company of the 
content of this agreement.55
The content of the “Political Agreement” dictated that ’’regardless of anything agreed 
between the Shaikh and the company”, no obligations or benefits could be transferred 
without prior consent, in writing, of HMG and never to any concern with less than 50% 
of both the capital and voting power held by British subjects. The majority of 
employees must be British, or subjects of the Shaikh, and “regardless of any agreement 
with the Shaikh” the import of foreign labour would be subject to the approval of the 
Political Agent.
As in Bahrain, a Chief Local Representative was to be appointed, and approved by 
HMG, and only permitted to deal with the Shaikh through the Political Agent. The
54 Chevron archives, Box 0426154, Principal Documents in Regard to Kuwait Re-Organisation (1951), 
Holmes’ correspondence to Kuwait Oil Company directors in London during the negotiations is attached 
to this report; Chisholm page 40-59 “sixth sense”
55 In early March Kuwait Oil Company had cabled instructions to both Holmes and Chisholm to add two 
clauses to the draft agreement now under discussion. The first referred to the means of arbitration if the 
company “failed to observe” any of the terms of what was titled the “Political Agreement”. The second 
clause declared if any of the terms of the agreement reached with the Shaikh “be inconsistent or in conflict 
with” the Political Agreement signed between the company and HMG the Shaikh’s agreement would be 
“subordinate to and controlled by” the terms of the Political Agreement. Perhaps failing to grasp the 
significance, Holmes and Chisholm agreed the Shaikh could not be asked to insert the clauses until he had 
studied the actual “Political Agreement” and so did not raise the two clauses with the Shaikh
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company was obliged to pay “due deference” to “the advice” of the Political Agent and 
the Political Resident. Also “regardless of any agreement with the Shaikh” the company 
could not use or occupy any sites which “may have been selected” by His Majesty's 
Government for defence purposes.
The company was to construct a refinery according to HMG’s directions as to “suitable 
type and capacity”. In a national emergency or war -  the existence of which HMG 
would be the sole judge -  His Majesty’s Government had the right to pre empt all the 
oil produced in Kuwait and additionally to require the company to produce the 
maximum possible of fuel oil, manufactured to British Admiralty specifications, and 
deliver this to a place determined by HMG. The price to be paid for such oil so 
commandeered would be decided solely by HMG. Finally, His Majesty’s Government 
would be “at liberty” to take control of the works, plant and premises of the Kuwait Oil 
Company at any time; compensation for such confiscation would be paid only for any 
resulting “loss or damage”.56
This secret agreement was signed on March 5th 1934 between the British Government 
and the Kuwait Oil Company. The India Office wondered when, or if, the Shaikh of 
Kuwait should be told and contacted the Political Resident saying “it seems desirable, 
at some stage, prior to conclusion of an agreement between the Shaikh and the Kuwait 
Oil Company, that the Shaikh should be informed of the Political Agreement between 
the company and HMG ...” In the event it was agreed to “hold back” telling the Shaikh 
until they could be certain he had actually committed to granting the concession to 
Kuwait Oil Company. The Admiralty worried that other oil companies, not so amenable 
to concluding a “Political Agreement” with the India Office, might jump in and grab the 
Kuwait concession. Furthermore, as the Admiralty reminded the India Office, “we do
57not want the terms of this agreement to be made more public than can be helped”.
The “Political Agreement” was finally given to the Shaikh of Kuwait on April 12th, 
together with the two clauses the Kuwait Oil Company insisted be included in the
56 IOL/L/PS/12/1 OR/1007/8 Vol.3808, India Office Confidential, Political Agreement between His 
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Kuwait Oil Company, dated March 5th 1934; See 
Chisholm page 58, the “Political Agreement” was kept hidden through the device of being transformed 
into “an exchange o f letters” between the Shaikh o f Kuwait and HMG, and “endorsed” by the Kuwait Oil 
Company
57 IOL/L/PS/12/1 OR/1007.8 Vol.3808, February 13th 1934, Secret and Important, India Office London to 
Political Resident (Fowle) “.. but method of approach to the Shaikh may be a matter of some delicacy. 
Please cable your views as to the tactics to be employed and at what stage of the negotiations, and in what 
manner, it would be best to give the Shaikh this information”; and April 10th 1934 Secret Admiralty to 
India Office “if Standard Oil o f California got hold o f the Political Agreement, as might well happen if it is 
communicated to the Shaikh, they might use it to advance a claim to the concession. ..besides, we do not 
want the terms. . .made more public than can be helped”; a similar “Political Agreement” would be imposed 
on Qatar
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Concession Contract. In something of an understatement, Dickson reported that “the 
Shaikh was very offended”. He had immediately grasped that the two clauses made the 
commercial agreement permanently subordinate to the “Political Agreement” drawn up, 
without the Shaikh’s knowledge, in collusion between the India Office and the Kuwait 
Oil Company. He pointed out he had been negotiating in good faith, going over each 
clause of the draft “time and time again”, for 48 days and was now close to conclusion. 
He charged that the content of the “Political Agreement” had been deliberately withheld 
from him until the last possible moment.
Due to his precarious political position, the Shaikh of Kuwait bitterly observed, he 
knew he could have “nothing whatsoever to say” about the imperial directives spelled 
out in the “Political Agreement” and the mention of HMG, by name, that clearly gave 
“ultimate control of the concession” to the British Government. The ramifications for 
him, he said, were that he would be seen by fellow Arab Rulers to have “signed away 
his independence”. The Shaikh said he would be a joke, a laughing stock, to Bin Saud 
and the other Gulf Shaikhs who would conclude that he was not even “allowed” to 
make a simple commercial agreement with a foreign business firm “without the British 
stepping in and forcing him to insert a 'by our leave’ clause”.
Kuwait Concession signed: December 1934
There was little the Shaikh, or Holmes could do, except hold out for the best terms 
possible for the actual concession. With some justification, the Shaikh no longer trusted 
the Kuwait Oil Company and now insisted on appointing his own London 
Representative whose sole objective would be protecting his, the Shaikh’s, interests and 
“obtaining information” on his behalf He stated unequivocally that he expected his 
current financial and other requests to be met. Under no circumstances would he permit 
any reference to the “Political Agreement” to be entered in the concession 
documentation. He said he wanted an immediate answer “as I see no good in delaying”. 
Holmes totally backed the Shaikh. He advised the Kuwait Oil Company in London that, 
if they could not agree all the Shaikh’s financial and other demands as incorporated in 
the latest draft, then they should put forward a definitive and final counteroffer.
58IOL/L/PS/12/1 OR/928/29 Vol.3811, April 24th 1934, Confidential Political Agent Kuwait (Dickson) to 
Political Resident (Fowle) copy to India Office “signed away his independence”. Dickson did not miss this 
chance to criticise the negotiations (in which he did not participate, on the express demand o f John 
Cadman, Dickson was not permitted to attend) and particularly Holmes. Dickson claimed that Shaikh 
Ahmad “did not like Holmes” and was persona non grata to him. Dickson reported that he, Dickson, had 
requested the Shaikh “as a personal favour” to insert the two clauses in the concession, the Shaikh 
declared he would not
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Gradually it dawned on the Kuwait Oil Company that Holmes may be “less than 
wholehearted” in following its instructions to reduce the Shaikh’s financial and other 
demands. Slowly, they came to the realisation that the Shaikh’s demands were 
remarkably identical with the attitude and advice the Kuwait Oil Company was 
receiving from Holmes. Seemingly incapable of imagining that any Englishman (or in 
Holmes’ case, British ‘colonial’) could be working for the benefit of the Shaikh, as 
usual they concluded that Holmes could only be aiming for some benefit to himself.59
During the final six weeks of negotiations, Holmes and the Shaikh had frequent 
meetings, to which Holmes’ supposed joint negotiator, Archibald Chisholm, was not 
invited. Chisholm was then under a cloud because both Holmes and Dickson suspected 
him of involvement in an attempt by Anglo Persian, through a front company called 
Traders Ltd, to cut the Gulf Oil Corporation completely out of the Kuwait concession.60
By November 7th, Holmes and the Shaikh had drawn up two alternatives from which 
the Kuwait Oil Company should select, which it finally did after lobbying of the 
American directors by Holmes. With Dickson as the witness, the Kuwait Oil 
Concession, in favour of the Kuwait Oil Company, was formally signed on December 
22nd 1934, on terms that Holmes had forecast the Shaikh would ask for back in March 
and had advised Kuwait Oil Company to accept. The final terms, in US dollars, were 
royalty of $1.10 per ton. Payment was $173,000 on signature with rent $35,000 before 
commercial production and $18,000 after. Holmes did get Shaikh Ahmad better terms 
than Abdul Aziz Bin Saud achieved from Standard Oil of California for the resale of the 
A1 Hasa concession (see below). Yet, the final settlement was not as attractive as the 
terms Holmes had originally offered on behalf of E&GSynd. In 1923, Holmes had also 
offered Kuwait 20% participation: this had been eliminated when Holmes was 
negotiating on behalf of Gulf Oil and was not reinstated in the Kuwait Oil Company 
terms.61
59 For example, Chisholm page 59 writes, “Holmes then aged 60 with a record o f remarkable 
achievements behind him (I was 32, this was my first big assignment) ... to secure the Kuwait concession 
had long been the final goal o f Holmes’ career both for prestige and for more mundane reasons. Not a 
wealthy man.. .he counted on his share o f rewards for successful negotiations.. also on being nominated as 
the Shaikh’s director, to be financial bulwarks for his old age”
60 Both Holmes and Dickson reached the conclusion that a last minute bid by Traders Ltd was a front for 
Anglo Persian seeking to cut out Gulf oil, both Holmes and Dickson concluded Archibald Chisholm was 
involved in this conspiracy. Much o f Chisholm’s book is an attempt to clear himself o f this charge, see for 
example, page 66, “the wholly baseless theory .. that Anglo Persian. ..were simultaneously and secretly 
doublecrossing their Gulf Oil partners by having Traders Ltd offer better terms to the Shaikh o f Kuwait”
61 Chevron archives, Box 0824611, December 23rd 1934, precis of Kuwait Concession gives final terms 
agreed. Included under “other payments”, $18,000 to help defray the Shaikh’s London trip. . .to Chief Local 
Representative $292 per month...to Shaikh’s London Representative $821 per month; See also Chisholm 
page 69/51/75/76/80, Chisholm defends the terms o f KOC’s offer on page 81 claiming “the negotiations 
were not a case of Kuwait’s British protecting power first preventing the Shaikh reaching agreement with
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In a letter dated January 5th 1935, Shaikh Ahmad appointed Frank Holmes as his 
London Representative saying, “as I have great confidence in your friendship, and 
depend upon your honesty, I have decided to appoint you my Representative in
London.” Holmes continued working in this capacity, frequently travelling to Kuwait
62and the other Arab States until his death in 1947.
The Shaikh offered the job of Chief Local Representative (Kuwait) to Muhammad 
Yateem. Perhaps remembering the trials the Political Officers of the Government of 
India had heaped on Holmes’ head when he held that job for Bahrain, Yateem refused 
it. Yateem may have been a wise man, because no sooner had the Shaikh given the job 
to Abdulla, the son of Mullah Saleh, than the Anglo Persian people, and the India 
Office, ignoring the fact that they had replaced Holmes with an American in Bahrain, 
began to agitate against his appointment using the argument that the position should be 
held by a British subject. At the end of 1935, when Harold Dickson retired at the 
Government of India regulated age of 55, he took the job from Abdulla Saleh. 
Surprisingly perhaps, it was Holmes who recommended Dickson.6 ,
When Frank Holmes returned to London after the conclusion of the negotiations, he told 
the people at the India Office that, despite the “unfavourable opinions“ historically 
expressed, he definitely considered there was a “good prospect of valuable oil in 
Kuwait”. Holmes held to this opinion as the Kuwait Oil Company proceeded to drill in 
the least likely place. That the Kuwait Oil Company began drilling near Bahra, in May 
1936, without results, can perhaps be attributed to the fact that it was Anglo Persian 
geologists who selected the first site.64
either E&GSynd or Gulf Oil then encouraging its favoured Anglo Persian to intervene and subsequently 
pressuring the Shaikh into awarding it cheaply to an Anglo-American combine”
62 Chisholm page 250 citing January 5th 1935, Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah, Kuwait, to Frank Holmes in 
London. IOL/L/PS/12/102/928/29 Vol.3811, December 12th 1934 India Office files, Article 6(c) read: The 
Shaikh shall have the right to appoint. . . a Representative in London to represent the Shaikh in all matters 
relating to this Agreement with the Company in its London office and such Representative shall have full 
access to the production records of the Company, including the agenda of the Board Meetings and shall be 
entitled to attend the Board Meetings at which the Shaikh’s interests are discussed. Salary... shall be
paid. . . by the Company and not by the Shaikh, but the travelling and general expenses of the Representative 
shall be defrayed from salary ”;
63 Dickson papers: Confidential, October 24th 1934, Holmes in Kuwait to Guy Steven, Gulf Oil Director 
KOC London “I cannot say there has been, in the past, complete confidence between Dickson and myself’ 
(However Dickson) “is now rated in Kuwait as the bosom friend of the Shaikh.. .(and now can).. visualise 
the outlook and aspirations of the Shaikh, and a more important point, of the Kuwait people. . . The Anglo 
side of this Company is suspect and the Shaikh . . . fears the treatment he is likely to receive at their hands.” 
Dickson remained as Chief Local Representative until his death in 1959. For Archibald Chisholm’s 
subsequent career see Appendix-3 Who 's Who
64 10L/R/15/1/645 Vol IX, February 11th 1935, Confidential India Office (Laithwaite) note of 
conversation with Major Frank Holmes “valuable oil in Kuwait”; Chisholm page 250, citing March 31st 
1935, Abadan General Manger to London, the geologists arrived in Kuwait on March 17th 1935 and 
included P T Cox (who delivered the 7th negative report, after four months including drilling, on Kuwait in
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In August 1938, Holmes was visiting New York and joined T E Ward for lunch. Ward 
wrote that “Holmes was confident about finding oil in Kuwait and said that he had not 
been in favour of drilling at Bahra, where the first well was abandoned at 8000 feet.” 
Holmes “had wanted the first well to be drilled at Burgan and was positive that the well, 
then being drilled, would strike oil”, Ward records, adding, “he was right!” Two months 
after Holmes’ lunch with Ward, the Burgan well struck oil. Further wells confirmed that 
Burgan was an oilfield of impressive magnitude. It was Burgan that Shaikh Mubarak 
had wanted the Slade Commission to see in 1913. To its detriment, the Kuwait Oil 
Company had ignored both Holmes’ proven instincts, and those of Shaikh Mubarak.65
A1 Hasa
Although actively involved in solving Abdul Aziz Bin Saud’s difficulties with the 
Ikhwan rebellion, and thus opening the way, the Government of India had little to do 
with the resale of Frank Holmes’ lapsed 1923 A1 Hasa concession to Standard Oil of 
California. Clearing the route for the Iraq oil pipeline had been the goal. Once this was 
accomplished, there was little interest in concessions in Saudi Arabia which, the experts 
still believed in 1933, was oil barren. The resale of Holmes’ A1 Hasa concession is a 
labrinthine story of double cross, subterfuge and betrayal that, unfortunately, space does 
not allow in this thesis.
That Standard Oil of California’s concession was Frank Holmes’ original A1 Hasa 
concession was never in doubt. As has been noted, it was Holmes’ identification of this 
field as being rich with oil that first aroused the interest of Standard Oil of California. 
The dimension of the field, as originally mapped by Holmes, was not altered for the 
resale. And, as shown, Philby secretly working for Standard Oil of California, had a 
copy of Holmes’ original map and dimensions received from Stuart Morgan. The 
concession obtained by Standard Oil of California in 1933 was Holmes’ original of 
1923, with the addition of options for other area.
1932). Ralph Rhoades, who confirmed Holmes’ positive opinion of Bahrain in 1928, was Gulf Oil’s 
geologist
65 For Holmes later life, see Appendix-2 Frank Holmes J934-J947, Ward page 244 “he was right!”; 
Chisholm, page 80, claims the Bahra site was selected from KOC surveys “and evidence derived from 
Holmes’ 1927 water wells”. Apart from his confusion about the “traces of oil” in the Bahrain wells, not 
those of Kuwait, Chisholm’s implication is not correct. From the very beginning, Holmes had advocated 
Burgan as Kuwait’s prime site. See also Ward page 231 citing KOC annual report of December 1951 “. . .all 
Kuwait production has thus far come from the Burgan field”
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Philby admitted this in the late 1950s when he described Holmes’ 1923 concession as 
“roughly the same as that now being operated in Eastern Arabia by the Arabian 
American Oil Company”. Dickson also pointed this out at the time when he 
commented, “the Hasa Concession, in respect of area especially, is virtually the same as 
was given to Major Holmes in 1923.” And Fred Davis, Standard Oil of California's first 
geologist in Bahrain and later Chairman of the Aramco Board, admitted in 1974 that the 
A1 Hasa concession, as identified and mapped by Holmes, "covered almost the entire 
area we had there at the start, and is where all our oil has been found ..." (my italics)66
Despite their later claims to have been exceedingly generous with the Saudi Arabians, 
the Americans paid less in 1933 than Holmes had done in 1923 for A1 Hasa. (This may 
have had something to do with Philby advising Abdul Aziz Bin Saud on the 
negotiations, while successfully keeping secret the fact that he was on a retainer, with 
the promise of extra staged bonuses, to obtain the concession for Standard Oil of 
California; Bin Saud received about one fifth of his original US$800,000 upfront asking 
price.)67
The financial detail of Standard Oil of California’s agreement, signed on May 29th 
1933, provided for a lump sum upfront of (US dollars) $173,000, composed of 
$150,000 (30,000 sterling in gold) together with the first year rent of $25,000 (5,000 
sterling in gold). However, the $150,000 was not a payment -  it was a loan -  to be
66 Philby Oil Ventures, page 62 “...copies in my possession of the original draft (of Holmes’ A1 Hasa 
concession)”. Furthermore, in the Editor’s Note, page 66, it is pointed out that Philby’s incorrect estimate 
that Holmes’ annual rent was 2,000 sterling is based on this draft, the amount was later raised to 3,000 
sterling in gold, plus payment each six months of a further 3,000 designated “protection fee”; Philby’s 
error on Holmes’ terms and conditions is continued in the literature today; Philby Oil Ventures page 62 
“the same as that now being operated”; IOL/R/15/5/242 Vol.VlI, June 7th 1933, Political Agent Kuwait 
(Dickson) to Resident (Fowle) “same as was given to Holmes in 1923”; Owen papers, Box la; October 
11th 1974, Fred A Davis to G Gish “is where all our oil has been found”
<>7 Philby Oil Ventures, page 127 to “work on behalf of Standard Oil of California”. Philby was paid a 
salary of US$1,000 a month, guaranteed for a minumum six months, “with substantial bonuses on the 
signature of the concession and on the discovery of oil in commercial quantities”; similar “substantial 
bonuses” are detailed in Twitchell papers (uncatalogued) January 10th 1933, Terms & Conditions, 
Standard Oil Company of California and K S Twitchell (signed New Yok between Lombardi and 
Twitchell) Twitchell’s contract included a salary of US$1,000 per month, for a minimum of three months, 
to be extended “as necessary”; an immediate deposit of $2,000 and expenses paid monthly. If, “through 
Twitchell’s efforts”, the company was successful in securing an oil concession, and proceeded on to test 
drill, he would get a “bonus” of $15,000 within 30 days of the well being spudded. Additionally, if the 
company did find “commercial production of oil”, Twitchell would receive $50,000; Philby Oil Ventures 
page 127-130 Philby told the Americans “to conduct negotiations with the government, with Twitchell in 
attendance, while I remained in the background.” Philby would provide “information and advice.” Philby 
was extraordinarily successful in keeping secret from the Saudi Arabians his well paid arrangement with 
Standard Oil of California. He later recorded that Yusuf Yasin, one of Bin Saud’s primary advisors during 
the negotiations, accused him years later saying “if 1 had known, at the time, that you were actively 
working for Standard Oil of California, I would have done my best to block the grant of the concession to 
them.” Stegner, in Discovery! claims not even Twitchell knew Philby was being paid by Standard Oil of 
California
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repaid from future royalties. The $25,000 first year rent was, in fact, the only actual 
payment. Everything else was in the form of loans with clauses in the contract dictating 
how these loans were to be repaid. After eighteen months the company would advance a 
second loan of $100,000.
When oil was discovered, and produced in commercial quantities, the company would 
make a third loan of $500,000. The royalty was four shillings a ton (matching the new 
royalty now obtained by Persia). The company would not pay either import or export 
customs duty and was exempt from all direct, or indirect, taxation. If the company 
organised its own subordinate company for the purpose of exploiting the concession, 
and if it offered shares in the subordinate company for sale to the general public, Saudi
Arabian subjects would be given the opportunity to subscribe a minimum of 20% of
68such shares.
Standard Oil of California’s 1933 agreement can be seen to be far from generous when 
contrasted with Holmes’ of a decade earlier. In 1923 Holmes terms were (US dollars) 
an upfront payment of $30,000 -  as a direct payment -  not a loan. Annual payments 
were $45,000 against Standard Oil of California’s 1933 rent of $20,000. Holmes' 
annual payment was made up of rent at $15,000 per annum plus payment each six 
months of $15,000, designated “security protection” provided by Bin Saud. Under 
Holmes’ terms, the Saudi Arabian Government held full participation in the 
development, from the beginning, in the form of a 20% shareholding and the right to 
take up, for cash, an additional 20%; if Bin Saud exercised this right he would hold 
40% of the company. The company would pay customs duty and, after the 
commencement of commercial production, would be liable for local taxes. 69
Standard Oil of California created the wholly-owned Californian Arabian Standard Oil 
Company organised under the laws of Delaware with a capitalisation of US$700,000 to 
which the concession was assigned at the end of 1933. As this was not a public 
shareholding company, no participation was offered to Saudi Arabia. That the 
concession was underpriced can be judged by the fact that, just three years later, in 
December 1936 (before oil was proven in March 1938) the Texas Oil Company bought 
a half share in the Saudi Arabian concession -  for which they paid Standard Oil of
68 Financial details o f the Standard Oil o f California 1933 purchase is in Chevron archives, Box 120797, 
Minutes o f Board o f Directors Meeting December 4th 1933, Shwadran page 292-293 and Yergin page 
291. Philby Oil Ventures, page 124, gives the date o f signature as May 10th 1933, this is certainly an error; 
Hewins page 222, referring to Bin Saud’s original request for a down payment of US$800,000 (100,000 
sterling) comments Bin Saud was “whittled down” and calls the final terms “derisory”
69 Holmes’ financial details are in Frank Holmes Personal papers that includes the original lease made in 
the name o f “Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal bin Saud, Sultan o f Nejd and its dependencies, and 
Major Frank Holmes o f 20 Cecil Street SW London in his capacity as the true and lawful attorney o f the 
Eastern & General Syndicate”
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California $3 million in cash and undertook to pay a further $18 million out of the oil 
produced in Saudi Arabia. Little wonder an Aramco official would comment some 
years later about “certain factions critical of American oil efforts in Saudi Arabia” who 
charged that Standard Oil of California “took advantage of the bare foot boys’' in its
70purchase of Holmes’ lapsed A1 Hasa concession.
Unlike Bahrain, where Holmes did all the preliminary work on his own concession and 
oil was found less than eight months after the spudding of the first well, it took 
Standard Oil of California five years, until March 1938, to unlock the secrets of A1 Hasa 
that Holmes had spotted a decade previously. Standard Oil geologists “drilled seven 
holes in Arabia and found no oil ... these seven wells cost US$7 million”, an Aramco 
geologist recorded. Some years later, Standard Oil of California Vice President, 
Maurice Lombardi, was asked whether he “had trouble getting the money” to continue 
the drilling program due to the series of dry holes. He said he had not. In what must be 
taken as a tribute to Holmes, even if unintended, Lombardi explained, “because of the 
discovery in Bahrain, we were sure there was oil in A1 Hasa”.71
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that outside events resulted in the decline of the authority of the 
Government of India. Until these events occurred, the development of the Arab oil 
fields had been blocked by the Government of India acting to support its hegemony. 
Prior to these events the only oil developer the Government of India was prepared to 
countenance in its area of influence was the Anglo Persian Oil Company and, as has 
been shown, that company’s absolute conviction that the Arab shaikhdoms were oil dry 
prevented it having any serious interest in investing either time or money outside Iran 
and Iraq.
70 Shwadran page 295 for financial detail the 1936 deal; Philby papers, Box XL11-3, April 18th 1962, Re 
(posthumous) publication of Philby’s “Arabian Oil Ventures” Gary Owen of Arabian American Oil 
Company, Washington, to Bill Sands “...in Arabian Oil Ventures there are three references to oil seepages 
in At Hasa all attributable to Karl Twitchell. No oil seepages have ever been noted by Aramco geologists -  
but there are certain factions critical o f American oil efforts in Saudi Arabia who like to say that the 
Americans knew there was oil there all the time and took advantage of the bare foot boys”
71 The Bahrain Well No.I was spudded October 16th 1931 this well “came in” on June 2nd 1932; Chevron 
archives, Box 120797, In-House interview with G G Gaylord April 25th 1958: Gaylord was sent to A1 
Hasa in 1936 “seven holes and no oil...cost US$7 million”; and In-House interview with Maurice 
Lombardi, September 9th 1955 “because of the discovery in Bahrain”, the interviewer attached this 
comment to his transcript, “This does not support Aramco publicity that attributes unusual courage to the 
company in pouring money into Arabia in depression years”
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The original principles agreed at Churchill’s 1921 Cairo Conference remained in place. 
These decreed that the Government of India held authority for the Gulf shaikhdoms, 
with the Colonial Office being called on in cases of “political significance”. The Iraqi 
model was used to ensure “maximum” British control of the company developing the 
Bahrain concessions through the medium of the “British Nationality Clause”. After the 
Colonial Office relinquished its interest in 1933 and handed this over to the India 
Office, the far more onerous, and secret, “Political Agreement”, was imposed for 
Kuwait. Both the Bahrain “British Nationality Clause” and the Kuwait “Political 
Agreement” served to preserve the power over the Arab rulers of the Government of 
India’s Political Resident and Agents.
While Iran’s oil was developed from 1908, and Iraq’s from 1920, this chapter has 
shown that it was the intransigence of the Government of India in closely guarding its 
area of influence from “foreigners” that held back commercial development of 
Bahrain’s oil until 1932 and Kuwait’s until 1938, despite Frank Holmes’ pinpointing of 
the location of these oil fields in 1923 and his continuing attempts to work them.
A1 Hasa is a slightly different story in that, following the Government of India’s original 
interference against Holmes on behalf of Anglo Persian, it was Bin Saud’s internal 
difficulties that caused the major delay, first his campaign to capture Mecca then the 
two waves of the Ikhwan rebellion. Nevertheless, it was the Government of India acting 
with the British Administration of Iraq that brought the Ikhwan rebellion to an end, on 
Bin Saud’s behalf, and so reopened access to Holmes’ lapsed 1923 A1 Hasa concession. 
Oil flowed in commercial quantities in the A1 Hasa concession in March 1938.
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SECTION THREE 
Resolution and Legacy
Chapter Eight
Legacy
Introduction
When Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939 the policy set in place at 
ChurchilLs 1921 Cairo Conference still prevailed; administration of the Arabian 
Peninsula was in the hands of the Government of India through her Political Officers, 
policy was with the India Office, taken over from the Colonial Office six years earlier. 
The Arab shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf played no part in detennining their own role 
in this conflict. They were unable to protest when Britain’s fear that the Germans might 
strike out from North Africa for the Arabian oilfields resulted in the shutting down of oil 
wells in Bahrain and Kuwait. As a result, Kuwait did not begin to export oil until 1946.
But the Persian Gulf of World War Two was not the Persian Gulf of World War One. 
The region’s war effort was not under the management of the Government of India that 
had in World War One so repressed the people of the area. Arab nationalism had already 
bubbled to the surface, particularly in Iraq. The Shaikh of Kuwait, Bin Saud and Iraq 
made cautious advances to the Germans and Italians. Young men in Iraq and Kuwait, 
concluding there could be little difference between “bossy Englishmen and bossy 
Germans”, openly gave vent to anti-British sentiments. When the Italians bombed the 
Bahrain oil installations, with little success, a group of Kuwaitis were inspired to seize 
the Kuwait arsenal which they held for several days, meeting little opposition from 
Kuwait’s officials. In April 1941 an insurrection broke out in Iraq that deposed the pro- 
British Premier. Britain responded by bringing in the Arab Legion from Jordan -  and 
flying in reinforcements from India. Suspicion of neutral Iran’s loyalties resulted in the 
August 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran.1
1 Shwadran page 388 in July 1942 Kuwait operations were suspended by the British Military as a war
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In comparison, Bahrain appeared an island of pro-British loyalty. Shaikh Hamad, whom 
the British had installed in 1923 when they so unceremoniously deposed his father, was, 
said Belgrave, the Bahrain “Adviser” since 1926, “more pro-British than any of the other 
Shaikhs”. Belgrave reported the Ruler of Bahrain “declared himself and his people 
wholeheartedly on the side of the Allies; he made a generous gift to war funds”. Such 
loyalty marked out Bahrain as the centre of Britain’s Gulf Administration after World 
War Two, and the home of the Government of India’s ideology during the war.
The contention of this thesis is that it was control of the Persian Gulf by the Government 
of India that held back the development of Arabia’s oil. Logically therefore, the 
independence of India in 1947 should have released the Arab shaikhdoms from the style 
of management employed by the Government of India. But, as will be shown, the same 
Political Officers trained and appointed by the Government of India continued in their 
positions for a decade or more and, particularly in Bahrain, there was little relief from 
the previous colonial type administration. As before, it was outside events that brought 
about change in the Arabian Peninsula.
It will be seen that the 1949 devaluation of the Indian rupee almost wiped out the royalty 
on oil due to Bahrain and Kuwait and this, together with the example of Venezuela’s 
“50-50” innovation with the oil companies, led to renegotiations and improved income 
for the Arab oil producers. Although Kuwait declared independence in 1961, full 
sovereignty only came to Bahrain, Qatar and the so-called Trucial States as a 
consequence of Britain’s withdrawal, first from Aden, and two years later, in 1971, from 
the region of the Persian Gulf. Moving quickly after independence, the Gulf States acted 
finally to gather control, after half a century, of their oil resources in their own hands.
Lastly this chapter examines the question of what was gained by diminishing the 
achievements of Frank Holmes in the discovery and development of Arabia’s oil. In
measure and all the wells were shut in; Clarke pages 174-176 for Britain’s “oil denial” policy that included 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and page 165-169 for Italian air raid; Hewins page 229 “Kuwait’s 
exports were nil until 1946”; Lacey pages 256-258 for Bin Saud’s flirtation with Germany; Hewins page 
225-227 “bossy Englishmen and bossy Germans”, “seized the Kuwait arsenal” and “reinforcements from 
India”; Shwadran page 60 “combined Russian-British force”
2 Belgrave page 120-124 “more pro-British”; Clarke page 167 goes further stating “Britain declared war 
on Germany. Next day, the Ruler o f Bahrain declared war on the Axis Powers”; Note that Shaikh Hamad 
died in February 1942, was succeeded by his son, Sulman, who died in 1961. Sulman was succeeded by his 
son, Isa (1933-1999)
Legacy 220
exploring this point, the still prevalent issue of the West’s claims to a moral “right” to 
Arabia’s oil is brought into focus.
Government of India retains its hold during World War Two
The Second World War did nothing to open up the thinking of the Government of India 
in relation to the Arabian Peninsula. Belgrave observed that several of “the ‘Politicals’ 
who served in Bahrain during the war were badly chosen and difficult to deal with ... so 
often the attitude was as though the Resident was the headmaster of a school, the 
Political Agent the form master, the Shaikh the head boy”. Belgrave understood well the 
Indian dimension of the British in the Persian Gulf. “Some of the Political Officers who 
had served in the states of Indian Princes expected the formality of an Indian Court ... I 
was in favour of a certain amount of state and ceremony on appropriate occasions 
provided it applied to the Shaikh, and not only to British officials”.3
Maintaining hegemony and keeping out “foreigners” was still the driving force. In 1943 
the Americans sounded out a proposal to install an American Consul at Bahrain to 
service Americans working in the oil companies. In March 1943 the Foreign Office, 
advised by the India Office, adopted a reasonable tone in initial attempts aimed at 
dissuading the Americans:
“The circumstances in Bahrain are exceptional ... Bahrain, like a 
number of other Arab Shaikhdoms in the Persian Gulf, is a British- 
protected State in special treaty relations with His Majesty’s Government.
In these Arab states the local Arab ruler exercises jurisdiction over his 
own subjects, and in some cases over other Arabs in his territory, but all 
other jurisdiction is exercised by His Majesty’s Government through the 
British Political Resident and the British Political Agent. The local Arab 
ruler, moreover, does not enter into relations with any foreign Power. We 
have hitherto not permitted any foreign Consuls or other Government 
Agents to reside in these Arab States, and for many reasons we should not 
wish now to alter the attitude which we have consistently maintained on 
this point ... it would of course be necessary to make it clear, if a foreign
3 Belgrave page 122 “difficult to deal with” page 125 “o f  an Indian Court”
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consul were appointed to reside in Bahrain, that he should deal exclusively 
with the British authorities and not with the Arab ruler. But there would 
always be a tendency on the part of the Arab ruler, if a foreign consul were 
to reside in his territory, to have dealings with him ... HMG would greatly 
prefer that there should be no change in the existing arrangement whereby 
no representative of other Governments reside in Bahrain. This system, we 
are convinced, has in the past greatly contributed to the maintenance of 
peace and good order. It has enabled the British representative in this area 
to exercise their influence to the fullest extent ... the growth of American 
interests in Bahrain entitles us to claim that the system has not adversely 
affected the United States.” 4
The India Office canvassed the Resident, and the Political Agents, requesting “any 
considerations ... which could be used to justify a refusal to meet the wishes of the 
Americans in this matter”. The Acting Political Agent in Bahrain supplied a number of 
arguments while warning that, if the Shaikh of Bahrain came to know of the proposal, 
“he would probably regard it with approval as emphasising the importance of Bahrain”. 
Urging the India Office to “resist the US Government in every way possible”, the 
Resident charged that the Americans had “a policy of penetration” and to allow them a 
consul in Bahrain “would undermine our whole position in the Gulf’. He said the 
Bahrain Oil Company was “British, not American”, and “bound to employ the minimum 
number of USA subjects”.
The Resident, who had maintained during the war the Government of India’s habit of 
deporting “suspicious” persons to Bombay, including an Italian Catholic priest, stated 
that the “result would be a ferment which would almost certainly compel us to declare a 
protectorate, an act which would have very serious political repercussions in every other 
state in the Gulf’. From New Delhi the Government of India declared that “the 
agreement between the oil company and HMG makes this a British company and its 
interests in Bahrain are a British charge”, and warned, “the US Government have other 
objectives in view beyond those which they have so far disclosed, including possible 
visions of oil and air hegemony along the entire length of the Arab coast” .5
4 IOL/R/15/2/854 Vol 36/2 March 18th 1943 Foreign Office to United States Embassy London “greatly 
prefer no change”
5 IOL/R/15/2/854 Vol 36/2 April 21st 1943 India Office London to Resident, Political Agent Bahrain, 
Government o f India New Delhi “to have your views , or any alternative suggestions”; April 21st 1943 
Political Agent Bahrain (Captain Michael Dixon-Acting) to Resident, re proposed USA Consulate “to
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The proposal was resoundingly rebuffed. The British suggested the Americans should 
install their consul in Dhahran, and in 1944 they did just that. But even Dhahran seemed 
too close for comfort. The Political Agent Bahrain appeared unaware his Acting 
replacement had noted that the Shaikh of Bahrain would be flattered by American 
interest in his country. The Political Agent now declared to the Resident that the Shaikh 
of Bahrain was “considerably alarmed” at the prospect of visits by the American consul. 
He claimed the Shaikh had told him “he relied on us, in whose hands the conduct of his 
Foreign Affairs rested, to protect him from such penetration ... although the United 
States is a great and powerful ally he did not desire our influence in his country should 
be shared by anyone ... in spite of my assurances, he is still deeply suspicious of even 
private visits of diplomatic representatives of our friends.”6
The letter of introduction from the new American Consul in Dhahran stated his duties 
would include “a visit to the Bahrain Islands, at least once a week, to perform such 
services as may be required”. The Resident was soon reporting, “Top Secret”, to the 
India Office London urging that the activities of the American consul “be confined to 
matters strictly within his purview”. Otherwise, the Resident warned, “our whole 
position along this coast will be rapidly undermined, more especially as he has 
expressed the desire to tour to Qatar, the Trucial Coast and Muscat”.
Nevertheless, the Resident assured the India Office, “we are extremely fortunate in that 
this individual has no knowledge of the Arab world”. The Resident reported the 
American Consul was an “inexperienced and uncouth” person, characteristics 
apparently illustrated by his having called on the Resident “in a shirt and trousers”. So 
long as the United States “are content to employ officers with these qualifications, the 
danger to our interests is minimised, although an intelligent man could secure very full 
details of local politics from the members of the American Mission who are extremely 
well informed”, he commented.
justify a refusal” also April 21st 1943 Political Agent Bahrain (Dixon) to Resident “ the suggestion that 
American Consul should be appointed to act jointly with Political Agent in hearing American cases is 
objectionable from both political and legal points of view. Political Agent’s loss of prestige would be very 
considerable and in no time he would be sharing the bench with a Persian colleague. American consul can 
attend judicial proceedings here as he can elsewhere in the Empire and also act as juryman or assessor”; 
April 27th 1943 Resident (Prior) to India Office London and Government o f India New Delhi “resist in 
every way possible”; May 6th 1943 Government of India New Delhi to India Office London and Resident 
“other objectives”; See Clarke page 169 for deportation o f Italian Catholic priest
6 10L/R/15/2/854 Vol 36/2 August 30th 1944 Secret Political Agent Bahrain (Major Tom Hickinbotham) 
to Resident “considerably alarmed”
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The Resident warned the India Office that once the Americans were “able to post 
officers with experience of the Middle East and a fluent knowledge of Arabic the 
position will become entirely different”.
Bahrain becomes repository of the Gulf Raj: 1947-1948
In late 1946, preparatory to Indian Independence, the establishment of the Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf was taken from Bushire in Iran and reset in Bahrain. As it 
was “inappropriate to hand over responsibility for dealing with the Gulf Arabs to Indians 
or Pakistanis”, the British Government announced that it would be taking over control of 
the affairs of the Residency, from London. In April 1947 the Gulf Rulers were informed 
that, owing to the constitutional changes affecting India and Pakistan, Britain would 
now deal with them directly.
The India Office retained responsibility for a further twelve months or more, even after 
its merger into the Commonwealth Relations Office, until late 1948, when the Foreign 
Office was appointed the responsible ministry. A renewed claim to sovereignty by Iran, 
prompted by the transfer of the Residency, ensured the dependency of Bahrain on the 
“goodwill” of the British Government.
Bahrain was now the repository of what remained of the Gulf Raj. The previous 
hierarchy was maintained with the Political Resident and the Officers of the Indian 
Political Service continuing to serve in their posts until they were gradually replaced by 
appointees of the Foreign Office. The last member of the old Indian Political Service 
remained at Bahrain until his retirement in 1958. The force on which the Resident had 
relied for so many years, the Indian Marine, became the Indian Navy. Nevertheless, the 
Resident was far from bereft. There were usually three British frigates in the Gulf, under 
the command of the “Commodore Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf’, and although “force 
was less often used”, a ship of the British Royal Navy could be called on “to stand by for 
the protection of lives and property” or for “mediation” at the Resident’s discretion.
7 IOL/RV15/2/854 Vol 36/2 September 3rd 1944 American Consulate Dhahran, Vice Consul (in charge) 
Parker T Hart, to His Britannic Majesty’s Political Agent Bahrain “at least once a week”; November 22nd 
1944 Resident (Prior) Top Secret to India Office London “inexperienced and uncouth”
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Under the new arrangement at Bahrain, the Resident and the Commodore lived side by 
side so as to achieve “the closest cooperation”. Conveniently, the RAF headquarters was 
just a stone’s throw away. The clause in the Bahrain oil concession, and in Kuwait’s 
secret “Political Agreement”, decreeing that the oil companies’ contact with the Rulers 
must pass solely through the British Political Agent remained in force.x
The G ulfs oil producers renegotiate: 1950
The oil producers in the Arabian Gulf chafed under the arrangements with the oil 
companies. From 1947-1952, as detailed further in the text, the American inspired 
Marshall Plan depended on the supply of Arabian oil for the rehabilitation of war torn 
Europe. Between 1945-1950 Anglo Iranian made a profit of 250 million sterling. The 
Iranian Government received a mere 90 million sterling in royalties. The British 
Government received more in taxes than Iran did in royalties. Additionally, the British 
Government made further substantial earnings through the dividends on its 51% 
shareholding, and the company sold large amounts of Iran’s oil to the British Navy, at a 
heavily discounted price.8 9
Like the Persians with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, the Saudi Arabians realised in 
1949 that it was the American oil company which was reaping the riches from their oil. 
In 1949, for example, Aramco’s profits were three times the amount the Saudi Arabian 
Government received. Moreover, the American Government was making more from the 
concession than was Saudi Arabia. Taxes paid by Aramco to the US Government for 
that year were US$43 million, $4 million more than the Saudis received in royalties. 
Using the same tactic as had the Turkish Petroleum Company in Iraq, Aramco paid no 
taxes in Saudi Arabia on the grounds that it was non-profit making because only its four 
American corporate owners took up its oil. A March 1949 article in Life Magazine 
recorded the detail that Saudi Arabia received some $110,000 a day from its oil -  while 
Aramco’s take was one million dollars each day, possibly more because “Aramco is 
secretive about its profits”. Devaluation of the Indian rupee in 1949, following India’s 
independence, reduced Kuwait’s royalty on its oil to about nine cents per barrel.10
8 Hay page 18 “inappropriate” and page 26 “force less often used”
9 Yergin page 451-452 “Anglo Iranian profit 250 million”
10 Yergin page 445 “Aramco’s profits were three times”; Anonymous, “Aramco: An Arabian-American 
Partnership Develops Desert Oil and Places US Influence and Power in the Middle East”, Life Magazine,
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The Americans blamed the oil countries’ unhappiness on the United Nations. A 
Standard Oil of California executive explained to the company’s historian that “in the 
beginning, doing business was about the same in each Middle East country, but after 
they got rich, they got difficult. Once the money had started to come in, agreements 
were ignored in favour of heavier and heavier demands for more money.” Trouble with 
oil rich countries began, he said, “about a year after the UN was formed in 1945 ... 
delegates from various countries tend to gravitate towards others with common interests 
and this leads to a pooling of information as to how much each is receiving in the way of 
oil royalties and other income.” * 11
The Gulf producers were aware that Mexico had nationalised its oil industry and 
Venezuela had improved its receipts from the oil companies. As the Standard Oil of 
California executive observed “all the Middle East countries wanted the same increased 
share. They all got it, too, except Iran, where the British held out -  and lost.” Both the 
Saudis and the Kuwaitis successfully pushed for new arrangements based on the 
Venezuela “50-50” formula. Under this method the oil company’s earnings became 
subject to a local income tax adjusted so that the combination of royalty payments and 
the income tax amounted to one half the oil company’s production profits, before 
deduction of foreign taxes. For the year 1951, Kuwait’s receipts leapt from US$30 
million to $140 million, the royalty going up from nine to 52 cents per barrel; in return 
the Kuwait concession was extended an additional seventeen years making its term 92 
years from 1934. For the same year, Saudi Arabia’s collection jumped from US$39 
million to $110 million. Iraq achieved a similar improvement by 1952 raising its oil 
income from 13.5 million sterling to 33 million in the next twelve months. 12
Bahrain had some success. After devaluation of the Indian rupee, renegotiation of the 
royalty to the Bahrain Government raised this to 29 cents per barrel from January 1950.
(March 28th, 1949) pages 62-64, 66-78, “Aramco is secretive about its profits”; Shwadran page 390 “nine 
cents per barrel”
11 Chevron archives, Box 120797, April 17th 1958, In-House interview with J.H. MacGaregill, headed 
Middle East Problems, “leads to a pooling o f information”: Clarke page 191 “June 1945 delegates from 50 
countries signed in San Francisco the World Security Charter establishing an international peacekeeping 
body and forum to be called the United Nations Organisation, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were 
immediate members”
12 Chevron archives, Box 120797, April 17th 1958, In-House interview J H MacGaregill “they all got it 
too”; Shwadran page 391 Table, Direct Oil Payments to Kuwait Government; Yergin pages 446-447 Saudi 
Arabia/Aramco December 1950 agreement “the heart o f which was the Venezuelan 50-50 principle”; 
Shwadran page 260 Iraq’s new agreement was signed in February 1952, page 271 in May 1950 Iraq had 
created the Development Board, assigning 70% of oil revenues
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Negotiations for the “50-50” agreement with the Bahrain Petroleum Company were 
conducted by the newly knighted Sir Charles Belgrave. “It was difficult”, he reported, 
“explaining to the Shaikh the ramifications of American tax laws that affected the 
discussions”. The Shaikh of Bahrain may well have been puzzled by Belgrave’s 
insistence that American taxes be taken into account. Bapco was registered in Canada, 
which did not levy corporate tax, and its marketing subsidiary, Caltex, was registered in 
the Bahamas where US taxes were not collected. Bapco did not pay American tax. The 
new arrangement reached in Bahrain raised the oil income from the 1951 US$4 million 
to $6.5 million two years later. As the oil produced by Bapco was sold to Caltex, its own 
subsidiary, at an artificially low price, Bahrain’s take on its oil bore no relationship to 
market prices. In early 1953, at the height of anti imperialist fever in Iran, which found 
its target in the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, the Ruler of Bahrain asked the oil company 
to be more revealing of its activities and to explain to the citizens of Bahrain “the 
company’s contribution to the country”. The Bahrainis, with a documented 4,000 year 
history, were somewhat surprised when Bapco responded by widely distributing a
13propaganda leaflet claiming the company’s contribution as “the story of Bahrain”.
Iran chose the Mexican option. Three days after becoming Prime Minister of Iran, Dr 
Muhammad Musadiq passed the nationalisation law on May 1st 1951, while declaring 
the Iranian people were opening “a hidden treasure upon which lies a dragon”. By 
“dragon” Musadiq meant the 51% British Government owned Anglo Iranian Oil 
Company.
Once again Kuwait was used by Britain in argument with Iran. Sir Anthony Eden, 
British Foreign Secretary at the time, recorded in his memoirs that he told the Iranian 
Ambassador in London: “I hoped the Iranians would have noticed our agreement with 
the Shaikh of Kuwait. It seemed a great misfortune that Iran was not enjoying a like 
increase in revenues.” Eden does not say whether or not he mentioned to the
13 Shwadran page 376 “29 cents per barrel”; Belgrave page 179 “ramifications o f American tax laws”, Note 
in Shwadran page 382 that Bapco was not liable for any tax, Canada levied tax only on dividends and 
Bapco never declared dividends; Shwadran page 376 Table, Royalty Payments to Bahrain; Clarke page 
209 “the story of Bahrain”; Much is written on Bahrain’s history, see for example, Bibby, Geoffrey, 
Looking fo r  Dilmun, London: Collins, 1970; Belgrave page 213, after helping to put down the 1956 
Bahrain rioting, much o f it targeting the Bahrain Petroleum Company, Belgrave sailed with his wife in June 
1957 “on the Queen Elizabeth as guests o f the Standard Oil Company o f California” for a month touring 
the USA, on page 217 Belgrave notes his son, James, was employed in the Public Relations Department of 
the Bahrain Petroleum Company from 1955-1957; See Shwadran page 382-383 for a discussion o f the 
“exorbitant profits” gleaned by Bapco “the Bahrainis received only a very small portion of the income from 
oil, compared with the company’s profits”
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Ambassador the “obdurate objections” of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company to any 
increase in payments to Kuwait, or the still secret “Political Agreement” between the 
Kuwait Oil Company and the British Government. In Eden’s view “British authority 
throughout the Middle East had been violently shaken” causing them to “move land 
forces and a cruiser to the vicinity of Abadan where the fate of the largest oil refinery in 
the world was at stake”. Only the urgent entreaties of the United States, concerned about 
a possible Soviet response, prevented their immediate use.14
The nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry focused the people of the Arabian 
Peninsula on the realisation that the reign of the Gulf Raj, enforced and policed by the 
Government of India, was all but over. Had the Indian Army and the Indian Marines still 
been available to back up British rule in the Persian Gulf, as happened in the past, the 
outcome in Iran might have been very different. There were many who regretted the 
passing of the old regime. 15
In 1956 rioting and rebellion broke out in Bahrain where the remains of the Gulf Raj 
now resided. The political uprising was aimed equally at the British political hold on the 
island’s affairs, represented by the Political Resident and the British “Adviser”, and the 
commercial hold of the Bahrain Petroleum Company. Belgrave, Adviser from 1926- 
1957, noted in his memoirs “when the Gulf was controlled by the India Office, and in 
the Residency and Political Agencies there were only a handful of British officials of the 
Indian Political Department and a staff of excellent hardworking Indians, the affairs of 
the Gulf were better managed than they are now”. Unconsciously echoing the Orientalist 
views about the “Eastern Mind” expressed in 1924 by Anglo Persian’s Abadan based 
general manager, Belgrave said affairs used to be better managed because “the British 
officials who were in the Gulf in those days, and in some cases their fathers before them, 
had spent all their working years in Eastern countries, in India, Persia and the Gulf. They 
knew the people and understood how to deal with them.”
14 Eden, Sir Anthony, Full Circle: The Memoirs o f Sir Anthony Eden, London: Cassell & Company, 1960, 
page 194 “dragon”, page 204 “would have noticed our agreement”; Yergin page 448 “obdurate 
objections”; Eden page 194-198 “moved land forces and a cruiser”; For the Iranian nationalisation of oil see 
also Shwadran pages 103-193 and Yergin pages 450-478
15 Iran paid a heavy toll for nationalising its oil industry. The nationalisation crisis of 1951-53 resulted in 
the Anglo-American engineered overthrow of the elected, reformist government of Musadiq, and the drift 
of Iran under the Shah into the American orbit, with consequences for the entire region. See Saikal, Amin, 
The Rise and Fall o f the Shah 1941-1979, London: Angus & Robertson, 1980
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Belgrave, who had charge of both the judiciary and the police, had deported politically 
troublesome Bahrainis in 1956, by British naval frigate, to imprisonment on St Helena. 
Napoleon’s place of banishment was chosen because the traditional destination of the 
Arabian Gulfs deportees, Bombay, was no longer an option. The 1956 deportations 
were questioned in the British Parliament, which perhaps explains Belgrave’s conviction 
that the authority exercised by the Government of India had been a good thing because 
“the opinions of the men on the spot carried weight and their decisions were not 
constantly countermanded from London”.
Belgrave praised the reign of the Government of India, and her Political Officers, on the 
grounds that “the British, who controlled the Gulf, were respected ... because they were 
represented in the Gulf by men who understood the Arabs”. Belgrave said connecting 
the Gulf Arabs to India had ensured “they were not interested in the affairs of the 
Levant”. Belgrave seemed to display the same Government of India xenophobia about 
“foreigners” as he concluded the rot had set in when “education, travel and most of all 
the propaganda power of the radio exposed the Gulf Arabs to outside influences ...”16
Following the July 1958 Iraq revolution, which ended the British imposed monarchy 
along with the last of the old British “Advisers”, Kuwait was the first of the Arab 
shaikhdoms to declare independence from Britain, in June 1961 abrogating all previous 
treaties including the infamous “Political Agreement”. The Yemen revolution broke out 
in September 1962, infected Aden, and continued in armed anarchy. In 1967, the British 
Cabinet, under a Labour government, issued its decision to quit Aden by the end of that 
year. The Gulf Rulers were informed that, by March 1971, Britain would also withdraw 
from the region of the Persian Gulf. Within a month of this announcement, the 
shaikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula held their first meeting aimed at achieving a 
federation.
Their aspirations were soon nipped in the bud when Britain’s opposition Conservative 
Party announced that, if they were returned to power, they would “reverse” the decision 
to withdraw from the Persian Gulf. In the election of May 1970, the British Government
16 Belgrave page 223 “the affairs of the Gulf were better managed”, page 233 questions were raised in the 
British House o f Commons about the legality o f the procedure by which three politically activist Arabs, 
subjects of the Shaikh o f Bahrain, were removed to and imprisoned on St Helena, a British colony; page 
236 “British were respected”, page 237 “outside influences”; See Rumaihi, Beyond Oil, in which the author 
argues that artificial attachment to India, with its accompanying imposed isolation, “distorted the Arab 
character o f the Gulf’
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did indeed change, causing consternation among the Gulf Rulers. Kuwait announced its 
“insistence” on British withdrawal. After touring the Gulf, the Foreign Minister of Iran 
declared there was concerted opposition “to a British military presence in the Gulf after 
1971” adding “all the states of the Gulf maintain the view that Gulf affairs must be 
handled by the countries of the region, without outside interference”.17
The new Conservative government appointed Sir William Luce, ex Governor of Aden 
and ex Resident in the Gulf, to report. In July 1967 Luce had commented in newspaper 
articles that Britain’s “continuing interest” in the Persian Gulf included the “security of 
oil supplies for the industrial world”. Luce had predicted withdrawal would result in 
“the whole area rapidly becoming a jungle of smash and grab”. From September 1970, 
however, his visit to the area led him to a different conclusion based on the realities now 
apparent in the region. Britain should withdraw on schedule, he recommended -  and 
afterwards station a naval force in the area.18
In August 1971 Bahrain ended all political and treaty relations with Britain and declared 
independence. Qatar followed in September and in December 1971 the United Arab 
Emirates was proclaimed as an independent federation. The final judgement on how the 
shaikhdoms viewed their history of being ruled by the Government of India, and her 
Political Officers, can be gleaned in the fact that not one of the states of the Arabian 
Peninsula applied to join the Commonwealth. They did, however, join the Arab 
League.19
17 The new Republic of Iraq made a claim on Kuwait, stating it had traditionally been within the vilayet of 
Basra, and if the British were going to give it up, then Iraq wanted it back; Ingrams, Harold, The Yemen, 
Imams, Rulers & Revolutions, UK: John Murray, 1963, page 129 “the Yemen revolution started during the 
evening of September 26th 1962”; Kelly, J B, Arabia the Gulf and the West: A Critical View o f the Arabs 
And Their Oil Policy, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980, page 47 “immediately quit Aden”; Kelly 
pages 57-60 and 78-81 for Conservative Party announcements, actions and policies, page 80 “Kuwait 
insistence” and “without outside interference”; Rumaihi Beyond Oil page 57-65 the first meeting of the 
Gulf States to discuss federation was held in Dubai February 25-27th 1968, just one month after Britain’s 
announcement of withdrawal
18 Kelly page 81 “smash and grab”, page 82 “withdraw on schedule”; Rumaihi page 59 The Shah of Iran in 
July 1968 declared Bahrain’s stated intention to join the union was a provocative act to which the Iranian 
Government would respond; The Shaikh of Bahrain lost his nerve saying, according to Kelly page 92, 
“Britain is weak now where she was once so strong You know we and everybody in the Gulf would have 
welcomed her staying”; Rumaihi Beyond Oil page 59, a UN commission of inquiry recommended Bahrain 
be recognised as an Arab country whose people desire independence, the Security Council resolution was 
dated May 11th 1970, Rumaihi comments “the recognition of a more prominent Iranian role in the Gulf 
was formalised in exchange for Iran’s renunciation of its claim to Bahrain”
19 Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) 1980’s “Practical Guide” series on Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE for independence details; Rumaihi Beyond Oil page 62 UAE constituent 
emirates were Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm A1 Qaiwan, Ajman and Fujairah, Ras A1 Khaimah became
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Why Frank Holmes was erased from the record
There is one final issue to be addressed -  what was gained by erasing Frank Holmes’ 
achievement from the record? Examination of this question below brings into focus the 
view, frequently still in evidence, that the western world has a “right” to Arabia’s oil. 
The conclusion is reached that the paramount gain from diminishing the role of Frank 
Holmes was to remove an impediment to both Britain’s and America’s claim to possess 
a moral right to Arabia’s oil.
The advantage obtained through erasing Holmes’ achievements from the record of 
discovery and development of Arabia’s oil comes into context when it is seen that both 
the British, and the Americans, rather than admitting a purely commercial and/or 
military interest in control of Arabia’s oil, professed to be driven by altruism. 
Historically, the British based their claim to a moral right to Arabia’s oil on assertions 
they were motivated by superior goals in that they were acting for the betterment of all 
mankind. The Americans based their claim on declarations that they had earned it; the 
Arabs owed it to them on the basis of the blood, sweat and tears they expended to find it.
The splendid vision of lofty British goals could not be spoiled by any mention of the 
gunboat diplomacy, repression, intimidation and sheer political bullying that had 
persuaded both Persia and Iraq to give up their oil and had prevented Bahrain, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia benefiting from theirs. Nor would Britain ever want to be reminded 
that she had missed out on the great oilfields of Arabia because the Government of India 
had been allowed a free hand in the Arabian Peninsula; a free hand which was used to 
persecute what they saw as a colonial interloper, geologist extraordinaire Frank Holmes.
The Americans would not wish to mar their created mythology in which virtuous, 
hardworking American pioneers self-sacrificingly toiled in the heat and sand of the
the seventh member in 1972, Lawrence, Rise/Fall/British Empire pages 559-587 covers Suez, Aden, Iran 
and the withdrawal from the Gulf, page 586 Lawrence comments “unlike Africa, or India, Arabia and the 
Gulf had never felt ...Britain's ‘civilising’ mission”; Note that in Oman in July 1970, the British engineered a 
coup in which Sultan Qaboos succeeded his father Sultan Said Bin Taimour, on his succession Qaboos did 
not abrogate the many treaties and alliances with Britain; See Rumaihi, Beyond Oil, page 53 quoting Sir 
Geoffrey Arthur, the last Political Resident in the Gulf, stating in a 1973 address given at Durham 
University “when Britain attempted to look up all the treaties and alliances binding it to the Gulf amirates, it 
proved impossible to produce a comprehensive list. Therefore, when Britain undertook to agree to 
independence, it made do with the stipulation that all prior treaties were to be annulled, without listing 
them”
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deserts, on behalf of the Arabs, until they discovered oil. As a Pulitzer Prize winning 
American journalist gushed in 1971 -  “the men of Aramco transformed Arabia” and 
what they did for the Saudi Arabians should “go on record as one of the outstanding jobs 
... in the history of the world.” Frank Holmes could have no place in folklore such as 
this. The fact that it was Frank Holmes who identified and mapped the fields, and held 
the original concessions that the Americans later purchased -  and where they found oil -  
was highly inconvenient. The record of Frank Holmes’ achievements had to go in order
70to make way for the American claim to have earned a right to Arabia’s oil.
British concessions, known as the Colonial Office model, were agreements with a 
sovereign under which the company had the right to explore for, own, and produce oil in 
that Ruler’s territory. It is important to note that oil was not viewed as an asset 
belonging to its owner, that is the country in which it was found, but belonging by right 
to those who extracted it. The same principle reverberates in the American claim to have 
earned a right to Arabia’s oil by dint of having brought it out of the ground. This concept 
was overturned when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
formed in 1960, succeeded in gaining international acceptance of the idea of national 
ownership of natural resources. Odell and Vallenilla in their 1978 work The Pressures o f 
Oil: A Strategy for Economic Revival commented on the argument prior to passage of 
the relevant resolutions through the United Nations. They stated that many industrialised 
nations supported the view that “such sovereignty was by no means absolute, in order, of 
course, to allow for the possibility of foreign companies’ rights over resources they
71discovered.”^
There was little difference between the British and the Americans in their initial 
approach to Arabia’s oil. Neither offered participation in the hugely exorbitant profits 
being made. Both manipulated production and supply in order to maintain the price of 
oil, though without extending any financial benefit to the countries in which the oil 
originated.
20 Stegner page xii “in the history of the world”
21 OPEC was formed in 1960 with 12 members, Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela (Ecuador joined in 1973 and left in 
1992); Odell, Peter R and Vallenilla, Luis, The Pressures o f Oil: A Strategy for Economic Revival, USA: 
Harper & Row, 1978 pages 63-64 “to allow for”; United Nations resolutions concerning permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources are mainly contained in General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 
3202 (S-VI) of May 1st 1974 containing the Declaration and the Programme o f Action on the 
Establishment o f a New International Economic Order and 3281 (XXIX) o f 12 December 1974 containing 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The Resolutions agreed that countries possessed 
undisputed rights to resources within their own borders.
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This united view of the West’s right to Arabia’s oil is apparent in the tenets of the 1947- 
1952 European Recovery Plan. Known after its originator as the “Marshall Plan”, this 
scheme aimed at rehabilitating a Europe devastated by World War Two, a war in which 
the Arabs played no part, through application of American aid -  and “a lavish and 
continuous supply of Middle Eastern oil”. In implementing the Marshall Plan, the price 
of Arab oil was pushed below that of American oil, resulting in “a great surge of cheap 
... Middle East oil”. As a US Government report of the time observed “without the 
petroleum, the Marshall Plan could not have functioned”. Here indeed was Arabia’s oil 
being utilised for the betterment of civilisation, but only that half of civilisation which 
existed in the (non communist) industrialised world. 22
Alignment of thinking, and action, was again clear when investigations in 1951 reported 
that the international oil companies combined to set prices. The price fixing and 
exploitative actions revealed involved five American companies -  Standard Oil of 
California, Texas Oil, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony Vacuum and Gulf Oil -  
together with British Petroleum and the Dutch Shell groups. The tactics of juggling 
quotas and production restrictions, first mooted by Sir John Cadman in 1933 and 
perfected by the international petroleum cartel that became known as the “Seven 
Sisters”, was the model on which OPEC would later draw.
Reaction was aggressively hostile, however, when it was mainly the Arabs 
implementing Cadman’s cartel principle, in the form of OPEC, rather than the Anglo- 
American “Seven Sisters”. In their 1978 publication Odell and Vallenilla discussed the
22 The plan was conceived by US Secretary of State George Marshall and announced in June 1947, 
Monroe, Britain’s Moment, page 95 and 113 “the Marshall Plan depended on a lavish and continuous 
supply of Middle Eastern oil”; Yergin page 423-426 “Middle Eastern oil was being pushed down to price 
levels below what had until then been the benchmark US Gulf Coast price” and “great surge of cheap 
production from the Middle East’, on page 425 Yergin comments “in 1946, 77% of Europe’s oil supply 
came from the Western Hemisphere. . .by 1951 it was expected 80% of supply would come from the Middle 
East” ; Note that Europe was the major market for American goods, without a prosperous Europe, the US 
faced the prospect of severe economic depression. Note also that sixteen European countries founded the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in April 1948 to administer the Marshall Plan 
(the OEEC was superseded by OECD in 1960) However, the largest amount of the US$13 billion 
American aid went to Britain, France, Italy and West Germany, in that order. After 1949 as Cold War 
tension rose, the funds increasingly went into military expenditure rather than industrial rebuilding
23 Sampson page 137-140 The US Federal Trade Commission investigated the foreign agreements of the oil 
companies, the report released in August 1951 charged the seven companies controlled all the principal oil 
producing areas outside the US, all foreign refineries, patents and refining technology, that they divided the 
world markets between them, and shared pipelines and tankers throughout the world -  and that they 
maintained artificially high prices for oil. The report said the companies were “engaged in a criminal 
conspiracy for the purpose of predatory exploitation”
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issue of united, and concerted, attempts to “break up” OPEC conducted by the members 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). “In the view 
of the United States and its allies,” the authors stated, “OPEC has neither the ‘right’ to 
exist nor even a right to insist on charging a ‘fair’ price for its oil.”24
The legacy of the early British and American claims is still apparent today. The 
industrialised world appears to believe it has a right to plenty of Arabian oil, preferably 
at a price set by the buyer not the seller (and a right to make a profit from it as every 
government does with the imposition of heavy domestic petroleum taxes). Echoes of the 
original American justification of the “right” to cheap Arab oil can still be heard when 
the Arabs are depicted as ungrateful -  “after all we’ve done for them” -  and the original 
British justification of their “right” to cheap oil is heard when the Arabs are accused of 
pushing up the price of oil, and so threatening the good of mankind and the very fabric 
of our civilisations. Both justifications are as spurious today as they were then.
The British claim examined
The best known of the Government of India’s Political Residents, Sir Percy Cox, once 
declared that “the Arab potentates” in the Persian Gulf were totally “the creation of 
Great Britain”. And the last of the Government of India’s Political Residents, Sir Rupert 
Hay, who retired in 1953, spoke of “the partnership between the Arabs of the Gulf and 
the British, that has been of most benefit to the Arabs, who have not only preserved their 
independence but acquired wealth through the development of their oil resources ... 
which only the Pax Britannica has made possible”.
The first Anglo Persian Chairman, Sir Charles Greenway, in a 1916 tribute to Sir 
Boverton Redwood, Britain’s eminence grise of petroleum, said he deserved the 
gratitude of the nation because of his role in the acquisition, exploration and 
exploitation of the oil fields of Persia. Redwood was a true patriot, the chairman said,
24 When OPEC was formed in 1960, seven o f the twelve founding members were Arab countries, plus 
non Arab Iran. The nations that signed the Convention o f the OECD in December 1960, were Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, and West 
Germany. Japan, Finland, Australia and New Zealand, joined later; Odell & Vallenilla page 62-65 
“neither the ‘right’ to exist.. nor.. charge a ‘fair’ price”
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because he had worked “to secure for the British nation that share in the oil industry ... 
to which we are entitled by virtue of our enormous consumption”.
The British were not shy about what they thought they could do with oil. In an article 
curiously entitled “The Romance of Persia’s Oil”, a British expert pointed out in 1920 
that because of its indispensable value in warfare “the nation which controls the largest 
oil supplies could in the end dictate terms to the rest of the world”. Anglo Persian’s 
second Chairman, John Cadman. addressing the American Petroleum Institute in 1921, 
referred to “those high qualities that are preserved by our two races”; he meant the 
British and the Americans. Speaking of the need for “cheap power produced from cheap 
petroleum”, he said cheap oil must be available “in the interests of civilisation and for 
the good of mankind ...”
The early British view of Arabia’s oil was clear. First, the countries of the Persian Gulf 
where the oil lay were “the creation of Great Britain”. Consequently, the creator had a 
prior right, as every parent had. Second, Britain was entitled to the oil because she used 
a lot of it. The third clinching, and it must be said imperialist justification, was that the 
oil should be given, without restriction and cheaply, to Britain because she would use it 
for the good of mankind and to preserve civilisation as we know it.
The philanthropic slant on Britain’s actions in the matter of oil was still being 
propagated in 1951 when Iran nationalised its oil industry. When Sir Anthony Eden 
drew up four “minimum” requirements for resolving this dispute, and forwarding them 
to the American mediators, he claimed to be acting to protect “all countries who had 
similar interests in foreign countries” as well as the Iranian people. Eden had experience 
in managing Britain’s oil relationships. He was Under Secretary at the Foreign Office in 
1933 when the Persian Government denounced the Anglo Persian Oil Company’s 
concession. In his memoirs, Eden claimed it was him who advised an immediate appeal 
to the League of Nations and later took part in “the negotiations that followed 
culminating in a new agreement between the company and the Government of Persia ... 
John Cadman represented the company”.
25 PRO/CO/730/26, December 20th 1922, Secret Cox to Duke o f Devonshire, Colonial Office “creation of 
Great Britain”; Hay page 18 “most benefit to the Arabs”; Owen papers, Box la, April 10th 1916, typed 
manuscript “Tribute to Sir Boverton Redwood” by Charles Greenway and Barnes, John K, “The Romance 
of Persian Oil”, The World’s Work magazine (nv/np) (June 1920) pages 143-152, “dictate terms to the rest 
of the world” and “As John Bull Views It”, an address by Sir John Cadman, American Petroleum Institute 
December 8th 1921 “interests of civilisation”
26 Eden page 199 four “minimum” requirements, pages 191-192 “took part in”
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The British claim to a moral right to Arabia’s oil, on the basis of a superior intention to 
use it to make the world a better place, was very much to the fore following the oil 
embargo imposed by the Arabs in response to the West’s support of Israel in the 1973 
war. British writer Leonard Mosley in the viciously anti-Arab 1974 bestseller, Power 
Play: Oil in the Middle East, advised of “the need” to place the Arab’s oil resources 
under “some sort of international control”. In return, Mosley said, the Arabs should be 
given “raised standards of living and freedom for all [sic] their people which will turn 
them away from war, militancy and blackmail.” An influential work, on many university 
reading lists for a decade or more, was J B Kelly’s 1980 Arabia the Gulf and West: A 
Critical View o f the Arabs and their Oil Policy. Kelly advocated everything from neo 
imperialism to western military occupation of the Arab oil fields, justifiable, he said, 
under something he called “the doctrine of necessity in international law ...”
The Gulf and its oilfields “are one of the great strategic prizes in the world“, Kelly 
declared, and could not be left in the charge of the Arabs because “no Middle Eastern 
state, least of all any of those bordering on the Persian Gulf, is the peer of any of the 
major powers of Europe”. Describing Arab oil policy as “the tactics of larceny and 
intimidation practised by the Middle Eastern oil producing states since 1970”, Kelly 
invoked the “moral right” to Arabia’s oil. Even though “desperate measures may be 
required to retain control over the Gulfs oil for the West”, he advised, this was 
preferable to “wasting effort” endeavouring to “cajole” the “regimes of the Gulf into 
acting with a sense of responsibility to the world at large”.27
The American claim examined
The seeds of the mythology and folklore claiming an American right to Arabia’s oil on 
the basis of being the area’s “oil pioneers” were sown in appearances before some 20 
congressional investigations into the petroleum industry. When the Americans moved 
into Arabia’s oil they were ideologically unable to expound a purely imperial rationale
27 Mosley, Leonard, Power Play, Oil in the Middle East, USA: Penguin Books, 1974, page 427 
“international control”. Mosley’s work is studded with vindictive allegations about the personal behaviour 
and character of the Gulf Arabs, particularly the Shaikhs, for which he provides neither source nor 
substantiation. There are many factual errors; Kelly page 499 “doctrine o f necessity in international law”, 
page 500 “the major powers o f Europe”, pages 502-504 “larceny and intimidation” and “to the world at 
large”
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of their right to Arabia’s oil -  in fact they repeatedly propagated the opposite. They 
claimed the Arabs welcomed them with open arms because of their Republican status, 
because they were not imperialists. :x
It is true that Abdul Aziz Bin Saud never forgave Anglo Persian for their personal slights 
of 1922-1923. The 1933 concession signed with Standard Oil of California did contain a 
clause prohibiting the transfer of rights and obligations, without the written consent of 
the Saudi Arabian Government. And certainly in originally granting this same 
concession to Frank Holmes in 1923, Bin Saud had required Holmes to sign a document 
specifically excluding Anglo Persian from his territory. In their mythology, however, the 
Americans extended Bin Saud’s specific objections to the Anglo Persian Oil Company 
into a mistrust of the British in general.29
The American claim that Bin Saud preferred Americans because they were republicans 
was prominent after Standard Oil of California obtained an expansion of the original A1 
Hasa concession in 1939. A New York Times article quoted company executives saying 
the King of Saudi Arabia had personally told them no European or Asian power could be 
trusted because they all had “political motives”. According to Standard Oil of 
California, Abdul Aziz Bin Saud said he “preferred to give all rights in the entire 
kingdom to us -  for much less than he could have had from others -  because ... the 
United States has no political designs on his country”. Immediately the King had signed
TOthis new concession, the USA accredited the first American Minister to Saudi Arabia.
28 Yergin page 409 “twenty Congressional hearings”; Curiously, the Life Magazine article of March 28th 
1949, pages 62-78, refers throughout to “American colonisers” and says “like most other colonists 
Aramco’s Americans spend their private lives apart from the natives” while also claiming “Aramco’s bosses 
have tried to avoid the odium of old style colonialism. They want Arabs to like Americans...Aramco 
minimum pay to its Arabs is 90 cents a day, skilled pay $270 a month, this means unprecedented 
fortune... skilled Arab employees do not often attain top rank... Aramco has even succeeded in tempering 
harsh Saudi Arabian justice with mercy. ..a doctor from Aramco now attends to paint the culprit’s forearm 
with iodine before the hand is chopped then bandages the stump. . . Aramco. . . will soon have to meet one of 
the chronic social questions of any venture in internationalism; whether or not to mix Arab and American 
students when it starts a high school, Aramco, which wants to show enlightenment, has not yet decided”
29 Abu Dhabi Documentation Centre copy of Records of the US State Department Relating to Internal 
Affairs of Saudi Arabia 1930-1944, Film-Tl 179/2, August 6th 1930, from US Consul Alexander Sloan 
Baghdad to Department of State, “King Bin Saud will not permit Anglo Persian to obtain any concession 
within the boundaries of Nejd. Furthermore (Bill Taylor, Standard Oil of California geologist visiting 
Bahrain) was informed the King had stated that if he gave an oil concession to any company and later found 
that company was affiliated in any way with APOC or had sold out to any company affiliated with APOC 
he would immediately cancel that concession." Shwadran page 293 “American concession ... contained a 
clause”
30 Levy, Joseph M, “US Company Wins Arabian Oil Grant”, New York Times August 8th 1939, page 1 
“this Arab potentate mistrusts all the European and Far East Powers”; Shwadran page 296 the 1939
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That Standard Oil of California and the Texas Oil Company, early partners in the 
American Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) did not actually believe their own 
propaganda claiming Bin Saud preferred them above all others becomes apparent in the 
events surrounding the involvement of the US Government in advancing finance to Bin 
Saud during World War Two.
In 1940, when the war curtailed production at Aramco and prevented travellers 
attending the annual pilgrimage at Mecca, Bin Saud requested financial assistance from 
the American oil company and, to the company’s chagrin, from the British Government. 
The company did make some advances against future royalties, secured by a two year 
extension of the concession period. But they were aware the British Government was 
granting subsidies to the Arab Shaikhs, and to Bin Saud, that were not in the form of 
loans and did not have to be returned. The Americans at Aramco were concerned that 
Bin Saud might repay his British benefactors by bestowing on them the only thing he 
had of value, an oil concession in his territory. They worried that while Bin Saud may 
not cancel their concession outright, he might reduce it and transfer part of it to the 
British.
In January 1941 Aramco set out to counter British influence by promising Bin Saud a 
loan of US$6 million. Two months later, in March 1941, when the US Government 
promulgated the Lend Lease Act, a program of military and economic aid to nations 
warring against the Axis powers, Aramco saw a means by which it could cast its own 
US Government as Bin Saud’s saviour, and be relieved of making the advance from its 
own funds. In appealing to the US Government to make this transaction under Lend 
Lease, the company initially played down its fear the concession may be cancelled if Bin 
Saud did not get the loan, or that the British might get part, or all, of the concession. 
Aramco professed to be humanistically concerned for the region as it warned 
dramatically “we believe that unless this is done, and soon, this independent kingdom -  
and perhaps with it the entire Arab world -  will be thrown into chaos”.31
agreement, known as the “supplemental agreement” covered the neutral zones between Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait and between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, for which the company made a down payment o f US$1.5 
million with annual rent at $750,000. Compared to the terms o f the company’s 1933 purchase, this can 
hardly be construed as “much less” than Bin Saud may have been able to get from “others”; Fortune 
Magazine May 1947 claimed “The best ambassadors the US has in the Middle East can be the American oil 
companies. . . The west is still on trial in the Middle East among peoples under constant pressure to choose 
between vying ways of life. Will it be poverty, chaos, and then the heel o f total authority? The Communists 
can offer words and propaganda. The oilman can offer a living example o f what freedom and enterprise can 
do”; The American Minister in Cairo was instructed to add Saudi Arabia to his portfolio in June 1939 
31 The Lend-Lease deal with Saudi Arabia is covered in Shwadran pages 301-307 and Yergin 393-399.
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The response to Aramco’s request was lukewarm. It was suggested that “some of it” 
might be done under Lend Lease by shipping food aid directly to Saudi Arabia; this 
suggestion was accompanied by the comment “although just how we could call that 
outfit a democracy I don't know”. In July 1941, when a US$425 million loan was 
approved to the British Government, President Franklin Roosevelt requested the 
Administrator of the Federal Loan Agency to “tell the British I hope they can take care 
of the King of Saudi Arabia. This is a little far afield for us!”32
Aramco was relieved they had avoided financial responsibility for Bin Saud. The 
British, drawing on the American loan, would take over. But they had not succeeded in 
their parallel aim of lessening British influence and increasing American power in the 
area. And, despite their claims since gaining the concession in 1933 that Bin Saud would 
deal only with Americans, they were anxious the British might gain ground. Appearing 
before the Senate Committee Investigating the National Defence Program (Part 41 
Petroleum Arrangements with Saudi Arabia) Aramco executives claimed the British 
were “increasing their influence with Saudi Arabia at American expense”.33
In a rare admission, in light of past (and future) propaganda, the Chairman of Aramco 
told the committee “... we have been afraid all the time over here of the encroachment 
of the British into the oil picture of Saudi Arabia”. In December 1942 the President of 
Standard Oil of California and the Chairman of the Texas Oil Company, parents of 
Aramco, told the US Secretary of the Interior, now acting as Petroleum Administrator 
for War, they feared the American concession would be cancelled and given over to 
British interests.
Their unrelenting three-year lobbying effort for Saudi Arabia to be granted status under 
Lend Lease finally succeeded. They were instrumental in the opening of America’s first 
legation, in Jedda, in May 1942. And on February 18th 1943, President Roosevelt 
declared “... to enable you to arrange Lend Lease aid to the Government of Saudi 
Arabia, I hereby find that the defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the
Note that the Lend Lease Act o f 1941 empowered President Franklin Roosevelt on behalf “o f any country 
whose defence the President deems vital to the defence o f the United States, to sell, transfer title to, 
exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defence article not expressly 
prohibited.” This included cash amounts. When the war ended in August 1945 Lend Lease appropriations 
totalled about US$48 billion, repayment to the US by all countries was virtually complete by 1960; 
Shwadran page 304 “thrown into chaos”
32 Shwadran page 305 “call that outfit a democracy” page 306 “take care o f the King”
33 Shwadran page 307 “at American expense”
Legacy 239
United States . Standard Oil of California and the Texas Oil Company had achieved 
their goal, they had committed the United States to the protection of the American 
concession in Saudi Arabia and removed the possibility of British encroachment.34
There is a postscript to this episode. The two oil company CEO’s had deeply impressed 
the US Secretary of the Interior with their warning of the danger to the American 
national welfare if Saudi Arabian oil was lost to the British. The Secretary was 
convinced America was running out of oil. The argument of the two CEOs had so 
swayed him that he concluded that if Saudi oil was so plentiful, and so important for the 
American national welfare, then the only guaranteed protection must be for the 
American Government itself to take over the Saudi Arabian concession. He 
recommended to the President that the Petroleum Reserves Corporation be organised to 
acquire and participate in the development of foreign oil reserves. The first order of 
business, the Secretary of the Interior said, should be “the acquisition of a participating 
and managerial interest in the crude oil concession now held in Saudi Arabia by an 
American company . He added that this move “will also serve to counteract certain 
known activities of a foreign power which presently are jeopardising American interests 
in Arabian oil reserves”.
The proposal was put to Standard Oil of California and Texas Oil. The CEO’s of both 
companies were shocked to realise just how persuasive their warnings and arguments 
had been. They could see that the enormous wealth producing concession they had 
fought so hard to protect from the British was about to slip from their grasp, hijacked by 
their own government. Negotiations continued from August to October 1943 with the 
government dropping its demand from 100% ownership to 70%, to 51%, and the 
company holding out for 33j%. Negotiations were broken off after the tide of war 
turned to the Allies favour in North Africa making the Middle East look secure again.35
Shwadran page 307“ encroachment o f the British” and page 308 Standard Oil o f California and Texas 
Oil Company December 2nd 1942 meeting with Harold Ickes Secretary of the Interior “feared that the 
American oil concession would be cancelled and given over to British interests”, page 309 “defence of 
Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence o f the USA”
35 Yergm page 395 refers to an article authored by Ickes in December 1943 entitled “We’re Running out of  
Od!”, Shwadran pages 310-315 “Rommel was chased out o f North Africa and the concession was secure”; 
See “Politics Has a Part in International Oil”, Life Magazine March 28th 1949 page 78 reports that in 
February 1949, James A Moffett, (in 1936 Chairman o f the Bahrain Petroleum Company and Caltex) a 
longtime friend o f President Franklin Roosevelt, successfully sued Aramco in the Federal Court for services 
involving using his influence with Roosevelt on Aramco’s behalf in the Lend Lease deal. The jury awarded 
Moffett US$1.5 million. Moffett’s offer, he claimed, was obtained from Aramco at Roosevelt’s request, 
had included petroleum products to the US Navy at “attractive prices” in return for the US Government 
advancing $6 million annually for five years to the King o f Saudi Arabia. A US Senate Committee,
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After World War Two Standard Oil New Jersey and Socony (the old Standard Oil New 
York) joined Standard Oil of California and the Texas Oil Company as equal partners in 
the Saudi Arabian concession. This took place against a background of renewed claims 
that Abdul Aziz Bin Saud would deal only with Americans. The US Secretary to the 
Navy confidently declared that Abdul Aziz Bin Saud did not “care which American 
company or companies developed the Arabian reserves” so long as they were 
“American”. And after Aramco executives put the merger proposal to Bin Saud they 
reported to the American public that the King of Saudi Arabia was “interested in only 
one point and on that he was insistent; he wanted to be certain neither Jersey nor Socony 
were ‘British controlled’.”36
Seemingly forgetting their panic of 1940-1943 that Bin Saud might redistribute the 
American concession to the British, the oil company cast itself as super-citizens, 
implying that it was through its efforts that the US was respected and admired on this 
foreign shore. This story was most often spun about the countries of the Middle East 
where the oil companies claimed to have won over the Arab rulers from a long 
association with the British. And, as has been seen, the State Department was not averse 
to claiming credit for itself for the American presence in Arabia. That even American 
officials might not have actually believed the propaganda about Saudi Arabia preferring 
them above all others” was again shown by the comment of the Assistant Secretary of 
State appearing before a Senate hearing in 1974. The 1951 “50-50” arrangement he had 
helped negotiate in Saudi Arabia was necessary, he said, because “the threat was the loss 
of the concession”. 37
Those who worked in the Arabian Peninsula, and did believe the mythology, were 
sometimes pulled up short. Saudi Arabia took a 60% share in Aramco in 1974, obtaining 
the remaining 40% after a further 18 months negotiating. In 1980 Saudi Arabia paid 
compensation to the four American ex-owners of Aramco, based on net book value of 
all their holdings within the Kingdom. After almost half a century, Saudi Arabia 
reversed the situation by informing Aramco it could continue to be the operator and 
service provider — for which it would receive 21 cents per barrel”.38
investigating Aramco oil sales to the US Navy, found Aramco had overcharged to the tune o f $25 million. 
What the author terms “the Moffett Affair” and the extension o f Lend Lease to Saudi Arabia is covered 
well in Miller, Aaron David, Search for Security Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy 1939- 
1949, USA: University o f North Carolina Press, 1980
37 Yergin page 412 “so long as they were American” and page 415 “on that he was insistent”
Yergin page 449 “the loss of the concession”
Yergin page 651-652 21 cents per barrel”; Brown Oil/God/Gold page 366 describes Aramco after the
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The Kuwait Government bought 60% of the Kuwait Oil Company in 1974, moving the 
next year to obtain the final 40%. The joint founders, Gulf Oil Corporation and British 
Petroleum (the renamed Anglo Iranian) demanded US$2 billion in compensation. 
Kuwait gave them US$50 million. Even so, the two companies assumed they would still 
have preferential access to Kuwait’s oil. Gulf Oil sent one of its best men. He was 
shocked to learn not only would there be no preferential access, but that Kuwait now 
intended to sell directly into Gulf Oil’s own markets, including Japan and Korea.
Apparently believing of the mythology, the American from Gulf Oil expected he could 
soften Kuwait’s position by running through “the history, at least as he understood it, of 
all that Gulf Oil had done for Kuwait”. After listening to this, the Kuwait official 
became very angry. Announcing “you never did us any favours”, he walked out of the 
room. It appears the American could not grasp that the offence was generated by his 
illusory picture of the discovery and development of oil in Arabia. After reflecting on 
the episode, this Gulf Oil executive said, he thought maybe the misunderstanding could 
have been caused by “the conceit of the Americans that we were loved — because we 
had done so much for these people”.39
Conclusion
The delay in developing the Arabian oil fields, until 1932 for Bahrain and 1938 for both 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, had further consequences for the economic opening up of the 
shaikhdoms. The time between the first oil flows and Britain’s September 3rd 1939 
declaration of war with Germany was not enough to get the industry up and running, 
particularly so for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The wartime shut down of the Arabian 
fields resulted in Kuwait, for example, not exporting oil until 1946 — 23 years after 
Frank Holmes had first moved to develop Kuwait’s oil.
Saudi Arabian takeover extraordinarily as “under Wahhabi management”
39 This episode is recounted in Yergin page 647-648 citing an April 2nd 1975 personal interview with the 
Gulf Oil executive concerned, page 653 Yergin comments “in the 1950s and 1960s cheap and easy oil had 
fuelled economic growth and thus, indirectly, promoted social peace. Now it seemed expensive and 
insecure oil was going to constrain, stunt, or even eradicate economic growth. Who knew what the social 
and political consequences would be? ...After 1973, the very substance o f power in international politics 
seemed to have been transmuted...”
Legacy 242
That Arabia’s oil was then utilised as the basis for rehabilitating the non-Communist 
European Allies provided little compensation. As shown above, when the Marshall Plan 
was implemented, it was the oil companies and their respective governments that made 
handsome profits. The oil-producing countries were in an unequal position because the 
oil companies were exempt from local taxation and levies, royalties were low and the 
methods of calculating the profits usually favoured the companies. In the early 1950s, 
following the lead of Venezuela and Mexico, the Arab producers acted to obtain some 
improvement in the profit distribution between themselves and their oil concessionaires. 
In most cases, improving the royalties and gaining increased share of the production 
involved bitter argument and not a little struggle.
Iran’s experience when nationalising its oil -  the gathering of the British Navy and 
threats of military action -  was a scene familiar to the rulers and people in the Arab 
shaikhdoms. They had lived with the gunships and Sikh platoons of the Government of 
India for a century or more. The subsequent Anglo-American orchestrated overthrow of 
Musadiq’s elected government in August 1953 provided a further salutary example of 
what could happen should the Arabs be too aggressive in trying to gain control over their 
oil. When it is also considered that after World War Two the British Navy, Air Force 
and Political establishment had well set up bases in Bahrain -  and many officials were 
still those originally trained and appointed by the Government of India -  it is not 
surprising that the Arab shaikhdoms did not move to gain full control of their oil 
industries until after gaining independence, even though they were well aware of how 
poorly they were served by the arrangements reached with the oil companies in the 
original concessions.
The imperial view that it was the exploiter, not the territory in which the resource lay, 
which owned the resource being extracted remained until the United Nations resolutions 
of 1974. As discussed above, this view was much to the fore, along with calls for 
military takeovers and international control of Arabia’s oil, after the Arab oil embargo 
following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
In exploring the issue of why Frank Flolmes’ achievements in discovering and 
developing the oilfields of Arabia has been diminished, a motivation was proposed. It 
was argued that the oil companies, and their associated governments, gained from 
obscuring Holmes’ role by removing an impediment to the advancement of claims to a 
“right” to Arabia’s oil, claims that can still be discerned today.
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Conclusion
This thesis set out to answer the question -  what was it that delayed development of 
Arabia’s oil, after discovery by Frank Holmes in 1922-1923, until 1932 for Bahrain 
and 1938 for both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia? The contention proposed was that it 
was rule by the Government of India in the Arabian Peninsula that prevented the 
development of Arabia’s oil. In pursuit of this contention it was necessary to 
demonstrate two main issues which were first, that Frank Holmes did identify the 
Arabian oil fields and second, that the Government of India did hold power in the 
Arabian Peninsula
The thesis employed the device of following Frank Holmes from his 1921 entry to 
the area through to the granting and development of the concessions, while 
examining the documented hostile reaction to his activities, in order to establish the 
position of the Government of India.
To test the assumption that Frank Holmes did discover the Arabian oil fields, that he 
was in fact Abu Al Naft (Father of Oil) as the Gulf Arabs dubbed him, the thesis 
began with an examination of the existing literature. It was shown that the depiction 
of Frank Holmes as a “soldier of fortune”, an “adventurer” and a “concession 
hunter”, although carelessly repeated in sequential publications, rests on a dubious 
basis.
The unflattering depiction of Holmes was shown to be influenced by the prevailing, 
and effective, corporate technique of charging competitors, such as Holmes and his 
Eastern & General Syndicate Ltd, with being opportunistic speculators rather than 
reputable industrial or commercial developers. The myth that the oil companies kept 
secret a knowledge that there was oil on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf was also 
exposed as baseless. The opposite was true in that all the surveys from 1904-1932, 
including seven “examinations” of Kuwait, agreed the Arab shaikhdoms were of no 
geological value.
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Frank Holmes’ discoveries were then demonstrated by following a wide range of 
documentation through his original exploration of A1 Hasa in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 
and Kuwait, and again through examination of the records relating to the eventual oil 
strikes that occurred in these concessions. In illustrating the scope of Frank Holmes’ 
achievements, the thesis established that, until his 1932 Bahrain oil strike shocked 
them all, the world oil experts were unanimous in their opinion that the Arabian 
Peninsula was oil-barren. Other individuals’ claims to discovery were also addressed. 
Similarly, the discovery claims of the oil companies including the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company and Standard Oil of California, were discounted.
In formulating the contention of this thesis, that rule by the Government of India was 
the determining factor in preventing development of Arabia’s oil, it was assumed that 
the Government of India did in fact hold that power. This assumption was explored 
throughout the thesis, and demonstrated particularly in chapter three, The Gulf Raj.
How the true dimension of the role of the Government of India in the Arabian 
Peninsula could have been previously obscured was a question that needed to be 
resolved. This study identified a number of factors as attributing to such 
misconception. Among these must be the frequent references by Government of 
India and British officials, including Churchill himself, to the need to avoid attracting 
attention to the “assumption” and nature of rule in the Gulf which were noted and 
evidenced.
Another strong contributing factor can be described as the characteristics of the 
Government of India’s administration and that of her Political Officers. This study 
revealed the Government of India’s frequent instructions to her Political Officers that 
the Rulers themselves should be persuaded to “request” certain actions. This 
procedural style was exacerbated by the Political Officers’ own habit of authoring 
requests and letters that the Rulers’ signed, or of writing in the Shaikhs’ name 
whether or not they signed.
It would seem that, if previous researchers consulted only the British Government 
documentation (eg Colonial Office and Foreign Office), and took these at face value 
without cross referencing to the correspondence of the Government of India, a false 
impression could have been gained that the Shaikhs had more freedom of action than 
was actually the case.
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Also identified as a factor contributing to the previous misreading of the position of 
the Government of India was the Political Officers’ habit of speaking for the 
Shaikhs. The Political Agents, and at times the Resident, forwarded reports 
purporting to quote verbatim the individual Shaikhs. When this study examined the 
record in sequence, it was noticeable how frequently the Shaikhs were quoted as 
expressing ideas that were remarkably similar to those contained in the Agents’ own 
personal correspondence. Harold Dickson in particular seems to have been a master 
of this.
The thesis demonstrated that this technique, as employed by the Political Officers, 
could continue because the arrangements reached at Churchill’s 1921 Cairo 
Conference restricted the British Government to communicating about, or with, the 
Shaikhs solely through the Government of India’s Political Resident. The same 
restriction applied to the Shaikhs in that they could communicate with the “High” 
Government in London only through the Political Agents and the Resident. As a 
result, officials in Britain would have had little chance of independently ascertaining 
what the Shaikh might, or might not, have thought or said.
It seems reasonably safe to assume that it was to the benefit of the Political Officers 
to report that the Shaikhs were in accord with whatever measures were currently 
being implemented. Perhaps because it was what they wanted to hear, the 
government in Britain accepted information received in this fashion. The British 
Government’s meetings and reports on matters relating to the Arabian Peninsula 
utilised and incorporated the reports of the Political Officers of the Government of 
India. In this way the material entered the records, and again if previous researchers 
took these at face value, could be assumed to be independent observations of the 
British Government.
It must be said that this unquestioning acceptance by the British Government of the 
reports of the Government of India’s Political Officers in the Persian Gulf was in 
keeping with the times. The belief prevailed that, as Belgrave the Bahrain Adviser is 
quoted in chapter eight, Legacy, these were men who understood “how to deal with” 
the Arabs. The Orientalist view of the “Eastern Mind” was alive and well in the 
offices of Whitehall.
Of equal importance in arguing this thesis was the India associations of the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company. That the British Government held 51% of this company may 
have influenced matters related to the oil of Iraq, but this was found to have little 
bearing on the development of Arabia’s oil.
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The influential factors which this study identified were the Company’s historic ties to 
India and the fact that, over the period of this study, the company was predominantly 
staffed by former members of the Indian military, or the Indian Civil Service. As has 
been shown, there was active collusion between the Anglo Persian Oil Company, and 
its personnel, with the Political Officers of the Government of India.
A coincidence of goals was shown to exist between the two in that both institutions 
aimed to protect their respective dominant positions. For Anglo Persian the aim was 
to maintain a de facto monopoly. In the case of the Government of India it was to 
keep away any outside influence that might not be sympathetic to her ideology. In 
pursuit of this shared goal the two institutions and their personnel combined in 
actions aimed first at thwarting the award of the Arabian concessions to Frank 
Holmes and then to prevent their development with American financial backing.
By focussing on the role of the Government of India and the accompanying 
opposition that prevented the Arabs developing their oil -  their only economic 
resource -  a cruel exercise in imperialism has been exposed. The people of the area 
were in dire economic straits, most particularly following the Depression and the 
coincident collapse of their alternative source of revenue, the market for natural 
pearls. Yet, for the purpose of maintaining her dominant position and that of the 
Anglo Persian Oil Company, the Government of India refused the possibility of 
economic relief through development of Frank Holmes’ oil concessions, even more 
so when he secured financial backing from the Americans.
That this refusal to allow acceptance of the offered economic development 
engendered distrust of “foreign” governments in the general population of the 
Arabian Peninsula is not surprising. Also not surprising is that this distrust was 
compounded by the realisation that, after the concessions were developed, other 
governments made more money in taxes from Arabia’s oil than did Arabia.
In seeking the answer to what was gained by diminishing Frank Holmes’ 
achievements, the hypothesis was proposed that doing so allowed propagation of the 
British and American claims to a “right” to Arabia’s oil — claims which steadily 
expanded to become the West in general possessing a right to Arabia’s oil. Arab 
recognition of the denial of their economic development, and profit-taking when it 
was developed, generated strong suspicion of the motivation behind such claims.
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This historic sense of entitlement on the one side, and deeply embedded wariness on 
the other, became apparent in the discussions around the final takeover by the Gulf 
States of full ownership of their respective oil companies. Both attitudes can be 
discerned today in the approach, and reaction, of each side to the subject of the Gulf 
States’ policies on production and pricing of their oil.
The Gulf States in maintaining their international relations must take the residual 
suspicion of other governments’ motivation towards them felt by the people of the 
Arabian Peninsula into account as public opinion. On the other hand, the Western 
nations’ relations with the Gulf States are frequently informed by the recognition that 
their general public holds the mythology-induced view of “after all we’ve done for 
them”.
Demonstration of the central role played by the Government of India, not previously 
brought out in the literature, has added another dimension to understanding of the 
historical experience of the Gulf Arabs. This thesis, by concentrating particularly on 
the 25 year period 1913-1938, and illustrating through the activities of Frank Holmes 
the catalyst for change provoked by his unwavering conviction that the area was rich 
in oil, has provided an insight into the development of the economics, politics and 
international relations of the modem states of the Arabian Gulf.
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Aba also called Bisht, formal, lightweight cloak worn by men, usually black or dark 
brown, frequently embroidered with gold thread along the edges (women wear 
abaya)
Abu Al I\aft Father of Oil (honorific awarded by the Gulf Arabs to Frank Holmes)
Aghal headband worn by men over the large cotton headscarf (ghutra), nowadays 
this is usually a heavy black silk loop, with or without cords extending down the 
back; originally the aghal was a double loop of rope that could be used to hobble 
camels; can also be made with gold strands to denote high rank.
Amir leader of a defined area containing a number of tribes (ie. Amirate). Note that 
the British frequently used the English “e” to express the Arabic “a/alif’, as in 
Bahrein, Koweit, and most notably “Emir”', this spelling was retained, for example, 
in the name “United Arab Emirates”
Arabian Gulf versus Persian Gulf, both titles “Arabian Gulf' and “Persian Gulf’ are 
now used interchangeably. Sayed Amin discusses this issue in legal and historical 
detail in Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arahian Gulf (Royston 1984 
pages 81-86) and notes that “Arabian Gulf is the common usage in the Gulf States. 
He points out that by 1968 all the Arab States had passed laws and issued decrees 
making the use of “Arabian Gulf’ compulsory in all official communications. Peter 
Mansfield in The Arabs (Allen Lane 1976 page 371) observes that “the Arabs of the 
area reject the term Persian Gulf and insist on ‘Arab’ or ‘Arabian Gulf. Persian- 
Arabian Gulf would be a suitable compromise but it is cumbersome.”
Balyoz descriptive term used by the Turks for the representative of the Venetian 
Republic to the Court of the Ottoman Sultan in Constantinople
Bin son of (female equivalent is Bint). Note that the term Ibn was the Turkish 
equivalent used by the Ottoman Empire
Diwan commonly used to describe an administrative office, as in “the Amiri Diwan”, 
literally it is the reception room of a palace or large private house, also called Majlis
Ikhwan literally “brotherhood”, can be a group of “brothers” come together to 
achieve a religious or political goal. In early Saudi Arabia, the Ikhwan were men 
from the Bedouin tribes whom Abdul Aziz Bin Saud galvanised into missionary- 
warriors who fought with him in the campaigns beginning with Hasa in 1913 to the 
1924 capture of Mecca and the subsequent surrender of Medina and Jedda. Bin Saud 
had also sought to bring the Bedouin tribes into settlements, the first was established 
in 1913, there were 60 within a decade. After the capture of Mecca and Jedda, the 
Ikhwan rebelled against Bin Saud. Successive waves of Ikhwan insurrection were 
only quelled, in 1930, with active British military assistance.
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Imam a learned religious leader
Majlis al Vrf roughly “commercial court”, a traditional meeting to resolve 
commercial disputes
Mesopotamia modem Iraq occupies most of the area of ancient Mesopotamia, the 
plain between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Before the 7th century, Mesopotamia 
was the centre of the Babylonian and Assyrian civilisations. The Turks initially 
conquered Mesopotamia in 1534 but did not secure true control until the 17th 
Century when Mesopotamia was brought under the direct administration of the 
Ottoman Empire. Mesopotamia had three provinces, Mosul, Basra and Baghdad. The 
name “Mesopotamia” continued to be used by the British until, following the 
uprising of 1920, plans were drawn up to institute a “provisional” government for 
what would now be called the State of Iraq. The area had been known as Al Iraq in 
antiquity and the Arabs had always used both Al Iraq and Mesopotamia 
interchangeably. In modem history others knew only Mesopotamia; the Ottomans 
used Mesopotamia. The revived name came into official usage in August 1921 when 
Faisal was proclaimed King of Iraq.
Qada (Turkish, in Arabic Qarya) village, designation used by Ottoman Empire
Shaikh was traditionally an awarded title for a tribal or religious leader (literally an 
honorific meaning “old man”) has come into use as an inherited title designating 
close members of the Ruler’s family (female equivalent is Shaikha)
Vilayet (Turkish, in Arabic Wilaya) province, designation used by Ottoman Empire
Wahhabi originally a reformist movement led by Muhammad Bin Abd Al Wahhab 
(died 1787) dedicated to rooting out what he saw as the decadence of popular Islam 
and achieving a return to the purity of Islam as it existed in the time of the Prophet 
and the four Caliphs who followed. In 1806 Wahhabi fighters led by the Amir 
Muhammad AI Saud (ancestor of Abdul Aziz Bin Saud) occupied Mecca but were 
ejected by forces sent by Ottoman Sultan Mahmoud 11. When the 21 year old Abdul 
Aziz Bin Saud recaptured Riyadh in 1902, he set in train a revival of the Wahhabi 
movement that gave birth to a warrior brotherhood with which he created, by 
conquest, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (Bin Saud’s fighting followers were known 
as “Wahhabi warriors” or “the Ikhwan”)
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FRANK HOLMES 1934-1947
There is little in the existing literature about Frank Holmes after the Kuwait 
concession was signed in 1934. Yet he continued to be associated with Arabian oil 
until after World War Two. He remained as Shaikh Ahmad’s Representative with the 
Kuwait Oil Company until his death in 1947, pursuing this work in the London office 
and frequently visiting Kuwait and the other Arab shaikhdoms.
Shaikh Ahmad made an official visit to England in 1935, sponsored by the India 
Office and Kuwait Oil Company. Although appreciating what he described as “the 
glorious programme of receptions in my honour”, Ahmad elected to spend the 
majority of his time with Frank Holmes including visitig Frank and Dorothy Holmes’ 
farm, “MillHill” in Essex. Holmes purchased this farm in 1922 because, he said, he 
needed to provide a home for the pedigree Arab horses given him by Bin Saud and for 
the Saluki hunting dogs of the Arabian Gulf which he and Dorothy bred. Dorothy had 
run the farm while Frank was in the Gulf, also maintaining a pedigree Fresian herd of 
some 30 milking cows and 20 young stock.1
That Frank Holmes was never motivated by personal gain is illustrated by the fact 
that, despite the fabulous wealth generated by the oil fields he discovered, “MillHill” 
was almost his only asset. The value of the entire estate left to Dorothy on Frank’s 
death was 30,000 sterling. According to Dorothy, New Zealand always remained 
Frank Holmes’ “first and last love”. The year he died, Dorothy said, they were 
planning to visit and “he was most disappointed when he realised this could not be 
done.” Perhaps he would have had some reservation at being described by Archibald 
Chisholm as “an outstanding British personality” in an obiturary in The Times of 
London. Shaikh Ahmad of Kuwait outlived Holmes by three years, until 1950. 
Eyecatching at Frank Holmes’ funeral was a gigantic floral tribute sent by Ahmad.
1 Interview with Archibald Chisholm, London, September 1987 for detail Holmes" later life, his estate and Shaikh 
Ahmad’s 1935 visit; Scholefield collection, Dorothy Holmes to Scholeficld, October 27th 1959 for detail 1922 
purchase o f “MillHill” and “pedigree Fresian herd” and “first and last love”.
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The obituary appeared in The Times of February 5th 1947 and read:
“Major Frank Holmes, who died last week, was uniquely 
responsible for discovering the vast petroleum resources of Arabia, 
whose development is of such current interest today. Though avoiding 
publicity in this country, he was an outstanding British personality in 
the Middle East especially among the Arab Shaikhs of the western 
shore of the Persian Gulf who appreciated both the formidable 
personality of this rugged New Zealander, and the great riches which 
the initiative of “the Father of Oil” (Abu al Naft), as they called him, 
brought to their coffers.
“A mining engineer by profession, Holmes staked his own 
opinion against that of experts in petroleum geology (who had 
pronounced Arabia "oil-dry") when he obtained a concession for 
Bahrain Island in 1923. For over five years thereafter he sought in vain 
to find a British or American oil concern to back his fancy and exploit 
the concession. Eventually he succeeded and the discovery of a major 
oil field in Bahrain in 1932 was rapidly followed by still greater 
discoveries in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (where Holmes himself was 
concerned in obtaining a concession from his old friend Shaikh Ahmad 
as Sabah in 1934). Of powerful physique, blunt speech, and great 
strength of character, Frank Holmes had also those qualities of 
generosity, friendliness and frankness which Arabia most admires.” 2
2 Chisholm pages 94-95 reprints this Obituary.
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Biographical Details of Mentioned Personalities
Ahmad, Hashem Bin, of Kuwait, Personal Secretary and Scribe of the Diwan to Abdul 
Aziz Bin Saud
al Gosaibi, Abdul Aziz (d.1950), Abdul Rahman (d.1976), Abdulla, Hassan and Sa’ad 
(known as “the five brothers”). The family originated in Hofuf, where they were 
involved in agriculture and traded dates to India through Bahrain, diversifying into trade 
in pearls. As young men Abdul Aziz, Abdul Rahman and Abdulla spent time in 
Bombay, where the family had an office, learning English and the merchant trade; 
Abdul Rahman was frequently in Paris dealing with the family’s pearl trade. The branch 
of Abdul Aziz Gosaibi represented the interests of Abdul Aziz bin Saud and his 
territories in Bahrain from 1908 until the establishment of the Saudi Arabian Foreign 
Service. In Bahrain they arranged accommodation and transport for all visitors to and 
from Bin Saud and provided a channel of communication; the British paid their subsidy 
to Bin Saud through the Gosaibis. For some years, the Gosaibis in Bahrain had close to 
a monopoly on the carrying trade between Bahrain and the mainland, and supplied Bin 
Saud with foodstuff from India and general provisions.
al Hashem, King Faisal bin Husain (1885-1933) son of Sharif Husain of Mecca, 1916- 
1918 commanded the Hijaz Army in operations with T. E. Lawrence. 1919 represented 
the Hijaz in Post WW1 Paris Peace Conference. 1918-1920 Head of the British 
Administration in Syria before the French entrenched their Syrian Mandate. August 
23rd 1921 proclaimed King of Iraq
al Hashem, Sharif Husain bin Ali of Mecca (1856-1931) father of Faisal of Iraq and 
Abdulla of Transjordan. 1908 became Amir of Mecca. 1914-1916 Britain’s main ally in 
the Middle East theatre of operations during WW1. 1916 proclaimed “King of the Arab 
Countries” by his own followers; the French objected to what they saw as Britain’s 
promotion of Hashemite leadership; in January 1917 a compromise was reached in 
which both Britain and France recognised Husain as “King of the Hijaz”. October 3rd 
1924 forced to abdicate on Abdul Aziz bin Saud’s military conquest of Mecca and went 
into exile in Cyprus, 1931 died while visiting his son in Amman.
al Idrissi, Muhammad bin Ali (1876-1923) Saiyed (religious leader and Sufi) and Ruler 
of Assir, Tihama, Hodeidah. Allied to the British during WW1 he could muster a 
fighting force of 30,000 men. Signed two treaties with the British, the first in 1915 
guaranteed protection of his coastal towns from foreign attack, provided a subsidy and 
arms. The second in 1917 related to Farasan Islands, which he had wrested from the 
Turks. On his death in 1923 Muhammad’s brother Hasan, then in his 40s, refused the 
succession preferring a Sufi spiritual life. The rule went to Ali, bom in 1905. Within 
two years Ali had ceded Hodeidah and other towns to the Imam Yahya and lost the 
support of the tribes in Assir. Ali was challenged by his kinsman, Mustafa, and in 1926 
was deposed. His uncle, Hasan, took up the rule but placed Assir under the “protection” 
of Abdul Aziz Bin Saud, shortly after formally annexed to Saudi Arabia.
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al Khalifa, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa (d. 1942) although holding the title of Deputy Ruler 
until the death of his father in 1935, Shaikh Hamad was Ruler of Bahrain from 1923 
when the Government of India forced his father to abdicate. Hamad and his brother 
Abdulla negotiated the Bahrain Oil Concession.
al Khalifa, Shaikh Isa bin Ali (1869-1935) signed two treaties with Britain, in 1880 and 
1892, not to enter into relations with any “foreign” government, and not to cede sell or 
lease any part of his territories without British consent. In 1914 Shaikh Isa signed the 
exclusion “convention” agreeing not to grant an oil concession except to an individual, 
or company, approved by the British Government. The Government of India forced 
Shaikh Isa to hand authority to his son, Hamad, in 1923.
al Sabah, Shaikh Ahmad bin Jabir (1885-1950), succeeded his uncle Shaikh Salim 
following the latter’s death in February 1923 (official date of accession is March 29th 
1923). Shaikh Ahmad negotiated the Kuwait Oil Concession
al Sabah, Shaikh Mubarak bin Sabah “Mubarak the Great” (1896-1915). Kuwait signed 
in 1899 a treaty with Britain agreeing not to conclude treaties with any other powers, 
not to admit any “foreign” agents and not to cede sell or lease any part of Kuwait’s 
territory without British consent, Britain promised to protect both the Al Sabah Ruler 
and his heirs. In 1913 Mubarak signed with Percy Cox the exclusion “convention” 
agreeing not to grant an oil concession except to an individual, or company, approved 
by the British Government.
al Saud, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman (1880-1953) after a childhood spent in exile in 
Kuwait, in 1902 Bin Saud regained the Saudi patrimony of Nejd. In 1924-1926 he took 
over the Hijaz, with Mecca, driving out the Hashemite rulers. In January 1926 he was 
proclaimed King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies (soon after he 
annexed the Assir from Yemen), September 18th 1932 proclaimed King of Saudi 
Arabia. From 1926 Bin Saud dealt with waves of internal rebellion until the British and 
the Government of India assisted him militarily in 1929-1930. Bin Saud signed with 
Percy Cox the Treaty of Darin in 1915, including the usual clauses of not entering into 
any correspondence, agreement or treaty with any “foreign” power and agreement not to 
cede, sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise dispose of any part of his territory without 
British consent. Bin Saud granted the Al Hasa oil concession to Frank Holmes in 1923 
and, after it had lapsed, negotiated it again in 1933 with Standard Oil of California.
al Thani, Shaikh Abdulla bin Qasim (d.1949), Ruler of Qatar. 1906-1913 was Governor 
of Doha and successful pearl merchant. 1913-1949 succeeded his father as Ruler of 
Qatar. Signed treaty with Britain in 1916 placing Qatar on same footing as the other 
Gulf Shaikhdoms. Abdulla secretly paid an annual subsidy to Abdul Aziz bin Saud to 
protect his territory from Bin Saud’s expansionism. In 1922, Abdulla tried to conclude 
an oil concession with Frank Holmes but was prevented from doing so by the 
Government of India’s Political Resident. In 1926, under pressure from the Political 
Agent, he signed a prospecting licence with D’Arcy Exploration Company (a subsidiary 
of the Anglo Persian Oil Company). In May 1935, in return for a formal document from 
the British Government guaranteeing recognition of his son and heir and protection 
from “outside” attack against his territory, he signed a concession with Petroleum 
Development (Qatar) Limited, the subsidiary of the Anglo Persian Oil Company.
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Belgrave, Sir Charles (1895 1970). Educated at Oxford. With the British Army in 
Sudan, Palestine, Egypt. Joined the Frontier Districts Administration (Anglo Egyptian 
Civil Service). Joined the Colonial Service in East Africa. Married the daughter of Lord 
Bristol. 1926 hired by the India Office and served as Financial Adviser to Shaikh 
Flamad, Ruler of Bahrain, and on Hamad’s death, to his son Shaikh Salman, until 
Belgrave’s retirement in 1957. Although the Government of India recommended the 
appointment of a personal “Adviser” to the Shaikh because of the impropriety of the 
Political Agent running all the affairs of the island, Belgrave actually reduced Bahraini 
input. Belgrave, with the assistance of a handful of British nationals, ran the 
Administration, the Police, and the Judiciary, as well as controlling all commercial and 
financial interests. Wrote Personal Column, published 1960.
British Oil Development Ltd (BOD) registered in London 1928 with mainly British 
and Italian shareholding. Reorganised with increased capital after obtaining in May 
1932 from the Iraq Government an oil concession west of the Tigris. Mosul Oilfields 
Ltd with British, Italian, German, Dutch, French and Iraq shareholding was registered in 
December 1932 to acquire the shares of BOD, the Iraq Petroleum Company moved to 
acquire the shares of BOD in 1936, dissolving both BOD and Mosul Oilfields in 1941
Burma Oil, (originally Burmah Oil), the first British oil company. Founded by a group 
of Scottish traders and investors after the 1885 annexation of Burma to India. Burma 
Oil began by appropriating the oil gathering activities of Burmese village people, an 
appropriation on which it built a commercial industry and a refinery in Rangoon. The 
growth of Burma Oil was aided by the monopoly, given in 1889 by the Government of 
India, over the sale and extraction of oil products and protection from all foreign 
competitors, throughout the Indian Empire. Chairman Lord Strathcona financed 
Canadian Pacific Railways. Before D’Arcy was producing in Persia he called for 
financial assistance. The British Admiralty feared the concession might fall into the 
hands of American or Dutch oil trusts and so persuaded Lord Strathcona to have Burma 
Oil cooperate with D’Arcy. In May 1905 Concessions Syndicate Ltd was formed for 
operations in Persia. After the 1908 oil strike at Masjid-i-Sulaiman, on April 14th 1908, 
Concessions Syndicate Ltd was relegated to a subsidiary and the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company formed with Lord Strathcona as Chairman. Burma Oil was the majority 
shareholder in Anglo Persian until the British Government1 s own 1914 purchase of 51% 
of the stock. Burma continued to hold 23% of Anglo Persian/British Petroleum until 
1974 when their shareholding was taken over by the Bank of England.
Cadman, Sir John, first Baron Cadman of Silverdale, (1877-1941). Educated in Science 
at Durham University. 1902 Inspector of Mines (coal) East Scotland and Staffordshire. 
1904-1907 set up the Mines & Petroleum Department for the Government of Trinidad. 
1908 with the Royal Commission on Mines. 1910 Professor of Mines at Birmingham 
University where he established the Department of Petroleum Technology. 1913 
appointed to the Admiralty Commission (with Admiral Slade) sent by Churchill to 
report on the operations of the Anglo Persian Oil Company, 1914 Director Petroleum 
Executive, Member Inter-Allied Petroleum Committee. 1921 joined Anglo Persian Oil 
Company. 1923 Director and 1925 Deputy Chairman, then Chairman Anglo Persian 
Oil Company. 1927-1941 Chairman both Anglo Iranian Oil Company and the Iraq 
Petroleum Company. At the time of his death he was Honorary Principal Adviser on Oil 
to the British Government.
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Chisholm, Archibald H T (1902-1988). Educated at Oxford, descended from Lord 
Byron, with family connections to the family of Anglo Persian’s John Cadman. Pursued 
journalism with the Wall Street Journal (his father was editor of The Times of London 
and Chairman of the Athenaeum Club, Arnold Wilson’s London haunt). 1927-1932 
hired by Cadman and sent to Persia for the Anglo Persian Oil Company. 1932-1934 
Anglo Persian’s negotiator for Kuwait oil concession. 1935-1936 with Anglo Persian at 
Abadan. 1937-1940 Editor of the Financial Times London. 1940-1945 with the British 
Army. 1945-1962 Manager Public Relations Anglo Iranian Oil Company/British 
Petroleum. 1962-1972 Adviser British Petroleum. 1973-1975 researched and published 
The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement, A Record o f the Negotiations 1911-1934
Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer (1874-1965). Entered Parliament in 1900. 
Junior officer with British Forces abroad and War Correspondent Boer War. 1905-1908 
Under Secretary for the Colonies. 1908-1910 President of the Board of Trade. 1910- 
1911 Home Secretary. 1911-1915 and 1939-1940 First Lord of the Admiralty. 1915 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. 1917 Minister of Munitions. 1918-1921 Minister 
of War. 1919-1921 Minister of Air. April 1921 October 1922 Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. 1924-1929 Chancellor of the Exchequer. 1940-1945 Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence. 1951-1955 Prime Minister
Cox, Major General Sir Percy Zachariah (1864-1937). Early career included six years in 
India with the Indian Army, four years as Political Officer in the Indian State of Baroda, 
six years in Somalia. 1904-1913 Political Resident Persian Gulf. 1914 Secretary, 
Foreign Department Government of India. 1914-1918 Chief Political Officer Indian 
Expeditionary Force “D”. March 1918-1920 Acting Minister Teheran. 1920-1923 as 
“Sir” Percy Cox, High Commissioner Mesopotamia/Iraq (Cox was also titular Political 
Resident until October 1920 although absent in Baghdad. On his 1918 appointment to 
Teheran, Lt-Col Arnold Wilson took over as “absentee Resident” in Baghdad)
Crane, Charles R, American millionaire, heir to the Crane Bathroom Equipment 
Company of Chicago and colleague of Henry Ford, Thomas Edison and George 
Westinghouse. Was American Minister to China 1921. Crane was appointed by US 
President Wilson to the 1919 King-Crane Commission sent to ascertain local reaction to 
the proposed post WW1 mandates in Palestine, Iraq and Syria, and particularly to the 
Balfour Declaration granting a Jewish “homeland” in Palestine. The report was never 
tabled at the Versailles Peace Conference. From his travels for the King-Crane 
Commission, and from time spent in Egypt as a young man, Crane developed a 
fascination for the Arab world and an empathy for the people. He believed the two 
important factors that could assist the Arabs out of poverty were education and 
agriculture. On his own expense he educated a number of Syrian/Lebanese young men 
in America. He was a patron of the American Mission hospitals and schools in the 
Arabian Peninsula and was involved in the setting up of American higher education 
facilities in Lebanon. He initiated a date farm on his ranch in California devoted to 
researching and improving Arabian strains and propagation techniques and did similar 
research on the breeding of Arabian horses. He paid for a three year fact finding and 
development mission to Yemen, which he visited twice, and similar to Jedda which he 
also visited. The two programs were led by the American engineer Karl Twitchell.
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Craufurd, Commander C E V Royal Navy (Retired). In WW1 commanded HMS 
"Mmto" patrolling the Red Sea. Employed personally by Sir Edmund Davis, Eastern & 
General Syndicate’s Chairman and chief investor, accompanied Elolmes to Aden in 
1921. He became obsessed with locating the site of King Solomon's Mines eventually 
becoming convinced he had traced them to the port of Makalla, not far from Aden. 
Delivered lectures and speeches, and wrote articles, on this subject in London until the 
mid 1930s. Infected American engineer Karl Twitched with a similar obsession when 
he came to Yemen in 1927 on a mission for American philanthropist Charles Crane; 
Twitched became convinced King Solomon’s Mines were in Saudi Arabia.
Curzon, George Nathanial; Lord Curzon of Kedleston, 1st Marquess (1859-1925); 
statesman and administrator. 1898-1905 Viceroy and Governor-General of India. 1915- 
1916 Lord Privy Seal. 1916-1918 Member of Lloyd George War Cabinet. 1916-1924 
Leader of the House of Lords. 1919-1924, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
D’Arcy, William Knox (1849-1917). Solicitor, bom in Devon UK. Held principal 
interest in Mount Morgan Gold Mine, Queensland. May 28th 1901 obtained oil 
concession from the Persian Government. May 21st 1903 formed First Exploration 
Company. May 5th 1905 formed, with Burma Oil Company, Concessions Syndicate 
Ltd. 1909-1917 Director Anglo Persian Oil Company (now incorporating D’Arcy 
Exploration and Concessions Syndicate Ltd)
Daly, (Sir) Major Clive Kirkpatrick. 1916-1920 served in the Indian Political Service as 
Lt. Col was Political Governor Diwania (Iraq). 1920 demoted to Major following the 
outbreak of the Iraqi Revolt in his area. January 1921-September 1926 Political Agent 
Bahrain, wounded in a local uprising against his oppressive policies and aimed, in part, 
at the Persians he had gathered into a police force, answerable only to him, to control 
the Bahrainis. The Government of India knighted Daly on his return to London
Damlouji, Dr Abdullah, Iraqi, physician, practising in Baghdad. Medical consultant to 
Sir Percy Cox’s administration in Baghdad. Personal friend and frequently physician to 
Abdul Aziz Bin Saud
Dickson, Harold Richard Patrick (bom Beirut 1881 died Kuwait 1959). 1908 with the 
Indian Army. 1912-1913 Tutor & Guardian to eldest son of Maharajah of Bikaner. 
1914-1915 with 29th Lancers to Mesopotamia. 1915-1919 selected by Arnold Wilson as 
Political Officer Nasiriyah (Iraq) press ganging Arab labourers for railway construction. 
November 1919-November 1920 as Major, Political Agent Bahrain. 1921 Political 
Adviser at Hillah (Iraq), including Karbala and Najaf until his removal in July 1922. 
August 1922-December 1922 in Bahrain, no official post, but loose title of “Personal 
Representative” of Sir Percy Cox, expected appointment as “Agent to Bin Saud”. 
December 1922-August 1923 pursued unfair dismissal case in London. 1924-1928 
reinstated to Indian Army in Quetta then Guardian & Tutor to second son of Maharaja 
of Bikaner. May 1928-April 1929 Secretary to the Political Resident Bushire. May 
1929-February 1936 (and temporary May 1941-August 1941) as Lt-Col, Political Agent 
Kuwait. 1936-1959 Chief Local Representative, Kuwait Oil Company. (His father, 
John, (1847-1908) bom in Tripoli Libya, was British Consul Beirut 1879-82, Consul 
General Damascus, Homs and Jerusalem 1882-1889. Grandfather was Dr Edward 
Dickson (1815-1900) bom in Tripoli Libya, employed by the Amirs of Western Tripoli 
(A1 Babat), later joined the Ottoman Military Service as a doctor, died in Istanbul.)
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East India Company, with rights and privileges granted by the British Parliament, 
gained control in India through conquest and the ceding to it of territories and 
concessions by local rulers. Its main commercial outlets, known as factories, were in 
Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The status of its chartered liberties and possessions has 
been compared to those of the Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge and the Church of 
England. The 1773 Regulating Act went some way towards giving the British 
government the right to oversee and regulate the affairs of India. In 1774 the East India 
Company appointed Warren Hastings first Governor General of India. The British 
Parliament’s India Act of 1784 passed executive control of India Affairs to a Board of 
Control whose president was a member of Cabinet and answerable to Parliament 
(Viscount Castlereagh). Disraeli’s legislation of 1858 established the British Crown as 
the government of India with two sources of executive power, the Secretary of State for 
India who answered to Parliament, and the Viceroy who oversaw everyday 
administration and law making. Under the Viceroy was a hierarchy of presidency and 
provincial governors, commissioners, judges, magistrates etc. The Indian Government 
recreated most British government departments, including its own Foreign Affairs.
Greenway, Sir Charles, Baron Greenway of Stanbridge Earls (1857-1934). In 1893 
joined Shaw, Wallace & Co India. 1897 senior partner, 1910 Senior Partner R.G.Shaw 
& Co, Managing Director Lloyd Scott & Co. 1910-1919 Managing Director then 1914- 
1927 Chairman and 1927-1934 President Anglo Persian Oil Company.
Gulbenkian, Calouste (1868-1955) Armenian. 1887-1891 graduated in Mining 
Engineering King’s College London, worked in the family’s oil business in Baku, wrote 
scholarly articles, and a book, on Russian oil, authored a report for the Turkish Sultan 
on oil possibilities in Mesopotamia. 1893 moved to Constantinople. 1896 moved to 
Egypt then London where he traded in Baku oil and acted as on oil industry broker. 
1907 returned to Constantinople representing Royal Dutch Shell. 1912 formed the 
Turkish Petroleum Company with the Deutsche Bank and Royal Dutch Shell holding 
25% each and 50% held by the Turkish National Bank; Gulbenkian held 30% of the 
Turkish National Bank which equated to a 15% holding in Turkish Petroleum. 1914 
Anglo Persian bought into Turkish Petroleum with the Deutsche Bank and Shell each 
retaining their 25% and Gulbenkian holding 5%. Gulbenkian succeeded in retaining this 
5% through the various incarnations of Turkish Petroleum and the subsequent Iraq 
Petroleum Company. He died, aged 85, in Lisbon.
Hardinge, Charles, 1st Baron of Penshurst (1858-1944). In 1896 Secretary Persian 
Legation. 1906-1910 Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 1910- 
1916 Viceroy of India. 1916-1920 again Permanent Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. 1920-1923 Ambassador in Paris
Heim, Dr Arnold Albert, (1882-1965) Swiss. Geologist and Dozent at the University of 
Zurich. Commissioned in 1924 by Frank Holmes and the Eastern & General Syndicate 
Ltd to survey for oil and water Bahrain, Kuwait, A1 Hasa and the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia 
Neutral Zone. In the late 1920s Arnold Heim published a number of magazine articles, 
and mounted lantern slide lectures, based on his 1924 visit to Arabia
Hirtzel, Sir Arthur (1870-1937). In 1894 joined India Office. 1917-1921 Assistant 
Under Secretary of State for India. 1921-1924 Deputy Under Secretary of State for India
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Hoover, Herbert Clark (1874-1964), 31st president of the United States (1929-1933)
In 1896-1897 worked for a leading engineer in San Francisco. On his 
recommendation the 22-year-old Hoover got a job with a London mining firm, 
Bewick, Moreing and Company, to introduce California methods to the company's 
gold mines in western Australia; he recommended the purchase of Sons of Gwalia 
gold mine in Kalgoorlie. He turned from technical work to administration, bargaining 
with labour and negotiating with the Australian government. His company transferred 
Hoover to China where he became chief engineer in the Chinese government’s 
imperial bureau of mines. In 1900 he held a one-fifth interest in Bewick, Moreing and 
Company, which then possessed gold, silver, tin, copper, coal, and lead mines in 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, and Nevada. He also owned a 
turquoise mine in Egypt. Hoover became a world-renowned consulting engineer, 
accepting commissions to revive unproductive mines and was managing director or 
chief consulting engineer in a score of mining companies, and he was a wealthy man.
In 1917 he was U.S. food administrator and chairman of the American Relief 
Administration to assist in the economic restoration of Europe. President Harding 
appointed him secretary of commerce in 1921. In seven years as head of the 
Department of Commerce, Hoover extended its control over mines and patents and 
supported the expansion of American business overseas. For the Republicans, Hoover 
won the 1928 presidential election in a landslide. He was in office less than eight 
months when the Wall Street crash occurred. In 1932, he lost to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Herbert Hoover died in 1964, in New York City.
Jacks, T. L.(l 884-1966). In 1909-1913 Oil Assistant Strick Scott & Co Abadan. 1917- 
1920 Assistant Manager then 1921-1922 joint General Manager with Arnold Wilson 
Anglo Persian Oil Company Abadan, 1926-1935 Resident Director Anglo Persian Oil 
Company Teheran
Khazail, Shaikh of Muhammerah, (1860-1936). The Anglo Persian Abadan refinery 
was built in his territory. In return for allowing the refinery, the 1909 undertaking, 
reconfirmed in 1914, given by Sir Percy Cox and the British to Khazail promised to 
protect he and his heirs against encroachment on his jurisdiction and recognised rights 
from the Persian Government. Until 1924 Khazail was the de facto Ruler of the left 
bank of the Shatt al Arab (Arabistan later Khuzistan). In April 1925, he was removed to 
house arrest in Teheran by the forces of Riza Khan who then established central 
government control over Khazaifs area. During a debate in the British Parliament it 
was claimed that no undertaking as to the personal security of Khazail had ever been 
given and, as his nationality was Persian, Britain’s only interest in him was one based 
on longstanding friendship. He was never permitted to return to Muhammerah and 
never regained any of his former rights. He died in Teheran.
Lawrence, Colonel Thomas Edward, “Lawrence of Arabia”. He was the illegitimate 
son of an Anglo Irish Baron. Educated at Oxford where he was mentored by D. G. 
Hogarth, influential author and archaeologist, associated with the Ashmolean Museum. 
In 1914 Hogarth took Lawrence with him to work with military intelligence in Cairo 
and transferred him into the Arab Bureau (of Intelligence and Diplomatic Officers) 
when he took over as Head. Lawrence was on the mission to Jedda in October 1916 and 
then joined the “Arab Revolt” financed and assisted by the British from Cairo, led by 
Faisal bin Husain Al Hashem, the son of the Sharif Husain of Mecca. Lawrence 
romanticised his own role in the Arab Revolt in the best selling Seven Pillars o f Wisdom
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Lombardi, Maurice, (b. 1878) Vice President and Director Standard Oil of California. 
His background was in the company’s “Foreign Crude Oil Production” department. He 
negotiated the 1928 purchase from Gulf Oil Corporation of Holmes/E&GSynd’s 
Bahrain oil concession. In September 1932 Lombardi met Karl S Twitchell in New 
York and asked for his assistance in obtaining from Abdul Aziz bin Saud the Frank 
Holmes lapsed 1923 A1 Hasa concession. Lomardi’s colleague, Francis Loomis, had 
already put the same request to H St John Philby. Eventually both Philby and Twitchell 
were hired by Standard Oil of California. Lombardi visited Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Egypt but did not visit Saudi Arabia. He retired in 1941
Longhurst, Henry, wrote Adventures in Oil: the Story o f British Petroleum, published 
1959, for the company’s 50th anniversary. At the time Longhurst was a sports reporter, 
specifically Golf Correspondent, for the London Sunday Times
Longrigg, Brigadier Stephen Helmsley. In 1920 worked with H. St John Philby at 
Interior Ministry Iraq. 1921 as Major, was Political Officer at Kut Iraq. 1922 replaced 
Dickson as Political Officer at Hillah Iraq. 1925 joined Anglo Persian/Iraq Petroleum 
Company. Wrote Oil in the Middle East: its Discovery & Development published 1954
Loomis, Francis C. Was Assistant Secretary of State under John Milton Hay (Hay, who 
had been assistant private secretary to President Lincoln, was Secretary of State to 
McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt). In 1901, while Hay was ill, Loomis took part in the 
negotiations for the Panama Canal concession. He joined Standard Oil of California 
with the title of Washington Representative. He dealt with the US State Department in 
the matter of requesting diplomatic intervention with the British over the Bahrain oil 
concession. In July 1932 he approached H St John Philby in London requesting him to 
use his friendship with Abdul Aziz bin Saud to assist Standard Oil of California to 
purchase Frank Holmes lapsed 1923 A1 Hasa concession and in September 1932 agreed 
the same thing with Karl S Twitchell who had already been approached by Loomis’ 
colleague Maurice Lombardi. Eventually both Philby and Twitchell were hired by 
Standard Oil of California.
Madgwick, Thomas George. British bom engineer. During WW1 was involved in 
sinking water wells in Salonika and Gallipoli. Lectured at Birmingham University and 
set up a London based consulting partnership. 1925 hired by Holmes/E&GSynd on a 
four month contract for the artesian water drilling project in Bahrain. Introduced 
American T. E. Ward, whom he knew from Trinidad, to Holmes/E&GSynd. 1926 
through Ward, obtained a short term contract as Petroleum Consultant for the Canadian 
Government in Calgary; this eventually became a permanent position in Ottawa. 
Madgwick’s claim to have discovered the oil of Bahrain became more and more 
elaborate over the years.
Mann, Dr Alexander, Physician. Nearing retirement on the staff of Sir Percy Cox in 
Mesopotamia, in 1921 he was sent by. Cox on a medical visit to Abdul Aziz Bin Saud. 
Subsequently Bin Saud appointed him (with Cox’s approval) his Personal 
Representative and Agent in London. In 1922, Mann brought Frank Holmes to Abdul 
Aziz Bin Saud. Holmes’ personal aim was to explore for oil and also report on 
development and investment opportunities, eg ports. Meantime, Mann was proposing 
his own ideas to Bin Saud for increasing revenue, such as issuing visas and passports 
and a postal service. When Mann’s activities came to the attention of the Government
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of India’s Political Officers in the Persian Gulf they successfully lobbied the Colonial 
Office to have him removed from Bin Saud’s service. Bin Saud was informed that 
HMG would not recognise Dr Mann in any official capacity, nor permit correspondence 
to be conducted through him. A dismissal letter was then arranged and given to Bin 
Saud for signature. In November 1923, the Political Officers became aware Mann was 
in Bombay, and were convinced he intended travelling to Bahrain and Nejd looking for 
oil concessions. While he was on board ship, they cabled an alert to every Gulf port 
describing Mann as a “notorious character”. On arrival Bahrain, he was detained, his 
passport cancelled, and he was told to move on. In July 1924, he arrived in Teheran, 
representing Sir Norton Griffiths and the Phoenix Oil and Transport Company. Again 
he aroused the enmity of the Political Officers and quickly departed.
Morgan, C. Stuart. British born, Morgan was with Wilson’s and Cox’s administration 
in Mesopotamia where he worked with H. St. John Philby at the Ministry of Interior. He 
moved on to join the Anglo Persian Oil Company. T. D. Cree, also ex-Mesopotamia and 
one of Philby’s partners in Sharqieh, recommended Morgan to the head of Standard Oil 
New Jersey (Teagle) which hired him as Adviser of Near Eastern work. He became 
Secretary of the Near East Development Corporation, the entity formed to represent the 
American interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company/Iraq Petroleum Company.
Muhammad, Khan Bahadur Mirza (1885-1974). From 1921-1945 was legal adviser in 
Basra to the Anglo Persian Oil Company. He Arabised his name to Muhammad Ahmad 
when he became an Iraqi subject after 1934. His colleague, Gabriel, was the attorney for 
Shaikh Ahmad of Kuwait.. Both men played a somewhat murky role in “Traders Ltd", 
the entity suspected of being created by the Anglo Persian Oil Company in 1934 to deal 
the Gulf Oil Corporation out of the Kuwait Oil Concession
Musadiq, Dr Muhammad Khan (b. 1873). Persian, he studied law in Switzerland. 1920 
was Governor General of Fars. 1921 Minister of Finance. 1922 Governor General 
Azarbijan. 1923 Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1925 opposed the change of regime. May 
1951 became Prime Minister of Iran; presided over nationalisation of the oil industry
Philby, Harry St. John Bridger “Jack”, (bom Ceylon April 1885 died Beirut September 
1960). 1904-1907 educated at Cambridge 1908-1913 various jobs with Indian Civil 
Service including Criminal Investigation Department (CID) Simla. November 1914 
Mesopotamia in response to Percy Cox’s urgent demand for linguists to help with the 
occupation, Philby’s job was to collect revenues, tax the Iraqis and set up a system of 
accounting. 1916 Revenue Commissioner. May 1917 Personal Assistant to Percy Cox. 
When Arnold Wilson moved from Basra to Cox’s office in Baghdad, Philby was sent, 
November 1917 to October 1918, to (unsuccessfully) encourage Abdul Aziz Bin Saud 
to extend military assistance for British campaign against the Turks. March 1920 failed 
in an application to join the financial mission to Persia. May 1920 failed in an 
application to join the staff of Sir Herbert Samuel High Commissioner ton Palestine. On 
Cox’s appointment as High Commissioner Iraq became British Adviser to the Iraqi 
Minister of Interior. Because of his active hostility to King Faisal, in July 1921 Philby 
was dismissed. October 1921 Chief British Representative to Amir Abdulla in 
Transjordan charged with setting up an administration and controlling revenues. 
Resigned in January 1924, just days before Sir Herbert Samuel was scheduled to 
dismiss him. October 1925-March 1926, backed by small group of London financiers, 
in Jedda scouting possibilities of concessions in Saudi Arabia. October 1926-1956
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Jedda Representative of Sharqieh Ltd, “the Company of Explorers and Merchants in the 
Near & Middle East”, originally with London financing.. February-May 1933 assisted 
Standard Oil Company of California to obtain A1 Hasa Concession and thereafter 
retained as Local Consultant. Philby caused a sensation in London by converting in 
1930 to the strict Wahhabi Islam of Saudi Arabia. His son was Harold “Kim” Philby, 
born in the Punjab 1912-died in Moscow 1988. Kim rose to Head of anti-Soviet 
Counterespionage in British Intelligence. Exposed as a Soviet spy in 1963, Kim was one 
of the most successful double agents in history.
Rihani, Ameen F (1876-1940) Bom in Freike, Lebanon, one of six children, the eldest 
son of a Lebanese Maronite raw silk manufacturer. In 1888, Ameen, then aged 12, and 
his uncle migrated to America, the father followed a year later. In New York, he 
worked in the family trading business. In 1895 he joined a touring theatrical group and 
was stranded in Kansas City. Back in New York he attended night school for a year and 
in 1897 entered the New York Law School. Twelve months later, following a severe 
illness, he was sent to Lebanon where he taught English and studied Arabic. In 1911 he 
published his first book in English, The Book of Khalid, with illustrations by fellow 
Lebanese American, Khalil Gibran. In 1916 he married, Bertha, an American painter. 
Between 1924 and 1932 Rihani made three extensive trips through the Arabian 
Peninsula and Yemen and published three books on his observations and experiences. 
Classified as travel books, the first works on the region aimed at the general reader, the 
books were; Ihn Sa'ud o f Arabia His People and Land 1928, Around the Coasts of 
Arabia 1930 and Arabian Peak and Desert Travels in Al-Yaman 1930
Riza Khan/Riza Shah (1878-1944). Rose to Colonel through the ranks of Persian 
Cossack Brigade, joint leader of coup d’etat. 1921 Minister of War. 1923 Prime 
Minister. April 1926 proclaimed as Riza Shah of the throne of Persia. 1942 abdicated
Saleh, Mullah, of Kuwait. Personal Secretary and Secretary of the Council of State, to 
Shaikh Ahmad al Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait. Saleh was also secretary to the two previous 
Rulers of Kuwait.
Slade, Admiral Sir Edmond (1859-1928). 1907-1909 Director Intelligence Division of 
the Admiralty 1909-1913 Commander in Chief East Indies. 1913 Head of the 
Admiralty Commission appointed by Churchill to report on the operations of the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company. 1914 appointed the British Government Director of Anglo 
Persian Oil Company after the British Government bought its 51% shareholding. 1916- 
1928 Vice Chairman Anglo Persian Oil Company
Stevens, Guy (d. 1945) Assistant to the Vice President (William Wallace) Gulf 
Exploration Company New York. February 1934 became senior Gulf Oil Director to 
Kuwait Oil Company, Gulf Oil’s joint venture with Anglo Persian Oil Company
Twitchell, Karl Saben (b. 1885 in Vermont). 1908-1913 graduated the Kingston School 
of Mines (Canada), worked as surveyor and manager of gold property in Nevada, 
sampler at gold mine in Denver Colorado. 1914-1918 worked for Seeley W Mudd and 
his partner Carl Lindberg at a copper mine in Arizona then at the Skouriatissa (iron 
pyrite) Mine in Cyprus and with the Cyprus Forest Department. 1920-1925 was with a 
failed tin mine (the mine had been salted), and copper mining in Portugal. 1926-1927 
worked at three concessions in Abyssinia held by Consolidated Gold Fields of South
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Africa. 1928-1931 sent by American philanthropist Charles Crane to Yemen to report 
on mineral possibilities, Crane provided training in systems of irrigation and pumps so 
Twitchell could also advise on agricultural development using seeds provided by US 
Department of Agriculture. Crane ordered a bridge built as a permanent monument to 
American friendship. 1932-1933 sent by Charles Crane to Jedda for the purpose of 
finding water in Saudi Arabia. Reported negatively on water possibilities but was 
fascinated by ancient gold mine remains, came to believe Saudi Arabia was the site of 
King Solomon’s Mines. Returned to the US for the purpose of raising investment 
capital to develop the ancient mine of Mahad Dhahab (Cradle of Gold). 1933-1934 
contacted by Standard Oil of California while in New York, appointed negotiator (along 
with Philby) for that company in their bid to obtain Frank Holmes’ lapsed 1923 A1 Hasa 
oil concession. Obtained gold mining concession from Saudi Government, formed the 
Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate Ltd, with British and American backing. Began 
production in 1937 extracted $32 million worth of gold, silver and copper before 
closing in 1954. Wrote Saudi Arabia, with an Account o f the Development o f its Natural 
Resources, published in 1947, in which he claimed to have discovered the oil of A1 
Hasa. In his later years developed a speaking and lecturing circuit as an American 
“insider” and expert on the Middle East.
Wahba, Shaikh Hafiz, (the Shaikh is an awarded honorific title) Originally Egyptian. In 
Kuwait, was active in education and played a role in local politics. Requested to come 
to Bahrain by the progressive Shaikh Abdulla A1 Khalifa after Abdulla’s return from a 
tour of European and Arab capitals. Wahba became Headmaster of the first modem 
school in Bahrain, set up by Abdulla.. In 1921 Hafiz Wahba was deported by the 
Political Agent Bahrain allegedly for conspiracy against the Order-in-Council. He 
joined the Amiri Diwan of Abdul Aziz Bin Saud, charged particularly with instituting a 
modem education system for Bin Saud’s territories. Shaikh Hafiz Wahba was Saudi 
Arabia’s first Minister (Ambassador) to Great Britain in London. Wrote Arabian Days, 
published 1964.
Wallace, William T, Vice President in New York of Gulf Exploration Company, Gulf 
Oil Corporation’s subsidiary dealing with its Bahrain and then Kuwait interests, 
Wallace negotiated the 1927 option on Holmes/E&GSynd Bahrain oil concession
Ward, Thomas E. British bom, president and proprietor of Oilfields Equipment 
Company New York. Acted as broker in 1927 sale of option on Holmes/E&GSynd’s 
Bahrain oil concession to Gulf Oil Corporation and again in the 1928-1929 transfer of 
this concession from Gulf Oil to Standard Oil of California. Wrote Negotiations for Oil 
Concessions in Bahrain, El Hasa (Saudi Arabia), the Neutral Zone, Qatar and Kuwait. 
Privately published 1965
Williamson, William Richard also known as Hajji Abdulla Fadhil (1872-1958). From 
1885-1890 was merchant seaman, gold miner California, whaling in the Artie and 
Pacific. 1891 joined Anglo-Indian police force at Aden and converted to Islam. 1893 
transferred to Bombay. 1894 1909 trader between Basra, Kuwait other Gulf ports and 
the interior. 1909 settled in Kuwait as shipowner and pearl merchant. 1914-1919 with 
the Anglo-Indian Army in Mesopotamia. 1919 Assistant Collector of Customs at Basra. 
1924-1937 Inspector of Gulf Agencies for the Anglo Persian Oil Company, translator 
and assistant to Archibald Chisholm during negotiations for Kuwait oil concession. 
1937 retired to Basra where he remained, living as an Iraqi.
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Wilson, Sir Arnold Toynbee (1884-1941). 1908 with the Political Department of the 
Government of India. Posted to Persia to guard the Anglo Persian Oil Company, from 
the native Persians. 1912-1914 Assistant Political Officer Basra. 1915-1917 Deputy 
Chief Political Officer. 1917-1920 Acting Civil Commissioner Mesopotamia/Iraq and 
Acting Resident Persian Gulf; presided over the tragic Iraqi revolt and was removed 
from Iraq by the British Government. In 1921 he was knighted by the Government of 
India and appointed as “Sir” Arnold Wilson General Manager Persia, Mesopotamia and 
the Gulf, Strick, Scott & Co managing agents of Anglo Persian. 1922 became Resident 
Director Anglo Persian Oil Company at Abadan sharing title of joint General Manager 
with T. L Jacks. 1926 transferred to London head office of Anglo Persian as Managing 
Director D’Arcy Exploration Company. 1932 resigned from Anglo Persian. 1933-1939 
Member of Parliament. 1939 joined Royal Air Force. 1940 killed in action
Yahya, bin Hamad al Din (1868-1948) Imam (religious leader) and hereditary Ruler of 
Yemen, estimated in the 1920s to contain a population of 3 million including Sunnis, 
perhaps one million Shia Zaidis, and Jews. It was believed the Imam could raise, and 
arm, a force of more than 300,000 men. During WW1 he was neutral against the Turks 
with whom he had signed a 10 year treaty in 1911. After the war the Imam shared the 
ardent Pan Arab ideology of Sharif Husain of Mecca. The Imam Yahya was 
assassinated in 1948.
Yateem, Muhammad and Ali, of the Bahrain Yateem family, influential merchants with 
connections throughout the Gulf and in Bombay. 1922-1934 Muhammad was personal 
assistant to Frank Holmes. (Frank and Dorothy Holmes took Muhammad’s nephew, 
Husain, for education at Brighton.) After the Kuwait Oil concession was concluded, 
Shaikh Ahmad of Kuwait offered the job of Chief Local Representative, Kuwait Oil 
Company, to Muhammad Yateem. Not anxious to deal again with the Anglo Persian Oil 
Company, Yateem refused it. He returned to the family business in Bahrain.
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